Tag Archives: Edouard Bruc

Antitrust and Competition: Investment Firms’ Voting Rights—The Devil is in the Potential Antitrust Liability

by Frédéric Louis, Anne Vallery, Álvaro Mateo Alonso, and Édouard Bruc

On January 27, 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) issued an important  ruling regarding an investment fund’s liability for the cartel behaviour of an affiliate. The CJEU confirmed that an investment fund is liable under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union based on holding 100% voting rights over an indirect affiliate that participated in a cartel, even though the fund held well below 100% equity in that affiliate during part of the relevant period (see here). This judgement tips the scales towards enforcement and away from key defence principles such as the presumption of innocence, or the requirement to sanction only the actual offender. Nonetheless, it sheds some useful insight for financial investors to mitigate antitrust exposure. Continue reading