Tag Archives: Kevin S. Schwartz

White-Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What Mattered in 2022 and What to Expect in 2023

by John F. Savarese, David B. Anders, Ralph M. Levene, Sarah K. Eddy, Wayne M. Carlin, and Kevin S. Schwartz

(Photos courtesy of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) From left to right: John F. Savarese, David B. Anders, Ralph M. Levene, Sarah K. Eddy, Wayne M. Carlin, Kevin S. Schwartz.

Introduction

Each year we try in this wrap-up memo to flag the main enforcement developments that companies should be alert to in the coming year and also to identify steps companies should be taking to prepare themselves in the event of a significant white-collar or regulatory enforcement inquiry. Because policy preferences (and politics) often shape these developments, the early days of any new administration in D.C. are frequently harder to read, and teasing apart mere rhetoric from concrete changes in enforcement priorities can be challenging. But now, two years into the Biden administration, we can see some clear themes emerging: Penalties are up—way up; investigations appear to be moving a bit faster; cryptoassets and cybersecurity have become heightened risk areas; government expectations for what constitutes full cooperation have been amped up; and many new disclosure demands across a wide range of corporate activities are coming on line. At the same time, however, several time-tested verities remain firmly in place, including the need to maintain strong internal accounting controls, provide comprehensive (and frequent) training, instill a genuinely ethics-oriented tone at the top, stay vigilant in detecting internal misconduct, and react swiftly in the event problems do arise by self-remediating and self-reporting when appropriate. A company that positions itself in this way optimizes its chances not only of securing the best possible resolution in the event of criminal or civil charges but also of forcefully resisting enforcement action where warranted.

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Understanding the Role of ESG and Stakeholder Governance Within the Framework of Fiduciary Duties

by Martin Lipton, Adam O. Emmerich, Kevin S. Schwartz, Sabastian V. Niles, and Anna M. D’Ginto.

Over the past decade, investors, companies, and commentators have increasingly accepted and adopted stakeholder governance as the way to pursue the proper purpose of the corporation and have embraced consideration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in corporate decision-making toward that end. But an emerging movement opposed to any consideration, at all, of ESG factors threatens to erase the gains that have been made over the past ten years and revert to the outdated view that the purpose of a company is solely to maximize short-term shareholder profits.

This debate is playing out very publicly, with politicians at the highest levels of state and federal government publicly staking out positions on ESG and the extent to which it should (or should not) be considered by asset managers; through regulation and law; and in boardrooms across the country and around the world. At one extreme, critics of ESG are dismissing any consideration of the long-term impact of environmental or social risk on a company as “woke” capitalism, to be condemned, if not outlawed. (See Bloomberg, Populist House Republicans Picking a Fight With US Business Over ‘Woke Capitalism’ (Nov. 27, 2022).) At the same time, attacks from the other end of the spectrum condemn board consideration of ESG in a stakeholder governance model as insufficiently prescriptive. Yet neither view, attempting to politicize the role of companies and their boards, grapples adequately with the real meaning of ESG and stakeholder governance and the role of these concepts in the decision-making process of corporate boards and management.
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Initial Observations on the FTX Debacle

by Kevin S. Schwartz, Rosemary Spaziani, David M. Adlerstein, and Samantha M. Altschuler.

The dust has not yet settled from the remarkable fall to earth of cryptoasset exchange FTX, associated hedge fund Alameda, and their Icarus-like founder, as revelations and conjecture continue to be disseminated at least daily about what happened and the collateral damage. While there are sure to be many important lessons from this situation as the facts and their effects become clear, some initial observations bear mentioning:
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SEC Civil Insider Trading Case Has Broader Repercussions for Cryptoasset Market

by Kevin S. Schwartz, Rosemary Spaziani, David M. Adlerstein, David E. Kirk, and I. Andrew Mun.

On July 21st, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York criminally charged three individuals, including a former employee of the cryptoasset exchange Coinbase, with wire fraud in connection with alleged trading of particular cryptoassets ahead of Coinbase’s public announcement that it would make a market in them. In a parallel action, the SEC brought civil insider trading charges against the same individuals, asserting that their trades violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The criminal action itself is notable as the first insider trading case involving cryptocurrency markets, but it does not address the legal status of the traded cryptoassets. The SEC’s civil action, however, expressly asserts that at least nine of the cryptoassets at issue are securities that are subject to the federal securities laws.
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