Category Archives: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

Cryptoasset Developments: Banking Regulators Reversing Anti-Crypto Stance

by Kevin S. Schwartz, David M. Adlerstein, and Ledina Gocaj

Photos of authors

Left to right: Kevin S. Schwartz, David M. Adlerstein, and Ledina Gocaj (photos courtesy of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz)

In a significant shift, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently issued an interpretive letter empowering national banks to make their own business decisions related to cryptoasset products and services. The OCC guidance, which rescinds its prior-approval requirement for national banks to engage in cryptoasset activities, comes on the heels of an announcement that the FDIC is reassessing its own supervisory approach after disclosing “pause” letters that it had previously sent to 24 banks interested in crypto-related activities. Together, these developments signal an abrupt end to the bank regulators’ arbitrarily imposed ban on banks engaging in cryptoasset-related activities, an important step forward that we had endorsed.

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“Operation Chokepoint 2.0”: De-Banking Policies and the Adverse Use of Reputational Risk in Bank Supervision

by Stephen T. Gannon, Max Bonici, Elizabeth Lan Davis, and Kristal Rovira

Photos of the authors

Left to Right: Stephen T. Gannon, Max Bonici, Elizabeth Lan Davis, and Kristal Rovira (photos courtesy of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP)

How subjective supervisory standards suppressed innovation and damaged innovators.

“The power to regulate—in addition to the power to tax—is the power to destroy.”

Peter Wallison, Judicial Fortitude (2018)

As we have previously noted, we expect that the second Trump Administration will be significantly more favorable to crypto than the Biden Administration, especially with the recent appointment of David Sacks as the Administration’s “Crypto Czar.” We anticipate that in short order the new Administration will address “de-banking,” a regulatory practice that has vexed the digital asset industry—and banking in general—over the last several years. In this context, “de-banking” means canceling banking services to crypto entities and individuals associated with them or crypto activities. It is a practice that has been sharply criticized and has become even less comprehensible as the digital asset industry has matured and embraced (indeed, has sought) reasonable regulation. In the last several days the attention paid to this issue has increased sharply as a result of comments by Marc Andreessen on the Joe Rogan podcast.

Regrettably, the de-banking problem is not new. De-banking crypto is simply the latest variation of regulators using vague and amorphous standards to supervise bank conduct through the subjective lens of what the federal banking agencies call “reputational risk.”

Below we discuss how we got here and some ways forward.

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Overhaul of Regulatory Capital Requirements Proposed by US Banking Regulators

by Matthew Bisanz, Jeffrey P. Taft, Andrew Olmem, Anna T. Pinedo, Angela M. Ulum, Stuart M. Litwin, Jerry R. Marlatt, Brian L. Kuhl, and Eric M. Reilly

Photos of the authors

Top left to right: Matthew Bisanz, Jeffrey P. Taft, Andrew Olmem, Anna T. Pinedo, and Angela M. Ulum.
Bottom left to right: Stuart M. Litwin, Jerry R. Marlatt, Brian L. Kuhl, and Eric M. Reilly.
(Photos courtesy of Mayer Brown)

On July 27, 2023, US federal banking regulators issued proposals to (i) significantly revise the risk-based regulatory capital requirements for certain midsize and larger US banking organizations (the “Capital Proposal”) and (ii) change the method for calculating the capital surcharge for globally systemically important banking organizations (“G-SIBs”) (the “G-SIB Surcharge Proposal”).[1] These proposals are of critical importance because the amount of capital a bank must maintain with respect to any particular loan, investment or activity is typically a significant – if not the most significant – factor in determining whether the relationship is profitable or even feasible.[2] Comments on both proposals are due by November 30, 2023.

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Key Takeaways from Interagency Guidance on Banks’ Risk-Management of Fintech Relationships

by Margaret E. Tahyar and Ledina Gocaj

Photos of the authors

Left to right: Margaret E. Tahyar and Ledina Gocaj (Photos courtesy of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP)

On June 6, 2023, the Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC (the Agencies) released final interagency guidance on banking organizations’ management of risks associated with third-party relationships.  Davis Polk’s memo on the guidance is linked here.  Our key takeaways:

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Recent Government Bank Failure Reports Point to Increased Regulation and Examination Scrutiny

Editor’s Note: The NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) is watching the recent banking crisis and failures of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank. In this post, lawyers at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP analyze the reports released by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and GAO, and the NYDFS.

by Derek Bush, Hugh C. Conroy, Jr., Patrick Fuller, Lauren E. Semrad, Julia A. Knight, Megan Lindgren, Rishi Kumar, and Abby Shamray

Photos of the authors

From top left to right: Derek Bush, Hugh C. Conroy, Jr., Patrick Fuller, and Lauren E. Semrad.
From bottom left to right: Julia A. Knight, Megan Lindgren, and Rishi Kumar.
(Photos courtesy of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP)

In late April, several banking regulators and the Government Accountability Office released reports analyzing factors that contributed to the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, while at the same time suggesting areas of forthcoming supervisory focus and regulatory change.[1] The “FRB Report,” led by Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr, analyzes the supervision and failure of SVB Financial Group and Silicon Valley Bank (together, “SVB”).[2] The “FDIC Report,” led by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) Chief Risk Officer, and the “NYDFS Report,” led by the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) Office of General Counsel, examine the supervision and failure of Signature Bank.[3] The “GAO Report” focuses on how the responsible bank regulatory agencies regulated and supervised SVB and Signature Bank, and how the agencies responded to the March 2023 turmoil.[4]

These reports offer a detailed look into the bank supervisory process and provide important insights into regulatory and supervisory changes that may be on the horizon. In this post, we summarize our expectations for potential regulatory and supervisory developments.

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Federal Reserve and FDIC Reports—Next Steps

Editor’s Note: The NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) is watching the recent banking crisis and failures of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and, most recently, First Republic Bank.  PCCE is looking to publish additional posts in this area and those interested should contact joseph.facciponti@nyu.edu.

by Dana Seesel Bayersdorfer, Jung Eun Choi, Luigi L. De Ghenghi, Ledina Gocaj, Randall D. Guynn, Eric McLaughlin, Daniel E. Newman, David L. Portilla, Gabriel D. Rosenberg, and Margaret E. Tahyar

Photos of the authors

From top left to right: Dana Seesel Bayersdorfer, Jung Eun Choi, Luigi L. De Ghenghi, Ledina Gocaj, and Randall D. Guynn.
From bottom left to right: Eric McLaughlin, Daniel E. Newman, David L. Portilla, Gabriel D. Rosenberg, and Margaret E. Tahyar. (photos courtesy of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP)

The Federal Reserve and the FDIC reports on their supervision of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank provide insight into potential upcoming shifts in regulatory and supervisory focus.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve or Board) released the results of its review of the supervision and regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), which was led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr (the Board Report),[1] and the FDIC released the results of its review of the supervision of Signature Bank,[2] which was led by FDIC Chief Risk Officer E. Marshall Gentry (the FDIC Report).[3]

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