Tag Archives: Eric B. Lewin

10 Key Takeaways from the Federal Reserve’s Final Rule on CSI and FOIA

by Luigi L. De Ghenghi, Randall D. GuynnJai R. Massari, Margaret E. Tahyar, Eric McLaughlin, Daniel E. Newman, and Eric B. Lewin 

The Federal Reserve’s recent updates to its regulations on confidential supervisory information (CSI) and availability of information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)[1] include several meaningful modifications to adapt these rules for the digital age of emails, data rooms and slide decks and the modern organizational structure and operations of banking organizations.  

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SCOTUS Expands Scope of FOIA Trade Secrets and Commercial Information Exemption

by Michael S. Flynn, Randall D. Guynn, Michael Kaplan, Neil H. MacBride, Paul J. Nathanson, Annette L. Nazareth, Margaret E. Tahyar, and Eric B. Lewin

The Supreme Court has updated an important Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) exemption for the digital age.  In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media (PDF: 125 KB), the Supreme Court last week significantly expanded the scope of FOIA Exemption 4.  FOIA Exemption 4 is the exemption most commonly claimed by private-sector entities when seeking to protect competitively sensitive information that must be disclosed to a federal agency.  It shields from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”[1]  Beginning with a D.C. Circuit decision in 1974, National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), courts have interpreted FOIA Exemption 4 narrowly.  For commercial or financial information to be “confidential,” a number of federal courts of appeals have required a showing of “substantial competitive harm” from disclosure.  Proving “substantial competitive harm” has proven difficult in practice, and, in this digital age, there is an increasing awareness that information and data are valuable.  The majority opinion in Food Marketing, written by Justice Gorsuch, squarely repudiated the “substantial competitive harm” test in favor of a less difficult standard, thereby broadening Exemption 4.

It is significant that the justices were unanimous in rejecting the “substantial competitive harm” test.  They disagreed about whether harm has any role to play in Exemption 4.  In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Breyer explained that he “would clarify that a private harm need not be ‘substantial’ so long as it is genuine.”[2]  In contrast, the majority wouldn’t apply a harm test at all, arguing that such a test is not supported by the statute.  Instead, the majority explained its test as follows: Continue reading