Friday, October 18, 2019; 3:45 – 5:45 PM
5 Washington Place, 202
New York, NY, 10003
Abstract: Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach both had the view that engaging with certain thought experiments in the course of moral theorizing was immoral. They had several reasons for viewing such engagement as immoral, but this presentation focuses on the claim that engaging with certain thought experiments is intrinsically wrong. Their claim is diagnosed and criticized, and then contrasted with the views of others, such as Susan Wolf, who holds a similar view but for different reasons. The common thread is that what one represents as a practical possibility, that is, as a possibility for the purposes of practical deliberation, is itself something that is morally evaluable. This is then shown to be relevant to understanding some results in empirical moral psychology with purport to show surprising features of how we represent possibilities.