Tag Archives: Jessica S. Carey

OFAC Cites the Use of U.S.-Origin Software and U.S. Network Infrastructure in Reaching a Nearly $8 Million Settlement with a Swiss Commercial Aviation Services Company

by H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Christopher D. Frey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Brad S. Karp, Rachel M. Fiorill, Karen R. King and Jacob A. Braly

On February 26, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a $7,829,640 settlement agreement with Geneva-based Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques SCRL (“SITA”), to settle its potential civil liability for 9,256 apparent violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (“GTSR”).[1] The case involved the alleged provision of commercial services and software subject to U.S. jurisdiction for the benefit of certain airline customers designated by OFAC as specially designated global terrorists (“SDGTs”) between April 2013 and February 2018.[2] Continue reading →

FinCEN Imposes Its First Penalty on a Bank Compliance Officer for $450,000 for Failing to Prevent AML Violations

by H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Christopher D. Frey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Brad S. Karp, Mark F. Mendelsohn, Richard S. Elliott, Rachel Fiorill, Karen R. King, Justin D. Lerer, Anand Sithian, and Avery Medjuck

On March 4, 2020, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued a consent order assessing a $450,000 civil money penalty against Michael LaFontaine, a former Chief Operational Risk Officer at U.S. Bank NA (“U.S. Bank”), for his alleged failure to prevent Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering (“BSA/AML”) violations that took place during his tenure.[1] This action—which follows U.S. Bank’s 2018 BSA/AML-related resolution with FinCEN, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Federal Reserve for a combined $613 million in financial penalties—marks the first time FinCEN has imposed a penalty on a bank compliance officer for his role in failing to prevent BSA/AML compliance program failures.[2] Continue reading →

Wells Fargo Reaches Resolutions with DOJ and SEC for $3 Billion, Agrees to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement

by Jessica S. Carey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Brad S. Karp, and Sofia D. Martos 

On February 21, 2020, Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiary, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, “Wells Fargo”), entered into resolutions with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) requiring Wells Fargo to pay a combined $3 billion in penalties in connection with its improper sales practices. Of this amount, $500 million would be received by the SEC for distribution to harmed investors. Specifically, Wells Fargo entered into:

  • a three-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (the “DPA”) with DOJ, in which it admitted to two criminal violations—creating false bank records and identify theft;[1]    
  • a settlement agreement with DOJ that resolves civil claims under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) based on the false bank records conduct;[2] and
  • a cease-and-desist order with the SEC[3] to settle allegations that it misled investors about the “success of its core business strategy at a time when it was opening fake accounts for unknowing customers and selling unnecessary products that went unused.”[4]

Continue reading →

DOJ Announces Revised Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Companies, Including Financial Institutions

by H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Christopher D. Frey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Brad S. Karp, Mark F. Mendelsohn, Richard S. Elliott, Karen R. King, and Anand Sithian

On December 13, the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) National Security Division (“NSD”) announced a new policy designed to encourage business organizations to make voluntary self-disclosures (“VSDs”) to the DOJ in connection with potentially willful export control and economic sanctions violations (the “Revised VSD Policy”).[1] The policy, which only applies to voluntary self-disclosures to NSD’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (“CES”), revises a 2016 DOJ policy on the same topic. As the policy notes, in the export control and sanctions context, criminal violations require proof of willfulness, defined as knowledge that the conduct violated the law.[2] Continue reading →

OFAC Takes Enforcement Action Against U.S. Parent Company for its Recently Acquired Chinese Subsidiary’s Iran Sanctions Violations

by Brad S. Karp, H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Christopher D. Frey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Richard S. Elliott, Rachel M. Fiorill, Karen R. King, Joshua R. Thompson

Enforcement Action Shows the Importance of Pre-Acquisition Sanctions Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Sanctions Compliance Enhancements

On March 27, 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a $1,869,144 settlement agreement with Connecticut-based Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. (“Stanley Black & Decker”), a manufacturer of industrial tools and household hardware, regarding 23 apparent violations of OFAC’s Iran sanctions regulations.[1] OFAC determined that Stanley Black & Decker’s Chinese subsidiary, Jiangsu Guoqiang Tools Co. Ltd. (“GQ”), knowingly provided power tools and spare parts to Iranian end-users.[2] According to OFAC, GQ’s shipments were made via third-party intermediaries, located in the United Arab Emirates and China, with the knowledge that the products were ultimately destined for Iran.[3]  Under U.S. law, non-U.S. companies owned or controlled by U.S. companies are required to adhere to Iran sanctions as if they were U.S. persons.  The settlement,  along with the Kollmorgen Corporation (“Kollmorgen”) settlement in February 2019, signals the Trump Administration’s willingness to hold U.S. parent companies liable for their subsidiaries’ Iran sanctions violations, which is an area that, prior to this year, had seen little enforcement activity to date. Continue reading →

Economic Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Developments: 2018 Year in Review

by Brad S. Karp, Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Michael E. Gertzman , Roberto J. Gonzalez, Richard S. Elliott, Rachel M. Fiorill, and Karen R. King.

Executive Summary

This memorandum surveys economic sanctions and anti-money laundering (“AML”) developments and trends in 2018 and provides an outlook for the year ahead. These areas remained a high priority last year, with the Trump administration making major changes in U.S. sanctions policy and federal and state agencies imposing over $2.7 billion in penalties for sanctions/AML violations. We also provide some thoughts concerning compliance and risk mitigation in this challenging environment.

After a period of relative quiet on the sanctions enforcement front, the last months of 2018 saw a $1.3 billion multi-agency resolution with Société Générale S.A., a burst of enforcement actions by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls (“OFAC”), and Treasury Under Secretary Sigal Mandelker’s announcement that OFAC will soon publish guidance on the “hallmarks of an effective sanctions compliance program” and incorporate these principles in future settlements. Last year also witnessed significant and constant changes to the sanctions policy landscape. In a dramatic break from the Obama administration’s policy towards Iran, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) in May 2018, and fully revoked JCPOA-era sanctions relief by November 2018, creating new sanctions risks for U.S. and non-U.S. companies across industries, generating conflict-of-law issues, and straining relations with U.S. allies.  The administration also took a number of significant actions with respect to Russia/Ukraine sanctions, including designating a number of Russian “oligarchs” and their global companies and taking further steps to implement the Russian secondary sanctions regime enacted by Congress in the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”).  The administration also imposed several new sanctions against the Maduro regime in Venezuela (and recently sanctioned Venezuela’s national oil company), continued its campaign of “maximum pressure” on North Korea, implemented Global Magnitsky Act sanctions targeting human rights abuses and corruption worldwide, and established new sanctions programs targeting the Nicaraguan regime and non-U.S. interference in U.S. elections. Continue reading →

Court Upholds SEC Authority and Finds Broker-Dealer Liable for Thousands of Suspicious Activity Reporting Violations

by H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, David S. Huntington, Brad S. Karp, Raphael M. Russo, Richard S. Elliott, Rachel M. Fiorill, Karen R. King, Anand Sithian, and Katherine S. Stewart

Decision Provides Rare Judicial Guidance on SAR Filing Requirements

On December 11, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) obtained a victory in its enforcement action against Alpine Securities Corporation, a broker that cleared transactions for microcap securities that were allegedly used in manipulative schemes to harm investors.[1] Judge Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a 100-page opinion partially granting the SEC’s motion for summary judgment and finding Alpine liable for thousands of violations of its obligation to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).[2]

Because most SAR-related enforcement actions are resolved without litigation, this decision is a rare instance of a court’s detailed examination of SAR filing requirements.  The decision began by rejecting—for a second time[3]—Alpine’s argument that the SEC lacks authority to pursue SAR violations.  The court then engaged in a number of line-drawing exercises, finding that various pieces of information, as a matter of law, triggered Alpine’s SAR filing obligations and should have been included in the SAR narratives.  This mode of analysis, which applies the SAR rules under the traditional summary judgment standard, may appear to contrast with regulatory guidance recognizing that SARs involve subjective, discretionary judgments.[4]

Although the decision has particular relevance in the microcap context, all broker-dealers—and potentially other entities subject to SAR filing requirements—may wish to review the court’s reasoning for insight on a number of SAR issues, including the adequacy of SAR narratives and the inclusion of “red flag” information. Among other cautions, the decision illustrates the dangers of relying on SAR “template narratives”[5] that lack adequate detail.

More broadly, the SEC’s action against Alpine is another indicator of heightened federal interest in ensuring broker-dealer compliance with Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requirements. For example, last month the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York brought the first-ever criminal BSA charge against a broker-dealer, noting that this charge “makes clear that all actors governed by the Bank Secrecy Act—not only banks—must uphold their obligations.”[6] Continue reading →

Preparing for an Uptick in Congressional Investigations of Corporations

by Susanna M. Buergel, H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Udi Grofman, Jeh Charles Johnson, Jonathan S. Kanter, Brad S. Karp, Mark F. Mendelsohn, and Alex Young K. Oh

Beginning next month, Democrats will control the House of Representatives for the first time since 2010.  Given the pent-up demand for House Democrats to make robust use of their oversight and investigative authorities, the current relative lull in congressional investigations of corporations is expected to end.  Corporations across sectors should anticipate an uptick in investigative activity. 

In addition to holding the majority for the first time in nearly a decade, this will be the first time that Democrats control the House since a 2015 rule change that empowered a number of committee chairs to subpoena witnesses or documents unilaterally.  The chairs of the following committees, among others, have this authority: Energy and Commerce; Financial Services; Intelligence; Judiciary; Natural Resources; and  Oversight and Government Reform.[1] Continue reading →

OFAC Reaches Settlement with Cobham Holdings, Inc. for Violations Resulting from Deficient Screening Software

by H. Christopher Boehning, Jessica S. Carey, Michael E. Gertzman, Roberto J. Gonzalez, Brad S. Karp, Richard S. Elliott, Rachel M. Fiorill, and Karen R. King

On November 27, 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a nearly $90,000 settlement agreement with Virginia-based Cobham Holdings, Inc. (“Cobham”), a global provider of technology and services in aviation, electronics, communications, and defense, on behalf of its former subsidiary, Aeroflex/Metelics, Inc. (“Metelics”).[1] The settlement involves three shipments of goods through distributors in Canada and Russia to an entity that did not appear on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”), but was blocked under OFAC’s “50% rule” because it was 51% owned by a company sanctioned under the Russia/Ukraine sanctions program. This is the second OFAC action of which we are aware that has relied on the 50% rule.  The apparent violations appear to have been caused by Metelics’s (and Cobham’s) reliance on deficient third-party screening software.

While difficult to predict, OFAC’s decision to pursue this action—involving only three shipments, a violation of the 50 percent rule, and where the root cause of the apparent violations is attributable to deficient sanctions screening software—may signal a raising of OFAC’s compliance expectations, consistent with Treasury Under Secretary Sigal Mandelker’s warning in a recent speech that private sector companies “must do more to make sure [their] compliance systems are airtight.”[2]

Below, we describe the settlement, OFAC’s penalty calculation, and several lessons learned. Continue reading →

Supreme Court Rules That Costs of Internal Investigation Are Not Recoverable As Restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996

by Jessica S. Carey, Roberto Finzi, Michele Hirshman, Lorin L. Reisner, Richard C. Tarlowe, Christopher D. Frey, Nairuby L. Beckles, and David Giller

On May 29, 2018, in Lagos v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (the “MVRA”)[1] does not require a criminal defendant to pay the costs and attorneys’ fees associated with an internal investigation conducted by a corporate victim.[2] The Court left open the question of whether the MVRA extends to the costs of an internal investigation that is conducted at the government’s request or invitation. Continue reading →