Tag Archives: Kevin E. Davis

U.S. Authorities Charge Adani Defendants with Integrity Washing

by Kevin E. Davis

Photo of the author

Photo courtesy of NYU

Gautam Adani is the founder of one of India’s largest conglomerates and ranks among the country’s prominent business people. He and his nephew Sagar Adani are learning the hard way that, in the U.S. legal system, the coverup can be treated just about as severely as the crime.

The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have accused the Adani defendants of collaborating with executives of a U.S.-listed Mauritian company called Azure Power Global Ltd. in a massive bribery scheme. The conspirators allegedly paid over USD 250 million in bribes to officials in the governments of several Indian states. The bribes were to induce the officials to purchase power that would be supplied by Adani Green Energy Ltd., an Indian company controlled by the Adani defendants, as well Azure. 

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The Second Circuit’s Decision in Hoskins and a Possible Legislative Response

Does the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”) empower the U.S. to prosecute an individual for foreign bribery if the bribes benefit a U.S. firm but the person is a foreign national employed by a foreign entity who does nothing in the furtherance of the crime while in U.S. territory? That was the central question in U.S. v. Hoskins, an appeal recently decided by the Second Circuit (Hoskins II). Cases like this will often turn on whether the individual qualifies as an “agent” of the U.S. firm, which can be a difficult question. The objectives of anti-bribery law would be better served if the statute were amended to focus on other factors. 

The Second Circuit’s decision arose from the prosecution of Lawrence Hoskins, a U.K. national employed by the U.K. subsidiary of Alstom S.A., a multinational company headquartered in France, between 2001 and 2004. Hoskins was assigned to work in Alstom’s French subsidiary in a department charged with supporting other units of the organization. His formal responsibilities included oversight of operational units’ selection of third party consultants and approval of key commercial terms of those consultants’ engagements  In a 2013 indictment the U.S. government alleged that Hoskins helped employees of other Alstom subsidiaries, including a U.S. subsidiary we can refer to simply as API, engage local consultants to pay bribes to obtain a contract to build a power plant in Indonesia. The indictment included substantive FCPA and money laundering charges as well as related conspiracy charges. The central question was whether the FCPA covered Mr. Hoskins’s activities. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to 1) issuers of securities registered in the U.S., 2) “domestic concerns” (basically, U.S. firms, nationals or residents) that are not issuers, 3) people other than issuers or domestic concerns who engage in prohibited activity while in U.S. territory, and 4) officers, directors, employees, agents and, in certain cases, shareholders of the first three types of actors. A foreign individual who does not commit any relevant act in U.S. territory is only covered under the fourth category. However, the U.S. Department of Justice has long taken the position that such individuals can also be prosecuted for conspiring to violate or aiding and abetting a violation of the FCPA. Continue reading

What Does the OECD Know About Organizational Liability?

by Kevin E. Davis

The OECD Working Group on Bribery – the group responsible for monitoring implementation of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention – has just closed a request for comments on the topic of liability of legal persons for foreign bribery. I submitted a comment, and I hope that others did as well, but I am afraid that instead of focusing on the issues I was asked to comment on I focused on my worries about the overall purpose of the exercise.

There is no question that the issues raised by the OECD are important. Imagine if the U.S. legal system did not have corporate criminal liability, how would it affect the scope and the intensity of corporate compliance? Would we still have compliance officers reporting directly to the board, supplier agreements replete with anti-corruption reps and warranties, and multi-million dollar internal investigations? Consider the potential effects of even a modest reform, such as treating the existence of an effective compliance program as a complete defense. Or, moving in the opposite direction, what if firms convicted of foreign bribery were automatically disbarred from all government contracts? Continue reading