My research focuses on political institutions, particularly in relation to questions of how to structure and constrain government power in both democratic and non-democratic countries. I specialize in positive political theory and applications of game-theoretic models to studying terrorism prevention, elections and representation, checks-and-balances institutions, and how to curb political violence and repression.
Currently, I am working on a book, “The Preventive State: Terrorism, Security and Liberty,” to illustrate the importance of assessing coercive anti-terror policies in light of the incentives of the bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementing them. The book presents an account of the normative, policy and institutional principles that should guide and limit the powers and actions of counterterrorism agencies in liberal societies.
I am also involved in a number of other ongoing research projects, including a new research program on the effects of modern information and digital technology on political processes in both democratic and authoritarian polities. You can find my published articles and working papers on the research page of this website.
Tiberiu Dragu. 2011. Is There a Trade-off Between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention. American Political Science Review 105 (1): 64-78.
Tiberiu Dragu and Jonathan Rodden. 2011. Representation and Redistribution in Federations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (21): 8601-8604.
Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. 2013. The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law. Journal of Politics 75 (4): 1038-1050.
Tiberiu Dragu, Xiaochen Fan and James Kuklinski. 2014. Designing Checks and Balances. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (1): 45-86
Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. 2014. The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism. American Journal of Political Science 58 (2): 511-524
Tiberiu Dragu and Oliver Board. 2015. On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System. Political Science Research & Methods 3 (3): 473-492.
Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan. 2016. An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition. Journal of Politics 78 (4): 1170-1183.
Tiberiu Dragu. 2017. The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention. Journal of Politics 79 (1): 223-236.
Tiberiu Dragu and Michael Laver. 2017. Legislative Coalitions with Incomplete Information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (11): 2876-2880.
Tiberiu Dragu and Hannah Simpson. 2017. Veto Players, Institutional Design and Policy Change. Research and Politics, July-September: 1-6. DOI: 10.1177/2053168017722704.
Tiberiu Dragu. 2017. On Repression and its Effectiveness. Journal of Theoretical Politics 29 (4): 599-622.
Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu. 2018. Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame. Comparative Political Studies 81 (5): 1042-1073
Tiberiu Dragu and Michael Laver. forthcoming. Coalition Governance with Incomplete Information. Journal of Politics.
Tiberiu Dragu and Adam Przeworski. forthcoming. Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard. American Political Science Review.
Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan. forthcoming. Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers. Journal of Politics.