NYU Center for Bioethics

As science, technology, and medicine advance, society will confront new ethical dilemmas at the nexus of public health policy and individual choice. The Master of Arts in Bioethics at the College of Global Public Health provides a strong philosophical foundation for navigating these urgent questions.

Events

Upcoming Conference: Animal Consciousness

On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness in conjunction with the NYU Center for Bioethics and NYU Animal Studies will host a conference on Animal Consciousness.

There has been a recent flourishing of scientific and philosophical work on consciousness in non-human animals. This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to ask questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What is the impact of animal consciousness upon theories of consciousness and vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in non-human animals?

PARTICIPANTS:

Speakers and panelists include:

Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology), Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, Philosophy), Marian Dawkins(Oxford, Zoology), Daniel Dennett (Tufts, Philosophy), Stuart Derbyshire (National University of Singapore, Neuroscience), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience), Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfrey-Smith (Sydney, Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Alexandra Horowitz (Barnard, Psychology), Eva Jablonka (Tel Aviv, Cohn Institute), Jennifer Jacquet (NYU, Environmental Studies/Animal Studies), Joseph LeDoux (NYU, Center for Neural Science), Björn Merker(Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy)

Organizers: Ned Block (NYU, Philosophy), David Chalmers (NYU, Philosophy), Dale Jamieson (NYU, Environmental Studies), S. Matthew Liao (NYU, Bioethics)

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE AND LOCATION:

The conference will be held at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 8th St), Room 200 (the main theater on the second floor). The overflow room will be Cantor 101.  The conference will run from 9:00am to 6pm on both days, with registration beforehand (beginning at 8:30). The Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain”, and “Animal consciousness and ethics”. The Saturday sessions will include “Self-consciousness in mammals”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel discussion. A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 

Guest Speaker Adam Etinson: On Falling Short

Many of us should do more for others – that is, more than we currently do. And we know this; we know that we are morally imperfect. At the same time, this knowledge often fails to provoke any significant change in our behavior. Somehow, we find ways of tolerating, accepting, or “making peace” with our own moral guilt or imperfection. How do we accomplish this? And is there anything that can be said in favor of such acceptance? Is it ever right, in other words, to accept our own moral badness? Or is that an inherently irrational, and potentially even dangerous, idea? This presentation argues that some insight into these questions can be gained by focusing on the distinction between the reactive attitudes of (i) blame and (ii) condemnation.
 

Adam Etinson is a Lecturer in Philosophy in the School of Philosophical, Anthropological, and Film Studies at the University of St Andrews. He works on a range of topics in moral and political philosophy. Much of his recent research is in the philosophy of human rights, but he also works on topics in social epistemology (such as the problem of ethnocentrism) and is interested in the historical and theoretical foundations of liberalism. He recently became the Assistant Director of CEPPA – the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at the University of St Andrews. For more, visit here. 

12:00 PM-1:30 PM
719 Broadway, Room 1221 New York, NY 10003

Lunch will be served

Guest Speaker Steve Clarke: Conscientious Objection and Consistency

 
In many countries a right to conscientiously refuse to perform particular professional duties that conflict with personally held moral values is granted to healthcare professionals and military personnel. However, no such right is granted to members of other professions, such as the law and policing, in which individual professionals may also be asked to compromise personally held moral values. Dr. Clarke investigates whether and how this apparent inconsistency could be justified.
 

Steve Clarke is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University, in Australia, and a Senior Research Associate of the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. For more, visit here. 

 

October 25, 2017
12:00 PM-1:30 PM
719 Broadway, Room 1221 New York, NY 10003

Lunch will be served

Attachment and Felt Necessity: Engaging with Value in Love and Addiction

 
Philosophers have employed two different varieties of felt necessity to explain central aspects of agency in addiction and love, respectively. In the case of addiction, the relevant felt need is often described in terms of an appetite, whereas love is characterized by necessities arising from a particular kind of caring. On Dr. Wonderly’s view, the extant literature offers an instructive, but incomplete picture of the roles of felt necessity in addiction and love. Dr. Wonderly argues that a third form of felt necessity – attachment necessity – often better captures central aspects of agency in love and addiction. Recognizing the role of attachment necessity will not only illuminate how felt necessity can impact the value of certain relationships, but it will also allow us to discern important features of addiction and love that remain obscured on extant approaches.
 

Monique Wonderly is the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics. She is primarily interested in puzzles at the intersection of ethics and the nature of emotions. She has published in the areas of applied ethics, philosophy of emotion, and history of philosophy. Her current research focuses on emotional attachment – and in particular, on questions concerning moral agency and ethical treatment that arise when considering certain attachment-related pathologies, including psychopathy and (some forms of) addiction. For more, visit here.

September 22, 2017
4:00 PM-6:00 PM
5 Washington Pl, Room 202 New York, NY 10003

Reception to follow

Implicit Moral Attitudes: Lessons from Psychology for Philosophy and Law

This talk describes and criticizes traditional approaches to moral psychology, which try to understand moral judgments through questionnaires. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that it is more accurate and illuminating to use tests of implicit attitudes modeled on tests of implicit racial attitudes. Sinnott-Armstrong explains one such test that we have used with great success in predicting notonly personality variables but also behavior (charity donations and voting). Finally, he draws out potential lessons for traditional issues in moral philosophy and legal responsibility.

 

Walter Sinnott–Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke University in the Philosophy Department, the Kenan Institute for Ethics, the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Law School. He publishes widely in ethics, moral psychology and neuroscience, philosophy of law, epistemology, informal logic, and philosophy of religion. 

Friday, March 3, 2017 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM
5 Washington Pl, Room 202
New York, NY, 10003

Reception to follow