Tag Archives: Lee G. Dunst

DOJ’s Expectations for Voluntary Disclosure and Cooperation: In Loco Parentis for Corporations?

by Lee G. Dunst

We are now almost one year in since the DOJ announced with much fanfare its repackaged approach to corporate cooperation in the Yates memo in September 2015, followed months later with the much-ballyhooed release of the FCPA Pilot Program in April 2016.  These highly publicized pronouncements reinforced the perception of DOJ’s focus on proactive corporate cooperation and voluntary disclosure with the enticement of the alleged benefits for companies.  At the same time, DOJ clearly has been engaged in a deliberate effort to tout the apparent benefits of corporate cooperation with its very public announcements in spring/summer 2016 of declinations of prosecutions in some circumstances (for example, Akamai, Johnson Controls and Nortek) and reduced penalties in other cases (such as Analogic/BK Medical), citing voluntary disclosures and cooperation as one of the primary reasons for leniency.  Continue reading