Given the importance of data sharing between mobility providers, it is a highly understudied topic area. Qi Liu studies the properties of data sharing between competitive mobility (transit) providers as a coopetitive game with coalition structure formation for partitioning data sharing and Bayesian game to compute the value of noncooperative equilibria under such a setting. We highlight that having everyone share with each other is not a foregone conclusion, even under complementary services (e.g. multimodal trips). The insights from this work can help guide policy toward more incentive-aware data sharing structures, quantifying subsidies or revenue allocations that can encourage cooperation, and for mobility aggregators (e.g. Whim, Transit App, Cubic, and the like) to consider data sharing requirements between different members.

The work was funded by NSF CMMI-1652735 and USDOT #69A3551747124.

Link to paper: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261522001126