Tag Archives: Daniel H. Rosenblum

DOJ Clarifies and Refines Its Policies for Corporate Criminal Enforcement

Editor’s Note: On September 15, 2022, the Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) at New York University School of Law hosted Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco while she delivered a speech detailing significant changes to the Department of Justice’s corporate prosecution policies. The speech and accompanying policy memo are available here. Over the coming days and weeks, PCCE will be publishing reactions to the new DOJ policies by practitioners, scholars, and compliance officers. 

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, David B. Anders, and Daniel H. Rosenblum

In an important policy speech late last week, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco acknowledged “the data showing [an] overall decline in corporate criminal prosecutions over the last decade.” The interesting question prompted by that data, of course, is the one no one seems to know the answer to: Is this decline in corporate prosecutions the result of efforts by well-managed companies to respond to the oft-repeated admonition to set the right tone at the top and invest extensively in compliance programs, training and personnel such that the number of corporate prosecutions actually should be coming down? Or is it because there is some lack of adequate prosecutorial effort or some other obstacle standing in the way of achieving the right level of corporate prosecutions? In the absence of any hard empirical data on that crucial question, DAG Monaco opted for the latter explanation, thus repeating the common DOJ mantra that it “need[s] to do more and move faster.”

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DOJ Extends FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Principles to Non-FCPA Misconduct Discovered in the M&A Context

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, David B. Anders, Marshall L. Miller, and Daniel H. Rosenblum

In an important speech, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division announced on Thursday that DOJ will “look to” the principles of the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (PDF: 50.6 KB) in evaluating “other types of potential wrongdoing, not just FCPA violations” that are uncovered in connection with mergers and acquisitions.  As a result, when an acquiring company identifies misconduct through pre-transaction due diligence or post-transaction integration, and then self-reports the relevant conduct, DOJ is now more likely to decline to prosecute if the company fully cooperates, remediates in a complete and timely fashion, and disgorges any ill-gotten gains. Continue reading