Tiberiu Dragu. 2011. Is There a Trade-off Between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention. American Political Science Review 105 (1): 64-78.
Tiberiu Dragu and Jonathan Rodden. 2011. Representation and Redistribution in Federations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (21): 8601-8604.
Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. 2013. The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law. Journal of Politics 75 (4): 1038-1050.
Tiberiu Dragu, Xiaochen Fan and James Kuklinski. 2014. Designing Checks and Balances. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (1): 45-86.
Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. 2014. The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism. American Journal of Political Science 58 (2): 511-524.
Tiberiu Dragu and Oliver Board. 2015. On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System. Political Science Research & Methods 3 (3): 473-492.
Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan. 2016. An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition. Journal of Politics 78 (4): 1170-1183.
Tiberiu Dragu. 2017. The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention. Journal of Politics 79 (1): 223-236.
Tiberiu Dragu and Michael Laver. 2017. Legislative Coalitions with Incomplete Information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (11): 2876-2880.
Tiberiu Dragu and Hannah Simpson. 2017. Veto Players, Institutional Design and Policy Change. Research and Politics, July-September: 1-6. DOI: 10.1177/2053168017722704.
Tiberiu Dragu. 2017. On Repression and its Effectiveness. Journal of Theoretical Politics 29 (4): 599-622.
Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu. forthcoming. Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame. Comparative Political Studies, DOI: 10.1177/0010414017730077.
Working Papers and Work in Progress:
Institutional Foundations of Coalition Governance (with Mik Laver) (revise and resubmit at the Journal of Politics).
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard (with Adam Przeworski).
Does Technology Undermine Authoritarian Governments? (with Yonatan Lupu).
Representative Democracy in the Age of Voter Surveillance.
Optimal Prevention? Dynamic Moral Hazard in Political Principal-Agent Problems.
The Strategy of Repression (with Xiaochen Fan).
Profiling and Terrorism Prevention (with Mattias Polborn).
Polarization and Issue-Selection in Electoral Campaigns (with Xiaochen Fan).
Mobilized Dissent and Repression as a Dual Coordination Problem (with Yonatan Lupu).