by Jonathan Rusch
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a variety of Western governments, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU), have imposed an ever-increasing array of sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior members of his government, state-owned enterprises, and numerous oligarchs.[1]
In the first several weeks of the war, a number of commentators were dubious about the sanctions’ effectiveness. For example, not even three weeks after the invasion, two economic analysts concluded, without citing specific data, that “there is not the slightest evidence that Moscow will change course and ‘rehabilitate’ itself in the eyes of the West.”[2]
As the war has continued through the summer, other commentators have been concluding, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, that the sanctions are effective. Their observations range from the reserved (i.e., “the sanctions [are] starting to bite”[3]) to the triumphal (i.e., the sanctions “are hitting Vladimir Putin and his accomplices hard”[4]). But these commentaries, too, generally lack specific and detailed empirical analysis. In fairness, it should be noted that – as University of Michigan Professor Paolo Pasquariello has written – “assessing the effect of sanctions . . . on the desired outcome is challenging for any social scientist”, especially in the absence of a counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened in Ukraine if sanctions had not been imposed on Russia).[5]