NYU Center for Bioethics

As science, technology, and medicine advance, society will confront new ethical dilemmas at the nexus of public health policy and individual choice. The Master of Arts in Bioethics at the College of Global Public Health provides a strong philosophical foundation for navigating these urgent questions.

Past Events

2020 Undergraduate Essay Contest

The Center for Bioethics at NYU is pleased to announce its second annual undergraduate essay contest. Undergraduates from across the country are invited to submit a 2,000-2,500 word essay addressing a contemporary issue in bioethics. The winning essay(s) will be eligible for publication in the Medical Dialogue Review and win a cash prize! Essays will be judged by the faculty of the Center for Bioethics at NYU.

Submissions should be sent to nyucenterforbioethics@gmail.com by February 15th, 2020. For details, see the flyer below:

Online Information Session

MA in Bioethics Online Information Session

Monday, February 3, 2020
12:30-1:30 PM EST

Register Now

Interested in the ethics of new technology, clinical practice, animal treatment, environmental and population issues, or neurology?

NYU’s Master of Arts degree in Bioethics is a major focus on the NYU Center for Bioethics. Based in the College of Global Public Health, the MA Program gives graduate level students the opportunity to study and explore a broad conception of bioethics, encompassing both medical and environmental ethics.

Join us for an online information session, hosted by Director S. Matthew Liao, with current faculty and students for an overview of the program curriculum and activities at the Center, as well as an opportunity to have any questions answered about the program or the admissions and financial aid processes.

 

S. Matthew Liao, director of the Center for Bioethics and holder of the Arthur Zitrin Chair, is the author or editor of four books (another forthcoming) and over 60 articles.

Dr. Liao is a Fellow of The Hastings Center and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Moral Philosophy, and has interests in the ethics of genetic enhancement and neurotechnology, human rights, children’s rights, climate change, and the role of intuitions in moral theory.

 

Meet the other panelists

Ethics of the Digital Transformation (Webcast)

S. Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao, Arthur Zitrin Chair & Professor

Link to original page

November 1st, 2019, 10:00 – 11:30 AM

Harvard Law School, Wasserstein Hall
Milstein East
Cambridge, MA 02138

The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University is delighted to welcome the President of Germany, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to campus for a special event on November 1 to discuss the Ethics of the Digital Transformation.

President Steinmeier will participate in an interactive panel session on the ethical, legal, and societal implications of digital technologies across geographies and as viewed from different disciplines. The discussion is moderated by Urs Gasser, Executive Director of the Berkman Klein Center and Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School, and will include a Q&A.

In addition to the German President, the following experts will join the open dialogue:

  • Jeanette Hofmann, Director of the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Professor of Internet Politics, Free University of Berlin
  • Matthew Liao, Director of the Center for Bioethics, Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics, New York University
  • Melissa Nobles, Kenan Sahin Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Professor of Political Science, MIT
  • Wolfgang Schulz, Director of the Leibniz Institute for Media Research | Hans-Bredow-Institute, Professor for Media Law and Public Law, University of Hamburg
  • Eva Weber-Guskar, Guest Professor for Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin
  • Crystal S. Yang, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

This special event, which will be webcast live on this page on November 1 at 10:00am, is part of the Berkman Klein Center’s Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative.

Opacity, Explainability, and Justification in Machine Learning – Dr. Annette Zimmermann

Friday, December 6, 2019; 4:00 – 6:00 PM
GCASL, 238 Thompson St, Room 288
New York, NY, 10012

RSVP

Abstract: It is intuitively plausible to think that persons who are adversely affected by the use of machine learning systems have, amongst other things, a right to normative justification: a right to be given good reasons why the deployment of machine learning systems for a particular task is morally permissible, all things considered. But what are the normative foundations of this right, and what does justification in this context entail? One central challenge is that machine learning systems are (partially) opaque. This may constitute a hard explainability constraint: in some cases, it may be impossible to explain why particular outcomes occur, and whether a given ML system is doing what it is supposed to be doing, and in the way that it is supposed to be doing it.

If explanation (and thus, explainability) is necessary—albeit not sufficient—for normative justification in this context, what does this imply for the right to justification? One possible response is to adopt a conditional account of the right to normative justification: persons have a right to justification only if explanation is possible. But the conditional solution seems intuitively unappealing because it lets potentially culpable agents off the hook rather easily.

Alternatively, one might reject the higher-order claim that justification requires explaining why and how particular outcomes occur in the context of machine learning systems. Several possible views are compatible with that move: on the one hand, one might substitute the explanation requirement by a significantly weaker one, such as ex post transparency. Yet this option is not without normative costs. On the other hand, one might argue that persons have a right to justification irrespective of the presence of a hard explainability constraint. This move implies a demanding view of justification—but is it too demanding?

A third possible strategy is to argue that there is both a right to explanation and an independent right to normative justification. This view differs from (1) and (2), neither of which are committed to the view that there is a right to explanation. If persons have a right to explanation which is not derivative of the right to justification, this raises the question whether explanation without justification is morally valuable. This is not obvious: we need to investigate which kinds of morally weighty interests, if any, justify the conferral of the right to explanation. Aside from articulating the independent normative sources of the right to explanation, defenders of this view would need to show who bears the correlative duty of explanation, since the set of agents who bear this duty might be significantly different from the set of agents who bear a duty of justification. This paper systematically assesses the normative implications of these three views.

 

Speaker Bio: Dr. Annette Zimmermann is a political philosopher working on the ethics of algorithmic decision-making, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Dr. Zimmermann has additional research interests in moral philosophy (the ethics of risk and uncertainty) and legal philosophy (the philosophy of punishment), as well as the philosophy of science (models, explanation, abstraction).

In the context of her current research project “The Algorithmic Is Political”, she is focusing on the ways in which disproportionate distributions of risk and uncertainty associated with the use of emerging technologies—such as algorithmic bias and opacity—impact democratic values like equality and justice.

At Princeton, she is based at the Center for Human Values and at the Center for Information Technology Policy. Dr. Zimmermann holds a DPhil (PhD) and MPhil from the University of Oxford (Nuffield College and St Cross College), as well as a BA from the Freie Universität Berlin. She has held visiting positions at the Australian National University, Yale University, and SciencesPo Paris.

What’s So Special About Human Dignity? – Adam Etinson

Thursday, October 10, 2019; 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM
Kimmel Center, Room 912
60 Washington Square South
New York, NY, 10012

RSVP

Abstract:  Human dignity makes demands on us. It is something we’re supposed to “respect.” But what are these demands? And what does it take to respect them? On these practical questions, contemporary philosophers tend, by and large, to fall into two camps. First, there are those who understand human dignity to require respect for moral status, or one’s status as a rights-bearer. And second, there are those who understand concerns about human dignity to be, in essence, concerns about autonomy or the inviolability of persons. In this talk, I argue that neither of these views are correct. Dignity’s concern is with social status – or what we sometimes call “honor.” What it requires is that we avoid humiliating or degrading others, and that we help protect them from such harm, too. 

 
Bio: Adam Etinson is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Philosophical, Anthropological, and Film Studies at the University of St Andrews. His work explores topics in ethics, political philosophy, moral psychology, and social epistemology. He recently edited the interdisciplinary volume, Human Rights: Moral or Political? (OUP, 2018). He is Assistant Director of the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs (CEPPA). And he is a member of the editorial board of The Philosophical Quarterly.