#Caribbean Coup 01.06.26.1700pst: Head of state immunity a farce, no special UNSC emergency betrays complicity, #Maduro an emperor with no clothes in NYC court, #Venezuela on high alert, #Cuba honors it’s soldiers KIA in Op Absolute Resolve.
https://x.com/jameslangelle/status/2008704055649112447
https://cdn.britannica.com/80/172780-050-5A7439E3/Venezuelan-President-Nicolas-Maduro.jpg
Expand on maduro’s claim in NYC court he is still Venezuela president.
Nicolás Maduro told a federal judge in Manhattan that he remains the “president of my country” as part of a broader effort to frame his case as the illegal abduction and prosecution of a sitting head of state, not just an ordinary criminal defendant. He also pleaded not guilty and described himself as a “decent man” and “innocent,” reinforcing that narrative.
What Maduro said in court
When asked to confirm his identity, Maduro replied through an interpreter: “I am the president of Venezuela,” and later added, “I am still president of my country.”
He coupled this with a firm not‑guilty plea, saying “I am innocent. I am not guilty. I am a decent man.”
Why he insists he is still president
Maduro’s claim rests on his assertion that his 2024 reelection was legitimate and that his removal by a U.S. military operation amounts to a coup and “kidnapping” of a sitting leader.
In Caracas, his vice president Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as interim president after his capture, but Maduro and his supporters continue to treat that transition as imposed by foreign intervention, not a lawful succession.
The legal angle in U.S. court
His lawyer has signaled that the defense may argue he enjoys head‑of‑state immunity, implying that as Venezuela’s president he should not be tried in a U.S. court for actions taken while in office.
U.S. officials, however, do not recognize him as Venezuela’s legitimate president due to allegations of fraud in the 2024 election, which makes it very unlikely a U.S. court will accept immunity based on that claim.
International and political context
The United States led a military operation that seized Maduro in Caracas and transferred him to New York, prompting criticism at the U.N. that the action violated Venezuelan sovereignty and international law.
The current U.S. administration and several allies see him as an ousted or deposed leader rather than a sitting president, which directly contradicts his insistence in court that he still holds the presidency.
How have US courts ruled on foreign leader immunity cases before
U.S. courts have generally treated foreign leader immunity as a matter of federal common law that heavily defers to the executive branch’s recognition and immunity decisions, but with important limits, especially for former leaders and for serious international crimes. The core pattern is: if the State Department says a sitting, recognized head of state is immune, courts dismiss the case; if not, courts usually let the case proceed.
Basic framework
The Supreme Court in Samantar v. Yousuf (2010) held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not govern immunity of individual foreign officials, including leaders; instead, their immunity is governed by federal common law.
Under that common law, courts look first to the executive branch (State Department/DOJ) for a formal “suggestion of immunity” or other recognition decision, and treat that as controlling for status‑based immunity like head‑of‑state immunity.
Sitting heads of state
When the State Department recognizes someone as the sitting head of state and files a suggestion of immunity, U.S. courts treat that as conclusive and dismiss suits against that leader, whether civil or, historically, in the very rare criminal context.
This deference comes from older Supreme Court precedents (such as Ex Parte Peru and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman) that required courts to follow the executive’s views on foreign sovereign immunity, and has been extended to individual heads of state.
Former leaders and conduct‑based immunity
For former leaders, U.S. courts distinguish between status‑based immunity (for being a head of state now) and conduct‑based immunity (for official acts performed while in office).
After Samantar, courts have been more willing to allow suits where the allegations involve violations of jus cogens norms (e.g., torture, extrajudicial killing), reasoning that such acts fall outside protected “official” functions and therefore do not attract conduct‑based immunity, especially when the executive does not insist on immunity.
Role of recognition and the executive
The Supreme Court’s Zivotofsky v. Kerry decision underscored that the President has exclusive authority to decide whom the United States recognizes as a foreign head of state, and U.S. courts follow that recognition strictly when deciding head‑of‑state immunity.
If the executive declines to recognize someone as a legitimate leader or declines to suggest immunity, courts typically proceed with the case, treating immunity claims skeptically or analyzing them under restrictive, conduct‑based principles.
Criminal cases and FSIA limits
The FSIA governs immunity of foreign states and their agencies primarily in civil cases, and Congress and the Supreme Court have clarified that FSIA does not itself create immunity from U.S. criminal prosecution.
For criminal cases against individuals (including foreign leaders), courts therefore fall back on the same judge‑made common‑law head‑of‑state immunity rules and on deference to the executive’s recognition and charging decisions, which is why any attempt by a foreign leader to claim criminal immunity in U.S. courts hinges on whether the current U.S. administration treats that person as a recognized, sitting head of state.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/expand-on-maduro-s-claim-in-ny-dn8qN6GwSbyvazC2mKyvAQ
#Venezuela Alert 01.06.26.1720pst: 1933 Montevideo Conference has no “protocol” on foreign leader recognition, only statehood. #Maduro abduction illegal, an international embarrassment, UN asleep and impotent, #Cuba pays the price.
https://x.com/jameslangelle/status/2008711078671491385
1933 Montevideo conference protocol on recognition of foreign leaders by united states.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention, signed during the Seventh International Conference of American States, addresses state recognition but does not contain a specific “protocol” on the recognition of foreign leaders by the United States. Instead, its core provisions focus on the declarative theory of statehood and general non-intervention principles.
Key Provisions
Article 3 states that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states,” emphasizing that recognition is declaratory rather than constitutive. Article 4 notes that recognition of a state is unconditional and irrevocable once granted, but it applies to states, not individual leaders or governments. The U.S. ratified it with reservations affirming its Good Neighbor Policy against intervention in other nations’ internal affairs.
U.S. Context
The convention aligned with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s shift away from prior U.S. doctrines like the Stimson Doctrine, which had withheld recognition from governments installed by force. No separate protocol on leaders exists; U.S. practice post-1933 evolved toward recognizing de facto governments controlling territory, without requiring democratic legitimacy. This influenced later policies but did not mandate recognition of specific foreign leaders.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/1933-montevideo-conference-pro-MlDfEktpTiWB006RdyzMiw
#Venezuela Alert 01.06.26.1750pst: Obscured in “fog of war:” 1933 Montevideo Conference, UN Article II, 2015 Supreme Court ruling, War Powers Act, exposes absurdity of “international law” to prevent Pres. #Maduro takedown. #Cuba mourns loss of 32.
https://x.com/jameslangelle/status/2008719162424832227
Explore the political damage if Trump ordered to release maduro, include rulings.
President Donald Trump faces significant political backlash for ordering the capture of Nicolás Maduro, with Democrats decrying it as an illegal act of war and some Republicans splitting over interventionism. This has divided his MAGA base and risks congressional hearings, especially if post-capture instability grows. No court has yet ordered Maduro’s release, but legal challenges loom over U.S. authority to “run” Venezuela.
Political Backlash
Democrats like Senators Chris Van Hollen, Chris Murphy, and Tim Kaine, who once pushed for Maduro’s ouster, now condemn the raid as unconstitutional and a violation of sovereignty. Trump’s base shows fractures, with Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene criticizing it as abandoning “America First,” and polls indicate low public support for U.S. control. Risks include mission creep, occupation demands, or a backlash akin to Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal.
Legal Rulings
The operation revives debates on presidential war powers, echoing the 1989 Panama invasion, with no clear legal rationale disclosed yet. A 2015 Supreme Court precedent on foreign recognition may deny Maduro head-of-state immunity, aiding prosecution for drug trafficking. Critics argue it shreds international law, but Trump cites bipartisan non-recognition of Maduro since 2019.
Potential Damage
Trump gains no “wag the dog” boost, starting from weak polling (only 17% favored force pre-raid), and faces House probes even before midterms. Ongoing Venezuelan instability under interim leaders like Delcy Rodríguez could fuel accusations of poor planning. Globally, it signals aggressive U.S. policy shifts, raising intervention fears elsewhere.
What legal arguments support ordering Maduro released by the president
Legal arguments for President Trump ordering Nicolás Maduro’s release center on diplomatic reciprocity, recognition of foreign legitimacy, and executive foreign affairs powers under Article II. These remain hypothetical, as no court has issued such an order amid ongoing debates over Maduro’s capture legality.
Diplomatic Immunity Claims
Maduro’s lawyers argue he retains head-of-state immunity despite U.S. non-recognition since 2019, invoking precedents like the Ker-Frisbie doctrine’s limits and UN Charter protections against forcible abduction. Release could follow if courts uphold sovereign immunity for official acts, as partially tested in Noriega’s 1989 case where courts rejected full immunity but allowed drug charges to proceed.
Non-Recognition Reversal
The administration deems Maduro illegitimate, treating him as a drug kingpin rather than president, but a policy shift—echoing bipartisan past calls for his ouster—could justify repatriation to stabilize Venezuela. Critics note U.S. courts under Article II defer to executive foreign policy, potentially enabling release without judicial mandate if Trump re-recognizes Maduro’s regime.[ from prior]
War Powers Limits
Ordering release aligns with Article II commander-in-chief authority for limited operations, avoiding War Powers Resolution violations by framing capture as law enforcement, not war; reversal avoids escalation. Supreme Court review could mandate release if capture deemed unconstitutional kidnapping, per scholars citing UN Charter breaches.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/explore-the-political-damage-i-bViUYhxWR3apB94L8xxDfw
Venezuela
