YiLin Lee
In 1972, Irving Janis, a research psychologist, coined the term “groupthink” to refer to a phenomenon that occurs when members of a group prioritize unanimity over a realistic appraisal of the situation at hand. Since then, this theory has been frequently applied to other poor group decisions, including political incidents like the Bay of Pigs and scientific mistakes like the Challenger (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Hogg & Hain, 2000). In modern society, a majority of decisions are highly dependent on groups. Small-scale groups such as sports teams, families, and even students enrolled in the same class make decisions on a daily basis. Furthermore, large-scale and high-stakes groups such as the United States Senate, jury panels, Boards of Directors, and the United Nations are all examples of groups in charge of decisions that have widespread consequences. These psychological concepts such as groupthink have consistently been applied to the realm of politics in attempts to understand the trends of large-scale social movements (Walker, 2002). The danger of groupthink is pervasive in these contexts, where the prioritization of solidarity and disregard for personal opinions could result in poor decisions detrimental for the group’s members and non-members.
A poor or defective group decision influenced by groupthink is characterized by a failure to consider other, more favorable alternatives before reaching a conclusion (Baron, 2005). For a decision-making process to be considered defective, it must fulfill one of four dimensions: (1) failure to create contingency plans, (2) lack of information search, (3) biased assessment of costs and benefits, and (4) incomplete consideration of all decision options (Baron, 2005). To prevent groupthink from occurring, it is important to understand these dimensions and the factors that enable the process. An example of groupthink that has more large-scale implications could be that of the United States Senate, since Senators are expected to vote in front of other members in ways that other Congressional representatives are not. While the US Senate drafts authorizing, appropriations, and entitlement legislation to represent and protect the diverse interests of the United States people, the process of groupthink directly counters the organization’s goal in giving a voice to all citizens equally. Thus, this paper explored the four dimensions of defective decision-making processes through the case study of the United States Senate, in order to answer the following question: What are the antecedent conditions that lead to groupthink in decision-making processes, and how can their occurrence be prevented?
Perception of Anonymity
One of the major dimensions of defective decision-making that research on groupthink explores is the perception of anonymity within groups (Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002). High anonymity occurs when individual characteristics (e.g., sex, age, name) are withheld from other members of the group, and low anonymity occurs when the opposite is true (Pinsonneault & Heppel, 1997). The relationship between the perception of anonymity and the decision to conform in a group can be seen through group pressure, specifically when individual opinions are distorted by the majority view and the pressure for conformity overwhelms rational individual judgement (Tyson & Kaplowitz, 1977). For example, research finds that individuals who are not guaranteed anonymity are more likely to conform to group opinions than those who are (Tsikerdekis, 2013).
Increased anonymity within the group is also associated with increased social influence; since individuals cannot be identified by other group members, they are more willing to bring forth dissenting opinions (Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002). One way to decrease the pressure to conform would be by increasing individual anonymity. However, in high-profile groups such as the United States Senate, anonymity is not something that can be granted to group members. While voting in the House of Representatives is done electronically and individually, voting in the United States Senate occurs in front of all other members, which is intended to hold Senators accountable for representing the opinions of the people who voted for them (Bullock & Brady, 1983). However, literature on groupthink suggests that this practice is counter-productive, since decreased anonymity is associated with an increased tendency for groupthink, and Senators might conform to larger group practices as a result (Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002; Tsikerdekis, 2013; Tyson & Kaplowitz, 1977).
Social Identity
Another preceding condition studied in groupthink research is social identity and the perception of group members’ views by other members of the group. Social identity theory claims that part of a person’s self-concept is dependent on the groups with which they are associated; thus, a person’s view of themselves is heavily influenced by the group(s) they identify with (Tajfel, 1974). Individuals with strong identification to the group are more likely to express their concerns with the group decision, while those who weakly identify with the group are more likely to change their opinion to fit into their perceptions of other group members’ feelings (Packer, 2009). Thus, weakly identified individuals are at a heightened risk of falling into groupthink (Packer, 2009). These differences in social identity create a discrepancy between individual and public concerns, especially when one believes that other members of the group also share the same opinions as an individual (MacDougall & Baum, 1997).
An example of social identity influencing groupthink is the idea of ‘Party over Policy’ in the United States Senate, which occurs when Senators, who must vote in front of others, vote in line with their party affiliation, rather than considering the possible consequences for their constituents (Cohen, 2003). Instead of objectively considering policy content, Senators align themselves with their political party and advocate for social policy based upon the party’s stated position. Since a Senator’s public identity is largely tied to the strength of their affiliation with a political party, Senators are required to present themselves as strongly tied to the group identity in order to further their political career (Liu & Srivastava, 2015). Unfortunately, this public identification and need for strong social identity also leaves Senators more vulnerable to groupthink.
Group Cohesion
Another aspect of groupthink that has implications for the US Senate is that of group cohesion, which is defined as the degree to which members wish to maintain group membership or agree with each other (Kim, 2001). Research on the impact of group cohesion on group productivity has found that higher group cohesion increases positive feelings about the group’s decision (McCauley, 1989; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1993). However, these positive feelings about group decisions and high levels of agreement within a group also allow for collusion to occur, which is defined as collaboration between members in order to satisfy needs hidden from the larger group (Schruijer, 2018). As individuals become increasingly concerned with forming new social relationships and increasing social cohesion, the opportunities and space to present dissenting opinions diminishes. For these reasons, strong group cohesion has been linked with a higher likelihood of groupthink (Baron, 2005). In fact, high group cohesion increases the potential for groupthink through increased identification with one’s social group, and thus, group performance tends to deteriorate as social cohesion increases (Packer, 2009; Rovio, Eskol, Kozub, Duda, & Lintunen, 2009; Turner et al., 1993).
The influence of group cohesion in the Senate can be seen through the occurrence of ‘Party over Policy’ mentality as well. Senators wish to maintain group membership so as to build their political career, since Senators who display strong ties to political parties are more likely to get voted into office than Senators who do not (Liu & Srivastava, 2015). The need to maintain group membership (in this case, membership with a certain political party) prevents Senators from presenting or expressing opposing political opinions, thus increasing the likelihood of groupthink in these settings (Rovio et al., 2009; Turner et al., 1993).
Conclusion
In a group such as the United States Senate, decision-making processes result in widespread repercussions for members and non-members. If no steps are taken to prevent the phenomenon from occurring, these important groups risk making defective, incomplete decisions that may have consequences for society at large. As anonymity is not a factor that can be manipulated or changed, especially for groups based on representation such as the US Senate, it is important that other influencing factors of groupthink are taken into consideration during the decision-making process. Social identity is another factor that is difficult to control for in the United States Senate, where members are directly voted for by the citizens.
Thus, while anonymity and social identity are hard to mitigate, there are ways of limiting the influence of group cohesion in the United States Senate, especially since the Senate, in particular, has unique subgroups within the larger group. Thus, future research could explore the consequences of subgroups that are not cohesive within themselves, such as the current lack of cohesion amongst Democrats and Republicans in the US Senate. This lack of subgroup cohesion in the United States Senate could actually allow for more dissenting opinions to be brought forth, thus countering the “Party over Policy” mentality.
Seminal literature also assumes that groupthink is an unconscious act of agreement due to a desire for unanimity within the group, but there is little work exploring those who consciously conform to majority opinions (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Baron, 2005; Janis, 1972; Packer, 2009). In the United States Senate, a conscious decision to agree with majority opinion rather than carefully considering all information has negative implications for current bills under consideration (e.g., Border and Refugee Assistance Act of 2019; Assault Weapons Ban of 2019; Medicare for All Act of 2019) that have heavy party leanings. Since groupthink seems to be almost inevitable in all large groups, this current review highlights how these defective decision-making processes play out in a vital decision-making body like the United States Senate, clarifying the need for support of dissenting opinions and ultimately increasing the effectiveness and quality of these decisions.
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