Category Archives: Enforcement Policy

National Bank Supervision Manual

by Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

OCC’s New and Revised Sections of Policies and Procedures Manual Relating to Enforcement Actions Suggest Continued Heightened Interest in Actions Against Individuals

Summary

Historically, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) has applied a single set of internal policies and procedures to enforcement actions brought against individuals (institution-affiliated parties (“IAPs”)) and institutions (national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks (collectively, “banks”)).  On November 13, the OCC issued a new section to its Policies and Procedures Manual (“PPM”) specific to enforcement actions against IAPs (the “IAP PPM”)[1] and simultaneously updated the existing sections for Bank Enforcement Actions and Related Matters (the “Bank PPM”)[2] and for Civil Money Penalties (“CMPs”) (the “CMP PPM”).[3]  The new IAP PPM generally breaks no new ground, and most changes to the Bank PPM and CMP PPM align those two sections with, and reflect the issuance of, the IAP PPM.  There are, however, several notable additions and modifications to the new and revised sections that serve to improve the clarity and transparency of the OCC’s enforcement action process. 

Beyond those distinctions, the issuance of a standalone IAP PPM suggests a continued, if not increased, focus by the OCC on actions against IAPs going forward, and is consistent with the broader theme, evidenced over the last several years, of regulatory and law enforcement focus on holding individuals accountable in cases of financial institution wrongdoing.[4]  The new OCC IAP PPM suggests a continual focus on holding individuals accountable for corporate misconduct in the financial industry. Continue reading

France Boosts Tax Fraud Prosecution

by Antoine F. Kirry, Frederick T. Davis, Eric Bérengier, Alexandre Bisch, Robin Lööf, Aymeric D. Dumoulin, Alice Stosskopf, Fanny Gauthier, and Line Chataud

On October 23, 2018, the French Parliament enacted a law aimed at combatting fraud (the “Law”).[1] The most innovative provisions of the Law change key procedural aspects of tax law enforcement, which is likely to result in an increased number of criminal tax fraud prosecutions against both individuals and legal entities. The Law also addresses customs and social security frauds.

Tax Fraud Prosecution: Open the Floodgates Continue reading

Getting Comfortable with Collective Knowledge

by Mihailis E. Diamantis

Doctrines for attributing knowledge to corporations seem to be stuck between doing far too little and the risk of doing far too much.  Respondeat superior forces plaintiffs and prosecutors to find a single corporate employee with all the relevant knowledge.[1]  This means corporations automatically win against knowledge-based allegations when, as will predictably happen, knowledge is dispersed across corporate personnel.  The familiar solution is to introduce some way to aggregate knowledge.  But the doctrine that does just that—the collective knowledge doctrine—has met with widespread skepticism.[2]  The worry is that the collective knowledge doctrine treats corporations as knowing too much by triggering knowledge-based penalties for mere negligence in maintaining lines of communication.[3]  As a result, few courts have adopted the collective knowledge doctrine since it was introduced more than thirty years ago.[4]

If judges and scholars are ever going to get comfortable with moving beyond respondeat superior, they need to think hard about the informational logic of the collective knowledge doctrine.  As I argue in a working paper, The Corporation and the Epistemologist,[5] that logic is poorly understood.  Discussions vacillate without warning between two versions of the doctrine: one of which is entirely toothless, the other of which is worryingly permissive.  Once these two versions are distinguished, the search for a happy compromise can begin. Continue reading

What’s in a Name? That Which We Now Call the Justice Manual Has a Familiar, But Distinctive, Scent

by Katya Jestin, David Bitkower, Matthew D. Cipolla, Anne Cortina Perry, and Jessica A. Martinez

On September 25, 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced the rollout of the “Justice Manual” – a revised and renamed version of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, a long-used reference for Department of Justice (DOJ) policies and procedures.[1] The most significant changes appear to be confined to anticipated codifications of well-publicized new policies (although one such policy was, puzzlingly, omitted). But some other changes have not been previously addressed by Department leadership, and may provide insight into the Department’s mindset in light of recent events.

The recent rollout was the culmination of a yearlong review and overhaul of the Manual, the first in more than 20 years.[2] This initiative to streamline DOJ policies and revamp the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual was announced by Deputy AG Rosenstein last October in a speech at NYU. Rosenstein explained in his initial announcement that the project would work to identify redundancies, clarify ambiguities, eliminate surplus language, and update the Manual to reflect current law and DOJ practice, including through the incorporation of outstanding policy memoranda.[3] According to DOJ’s recent announcement, the name change from “U.S. Attorneys’ Manual” to “Justice Manual” not only reflects this significant undertaking by DOJ employees, but also emphasizes the applicability of the Manual to the entire Department, beyond the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.[4] Continue reading

Director of the Serious Fraud Office Lisa Osofsky Keynote on Future SFO Enforcement

by Lisa Osofsky

Thank you.

I have just completed my first month as Director of the Serious Fraud Office.

As a new director, I have spent my first weeks meeting the talented and hardworking SFO team – from lawyers to investigators to accountants to computer experts to the administrative team who are the backbone of every government agency all around the globe.   I have come to an office with strong values and a commitment to justice, a dedication for searching for the truth.  Continue reading

DOJ Extends FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Principles to Non-FCPA Misconduct Discovered in the M&A Context

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, David B. Anders, Marshall L. Miller, and Daniel H. Rosenblum

In an important speech, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division announced on Thursday that DOJ will “look to” the principles of the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (PDF: 50.6 KB) in evaluating “other types of potential wrongdoing, not just FCPA violations” that are uncovered in connection with mergers and acquisitions.  As a result, when an acquiring company identifies misconduct through pre-transaction due diligence or post-transaction integration, and then self-reports the relevant conduct, DOJ is now more likely to decline to prosecute if the company fully cooperates, remediates in a complete and timely fashion, and disgorges any ill-gotten gains. Continue reading

New York Office Of The Attorney General Publishes Report On Virtual Currency Platforms And Their Potential Risks

by Arthur S. Long, Carl E. Kennedy, and Jeffrey L. Steiner

This post reviews the New York State Office of the Attorney General’s (the “OAG”) Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report (the “Report”), which was published on September 18, 2018.[1]  The publication of the OAG’s 42-page Report brings to a close its six-month fact-finding inquiry of several virtual currency platforms.[2]  The OAG sent out detailed letters and questionnaires to a number of virtual currency platforms seeking information from the platforms across a wide-range of issues, including trading operations, fees charged to customers, the existence of robust policies and procedures, and the use of risk controls.  Continue reading

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner Announces that FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Will Apply to Mergers and Acquisitions

by Nicolas Bourtin, Theodore Edelman, Sergio Galvis, Aisling O’Shea and Nathaniel Green

During a speech delivered on July 25, 2018 at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner, who oversees the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Fraud Section (which includes the DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) Unit), announced that successor companies that identify potential FCPA violations in connection with a merger or acquisition and disclose that conduct to the DOJ will be treated in conformance with the DOJ’s FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (the “Policy”).  Continue reading

The Post-Lucia Executive Order on ALJs

by Daniel Walfish

Last week, the White House, reacting to the Supreme Court’s June 21, 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC, issued an Executive Order exempting Administrative Law Judges, or ALJs, from the competitive civil service. This post considers what the order might mean for the Securities and Exchange Commission and other agencies that use ALJs to adjudicate enforcement cases. Lucia held that the SEC’s ALJs are “officers” subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which means they have to be appointed by (as relevant here) the head of the agency – that is, the SEC’s Commissioners. Previously ALJs were hired through an examination-based process handled by the Office of Personnel Management, or OPM (effectively the human resources department of the federal government). OPM typically presented an agency with a list of eligible candidates ranked on the basis of the examination, among other things, and the agency selected an ALJ from among the top three candidates on the list. Continue reading

To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Analyzing the Consequences of Voluntary Self-Disclosure for Financial Institutions

by F. Joseph Warin, M. Kendall Day, Stephanie L. Brooker, Adam M. Smith, Linda Noonan, Elissa N. Baur, Stephanie L. Connor, Alexander R. Moss, and Jaclyn M. Neely.

One of the most frequently discussed white collar issues of late has been the benefits of voluntarily self-disclosing to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) allegations of misconduct involving a corporation.  This is the beginning of periodic analyses of white collar issues unique to financial institutions, and in this issue we examine whether and to what extent a financial institution can expect a benefit from DOJ for a voluntary self-disclosure (“VSD”), especially with regard to money laundering or Bank Secrecy Act violations.  Although the public discourse regarding VSDs tends to suggest that there are benefits to be gained, a close examination of the issue specifically with respect to financial institutions shows that the benefits that will confer in this area, if any, are neither easy to anticipate nor to quantify.  A full consideration of whether to make a VSD to DOJ should include a host of factors beyond the quantifiable benefit, ranging from the likelihood of independent enforcer discovery; to the severity, duration, and evidentiary support for a potential violation; and to the expectations of prudential regulators and any associated licensing or regulatory consequences, as well as other factors.  Continue reading