Category Archives: Enforcement

English High Court Considers Status of Internal Investigation Interview Notes

by Karolos Seeger, Andrew Lee, and Robin Lööf

In R (AL) v Serious Fraud Office,[1] the English High Court considered the SFO’s obligations to individuals prosecuted following the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) in July 2016 with a company anonymised as “XYZ Ltd”. The Court’s decision is likely to force the SFO to adopt a much more aggressive approach in relation to company counsel’s notes of interviews conducted during a company’s internal investigation. In particular, when those interview notes are potentially relevant to the defences of individuals being prosecuted, this judgment is likely to lead to the SFO putting further pressure on companies to produce the notes, through court proceedings if necessary. We analyse these and other issues covered by the judgment below. Continue reading

NIST Releases an Updated Version of its Cybersecurity Framework

by Sabastian V. NilesMarshall L. Miller, and Jeohn Salone Favors

Last week, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released an updated Cybersecurity Framework that revises NIST’s baseline recommendations for the design of cybersecurity risk management programs.  In announcing its release, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross described the updated Framework as “a must do for all CEOs” and recommended that “every company” adopt the Framework as its “first line of defense.”  As with the prior version, the updated NIST Framework provides a useful tool to guide and benchmark company approaches to cybersecurity risk and will impact how regulators evaluate cybersecurity programs and incident responses across sectors. Continue reading

Singapore Introduces Deferred Prosecution Agreements

by Zachary S. Brez, Brigham Q. Cannon, Mark Filip, Asheesh Goel, Cori A. Lable, Kim B. Nemirow, Abdus Samad Pardesi, Richard Sharpe, William J. Stuckwisch, Marcus Thompson, Satnam Tumani, and Jodi Wu

On 19 March 2018, Singapore passed legislation introducing the concept of the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) to the jurisdiction for the first time. Under the new laws, corporations (but not individuals) facing prosecution for offences of corruption, money laundering or receipt of stolen property may attempt to negotiate the terms of a DPA with prosecuting authorities, under which they would avoid prosecution, in return for adherence to various conditions imposed upon them, for a set period of time.

By introducing the DPA as an enforcement tool, Singapore joins the ranks of the United States[1], Brazil[2], the United Kingdom[3] and France,[4] which form the vanguard of an increasingly consistent global approach to corporate criminal resolutions. Australia and Canada are also both currently evaluating whether to introduce similar legislation. Continue reading

The Jury is Out on Compliance in the First Test of the Bribery Act’s Adequate Procedures Defence

by Omar Qureshi, Iskander Fernandez, and Amy Wilkinson

Last month saw the first contested prosecution of a corporation for failure to prevent bribery under section 7 of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 (the “Bribery Act”), providing the first insights into how such a case may be argued and determined.  The defendant company Skansen Interiors Limited (“SIL”) was found guilty of failing to prevent bribery by one of its employees, who paid £10,000 (and offered, and tried to secure payment of a further £29,000) to another in order to secure two contracts for SIL.  The individuals involved had already pleaded guilty to substantive bribery offences.

A jury found SIL did not have adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery.  While the judge did not give her views on what may constitute adequate procedures and why SIL’s fell short, the jury’s verdict indicates that even small companies may need to have documented and targeted procedures in place, specifically addressing bribery prevention, if they are to succeed in proving an adequate procedures defence. Continue reading

First French DPAs for Corruption Offences

by Antoine Kirry, Karolos Seeger, Alex Parker, Alexandre Bisch, and Robin Lööf

On March 5, 2018, French prosecutors published two Judicial Conventions of Public Interest (“CJIPs” or “French DPAs”) approved by the President of the High Court of Nanterre on February 23. The CJIPs, entered into between prosecutors and two sub-contractors to state-owned utility EDF, SAS Kaefer Wanner (“KW”) and SAS SET Environnement (“SET”), allege that these companies had ceded to solicitations to pay bribes to an EDF procurement manager, and that this behaviour amounted to corruption by them of an individual charged with a public service. KW and SET admitted these facts and their legal qualification[1], and agreed to pay financial penalties of €2,710,000 and €800,000 respectively and compensation to EDF of €30,000 each. In addition, they agreed to submit to monitoring by the French Anti-corruption Agency (“AFA”) for, respectively, 18 and 24 months.

The KW and SET CJIPs are the first to be concluded in respect of corruption offences. Helpfully, they provide (1) detail on the financial incentive of entering into a French DPA for companies with potential exposure for corruption-related offences in France, (2) clarification that co-operation and remediation can significantly reduce the financial penalty, as well as (3) the first examples of monitorships to be supervised by the AFA. However, the crucial question of how a company can qualify for a French DPA remains largely unanswered. Continue reading

The New DOJ FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Highlights the Continued Importance of Anti-Corruption Compliance

by Lisa Vicens, Jonathan Kolodner, and Eric Boettcher

In a significant development for companies relating to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in late November the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a new FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (the Enforcement Policy).

The Enforcement Policy[1] is designed to encourage companies to voluntarily disclose misconduct by providing greater transparency concerning the amount of credit the DOJ will give to companies that self-report, fully cooperate and appropriately remediate misconduct. Notably, in announcing the Enforcement Policy, the DOJ highlighted the continued critical role that anti-corruption compliance programs play in its evaluation of eligibility under the Enforcement Policy. Continue reading

White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What to Expect in 2018

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, Wayne M. Carlin, David B. Anders, Jonathan M. Moses, Marshall L. Miller, Louis J. Barash, and Carol Miller

Introduction

In our memo last year, we acknowledged that it was close to impossible to predict the likely impact that the newly elected Trump administration would have on white-collar and regulatory enforcement.  (White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What to Expect in 2017)  Instead, we set out a list of initiatives we urged the new administration to consider, including clarifying standards for when cooperation credit would be given, reducing the use of monitors, and giving greater weight to a company’s pre-existing compliance program when exercising prosecutorial discretion, among other suggestions.  While the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions has, for example, taken some steps toward clarifying the applicable standards for cooperation and increasing incentives to disclose misconduct in the FCPA area, few other policy choices or shifts in approach have been articulated or implemented.  Continue reading

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari on the Constitutionality of SEC ALJ Appointments– What This Means for the Securities Industry

by Matthew C. Solomon, Alexander Janghorbani, and Richard R. Cipolla

On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, No. 17 130,[1] a case raising a key constitutional issue relating to the manner in which the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) appoints its administrative law judges (ALJs).  The Court will decide “[w]hether administrative law judges of the [SEC] are Officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.”  The answer to this question matters because if SEC ALJs are “officers,” then they should have been appointed by the Commission itself instead of hired through traditional government channels—and the Commission only exercised its ALJ appointment authority in late-2017.  Although the question is limited to SEC ALJs, any decision could also impact ALJs at other agencies government-wide.

At this point, both the petitioner and the Solicitor General (SG) actually agree that ALJs are officers.  In its response to the cert petition raising this issue in Lucia, the SG, in an about-face, had abandoned the SEC’s long-held defense of the manner in which it appoints its ALJs.  Up until now, in an attempt to fend off an asserted constitutional defect in their AJL’s method of appointment, the SEC has argued (with SG approval) that ALJs are “mere employees” of the SEC, and not “officers.”  The day after the SG dropped this position—and with no warning in its briefing—the Commission took the step to appoint the current ALJs.[2]   Continue reading

Global Anti-Bribery Year-in-Review: 2017 Developments and Predictions for 2018

by Kimberly A. Parker, Jay Holtmeier, Erin G.H. Sloane, Lillian Howard Potter, Tetyana V. Gaponenko, Victoria J. Lee, and Roger M. Witten

This past year marked the 40th anniversary of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).  Since its enactment in 1977, the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) has brought approximately 300 FCPA enforcement actions, while the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has brought approximately 200 cases.[1]  This anniversary year, the first year of the Trump administration, demonstrated that the FCPA continues to be a powerful tool in combating corruption abroad and encouraging compliance at global companies.

Below are six key take-aways regarding FCPA enforcement in 2017: Continue reading

American Law Enforcement’s Focus on Cooperation and Self-Reporting

by Lee S. Richards

From recent experience in cross-border investigations (especially the Libor investigation in the United States and the United Kingdom), it has become apparent that many of our colleagues overseas in private practice are bewildered by the propensity of American white collar defense lawyers to rush into the Government to disgorge the product of their internal investigations when representing companies.  Self-reporting in the United States is now a prerequisite to obtaining full cooperation credit and the mitigation of punishment that goes along with it.  See, for example, the recent pronouncements about cooperation by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and by James McDonald, Director of Enforcement at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.[1]

European law enforcement is not premised on the notion that the only clear way to obtain leniency for a business organization is to cooperate, or, indeed, to turn the company in.  For many private lawyers in other countries the imperative to cooperate simply does not compute. Continue reading