BORDERLANDS

v. 25, i. 03.08.25. Exclusive to “X”

Word Press Publishing at New York University

James C. L’Angelle, Editor-in-Chief

Introduction

     The recent statement by the White House concerning a “bilateral” treaty between the United States and Japan from 1960 raised the issue of the former’s lack of a security-military commitment, with the latter doing the heavy lifting. It comes as no surprise in light of other treaties such as NATO in Europe with the U.S. again carrying The Weight.

     Part and parcel to how it all unfolded had to do with certain ambiguous positions by the two nations coupled with the American public not totally informed of the agreement. The situation was quite different in Japan.

     (Image credit: The Rock Hill, SC Herald, 18 June 1960, page 1)

Methodology

     The research follows the usual pattern with Capsules containing artificial intelligence (AI) queries, which have their reference links in-text, and a link to the AI at the end of each query. Depending on what can be recovered from primary sources, the next sections might be Congressional Record and Newspaper Archives. Beyond that, Notes will make an effort to clarify the information found in the previous sections, followed by an Afterword.

Capsules

(Begin Perplexity-AI)

japan united states security pact of 1960

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, commonly known as the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, was signed on January 19, 1960, and took effect on June 23, 19601. This treaty revised and replaced the original 1951 security agreement, significantly improving the terms for Japan12.

Key aspects of the 1960 treaty include:

1. Mutual defense commitment: The U.S. agreed to defend Japan if attacked12.

2. Prior consultation: The U.S. must consult with Japan before using forces based there1.

3. Removal of domestic interference clause: The U.S. lost the right to intervene in Japanese domestic disputes1.

4. Term limit: The treaty specified an initial 10-year term, after which either party could abrogate it with one year’s notice12.

The treaty allowed the continued presence of U.S. military bases on Japanese soil while committing both nations to mutual defense1. It has remained unchanged since 1960, making it one of the longest-lasting treaties between great powers since 16481.

The revision process was contentious, leading to the massive Anpo protests in Japan, the largest in the country’s history1. Despite this opposition, the treaty was ratified and has formed the basis of the U.S.-Japan military alliance ever since15.

Today, the treaty remains a cornerstone of U.S.-Japan relations, with nearly 50,000 American troops still stationed in Japan78.

https://www.perplexity.ai/search/japan-united-states-security-p-EZa133QqQjO5Ug306ea3Sw

What were the main reasons for the widespread opposition to the 1960 treaty in Japan

The widespread opposition to the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in Japan stemmed from several key factors:

1. Fear of military entanglement: Many Japanese were concerned that the continued presence of U.S. bases in Japan would contribute to international tensions and potentially involve Japan in conflicts against its will1.

2. Nuclear threat: There were fears that the alliance with the U.S. would make Japan a target for nuclear attacks from the Soviet Union or China1.

3. Loss of independence: Critics argued that the treaty effectively deprived Japan of its independence and was a form of capitulation to Washington1.

4. Pacifist sentiment: Many intellectuals and citizens, influenced by post-war pacifism, opposed anything that appeared to be a return to militarism1.

5. Distrust of Prime Minister Kishi: Much of the anger was directed at Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, whose heavy-handed tactics in pushing the treaty reminded many of pre-war authoritarianism26.

6. Desire for neutrality: Some groups hoped for Japan to take a more neutral stance in the Cold War, rather than aligning closely with the United States7.

7. Recent conflicts with U.S. forces: Incidents involving U.S. troops and Japanese residents, such as conflicts over military bases and artillery ranges, had heightened anti-American sentiment3.

8. Controversial ratification process: Kishi’s attempt to force a vote on the treaty by removing opposition members from the Diet chamber sparked widespread outrage and intensified the protests3.

These factors combined to create a broad coalition of opponents, including political parties, labor unions, student groups, and ordinary citizens, leading to some of the largest protests in Japan’s modern history27.

https://www.perplexity.ai/search/what-were-the-main-reasons-for-VPQXlfrzTFm9DIe7DtYY.Q

when was the us-japan security pact of 1960 ratified by the senate

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 was ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 22, 19603. The Senate approved the treaty with a vote of 90 to 2, just seven hours before the treaty was officially exchanged between U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II and Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama3. This ratification process occurred with unprecedented speed and secrecy, as the treaty became effective on June 23, 196013.

It’s worth noting that the ratification and exchange of instruments happened under unusual circumstances due to widespread protests in Japan. The official ratification instruments had to be smuggled to Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi for his signature in a candy box to avoid notice from protesters1. The treaty automatically took effect once the ratification instruments were exchanged between Japanese and American officials in Tokyo1

https://www.perplexity.ai/search/when-was-the-us-japan-security-TRUXfUh9SSuIssmakZWaLw

(End Perplexity-AI)

Congressional Record

Congressional Record (House, 16 June 1960, pages 12941-42)

GPO-CRECB-1960-pt10-3-2.pdf

WE MUST UNDERSTAND RECENT EVENTS IN JAPAN 

     Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and include a statement. 

     The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado? There was no objection. 

     Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, the distressing events now occurring in Japan prompt me to call to the attention of the Members a statement signed by 400 clergymen in the United States, from all parts of this great Nation. I think it deserves a thoughtful study by every American, and especially the thoughtful attention of the U.S. Senate.

     We need to understand events in Japan in more historical terms than simply declaring that those who disagree are Communists. Much damage has already been done. Before it is too late to make amends, I trust Americans will reexamine this proposed mutual security pact. The opportunities to encourage democracy will not be enhanced by rushing approval of a basic course of action which is fundamentally opposed by a significant part of the whole community. Great national purposes such as justify international treaties should have widespread popular support throughout the countries which are party to them. Otherwise, with the first change in administration. the treaty will be renounced. We should not assume that so fragile a reed represents a powerful sword or a strong shield. statement follows: 

     The undersigned, as a result of our deep desire for total world disarmament and our respect for the Japanese Constitution’s renunciation of war and military preparations, join in issuing this statement to our fellow citizens: 

     The United States and Japan have concluded a little publicized series of negotiations that will become a treaty of military alliance if it is signed and ratified by both countries. The draft of this “Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty” will extend for another 10 years the stationing of United States forces in Japan. It obligates Japan to resist and to retaliate against any attack on U.S. bases. It requires Japan to have sufficient military capability for modern war, a standard provision of all countries having mutual aid treaties with the United States. It also sanctions the use of Japanese forces outside of Japan. Moreover, there is no provision against the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and presumably it opens the way to Japan’s becoming a nuclear power. 

…

     This treaty is a clear violation of article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which contains the following: 

     “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.    

     “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential, will never b~ maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 

     This provision in the Japanese Constitution was in effect a joint declaration of the Japanese and American people. Not only was it widely hailed In both countries at the time but it was a Japanese concept encouraged and accepted by the United States then occupying Japan. 

…

     The present effort to circumvent the Japanese Constitution is the joint responsibility of the Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi and the U.S. Government. There is no popular demand in Japan or in the United States for a military alliance between the two countries. In fact, there is widespread opposition in Japan to any military alliance and especially to any pact that would provide an entering wedge for the eventual introduction of nuclear weapons. 

     During his first years in office Premier Kishi indicated that the Japanese Constitution precluded any military alliance with the United States. About a year ago he suggested changing the Constitution. Realizing how unpopular and impossible. this was he finally asserted that the Constitution permitted rearmament as well as a military pact with the United States. 

(House 12942)

     The pressures for this treaty include the following: 

1. The prewar Japanese industrial combines which were dissolved by MacArthur following the war have been resurrected. They profit from U.S. military aid and military contracts from U.S. forces in Japan who spend some $200 million annually for goods and services in Japan. They not only want to continue the presence of American troops in Japan but look forward to an expanded rearmament program by Japan itself. These economic pressures are exerted by leading industrialists within Kishi’s own party as well as in other ways. (John G. Roberts, “Remilitarization of Japan,” the Nation, Dec. 19, 1959.) 
2. American economic interests such as Westinghouse, General Electric, Western Electric, Standard Oil, and Alcoa are business allies of the Japanese industrial houses. American investments in Japan have jumped from a prewar figure of $119 million to over $600 million. More than 800 U.S. companies have profitable tieups with Japanese firms. In addition, loans totaling more than 2 billion have been made in the post war period. These loans were Government and World Bank loans. “The protection of this investment,” asserts one authority, “is a sufficient incentive for encouraging Japan to rearm” (idem). 
3. One reason Japan is so susceptible to economic pressure is the policy of the United States concerning trade with China. Even such trade as Japan might have had without strong objection from the United States was cut out by China in 1958 because of Japan’s close support of American policy. 
4. Beyond the economic pressures are the political ones. It was the complete destruction of Japan by the United States in World War II that created the power vacuum that in turn permitted the Chinese Communists to become the strongest power in Asia. In this day of rising Russian and Chinese power the United States has no powerful allies in Asia. The one hope for a great power in Asia allied to the United States is Japan. The United States, as a part of its policy of hostility toward China and its reluctance to work for disarmament, is concentrating on the rebuilding of a strong, militarized Japan. 

     In one sense the proposed treaty is simply the method of formally declaring and extending a policy the U.S. Government has pursued for some years. The Pentagon has not wanted American troops withdrawn from Japan. Therefore when the pressures for ending the occupation were mounting, we concluded a peace treaty with Japan which at one and the same time provided for withdrawal of occupation forces and for the right of Japan to retain foreign armed forces on her soil as a result of bilateral or multilateral agreements. 

     James Reston, in the November 19, 1951, New York Times, wrote: “The Pentagon would like to keep most of its buildings, its hotels, its golf courses. It would also like to retain legal jurisdiction over its personnel at all times and, of course, it is concerned to see that the Army post exchanges are well supplied with everything from American golf balls to liquor, tax free. 

     “The State Department recognizes that the Army has an argument on all these points, but in the political field the United States has made a great play with the theme that it was restoring Japan’s independence while the Russians were using their security treaty rights to dictate to their allies how they should live and serve the interests of the military authority. 

     “Mr. Rusk will talk with General Ridgway about trying to work out a compromise that will avoid suspicion that the United States is clamping a phony independence on Japan while at the same time preserving the facilities essential to the U.S. military command.” 

     The proposed treaty and the policies it promotes have some dangerous and far-reaching implications for our own people, the Japanese people, and for world peace. 

1. The treaty perpetrates the unsound economic policy of tying Japan both to the United States and to a military economy. Japan’s natural markets and sources of raw materials should be with her Asian neighbors rather than a distant United States. Japan’s economic base is such that she cannot support a huge military revival without becoming increasingly dependent upon the United States. This means further sacrifices for the U.S. taxpayer and a false economic base for the people of Japan. 
2. The treaty of alliance and the rearmament of Japan will not increase the stature of either Japan or the United States in Asia. Instead it will reawaken memories of Japanese militarism and occupation during World War II. It will tar Japan with the brush of Western imperialism for becoming an economic vassal and a military subaltern of the United States. It will indicate that the United States is intent on the continued military occupation of Japan while calling it by more acceptable names. Asians do not want British, French, Dutch or U.S. imperialism influencing or manipulating their decisions. They resent Western bases in Asia as we would resent Russian or Chinese bases in the Western Hemisphere. 
3. At the very moment when the Soviet Union has stated its readiness for total universal disarmament and has urged a relaxation of tensions, we are pursuing a policy that moves in the opposite direction. This policy will make it more difficult for both China and Russia to believe we want a relaxation of tensions. Already there is some indication that Khrushchev has had difficulty in convincing his Chinese ally of the value of relaxation of tension and the timing and value of disarmament when our Asian actions move in the opposite direction. Yet it is increasingly obvious that the world must begin to disarm and China must be included in such a disarmament program. 
4. Even from the military point of view there is no guarantee that the Japanese armed forces we build up will be dependable. Presumably Japanese armed forces will be useful to the United States only if we are involved in war with China or Russia or both. But if Japan is threatened with nuclear bombs or missiles is there any greater likelihood that Japan will submit to atomic bombardment and stay in the war than she did after only two such bombs in World War II? 
5. The imposition of the treaty upon the Japanese people may well lead to the vitiation of democracy in Japan. Only since World War II has anything like real popular democracy had a chance to flourish in Japan. Untrammeled by a military caste and with the big industrial empires broken by Mac Arthur’s occupation staff, popular democracy was given a chance in Japan. Now, however, Premier Kishi’s Liberal Democratic Party (which is the majority party), under pressure from the industrialists and disregarding the objections of opposition parties and public opinion polls, is insisting on the treaty. A communication from Prof. Iwao Ayusawa, chairman of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in Japan, says, “it is feared that the arrogance and tyranny of the majority which the government is indulging in may lead the people to a disbelief in democracy itself.” If the majority party becomes the voice of the industrialists, who together with the military were the real rulers of pre war Japan, there is not only grave danger of a repetition of such behind-the-scenes control of a facade of democracy but also danger of undemocratic popular reaction to such control. 

(Signed by 400 ministers.) 

(End Congressional Record)

Newspaper Archives

(Begin Newspaper Archives)

     TOKYO (AP)-The Soviet Union is trying harder than ever to smash Japan’s new security treaty with the United States. Red China, East Germany, North Vietnam and North Korea joined the campaign today. …

     Red China’s Foreign Minister Chen Yi in an article written for the Feb. 1 issue of Peiping’s magazine “Red Flag,” said the new U.S.- Japan treaty “marks the revival of Japanese militarism.”

(The Dothan, Alabama Eagle, 29 January 1960, page 7)

RIOTS BREAK OUT IN TOKYO

DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE. Waving a huge college flag and holding long sticks, students storm into the Japanese Diet (Parliament) grounds, which were picketed by police in armored trucks. At least 1 person was killed and another 473 injured as some 12,500 fanatic left wing students demonstrated against the impending arrival of President Eisenhower, the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the Kishi government in the latest uprising today (UPI Telephoto) 

(The Marion Ohio Star, 15 June 1960, Page 1)

(End Newspaper Archives)

Notes

     Ambivalence toward the treaty in the United States was probably due to its innocuous nature, and the fact Japan at the time, although under threat from the communist hordes of Asia, just didn’t have the appeal of all the sensational headlines in Europe, with the USSR, the Berlin Wall and the treaty’s fleeting trend in the news. After all, it had been voted on in January and wasn’t confirmed until June; the attention span of the Americans just may not have been able to stay in focus that long. Not so for Japan.

Afterword

     “The Red Flag (红旗; Hóngqí) was a prominent theoretical journal published by the Chinese Communist Party, not a newspaper from Peiping (now known as Beijing) It was established in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward era and served as a crucial media outlet for political theory and party ideology”

     The new White House administration calling into question by asking, “Who makes these deals” echoes Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid asking, “Who are those guys?” By now, most of the names are forgotten. Hopefully, this effort to recover the facts behind the pact have been useful to understanding the positions of both nations at the time facing a threat, surrounded by Butch and the Sundance at the end of the film, not by federali soldiers, but by communists.