Tag Archives: David B. Anders

DOJ Clarifies and Refines Its Policies for Corporate Criminal Enforcement

Editor’s Note: On September 15, 2022, the Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) at New York University School of Law hosted Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco while she delivered a speech detailing significant changes to the Department of Justice’s corporate prosecution policies. The speech and accompanying policy memo are available here. Over the coming days and weeks, PCCE will be publishing reactions to the new DOJ policies by practitioners, scholars, and compliance officers.

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, David B. Anders, and Daniel H. Rosenblum

In an important policy speech late last week, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco acknowledged “the data showing [an] overall decline in corporate criminal prosecutions over the last decade.” The interesting question prompted by that data, of course, is the one no one seems to know the answer to: Is this decline in corporate prosecutions the result of efforts by well-managed companies to respond to the oft-repeated admonition to set the right tone at the top and invest extensively in compliance programs, training and personnel such that the number of corporate prosecutions actually should be coming down? Or is it because there is some lack of adequate prosecutorial effort or some other obstacle standing in the way of achieving the right level of corporate prosecutions? In the absence of any hard empirical data on that crucial question, DAG Monaco opted for the latter explanation, thus repeating the common DOJ mantra that it “need[s] to do more and move faster.”

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Second Circuit Reverses LIBOR Convictions

by John F. Savarese, David B. Anders, Sarah K. Eddy, and Remy Grosbard

In a careful but blunt opinion (PDF: 3.3 MB) yesterday, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions of two Deutsche Bank derivatives traders charged with wire fraud for manipulating LIBOR. The decision underscores that not all conduct deemed unfair is criminal, and represents the latest blow to a theory of criminal liability that DOJ has invoked to extract billions of dollars in penalties from financial institutions—all before the theory’s viability could be tested in the courts.

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SEC Division of Enforcement Forms New Climate and ESG Task Force to Target ESG-Related Misconduct and Potential Violations

by David M. Silk, Wayne M. Carlin, David B. Anders, Sabastian V. Niles, and Carmen X. W. Lu

Last week, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance announced (PDF: 131 KB) it would enhance its focus on climate-related disclosures and risks at the direction of the Acting Chair of the SEC. Yesterday, the SEC announced a new Climate and ESG Task Force within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. This Enforcement Task Force will be heavily resourced, have access to ESG-related whistleblower complaints and referrals and focus on proactively identifying ESG-related misconduct (such as material disclosure “gaps” and misstatements), including by using data analysis to identify potential violations.

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White-Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What Mattered in 2020 and What to Expect in 2021

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, Wayne M. Carlin, David B. Anders, Sarah K. Eddy, Lauren M. Kofke, Carol Miller, and Tamara Livshiz

As we write this memorandum, a new administration is forming in Washington, with new leadership teams being nominated at DOJ, SEC, CFTC and other regulatory and law-enforcement agencies — thus prompting the question of what these changes may portend for white-collar and regulatory enforcement priorities, trends and policies. Having watched many administrations come and go over the years, our sense is that, in this area at least, continuity tends to prevail over disruption. That said, we can offer the following educated guesses on what to expect going forward:

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Government Wins Significant Spoofing Conviction

by John F. Savarese, David B. Anders, and Louis J. Barash

Late last week, the government won a jury verdict in a major “spoofing” trial. United States v. Vorley, No. 18 CR 00035 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2020). The jury found that Vorley and his co-defendant violated the federal mail fraud statute by placing orders that they did not intend to execute, in the hope that such orders would move the market and enable them to execute other profitable orders. Continue reading →

Supreme Court Limits SEC Disgorgement Remedy

by John F. Savarese, Wayne M. Carlin, and David B. Anders

In an 8-1 decision issued yesterday in Liu v. SEC (PDF: 193.50 KB), the Supreme Court upheld the SEC’s authority to obtain disgorgement from securities law violators, but also indicated some limitations on the scope of the remedy. Some observers had raised questions about the continued viability of the disgorgement remedy after the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC (PDF: 2112 KB). Today’s decision makes clear that SEC disgorgement is alive and well. Nevertheless, in light of some comments in today’s opinion, the SEC will likely need to rein in some of its prior practices.

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White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement in the Era of COVID-19

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, Wayne M. Carlin, and David B. Anders

When we issued our memorandum (PDF: 231KB) on “what to expect in 2020” concerning white collar and regulatory enforcement developments, we certainly did not expect that just two months later, 41 states would effectively be locked down due to the coronavirus pandemic, many courts would be closed, and governments would be intensely focused on adopting measures responsive to the global health crisis. What we’re now seeing in the white collar/regulatory world is that, instead of pushing forward at their usual pace, prosecutors and regulators are adjusting to a new reality in which live testimony is impractical, courts are on pause and most everyone is working from home. It is impossible to predict when the normal cadence of such investigations will resume, but inquiries of all kinds will undoubtedly return to their normal pace and intensity when the crisis abates. Continue reading →

Controlling Material, Non-Public Information During the Coronavirus Pandemic

by John F. Savarese, Wayne M. Carlin, and David B. Anders

In an unusual statement issued earlier this week, the Co-Directors of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, Stephanie Avakian and Steven Peikin, reminded market
participants of the critical importance of maintaining proper control over the
dissemination of material, non-public information, adhering to the restrictions
imposed by Regulation FD on selective disclosures, and assuring compliance with
policies and procedures designed to prevent insider trading and other conduct that
would undermine market integrity. They stressed in particular that, as companies and
markets cope with the outbreak of COVID-19 and the continuing coronavirus
pandemic, corporate insiders are likely learning new material, non-public information
“that may hold an even greater value than under normal circumstances.”
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DOJ Extends FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Principles to Non-FCPA Misconduct Discovered in the M&A Context

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, David B. Anders, Marshall L. Miller, and Daniel H. Rosenblum

In an important speech, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division announced on Thursday that DOJ will “look to” the principles of the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (PDF: 50.6 KB) in evaluating “other types of potential wrongdoing, not just FCPA violations” that are uncovered in connection with mergers and acquisitions. As a result, when an acquiring company identifies misconduct through pre-transaction due diligence or post-transaction integration, and then self-reports the relevant conduct, DOJ is now more likely to decline to prosecute if the company fully cooperates, remediates in a complete and timely fashion, and disgorges any ill-gotten gains. Continue reading →

DOJ Applies Principles of FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy in Other White-Collar Investigations, Increasing Opportunity for Corporate Declinations

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, Wayne M. Carlin, David B. Anders, Marshall L. Miller, and Jonathan Siegel

Late last week, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division announced at an ABA white-collar conference that it has begun using the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (PDF: 51 KB) as “nonbinding guidance” in other areas of white-collar enforcement beyond the FCPA. As a result, absent aggravating factors, DOJ may more frequently decline to prosecute companies that promptly self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate with DOJ’s investigation, remediate in a complete and timely fashion, and disgorge any ill-gotten gains. As a first example of this approach, the officials pointed to DOJ’s recent decision (PDF: 1,743 KB) to decline charges against Barclays PLC, after the bank agreed to pay back $12.9 million in wrongful profits, following individual charges arising out of a foreign exchange front-running scheme. Continue reading →