NYU Center for Bioethics

As science, technology, and medicine advance, society will confront new ethical dilemmas at the nexus of public health policy and individual choice. The Master of Arts in Bioethics at the College of Global Public Health provides a strong philosophical foundation for navigating these urgent questions.

Events

NYU Philosophical Bioethics Workshop

REGISTER HERE

Zoom link will be sent to registered guest prior to event
 

WORKSHOP PROGRAM

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6

SESSION 1 – 2:00-3:15pm

‘The Machine Mind: Beyond Transparent Biases’, Robyn Waller (Iona) and Russell Waller (Moduli Technologies)

Chair: Lovro Savic (Oxford)

SESSION 2 – 3:30-4:45pm

‘Why Does Decision Making Capacity Matter?’, Ben Schwan (Case Western)

Chair: Nada Gligorov (Mt. Sinai)

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 7

SESSION 3 – 1:00-2:15pm

‘No Love Drugs Today’, Robbie Arrell (Leeds)

Chair: K. Lindsey Chambers (University of Kentucky)

SESSION 4 – 2:30-3:45pm

‘On a Supposed Duty Not To Create Deficient Lives (That Are Worth Living)’, Christopher Schimke (University of Washington) *Graduate Student Prize Winner*

Chair: Brian Berkey (University of Pennsylvania)

SESSION 5 – 4:00-5:30pm

Keynote ‘Some Rights in a Pandemic’, Frances Kamm (Rutgers)

Chair: Matthew Liao (NYU)

Between All and Nothing: Or, Defending the Impermissible

with Dr. Kerah Gordon-Solmon

Friday, October 2nd, 2020
4:00 – 6:00 PM

Note: This talk will take place via Zoom.
Please RSVP for login information.

Abstract:

Suppose that two victims are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. Agent has three options: 

Save One, allowing her arms to be crushed 

Save Both, allowing her arms to be crushed

Save None, keeping her arms.

Call this case All or Nothing, in honour of its paper of origin (by Joe Horton).

Agent is not obligated to perform a rescue, in the circumstances. She has a prerogative not to sacrifice her arms to save two or fewer lives. But if she does make the sacrifice — if she rushes into the collapsing building — she has a duty to rescue both victims. Keeping her arms is her only prerogative-protected interest at stake; it is the only interest of hers that counts against the moral reasons to Save Both. Having undertaken that sacrifice, she must Save Both.

The paper defends the following claims. (1) It is impermissible for Agent to Save One, for the reason that Saving One wrongs the second victim. (2) It is permissible for Agent to Save None. (3) The balance of moral reasons nonetheless favours Saving One over Saving None. (4) More generally, from the moral point of view, impermissible conduct is not always inferior to permissible conduct. 

Speaker Bio:

Kerah Gordon-Solmon is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Queen’s University.  She received her D.Phil. from the University of Oxford in 2012.

Her research lies in normative and practical ethics, and political philosophy. She has published articles on various topics within these sub-disciplines, including: the ethics of self- and other-defense, the ethics of human genetic enhancement, the value of choice, moral desert, and luck-egalitarian justice. Her work has appeared in such venues as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, the Journal of Moral Philosophy and Law and Philosophy. 

Summer Talk Series in Ethics: Cogito Ergo Zoom

S. Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao, Arthur Zitrin Chair & Professor

Thursday, August 6th 3PM EST

Gwen Bradford (Rice) has organized a Summer Talk Series in Ethics (subtitle: Cogito Ergo Zoom) that is open to all. The final talk in the series will feature S. Matthew Liao (NYU) and will be on “A Right Response to Anti-Natalism”. You can sign up to get the Zoom link you will need to join here.

Past and Future Limits on Human Gene Editing in Bioethical Debate: A Social Explanation


with Dr. John H. Evans

Thursday, April 30, 2020
2:00 – 3:30 PM

Note: This talk will take place via Zoom.
Please RSVP for login information.

Abstract: A year and a half ago a scientist in China announced that he had facilitated the creation of two genetically modified girls.  If true, this would be the first instance of both germline human gene editing and the first germline genetic enhancement – two ethical lines that had previously been critical in the American ethical debates about gene editing.  While American scientists and bioethicists were critical of this experiment because safety and other protocols were not followed, they were mostly not opposed to his moving beyond the germline.  Using empirical slippery slope theory, I explain how an ethical consensus in the 1970s to not engage in germline modification broke down.  Through a sociological examination of the argumentative structure in this public bioethical debate I also provide predictions for the viability of future barriers on the slippery slope.

Speaker Bio: John H. Evans is the Tata Chancellor’s Chair of Social Science, Co-director of the Institute for Practical Ethics and Associate Dean of Social Sciences at the University of California, San Diego.  His career has focused on the sociological examination of ethical debates surrounding human biology, particularly debates about human genetic modification  He was a member of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine Committee on Human Gene Editing.

Machine learning and epidemiology: a philosophical perspective on public health disruptors

with Dr. Alex Broadbent

Tuesday, March 3, 2020

12:30 – 2:00 PM

5 Washington Place, Rm 101
New York, NY, 10003

Lunch will be served.

Abstract: Machine learning (ML) appears to offer near-magical abilities to make predictions from large, messy data sets, without the usual headaches associated with (or caused by?) working out which exposures are associated with, or cause, the outcome or outcomes of interest. This is a shock for epidemiology, since applications of ML to population and public health are still relatively new and rare. It threatens epidemiological expertise, which appears not to be necessary for the machines. And it threatens epidemiological methodologists, many of whom insist that causal inference is an essential prerequisite for good predictions, and in particular for effective interventions. Advocates of the potential outcomes approach (POA) are especially vocal in this regard. This talk explains the potential and limitations of ML for epidemiological research, and what is needed to realise the potential benefits for public health. It advocates moving beyond the “catalogue” approach of repeatedly checking whether associations are causal – which, from a philosophical perspective, is neither necessary and sufficient for acting on a prediction. Instead it draws a distinction, familiar from philosophy of science, between context of discovery and justification, and argues that, for justification, a wider theoretical understanding of a domain must be built up, using both descriptive and analytic methods.

Speaker Bio: Dr. Alex Broadbent is Professor of Philosophy, Executive Dean of Humanities, and founding Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science at the University of Johannesburg. He has interests in philosophy of science, medicine, epidemiology, and law.