HEADQUARTERS
7th Comm. Bn. (-) Rein.
FPO PacFlt Support
FMF SF 9002x
May 2025
Fm. Charlie.Two SU Alpha.
To. CMG, FMF
Subj. Intervención México–Tri-Lateral Accord–Cartel Cessation of Criminal Activities.
Ref: DivO 5750.2B
(a) MCO 5750.4
(b) FMF Pac 5750.8
(c) DivO 57550.2B
Encl: (1) In accordance with the above provisions of references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.
PART I. INTRODUCTION A hypothetical title for an agreement between Mexico, the United States, and cartels to halt smuggling and trafficking could be:
“Trilateral Accord for the Cessation of Transnational Smuggling and Trafficking Activities” (TACT-Smuggling/Trafficking)
This title reflects cooperation among the three parties-Mexico, the U.S., and cartels-focused on ending illegal smuggling and trafficking operations. It aligns with ongoing efforts by both governments to combat cartel activities through law enforcement cooperation, sanctions, and pressure tactics, as described in recent U.S. and Mexico initiatives.
PART II. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
A hypothetical organizational chart to coordinate a stand-down of smuggling and trafficking among the United States, Mexico, and cartels would involve a trilateral structure combining government and cartel leadership with clear communication and enforcement roles:
A hypothetical organizational chart to coordinate a stand-down of smuggling and trafficking among the United States, Mexico, and cartels would involve a trilateral structure combining government and cartel leadership with clear communication and enforcement roles:
1. United States Government Leadership
a. President of the United States
b. Secretary of Homeland Security
c. Attorney General
d. DEA Administrator
e. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
c. Attorney General
d. DEA Administrator
e. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
2. Mexican Government Leadership
a. President of Mexico
b. Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection
c. Attorney General of Mexico
d. Head of Mexican National Guard
e. Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.
a. President of Mexico
b. Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection
c. Attorney General of Mexico
d. Head of Mexican National Guard
e. Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.
3. Cartel Leadership (Hypothetical Representatives for Negotiation)
a. Sinaloa Cartel Leader
b. Jalisco New Generation Cartel Leader
c. Gulf Cartel Leader
e. Other major cartel representatives
a. Sinaloa Cartel Leader
b. Jalisco New Generation Cartel Leader
c. Gulf Cartel Leader
e. Other major cartel representatives
4. Coordination Structure Trilateral Security Council:
a. Composed of top officials from the U.S. and Mexican governments and designated cartel negotiators, tasked with setting strategic objectives and overseeing compliance.
b. Joint Intelligence and Enforcement Task Force: Includes DEA, FBI, Mexican Federal Police, and cartel-appointed liaison officers to share intelligence and coordinate operations to prevent violence and trafficking.
c. Economic and Social Development Committee: Focused on reducing cartel incentives by promoting legal economic opportunities in cartel-controlled regions, involving U.S. and Mexican economic agencies.
d. Monitoring and Compliance Unit: Independent body with representatives from both governments and neutral international observers to monitor adherence to the stand-down agreement.
e. This structure would require unprecedented cooperation and trust, with cartel leaders agreeing to cease trafficking and violence in exchange for negotiated terms.
b. Joint Intelligence and Enforcement Task Force: Includes DEA, FBI, Mexican Federal Police, and cartel-appointed liaison officers to share intelligence and coordinate operations to prevent violence and trafficking.
c. Economic and Social Development Committee: Focused on reducing cartel incentives by promoting legal economic opportunities in cartel-controlled regions, involving U.S. and Mexican economic agencies.
d. Monitoring and Compliance Unit: Independent body with representatives from both governments and neutral international observers to monitor adherence to the stand-down agreement.
e. This structure would require unprecedented cooperation and trust, with cartel leaders agreeing to cease trafficking and violence in exchange for negotiated terms.
(1) Current frameworks like the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control and the High-Level Security Dialogue provide a foundation but do not include cartel participation.
(2) The U.S. designation of cartels as terrorist organizations complicates direct negotiation but highlights the need for innovative approaches.
5. Agency Name U.S.-Mexico Border Compliance and Verification Agency (B-CVA)
a. Mission
a. Mission
(1) To monitor, verify, and enforce cartel compliance with the halt of smuggling and trafficking activities, ensuring transparency and cooperation between U.S. and Mexican authorities.
b. Key Functions Monitoring & Intelligence:
b. Key Functions Monitoring & Intelligence:
(1) Use advanced surveillance, data analytics, and joint intelligence sharing to detect any illicit activity or breaches.
c. Verification & Auditing:
c. Verification & Auditing:
(1) Conduct regular inspections and audits of border crossings, financial transactions, and known cartel networks.
d. Liaison & Coordination:
d. Liaison & Coordination:
(1) Act as a bridge between U.S. agencies (DEA, DHS, FBI, Treasury) and Mexican law enforcement to maintain continuous communication and cooperation.
6. Enforcement: Coordinate with law enforcement to respond swiftly to violations, including sanctions, arrests, and asset seizures.
a. Community Outreach: Work with border communities to gather intelligence and reduce cartel influence.
b. Structure Joint U.S.-Mexico Leadership: Co-led by appointed officials from both countries to ensure mutual trust and accountability.
c. Multidisciplinary Teams: Comprising law enforcement, financial crime experts, intelligence analysts, and legal advisors.
d. Technology Division: Focused on monitoring drug shipments, human trafficking, and financial flows using cutting-edge tech.
a. Community Outreach: Work with border communities to gather intelligence and reduce cartel influence.
b. Structure Joint U.S.-Mexico Leadership: Co-led by appointed officials from both countries to ensure mutual trust and accountability.
c. Multidisciplinary Teams: Comprising law enforcement, financial crime experts, intelligence analysts, and legal advisors.
d. Technology Division: Focused on monitoring drug shipments, human trafficking, and financial flows using cutting-edge tech.
7. Compliance Review Board: Independent body to review agency actions and cartel compliance reports.
a. Accountability Measures Transparent reporting to both governments and the public.
b. Regular third-party audits.
Clear metrics for success, such as reductions in trafficking incidents and cartel-related violence.
c. This agency would leverage existing cooperation frameworks and address the complex challenges of cartel operations, which include fentanyl trafficking, human smuggling, and money laundering.
a. Accountability Measures Transparent reporting to both governments and the public.
b. Regular third-party audits.
Clear metrics for success, such as reductions in trafficking incidents and cartel-related violence.
c. This agency would leverage existing cooperation frameworks and address the complex challenges of cartel operations, which include fentanyl trafficking, human smuggling, and money laundering.
PART III. NARRATIVE SUMMARY
A hypothetical scenario where Mexican cartels agree to halt smuggling and trafficking into the US might unfold as follows:
A hypothetical scenario where Mexican cartels agree to halt smuggling and trafficking into the US might unfold as follows:
1. The US and Mexican governments launch a comprehensive, well-funded bilateral initiative combining enhanced law enforcement cooperation, economic incentives, and social programs to reduce cartel influence and provide alternative livelihoods in cartel-controlled regions.
a. The initiative includes expanded legal migration pathways and expedited asylum processing to reduce migrants’ reliance on smugglers, undermining cartel profits from human trafficking.
b. In exchange for substantial financial aid, infrastructure investment, and reduced military pressure, major cartels like Sinaloa and Jalisco agree to cease drug and human smuggling operations into the US, motivated by the prospect of long-term stability and legitimate business opportunities.
c. Cartels receive guarantees of non-interference in certain local economic activities and protection from aggressive military crackdowns, fostering a fragile but enforceable truce.
d. Both governments enhance border security technology and intelligence sharing to monitor compliance, while community programs aim to reduce violence and cartel recruitment.
d. Over time, cartel revenues from smuggling drop sharply, and violence related to trafficking declines, though challenges remain in fully dismantling criminal networks.
e. This scenario hinges on unprecedented cooperation, significant resources, and addressing root causes of migration and cartel power, which have historically made such agreements difficult to achieve.
a. The initiative includes expanded legal migration pathways and expedited asylum processing to reduce migrants’ reliance on smugglers, undermining cartel profits from human trafficking.
b. In exchange for substantial financial aid, infrastructure investment, and reduced military pressure, major cartels like Sinaloa and Jalisco agree to cease drug and human smuggling operations into the US, motivated by the prospect of long-term stability and legitimate business opportunities.
c. Cartels receive guarantees of non-interference in certain local economic activities and protection from aggressive military crackdowns, fostering a fragile but enforceable truce.
d. Both governments enhance border security technology and intelligence sharing to monitor compliance, while community programs aim to reduce violence and cartel recruitment.
d. Over time, cartel revenues from smuggling drop sharply, and violence related to trafficking declines, though challenges remain in fully dismantling criminal networks.
e. This scenario hinges on unprecedented cooperation, significant resources, and addressing root causes of migration and cartel power, which have historically made such agreements difficult to achieve.
PART IV. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
1. A dialogue between Mexican cartels and the U.S. government would likely focus on several critical issues:
a. Drug trafficking and smuggling routes: Addressing the flow of illicit drugs, including fentanyl, across the U.S.-Mexico border, and efforts to disrupt these operations.
b. Cartel designation and legal implications:
a. Drug trafficking and smuggling routes: Addressing the flow of illicit drugs, including fentanyl, across the U.S.-Mexico border, and efforts to disrupt these operations.
b. Cartel designation and legal implications:
(1) The U.S. has designated major Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which affects law enforcement tactics, asset freezes, and prosecution strategies.
c. Security cooperation and intelligence sharing:
c. Security cooperation and intelligence sharing:
(1) Discussions on joint efforts to combat cartels, including intelligence exchange, training, and coordinated law enforcement actions, while balancing Mexico’s sovereignty concerns.
d. Cartel violence and terrorism tactics:
d. Cartel violence and terrorism tactics:
(1) Addressing cartel violence in Mexico and potential threats in the U.S., including cyber operations and retaliation risks.
e. Corruption and governance:
e. Corruption and governance:
(1) Tackling corruption within Mexican institutions that enable cartel operations, a key obstacle to effective enforcement.
f. Economic and social factors:
f. Economic and social factors:
(1) Exploring ways to reduce drug demand in the U.S. and support economic development in Mexico to undermine cartel recruitment and influence.
g. Potential U.S. unilateral actions: The possibility and consequences of U.S. military or covert operations against cartels in Mexico, which remain highly sensitive and controversial.
h. Overall, the dialogue would balance enforcement, legal, diplomatic, and socio-economic dimensions to address the complex transnational threat posed by cartels.
g. Potential U.S. unilateral actions: The possibility and consequences of U.S. military or covert operations against cartels in Mexico, which remain highly sensitive and controversial.
h. Overall, the dialogue would balance enforcement, legal, diplomatic, and socio-economic dimensions to address the complex transnational threat posed by cartels.
2. A hypothetical summit between Mexican cartels and the US government is highly unlikely and unprecedented given the current context of escalating conflict and military posturing.
a. The US has increasingly treated Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, with recent designations granting enhanced counterterrorism powers, including covert operations and potential military action on Mexican soil. b. The US approach involves a combination of military pressure, covert CIA and special forces operations, and diplomatic efforts to compel cartels to cease drug trafficking and sever ties with hostile states.
PART V. SEQUENTIAL ASPECTS
A hypothetical series of events leading to a trilateral accord between the U.S., Mexico, and cartels for cessation in smuggling and trafficking could unfold as follows:
A hypothetical series of events leading to a trilateral accord between the U.S., Mexico, and cartels for cessation in smuggling and trafficking could unfold as follows:
1. Escalating violence and mutual losses:
a. Continued cartel violence destabilizes Mexican regions and increases U.S. opioid deaths, pressuring all parties to seek peace.
2. Backchannel negotiations:
a. Mexican government intermediaries and U.S. officials initiate secret talks with cartel leaders, leveraging existing cartel territorial divisions and alliances to propose a ceasefire and regulated smuggling corridors.
3. Cartel leadership consolidation:
a. Cartels unify or form alliances to reduce infighting, increasing their bargaining power and willingness to negotiate for stability and profit preservation.
4. Mutual recognition of interests:
The U.S. acknowledges the limits of interdiction, Mexico seeks reduced violence, and cartels desire legal protections and reduced law enforcement pressure, creating common ground.
5. Drafting the accord:
a. Terms include cessation of violent turf wars, regulated trafficking routes with cartel cooperation on smuggling reduction, and anti-corruption commitments from Mexican authorities, with U.S. offering economic incentives and scaled-back enforcement in exchange.
6. Public announcement and enforcement:
a. The accord is publicly announced, with joint U.S.-Mexico monitoring and cartel self-policing to maintain peace and reduce trafficking-related violence.
b. This scenario mirrors past cartel territorial pacts and recognizes the complex interplay of corruption, enforcement limits, and cartel business models.
b. This scenario mirrors past cartel territorial pacts and recognizes the complex interplay of corruption, enforcement limits, and cartel business models.
PART VI. CIVIL AFFAIRS
International press and social media might spin a trilateral accord between the U.S., Mexico, and cartels to halt smuggling and trafficking in various ways:
International press and social media might spin a trilateral accord between the U.S., Mexico, and cartels to halt smuggling and trafficking in various ways:
1. U.S. mainstream media (e.g., CNN, The New York Times) could frame it as a controversial but pragmatic step toward reducing violence and drug flow, highlighting government efforts to combat cartels while questioning the ethics of negotiating with criminal groups.
2. Mexican outlets (e.g., El Universal, Milenio) might emphasize sovereignty and cooperation, portraying the accord as a necessary evil to restore peace and security, while also scrutinizing cartel influence on politics.
3. International media (e.g., BBC, Al Jazeera) could analyze it as a complex case of state-criminal collusion, reflecting on the blurred lines between law enforcement and organized crime in the region.
4. Social media platforms would likely see polarized reactions: some users praising any move to reduce violence, others condemning perceived legitimization of cartels.
5. Cartels themselves might use social media to spin the accord as a victory or peace deal to boost their image and recruitment, given their active use of platforms like Facebook for smuggling and propaganda.
6. Communist nations might spin a tri-party agreement between the U.S., Mexico, and cartels to halt smuggling and trafficking as evidence of U.S. imperialism and collusion with corrupt elements to control and suppress Mexico and its people.
a. They could argue that the U.S. is using the cartel issue to justify military intervention and economic pressure (tariffs, sanctions) on Mexico, undermining its sovereignty and exploiting internal conflicts for geopolitical gain.
(1) The narrative might emphasize that the U.S. is framing cartels as “terrorist organizations” to legitimize harsh counterterrorism measures, covert operations, and military presence in Mexico, portraying these actions as a form of neo-colonialism or proxy warfare rather than genuine cooperation against crime. (2) Additionally, communist rhetoric might highlight the historical complicity and corruption within Mexican political and military elites who have long benefited from trafficking, suggesting the agreement is a façade that ignores deeper systemic issues and perpetuates inequality and violence.
(3) They could also claim the agreement serves U.S. capitalist interests by protecting drug markets and controlling migration flows rather than addressing the root causes of trafficking and smuggling.
b. In sum, the spin would frame the agreement as a U.S.-led coercive strategy to dominate Mexico and suppress popular resistance, rather than a genuine multilateral effort to combat crime.
6. Overall, the narrative would vary from cautious optimism about reducing trafficking to deep concerns over cartel empowerment and rule-of-law erosion.
PART VII. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Key supporting documents and evidence that would typically be associated with such an agreement include:
a. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements:
a. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements:
(1) Existing U.S.-Mexico agreements on drug trafficking and border security, such as memorandums of understanding and joint law enforcement protocols.
b. Sanctions and Designations:
b. Sanctions and Designations:
(1) U.S. Treasury and State Department documents designating cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and imposing sanctions on cartel members and entities.
c. Law Enforcement Coordination Records:
c. Law Enforcement Coordination Records:
(1) Documentation of joint operations and enforcement actions between U.S. and Mexican agencies (DEA, FBI, HSI, Mexican law enforcement).
d. Alerts and Advisories:
(1) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) alerts and red flag typologies related to smuggling and trafficking schemes.
Indictments and Legal Filings: Federal indictments and court records detailing cartel operations, alliances, and enforcement actions.
e. Intelligence Assessments:
Indictments and Legal Filings: Federal indictments and court records detailing cartel operations, alliances, and enforcement actions.
e. Intelligence Assessments:
(1) Reports and intelligence sharing agreements regarding cartel activities, trafficking routes, and enforcement outcomes.
f. Press Releases and Official Statements:
f. Press Releases and Official Statements:
(1) Public announcements from U.S. and Mexican government agencies on enforcement actions, sanctions, and policy shifts.
2. No public evidence exists of a formal tri-party agreement including cartels as official signatories; most documents reflect government-to-government cooperation and enforcement actions against cartels, not with their participation.
3. Synthetic intelligence: Perplexity AI
4. Current news, media platforms, outlets, social media venues.
5. Image: https://easy-peasy.ai/ai-image-generator/images/mexican-gangsters-flamboyant-weapons-neon-lit-alley
6. Report: JC-Lima, NCTC/R. (204xxxx-2533), FB Tango.
JTF-SB 2025
3/LRC/cr1/5750
CMCC NR _____3______
Ser. No. 040-25
COPY _1__ OF __10__COPIES
May 2025
END OF REPORT