On September 17, 2024, the NYU Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) hosted Nicole M. Argentieri, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Brent Wible, Chief Counselor for the Criminal Division, and Molly Moeser, Chief of the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, as well as academics and distinguished counsel, for a discussion of the DOJ Criminal Division’s newly-announced Corporate Whistleblower Awards Program. A link to the details of the program is here. Below are the remarks delivered by PDAAG Argentieri. After Argentieri’s remarks, PCCE Faculty Director Jenifer Arlen led a fireside chat discussion with Brent Wible, followed by a moderated panel discussion that included Molly Moeser, Jane Norberg (Partner, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP), Preston Pugh (Partner, Crowell & Moring LLP), Dan Richman (Professor, Columbia Law School), Max Rodriguez ’15 (Principal, Max Rodriguez Law PLCC), and Andrew Weissmann (Professor, NYU Law). Opening remarks were delivered by Troy McKenzie, Dean of NYU School of Law.
Category Archives: U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
The Top 5 Mid-Year Developments in Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement in 2024
by Stephanie Brooker, M. Kendall Day, Ella Capone, Chris Jones, and Ben Schlichting
In this piece, we analyze some of the most important mid-year trends and developments in AML regulation and enforcement thus far in 2024. Overall, 2024 has been very active, including key proposed and finalized rules, DOJ policy initiatives, and a notable judicial opinion discussed below. For a longer version of this piece, please visit Gibson Dunn’s website.
Where’s the Beef? Demonstrating “Timely & Appropriate” Remediation
by Jonny Frank, Michele Edwards, and Christopher Hoyle
This article is part 4 in a series on remediation. Read part 1 on Root Cause Analysis here, part 2 on Read Across and Remediation here, and part 3 on Corrective Action Plans here.
Organizations seeking credit for “timely and appropriate” remediation under the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy (“CEP”) must show they conducted a comprehensive root cause analysis, addressed the root cause findings, and implemented an effective compliance program.[1] Additional guidance on DOJ expectations appears in Criminal Division memos on the evaluation of compliance programs,[2] and the selection of corporate compliance monitors.[3] The SEC has similar expectations.[4]
Building on our discussion of Root Cause Analysis (“RCA”), Similar Misconduct, and Timely and Effective Corrective Action Plans, this article suggests key steps to demonstrate the remediation and compliance program effectiveness to the board, prosecutors, regulators and other stakeholders.
DOJ Launches New Whistleblower Incentive Program
by Kevin Chambers, Terra Reynolds, Douglas K. Yatter, and Lilia B. Vazova
DOJ’s pilot program aims to fill gaps in existing federal whistleblower programs and incentivize prompt corporate self-disclosure alongside individual whistleblower tips.
Following the March 2024 announcement of its intention to introduce a new corporate whistleblower incentive program, on August 1, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a three-year pilot program for rewarding whistleblowers who alert DOJ to significant corporate misconduct. DOJ’s new program, modeled after whistleblower programs run by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), may generate a significant number of tips about potential misconduct and adds an important new dimension for companies’ compliance measures and handling of investigations.
DOJ National Security Division Issues First-Ever Declination Under Enforcement Policy
by Satish M. Kini, David A. O’Neil, Jane Shvets, Rick Sofield, Douglas S. Zolkind, Carter Burwell, Connor R. Crowley, and Hillary Hubley
Key Takeaways
- Even in criminal national security matters, early self-reporting, remediation and cooperation can enable companies to avoid prosecution and penalties.
- Federal enforcement agencies are continuing to collaborate in investigating and prosecuting criminal cases at the intersection of national security and corporate crime.
- Multinational corporations and academic institutions should be aware of the risk of outsiders fraudulently affiliating themselves with legitimate institutions to skirt export control laws.
Strategic Communications Considerations When a Government Investigation Becomes Public Through Voluntary Self-Reporting or Other Means
The SEC, DOJ, and nationwide USAOs are increasingly encouraging organizations to self-report misconduct, fully cooperate with authorities, and meaningfully remediate. In return, companies may receive reduced penalties, up to and including a government agreement not to criminally prosecute and a declination to bring a civil enforcement action.
However, in addition to being costly and time-consuming, self-reporting presents reputational risks. There also is always a possibility that a sensitive matter will leak. In any event, having complementary legal and crisis communications strategies in place can help companies avoid costly missteps and mitigate reputational damage.
BIS Primes the Corporate Enforcement Engine: A Fresh Look at What Recent BIS Actions & Statements Mean and a Proposed Framework for How U.S. Companies Can Best Prepare
by Brent Carlson and Michael Huneke
The risk of corporate criminal enforcement actions for export controls evasion or diversion is significantly increasing. Recent actions and statements by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry & Security (“BIS”) suggest that, beyond saber-rattling, BIS is deliberately priming the corporate enforcement engine with the fuel for an enforcement wave that will follow the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) “playbook” that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has successfully deployed for the last two decades.
The fuel comes in the form of official, multiagency guidance documents and other actions that describe circumstances indicating a “high probability” of misconduct, which as we have previously written is a freestanding basis for enforcement actions under both the FCPA and the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).[1] Such agency actions by BIS notably include the issuance to U.S. companies of lists of counterparties under cover of what BIS officials describe as “red flag” letters. Since our prior analysis,[2] BIS has reemphasized the significance of such letters and underscored the importance of how U.S. companies respond.
Keeping Deferred Corporate Charges Deferred: Some Dos and Don’ts
by John Savarese, Randall Jackson, and Michael Holt
At the heart of every white-collar deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is the deferral of filed criminal charges and a promise by DOJ to dismiss those charges at the end of a fixed term if the company has lived up to its remedial and other commitments. Breaches of these agreements are rare. But DOJ’s recent letter advising the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas that Boeing breached its obligations under a January 2021 DPA (entered into with DOJ to resolve criminal charges relating to Boeing’s mishandling of FAA reporting concerning its 737 MAX aircraft following fatal crashes of two of those planes) provides a telling reminder of the critical need for companies to design and carry out an effective and comprehensive plan to abide by all terms established under a DPA.
Crypto Experts React to Recent SDNY Ethereum Fraud Indictment
The NYU Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) is following the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’s recent indictment of two individuals for allegedly attacking and stealing $25 million from the Ethereum blockchain. The indictment in the case, United States v. Peraire-Bueno, 24 Cr. 293 (SDNY), is available here. Below, several crypto experts and former prosecutors provide their reactions to the case.
Will the Justice Department’s “90-Day Sprint” Creating a New Whistleblower Program Permit Confidential or Anonymous Reporting?
On March 7, 2024, in speech before the American Bar Association, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced a “90-day sprint” to establish a new Justice Department whistleblower program. The DAG’s reason for announcing the new program was clear:
Ever since Dodd-Frank created whistleblower programs at the SEC and the CFTC, those agencies have received thousands of tips, paid out many hundreds of millions of dollars, and disgorged billions in ill-gotten gains from corporate bad actors.
Yet both programs, and similar ones at IRS and FinCEN — by their very nature — are limited in scope. They only cover misconduct within their agencies’ jurisdictions. . .
These programs have proven indispensable — but they resemble a patchwork quilt that doesn’t cover the whole bed. They simply don’t address the full range of corporate and financial misconduct that the Department prosecutes.
So, we are filling these gaps.
The critical issue facing the Justice Department is precisely how they will “fill these gaps.” Among the most pressing concerns is confidentiality. Whistleblower advocates have uniformly asked the Justice Department to permit anonymous and confidential reporting as is currently permitted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the highly successful Dodd-Frank Act. However, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has historically not permitted anonymous or confidential whistleblower disclosures to the department. The current DOJ-approved procedures require all “human sources” to undergo an extensive background screening making anonymous reporting impossible. Even when a whistleblower is granted confidential informant status, the current procedures permit the DOJ to waive confidentiality essentially at-will.