by Elliot Ward
One of the more unique features of Chinese cities is the phenomenon of “urban villages”. These are former rural areas that, with rapid urbanization and rural-urban migration, have been enveloped by ever expanding cities. What once was farmland is sold to developers and annexed as city territory, while the village itself remains in the hands of the villagers. Unincorporated and administratively independent, the villages often become migrant housing communities known for poor sanitation, substandard roads and infrastructure, cramped living conditions, and crime.
The particular state of these “urban villages” is in large part the legacy of one of the major elements of China’s development path, the separation of urban and rural life. From just about day one of communist rule, the country was divided into urban and rural districts which not only created different systems of administration, the unequal distribution of public investment, and a history of divergent government policy, but led to social stratification enshrined in the hukou registration system, which to this day labels individuals as either rural or urban with power over the quality and location of public services a person can receive.
“Urban villages” represent this division from two angles: through quirks in land and administrative policy that have allowed the development of these non-city areas within cities, and through the concentration of rural migrants in urban villages that makes them microcosms for the challenges and disenfranchisement facing rural migrants hoping to make it in the city.
Urban and rural areas have very different property systems in China. In rural areas land is collectively owned, and individuals with rural hukou registration are entitled to a portion of land on which to work and live. As cities expand, developers work with city officials to buy land from nearby villages and incorporate it into the city administrative area. This is particularly profitable because land markets are heavily controlled, often meaning a big price gap between what developers pay to villagers and what they can sell for after the land has been incorporated into cities and developed. Further, because village land is collectively owned, decision-making power over land sales falls into the hands of a few local leaders, setting the stage for influence peddling and leading to forced evictions of resistant residents. The worst cases have led to riots and even self-immolations as villagers resist eviction or protest compensation levels.
Urban villages are in part a result of avoiding the thorny issue of compensation and relocation. As developers are looking for the best deal and the least headaches, they often choose to buy only the farmland surrounding villages, but not the village residential area itself. In addition to the unwanted trouble of potential resistance from disgruntled local villagers, and in part because of general public disapproval of forced evictions, there are increasingly complicated rules governing compensation for relocated residents, making the whole affair expensive and unpleasant. Add that villagers realize they will soon be property owners in the middle of the city and you have reasons why developers don’t want to buy and villages don’t want to sell the residential core of urbanizing rural areas.
So while the city extends its network of services—roads, sewers, schools, hospitals—and massive housing
complexes go up, the village is left to fend for itself, an unincorporated but entirely surrounded not-technically- city within the city. But there is an economic opportunity for villagers: with relatively little investment, and unburdened by city codes, villagers construct apartment buildings and become landlords. Over a few years, what was once a village of a few families becomes an urban area housing hundreds or thousands.
And while some of these landlords become quite wealthy, living conditions in the urban villages suffer. Administratively divorced from the city, service provision is left to the original village leadership. Beyond the reach of city police and organized garbage collection, devoid of connections to public transportation, denied recognition by city school districts, and without links to city sewer and water systems or incorporation into almost any other city services, not even the best intentioned village leaders could be expected to provide much. To be sure, some urban villages do better than others, but most seem to descend into dirt, poverty, dilapidation, and crime.
Borne of the administrative quirks separating rural and urban, the residents of urban villages represent the human side of the rural- urban divide. Drawn to the city by jobs and the promise of social mobility, urban village residents are disproportionately rural migrants, a manifestation of how inequality and discriminatory practices push rural hukou registration holders to the fringes of society. For example, while urban villages certainly offer the benefit of lower rents, rural migrants are barred from many low-income housing options. Much of government subsidized housing is limited to those holding local urban hukou. The lack of public services within the urban village reflects rural hukou holders’ ineligibility for many other public services, with schools, hospitals, and employment opportunities restricted by hukou status.
A precise count of urban villages in China is probably impossible, but in the biggest cities, best estimates put the number in the hundreds. The phenomenon is perhaps most famous in southern factory cities. Guangzhou is reported to have 277 urban villages housing 1 million people, and Shenzhen with 241 urban villages housing more than 2 million. I’ve heard numbers of more than 150 in Beijing. The issue makes it into the newspapers sometimes, and there have been cases of redevelopment that usually involve demolition and relocation and have been criticized for simply moving, not fixing, the problem.
The central government recently concluded a major high-level policy meeting, the outcome of which included broad pronouncements for a new direction in the country’s urbanization strategy. If followed, the new direction could do much to temper the rural-urban divisions that have made urban villages what they are. While still only broad statements of intention, the official document endorsed the idea of unifying the land administration system to eliminate divided rural-urban land markets. It also promoted the extension of experiments in some cities to ease or eliminate the distinction between rural and urban hukou registration status in the provision of services.
These are promising developments. And while many commentators believe in this case the government will follow through, there is a long road ahead. Whatever the outcome, for the time being, urban villages remain a reminder of the ongoing dichotomy between rural and urban that continues to shape the social as well as physical landscape of China.