Tag Archives: Andrew J. Leone

A Regime Shift in the SEC Enforcement Cooperation Program

by Andrew J. Leone, Edward X. Li, and Michelle Liu

Leniency programs can be powerful enforcement tools. For example, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Leniency Program has been successful in cracking down on cartel activities since 1993. By encouraging violators’ self-reporting and voluntary remediation, regulators can conserve valuable resources and rectify more misconduct than they otherwise would. However, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) leniency program, which began with the 2001 Seaboard Report, long illustrated a different reality. Files (2012) finds that cooperating with the SEC can leave firms worse off. The press also harshly criticized the SEC for failing to detect egregious frauds during the Financial Crisis, despite a budget surge since 2001. To address these concerns, the SEC issued a new initiative in 2010 and, for the first time, formalized a multitude of new cooperation policies in the SEC Enforcement Manual. In our forthcoming article in the Journal of Accounting & Economics, we investigate the effects of these policy changes.

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