by Anat Carmy-Wiechman and Giovanni Patti
Left to right: Anat Carmy-Wiechman and Giovanni Patti (Photos courtesy of authors)
In a new report, the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings.
by Anat Carmy-Wiechman and Giovanni Patti
From left to right: Anat Carmy-Wiechman and Giovanni Patti (Photos courtesy of authors)
In a new report, the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings.
by Anat Carmy-Wiechman, Giovanni Patti, Peter Robau
In a new report, the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings.
by Anat Carmy-Wiechman, Giovanni Patti, and Peter Robau
In a new report (PDF: 0.99 MB), the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings. Continue reading
by Giovanni Patti and Peter Robau
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission settles the overwhelming majority of its enforcement actions, most with consent decrees where the defendant “neither admits nor denies” wrongdoing.[1] The SEC has publicly defended its use of “neither admit nor deny” settlements, arguing they: (1) reduce the time and resources required to litigate a case, (2) expedite recovery for defrauded investors, and (3) protect defrauded investors by reducing the risk that the SEC will lose at trial.[2] As John Coffee recently noted, “[e]very few years, the issue is certain to be raised: Why does the SEC persist in ‘neither admit nor deny’ settlements, which allow an issuer to avoid acknowledging any misconduct?”[3] Continue reading
by Anat Carmy-Wiechman, Giovanni Patti, and Peter Robau
In a new report (PDF: 1.02 MB), the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings.
Continue reading
by Anat Carmy-Wiechman, Giovanni Patti, and Peter Robau
As the second fiscal year of Chairman Jay Clayton’s tenure at the SEC ends, a look at the Commission’s enforcement actions against public companies and their subsidiaries may help to understand the new enforcement priorities at the SEC. In a new report (PDF: 995 KB), the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, investigated recent trends in enforcement via the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED). Below, we highlight some of the key findings. Continue reading