Tag Archives: Gregory J. Lyons

CFPB’s Report on Buy Now, Pay Later

by Courtney M. Dankworth, Alexandra N. Mogul, Gregory J. Lyons, Courtney Bradford Pike, Zila Reyes Acosta-Grimes, and Jehan A. Patterson

On Thursday, September 16, 2022, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or the “Bureau”) published a report (the “Report”) detailing the regulatory risks of Buy Now, Pay Later (“BNPL”) products in response to last December’s market monitoring orders to five BNPL companies.

BNPL generally refers to a credit product offered by a third-party institution that enables consumers to split the payment for a retail transaction into four equal installments: the first payment is a down payment due at checkout, and the remaining payments are made in two-week intervals over the next six weeks. BNPL lenders do not charge interest; rather, they incur revenue in the form of late fees and, in some instances, transaction fees.

This blog post first provides a brief overview of some of the unique qualities of the BNPL industry, which has been experiencing significant growth over the past few years. It then outlines the key risks to consumers posed by the BNPL industry as highlighted in the Report as well as the Bureau’s stated next steps for increasing its oversight of the industry. At least in the near term, it appears that the Bureau intends to exercise its jurisdiction over BNPL lenders through supervisory examinations and the issuance of interpretive rules or similar guidance to provide consumers with protections similar to those in the traditional credit card space. This blog post outlines steps that BNPL lenders may wish to consider taking to mitigate the potential risks to consumers that the Report identifies.

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Insulated No More: The Seila Decision and the End of the Independent CFPB Director

by Courtney M. Dankworth, Mary Beth Hogan, Gregory J. Lyons, Erol Gulay, David Imamura, Alexandra N. Mogul, and Victoria L. Recalde

On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, finding unconstitutional the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “CFPB” or “Bureau”) leadership structure in which a single director is removable by the President only for cause. This “for cause” limitation on the President’s removal powers by the authors of Dodd-Frank made the CFPB leader more independent than the leaders of other executive agencies. In addition, given the CFPB Director’s five year term, a CFPB Director appointed by one President could remain in office well into the tenure of the next.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Seila eliminates this “for cause” protection, ending the CFPB’s insulated political status and opening up the CFPB to leadership change when a new President takes office. This decision will have a narrow immediate impact, since the CFPB is currently headed by an appointee of President Trump, but will have greater meaning if former Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidency in the fall. More generally, the decision will lead to a CFPB that is more closely aligned with the political priorities of whichever administration is in power.

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