Tag Archives: Charu A. Chandrasekhar

Lessons Learned: One Year of Form 8-K Material Cybersecurity Incident Reporting

by Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Erez Liebermann, Benjamin R. Pedersen, Paul M. Rodel, Matt Kelly, Anna Moody, John Jacob, and Talia Lorch 

Photos of authors.

Top (left to right): Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Erez Liebermann, Benjamin R. Pedersen, and Paul M. Rodel. Bottom (left to right): Matt Kelly, Anna Moody, John Jacob, and Talia Lorch. (Photos of courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On December 18, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) rule requiring disclosure of material cybersecurity incidents became effective. To date, 26 companies have reported a cybersecurity incident under the new Item 1.05 of Form 8-K (“Item 1.05”). After over a year of mandatory cybersecurity incident reporting, we examine the key trends and takeaways.

Key Takeaways from a Year of Cybersecurity Incident Reporting on Form 8-K

In early 2024, companies filed a flurry of Forms 8-K under Item 1.05, which stated that the relevant cybersecurity incidents did not have material impacts on the companies’ financial conditions or results of operations. These disclosures were in response to the SEC’s rules requiring that cybersecurity incident disclosures include a description of “the material aspects of the nature, scope, and timing of the incident, and the material impact or reasonably likely material impact on the issuer, including its financial condition and results of operations.” Following these disclosures, the SEC clarified its expectations for cybersecurity incident reporting in a statement issued by the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (the “Statement”), as well as through several comment letters issued by the Staff of the SEC (the “Staff”) to companies which filed Item 1.05 Forms 8-K.

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SEC’s Focus on Cyber and AI to Continue Under Trump Administration

by Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, Avi Gesser, Erez Liebermann, Julie M. Riewe, Jeff Robins, Kristin A. Snyder, and Cameron Sharp

Photos of the authors

Top left to right: Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, and Avi Gesser. Bottom left to right: Erez Liebermann, Julie M. Riewe, Jeff Robins, and Kristin A. Snyder. (Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).

On February 20, 2025, the SEC announced the creation of the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit (“CETU”) to focus on “combatting cyber-related misconduct and to protect retail investors from bad actors in the emerging technologies space.” In this blog post, we provide an overview of the announcement, which illustrates that the Trump administration will continue to prioritize SEC cybersecurity and artificial intelligence examinations and enforcement, with a particular emphasis on fraudulent conduct impacting retail investors.

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Managing Cybersecurity Risks Arising from AI — New Guidance from the NYDFS

by Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, Avi Gesser, Erez Liebermann, Marshal Bozzo, Johanna Skrzypczyk, Ned Terrace, and Mengyi Xu.

Photos of the authors

Top left to right: Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, Avi Gesser, and Erez Liebermann. 
Bottom left to right: Marshal Bozzo, Johanna Skrzypczyk, Ned Terrace, and Mengyi Xu. (Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On October 16, 2024, the New York Department of Financial Services (the “NYDFS”) issued an Industry Letter providing guidance on assessing cybersecurity risks associated with the use of AI (the “Guidance”) under the existing 23 NYCRR Part 500 (“Part 500” or “Cybersecurity Regulation”) framework. The Guidance applies to entities that are covered by Part 500 (i.e., entities with a license under the New York Banking Law, Insurance Law or Financial Services Law), but it provides valuable direction to all companies for managing the new cybersecurity risks associated with AI.

The NYDFS makes clear that the Guidance does not impose any new requirements beyond those already contained in the Cybersecurity Regulation. Instead, the Guidance is meant to explain how covered entities should use the Part 500 framework to address cybersecurity risks associated with AI and build controls to mitigate such risks. It also encourages companies to explore the potential cybersecurity benefits from integrating AI into cybersecurity tools (e.g., reviewing security logs and alerts, analyzing behavior, detecting anomalies, and predicting potential security threats). Entities that are covered by Part 500, especially those that have deployed AI in significant ways, should review the Guidance carefully, along with their current cybersecurity policies and controls, to see if any enhancements are appropriate.

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Supreme Court Punches SEC APs Right in the Seventh Amendment

by Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Arian M. June, Robert B. Kaplan, Julie M. Riewe, Kristin A. Snyder, and Jonathan R. Tuttle

Photos of the authors

Top left to right: Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Arian M. June, and Robert B. Kaplan. Bottom left to right: Julie M. Riewe, Kristin A. Snyder, and Jonathan R. Tuttle. (Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

Recently, in a long-awaited ruling with significant implications for the securities industry and administrative agencies more generally, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jarkesy v. SEC, holding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial precluded the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) from pursuing monetary penalties for securities fraud violations through in-house administrative adjudications. The key takeaways are:

  • The Court’s ruling was limited to securities fraud claims, but other SEC claims seeking legal remedies may be impacted, as well as claims by other federal agencies that may have been adjudicated in-house previously.
  • We expect that the SEC will continue its practice of bringing new enforcement actions in district court, except when a claim only is available in the administrative forum.
  • Because of the majority decision’s focus on fraud’s common-law roots, the decision raises questions about whether the SEC may bring negligence-based or strict liability claims seeking penalties administratively.
  • The Court did not resolve other constitutional questions concerning the SEC’s administrative law judges, including whether the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings violates the non-delegation doctrine and whether the SEC’s administrative law judges are unconstitutionally protected from removal in violation of Article III.
  • We anticipate additional litigation regarding these unresolved issues.

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Incident Response Plans Are Now Accounting Controls? SEC Brings First-Ever Settled Cybersecurity Internal Controls Charges

by Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, Erez Liebermann, Benjamin R. Pedersen, Julie M. Riewe, Matt Kelly, and Anna Moody

Photos of the authors

Top left to right: Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky and Erez Liebermann. Bottom left to right: Benjamin R. Pedersen, Julie M. Riewe, Matt Kelly and Anna Moody. (Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

In an unprecedented settlement, on June 18, 2024, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) announced that communications and marketing provider R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (“RRD”) agreed to pay approximately $2.1 million to resolve charges arising out of its response to a 2021 ransomware attack. According to the SEC, RRD’s response to the attack revealed deficiencies in its cybersecurity policies and procedures and related disclosure controls. Specifically, in addition to asserting that RRD had failed to gather and review information about the incident for potential disclosure on a timely basis, the SEC alleged that RRD had failed to implement a “system of cybersecurity-related internal accounting controls” to provide reasonable assurances that access to the company’s assets—namely, its information technology systems and networks—was permitted only with management’s authorization. In particular, the SEC alleged that RRD failed to properly instruct the firm responsible for managing its cybersecurity alerts on how to prioritize such alerts, and then failed to act upon the incoming alerts from this firm.

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Treasury’s Report on AI (Part 1) – Governance and Risk Management

by Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, Erez Liebermann, Matt Kelly, Johanna Skrzypczyk, Michelle Huang, Sharon Shaji, and Annabella M. Waszkiewicz

Photos of the authors

Top: Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, Erez Liebermann, and Matt Kelly
Bottom: Johanna Skrzypczyk, Michelle Huang, Sharon Shaji, and Annabella M. Waszkiewicz
(Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On March 27, 2024, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) released a report on Managing Artificial Intelligence-Specific Cybersecurity Risks in the Financial Services Sector (the “Report”). The Report was released in response to President Biden’s Executive Order (“EO”) 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, which spearheaded a government-wide effort to issue Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) risk management guidelines consistent with the White House’s AI principles. Continue reading →

Preparing for AI Whistleblowers

by Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, Arian M. June, Michelle Huang, Cooper Yoo, and Sharon Shaji

Photos of the authors

Top row: Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, and Arian M. June
Bottom row: Michelle Huang, Cooper Yoo, and Sharon Shaji
(Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

As artificial intelligence (“AI”) use and capabilities surge, a new risk is emerging for companies: AI whistleblowers. Both increased regulatory scrutiny over AI use and record-breaking whistleblower activity has set the stage for an escalation of AI whistleblower-related enforcement. As we’ve previously written and spoken about, the risk of AI whistleblowers is rising as whistleblower protections and awards expand, internal company disputes over cybersecurity and AI increase due to a lack of clear regulatory guidance, and public skepticism mounts over the ability of companies to offer consumer protections against cybersecurity and AI risks.

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100 Days of Cybersecurity Incident Reporting on Form 8-K: Lessons Learned

by Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Erez Liebermann, Benjamin R. Pedersen, Paul M. Rodel, Matt Kelly, Anna Moody, John Jacob, and Kelly Donoghue

Photos of authors

Top (left to right): Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Erez Liebermann, Benjamin R. Pedersen, and Paul M. Rodel
Bottom (left to right): Matt Kelly, Anna Moody, John Jacob, and Kelly Donoghue (photos of courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On December 18, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) rule requiring disclosure of material cybersecurity incidents became effective. To date, 11 companies have reported a cybersecurity incident under the new Item 1.05 of Form 8-K (“Item 1.05”).[1]

After the first 100 days of mandatory cybersecurity incident reporting, we examine the early results of the SEC’s new disclosure requirement.

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AI Enforcement Starts with Washing: The SEC Charges its First AI Fraud Cases

by Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, Arian M. June, Robert B. Kaplan, Julie M. Riewe, Jeff Robins, and Kristin A. Snyder

Photos of authors

Top (left to right): Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Avi Gesser, and Arian M. June
Bottom (left to right): Robert B. Kaplan, Julie M. Riewe, Jeff Robins, and Kristin A. Snyder (photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On March 18, 2024, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced settled charges against two investment advisers, Delphia (USA) Inc. (“Delphia”) and Global Predictions Inc. (“Global Predictions”) for making false and misleading statements about their alleged use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in connection with providing investment advice. These settlements are the SEC’s first-ever cases charging violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in connection with AI disclosures, and also include the first settled charges involving AI in connection with the Marketing and Compliance Rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”). The matters reflect Chair Gensler’s determination to target “AI washing”—securities fraud in connection with AI disclosures under existing provisions of the federal securities laws—and underscore that public companies, investment advisers and broker-dealers will face rapidly increasing scrutiny from the SEC in connection with their AI disclosures, policies and procedures. We have previously discussed Chair Gensler’s scrutiny of AI washing and AI disclosure risk in Form ADV Part 2A filings. In this client alert, we discuss the charges and AI disclosure and compliance takeaways.

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Resisting Hindsight Bias: A Proposed Framework for CISO Liability

by Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, Erez Liebermann, Julie M. Riewe, Anna Moody, Andreas A. Glimenakis, and Melissa Muse

photos of the authors

Top left to right: Andrew J. Ceresney, Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Luke Dembosky, and Erez Liebermann.                    Bottom left to right: Julie M. Riewe, Anna Moody, Andreas A. Glimenakis, and Melissa Muse. (Photos courtesy of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP)

On October 30, 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) charged SolarWinds Corporation’s (“SolarWinds” or the “Company”) chief information security officer (“CISO”) with violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws in connection with alleged disclosure and internal controls violations related both to the Russian cyberattack on the Company discovered in December 2020 and to alleged undisclosed weaknesses in the Company’s cybersecurity program dating back to 2018.[1] This is the first time the SEC has charged a CISO in connection with alleged violations of the federal securities laws occurring within the scope of his or her cybersecurity functions.[2] In doing so, the SEC has raised industry concerns that it intends to—with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, but without the benefit of core cybersecurity expertise—dissect a CISO’s good-faith judgments in the aftermath of a cybersecurity incident and wield incidents to second guess the design and effectiveness of a company’s entire cybersecurity program (including as it intersects with internal accounting controls designed to identify and prevent errors or inaccuracies in financial reporting) and related disclosures and attempt to hold the CISO liable for any perceived failures.

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