In 1966, soon after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and amidst the increasingly violent war in Southeast Asia, a group of Red Guards set out from Beijing in order to join the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Their long journey, which took a number of months, brought them first to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, where the group of four paused at the behest of the North Vietnamese government. Vietnamese officials were unhappy that the Red Guards had crossed the border illegally and that they wanted to continue on to South Vietnam. They urged the Red Guards to return home or at least to remain in Hanoi. The Red Guards, determined to press their revolution forward, responded by quoting Lenin: “Workers do not have countries. We want to engage in world revolution, so we therefore don’t have borders.”¹ This group of Red Guards was not alone; many Chinese students followed in their footsteps, hoping to support the anti-imperialist struggle in Southeast Asia. The number of Red Guards in Hanoi swelled to such a large number that the North Vietnamese ambassador to the PRC found it necessary to broach the subject with Mao Zedong. The ambassador complained about the rowdy Red Guards and asked Mao to intercede. Mao, however, brushed off the comment, and replied that “some Red Guards do not even know what a national border means.”²

For the Communist Party and for many Red Guard groups, the Sixties were simple: China was the only viable model of international revolution that remained in the world.³ Despite this simple formulation, the implications of this worldview had a profound effect on politics and culture, altered the trajectory of the state, and intertwined with the violence and chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The Sixties began in China in 1962 when Beijing and Moscow formally
broke off diplomatic relations. This event precipitated a profound crisis in China that went beyond diplomacy. The real shock of the Sino-Soviet Split was paradigmatic. Since the PRC’s founding in 1949, the Soviet Union was viewed as a model revolutionary society. Propaganda extolled the virtues of the Soviet system, and the CCP vested itself in the icons and symbols of the Soviet Union. Soviet heroes were Chinese heroes and Soviet holidays – like the October Revolution – were widely celebrated in the PRC. The symbolic power of the Soviet Union, both as the epitome of modernity and a vestige of socialist icons, shaped how China saw itself and its places in the world. In essence, the Soviet Union was China’s future. The notion, however, was utterly destroyed by the Sino-Soviet Split.

In place of the Soviet Union, the CCP constructed a new set of narratives that implied China’s centrality in the world. Using language, political codes, and propaganda, the Party emphasized the idea that China had inherited the revolutionary tradition abnegated by the Soviet Union. China did not need to look toward the Soviet Union; the world would instead look to China. Officials thus merged domestic and international revolution into one sphere. This became the new ethos of the 1960s, permeating culture and domestic politics and shaping the trajectory of a number of mass campaigns, including this Cultural Revolution. Indeed, when the Cultural Revolution began, the Red Guards co-opted the CCP’s global narratives and incorporated them into their movement. Many Chinese students presented themselves as the vanguard of international revolution, and the Cultural Revolution as the apex of Maoist politics.

The Chinese Sixties were predicated on two familiar phenomena: movement – that is actual contact between Chinese people and foreign revolutionaries – and imagination – the process by which China connected itself and its politics to social movements around the world. Scholars of the Sixties have long identified these two forces – contact and imagination – as
integral to the cohesiveness of the decade. And yet, the Chinese case is also distinctive. In China, the divide between contact and imagination was fluid and easily traversed. Visits from foreigners were amalgamated with familiar Maoist tropes. Contact with the outside world was extrapolated to represent larger political phenomena. Individual statements of support were presented as representative of an entire body, ethnic group, race, or class. When a group of Japanese leftists visited China in 1965, for example, their support was presented as representative of all Japanese people. Revolutionary Maoist organizations in Africa represented all Africans, the Black Panthers all African Americans.

The process of constructing the Sixties similarly tells us a great deal about how the Chinese Communist Party legitimized itself. It also helps us to better understand who the Red Guards were and what they thought they were doing. One of the crucial characteristics of the Chinese Sixties is the ways in which foreign social movements were co-opted and Sinified – infused with Maoist symbols and codes so as to be more recognizable and palatable. The Chinese Communist Party engaged in a process of “cutting,” as Foucault describes it, so as to bring order to the various political movements around the world. New paradigms engendered in the Sixties facilitated the internalization of Chinese politics. This was essentially an ontological pursuit. The Chinese Communist Party birthed a world in which the PRC had supplanted the Soviet Union as the dominant revolutionary state. Not only was the Party using the Sixties to create a new reality, but it was also attempting to constitute itself through this reality.

The construction of the Sixties also required synchronizing the world – the CCP made it appear as if international social movements mirrored what was happening (or had happened) in China. This synchronicity was teleological. The Party suggested that all revolutionary movements would eventually adopt the ideology and shape of the PRC. Many Red Guard groups
followed suit, implying that the world would eventually produce a number of discrete Cultural Revolutions. The synchronicity of the 1960s was vital to the construction and maintenance of China’s revolutionary community, in the same way that synchronicity is central to the creation of modern nation-states. The Chinese Sixties also produced a political, social, and cultural topography that valued ideological space over national space. In many instances, imagined revolutionary fraternity obviated political borders. And, similar to the creation of the nation-state, the global revolutionary community existed discursively, relying on elaborate ceremonies and shared temporalities as well as detailed stories and anecdotes from foreign revolutionaries that praised Maoist politics. In this way, the global and the national worked side-by-side to create a revolutionary ethos that was both of the Sixties and firmly grounded in the People’s Republic of China. As Lydia Liu aptly observes, “national and even racial identity needs to be understood and analyzed in terms of what the international is doing within the national imaginary, not just beyond its borders.” In this case, the CCP and the Red Guards imagined the 1960s within a Maoist revolutionary framework, deeply affecting the development of a number of mass campaigns in China.

**The Japanese Friendship Associations**

In order to demonstrate the process through which the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Guards constructed the Sixties, I will discuss two overlapping case studies. The first involves actual contact (the visit of 500 Japanese leftists to the PRC in 1965), while the second analyzes the nature and contours of political rhetoric during the Cultural Revolution. In 1965, despite years of hostile relations, the CCP invited 500 Japanese delegates to visit the PRC. The tour was composed of mostly young people who were also described as friends and Maoist sympathizers. During their stay in China, the delegation met with Chinese youth and heard
speeches from top officials. They toured 15 cities and even had a brief meeting with Mao
Zedong in Beijing. The tour was well publicized in China and people were encouraged to attend
welcoming ceremonies for the delegation. In Wuhan, one of China’s largest industrial cities,
100,000 people attended a parade held in honor of the touring delegation.\textsuperscript{12}

The Japanese delegation’s visit proved to be fertile ground for the affirmation of China’s
post-Soviet worldview. The CCP assiduously recorded every aspect of the Japanese delegation’s
trip. Japanese interviews were transcribed in newspapers, preserved in official records, and
broadcast over the radio. The trip was a major event if only because it supposedly proved how
important the CCP (and Mao, specifically) was to the world. And yet, despite the importance of
this visit, it was also potentially risky. The Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council admitted
that meetings between the Japanese delegation and the Chinese people could be “very
complicated.”\textsuperscript{13} Many CCP officials worried that the Japanese delegation was not sufficiently
radical, and that they were plagued by revisionist attitudes. One memo noted that certain
Japanese activists harbored “Trotskyist sentiments” and that the left in Japan generally “took a
sectarian approach and imposed their own views on mass organizations while obstructing the
development of a youth movement.”\textsuperscript{14}

The CCP also worried about how everyday Chinese citizens would react to the delegates.
For one, CCP officials were concerned that Chinese youth would be too strident or overbearing
in their interactions with the Japanese people. They recognized the need to “put politics up front”
but they also warned against alienating the delegation by being too critical. Local Chinese
officials and Chinese students were instead instructed to “use Mao Zedong Though flexibly” (活
学活用), to understand the guiding principles of the Central Committee, and to conform these
principles to the reality of the foreign guests’ ideologies.”\textsuperscript{15} The Chinese people were also
instructed to excise certain phrases from their vocabulary – terms like “Japanese devils” and “little Japanese” were labeled taboo. In order to mitigate any animosity toward the Japanese delegation, the Beijing Foreign Affairs Office issued a proclamation to various provincial, township, and city government organizations explaining why such resentment was unfounded. First, the Beijing government urged people to separate Japanese militarism from the Japanese people. The atrocities committed in China during World War II, for example, were the fault of militarist and capitalists, but not of the Japanese people themselves. The memo furthermore reminded people that there were certain international forces that did not wish to see an improved relationship between China and leftists in Japan, including “American imperialists, Chiang Kaishek, Japanese reactionaries, and Khrushchev revisionists.”

But perhaps the biggest concern of the central government was how historical animosities between China and Japan might color the Japanese delegation’s visit. After all, China was only two decades removed from the brutal occupation of the Japanese army during World War II. And in the intervening years, the Chinese Communist Party had actively kept the memory of the occupation alive, deploying it as a political tool to reinforce the Party’s own nationalist credentials. Now the Party was somewhat caught between their own rhetoric and promoting revolutionary contact with a neighboring country. Rather than avoid the subject entirely, however, the CCP recognized the legacy of World War II and attempted to equate Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s with American imperialism in the 1960s. During their visit, the Japanese delegation met with a Chinese family who had suffered at the hand of the Japanese army during World War II. One of the members of the delegation was in the Japanese army that invaded China in 1937. The Japanese delegate spent time with the family, recalling the atrocities that his own country had committed and recounting the violence and horror of the invasion. He
also noted how his experiences during World War II had changed his outlook on the world. The
delegate furthermore compared Japanese atrocities in China to the American imperialism in
Taiwan, South Vietnam, and South Korea.\(^{19}\) By using the Japanese invasion of China to frame
American imperialism, both Japanese and Chinese citizens were able to articulate outrage that
resonated within the Sino-Japanese historical sphere.

Despite the risks of the Japanese visit, the benefits far outweighed any potential
controversy. The Office of Foreign Affairs of the CCP believed that young people in China could
especially benefit from the Japanese delegation’s visit. They specifically invoked the need for
Chinese youth to understand the extent of and contours of international protest. A Foreign
Affairs Office memo noted, “in the current upheaval and among the major reorganization of the
international situation, the work of these Japanese youths is of important significance (because) it
will add to the understanding of the international situation among China’s young people.”\(^{20}\) The
relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese was presented as “mutually beneficial.” The
Foreign Affairs Office reminded anyone with lingering doubts about the visit that Japanese youth
had long opposed “the restoration of Japanese militarism and had overall opposed American
imperialism.”\(^{21}\) To facilitate this understanding, the central government also created a list of
approved slogans that could be shouted to greet the Japanese delegates on their tour around the
PRC. Many of these slogans were meant to demonstrate solidarity and mutual opposition to
American imperialism. Those attending the welcome ceremony for the Japanese delegates, for
example, were instructed to shout “support the movement to restore diplomatic relations between
China and Japan.” After this, the slogans became less specific and focused on Japanese
militarism, the war in Vietnam, and the dangers of American imperialism: “support the struggle
against American patriotism and American militarism;” “oppose the restoration of Japanese
militarism;” and finally, “American imperialists, get out of Japan, Chinese Taiwan, and Vietnam.”

The war in Vietnam proved to be a catalyst for Japanese and Chinese contact, just as it facilitated international solidarity around the world in the 1960s. The Chinese Communist Party merged the Vietnam War and the Japanese delegation’s visit into a single revolutionary discourse. 1965 was also a crucial year in Japan as more and more Japanese people turned against the war. Many saw Vietnam as a metaphor for everything that was wrong with Japanese society: the country’s turn away from pacifism, its subservience to the United States, and the presence of American military bases on Japanese soil that were used to support the war. Even officials in the Japanese government were beginning to oppose American foreign policy. The Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP recognized the growing tensions between the United States and Japan, and specifically mentioned that a number of leftists in Japan had “opposed the Japanese-American security treaty and made good progress in organizing youth groups.” The Japanese delegation itself was unwavering in its condemnation of the war. As one Japanese delegate noted, “the fact that Japan was helping the Americans bomb the Vietnamese people, and that the Japanese people were doing nothing to stop this makes me feel very guilty.” The CCP also used the Japanese delegation’s visit to establish the stakes and consequences of the Vietnam War. Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing who delivered a speech to the Japanese delegation, noted how bad things were in Vietnam. According to Peng, “the heroic Vietnamese people were placed in a desperate situation.” Despite this gloomy report, he assured the audience that American imperialism could still be defeated, but only though the unity of the Japanese and Chinese people.
The Japanese delegates also discovered that the Chinese people were highly vested in the war, at all levels. For instance, when the Japanese delegation traveled to Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, they visited a local primary school where they asked the students their opinion on the war. One student responded that, “we know all about it. We read reports and our teachers talk about it (the war). We listen and we detest American imperialism even more. We support the Vietnamese people’s struggle, and we want the American imperialists to get out of Vietnam.”

During another encounter, a Japanese delegate happened to ask a woman in Beijing why Chinese people wear overalls. She responded that it was somehow a sign of the Chinese people’s commitment to “resisting America and aiding Vietnam.” The unnamed Japanese delegate was so impressed by the woman that he “couldn’t wait to return to Japan and tell all of the workers that they should study the great international spirit of the Chinese people.”

The image that was being projected through the Japanese delegation’s visit was intended to capture the internationalism and revolutionary commitment of the Chinese people. From the youngest children to the everyday worker, the Chinese people were firmly committed to defeating the United States in Vietnam. This commitment, while genuine for a number of Chinese people, was also a tool for the CCP. The Party used the delegation’s visit to demonstrate its unwavering commitment to international revolution, which stood in stark contrast to the Soviet Union. While Vietnam proved fertile ground for cultivating these narratives, the Chinese Communist Party also produced a crucial document – “The Collected Stories form the Sino-Japanese Friendship Alliance” – that truly captures this process. The collection is a compilation of interviews, anecdotes, reflections, and testimonials from the Japanese delegates, some of which were broadcast on the radio in China. In its entirety it is essentially a paean to the PRC. Although meant to record the Japanese delegation’s experiences, it is clear that the document’s
contents were intended to foster China’s global revolutionary narratives. This document offers an example of how international contact in the 1960s was catalogued, and how events were extrapolated to fit a Maoist worldview. It also demonstrates the archival process through which the CCP attempted to preserve China’s commitment to international revolution. This was, in essence, a form of knowledge production – a way of using the Sixties to produce evidence of China’s importance around the world.

This process is perhaps best captured in a conversation that took place among two Japanese delegates in the city of Xi’an. These two delegates had decided to go for a walk around the city during their visit. A transcript of their reflections was reproduced in the “Collected Stories:”

Masunaga: Tonight we went for a walk (in Xi’an) because we wanted to see how average people lived and we wanted to observe all of the customers in the markets. I felt that the situation was roughly the same as in Japan in 1950 and 1951. What the people wear and their standard of living is not high. Their culture also needs to be raised.

Kasahara: The problem is this, you have to compare the (new China) to the old China. Right now the streets don’t have very bright lights, but we know this: China has neither thieves nor rapists, so if it’s a little dark that’s not a problem.

Masunaga: Right, if the streets were this dark in Japan we would have definitely been robbed.

Kasahara: It was very difficult for the Chinese people to make a change of this degree.

Masunaga: (With a great deal of emotion): Ah, when will we have this type of society in Japan! We have to work hard and change the consciousness of our young people. This is a historical inevitability, and sooner or later things will go this way. We will tell all of our young people about the situation in China.

The actual physical reproduction of this conversation is perhaps more fascinating than its contents. In this instance, the reader is provided with a “fly on the wall” perspective as the two delegates reflect on their experiences in Xi’an. There is also a story within the conversation: we witness the transformation of the first speaker, Masunaga, as he goes from skeptic to convert.
Through the delegates were are reminded of Chinese socialism’s ability to eliminate many of society’s worst crimes, like rape and theft. And finally, the entire structure of the conversation, as it was recorded here, resembles a play, as if it was meant to be reenacted. The reader is even provided with the emotional registers that underscore the depth of Masunaga’s transformation: he declares his last statement “with a great deal of emotion.” The veracity of this conversation is difficult to prove, although the actual statements are obviously exaggerated to one degree or another. The deeper meaning of this document, however, is reflected in the PRC’s efforts to use international contact in the 1960s as a means of promoting the advantages of a Maoist society.

The “Collected Stories” included other testimonials and recorded interactions that supposedly captured the Japanese delegation’s admiration for the Chinese people themselves. In one document, titled “The Consciousness of Chinese Children is Greater than Mine” (中国小朋友的觉悟比我高), a Japanese delegate again returns to the theme of the militancy and revolutionary commitment of Chinese youth. This delegate recalled a conversation in which he was asked by a seven-year old about the political situation in Japan. The child was especially interested in learning about Japan’s revolutionary development. When the delegate replied that the Japanese people do indeed “struggle” (for revolution) the child grew frustrated about the lack of details and demanded that they sit down and have a longer conversation about Japanese politics. The “Collected Stories” also noted that many delegates were deeply impressed with how women were treated in China. On a scheduled trip to a hydraulic dam, a Japanese delegate noticed a Chinese woman operating a crane. The delegate observed that “some people in Japan would say that this was forced labor, but in fact this type of meticulous work is very suitable for women.” In reality, according to the observer, “Japanese women probably envy Chinese women.”
The CCP reserved the largest portion of the “Collected Stories” for the delegation’s praise of Mao Zedong. Mao was called a shining beacon, a visionary, and the hope of all revolutionary people (language the would be mimicked almost word-for-word by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution). The “Collected Stories” internationalized Mao, and Japanese delegates framed him as the most important revolutionary leader in the world. The “Collected Stories” noted that one Japanese delegate declared, “in Chairman Mao’s heart is a map of the world; on his mind are the people around the world that have not yet been liberated.” Another delegate declared, “Mao Zedong is the leader of the world’s revolutionary youth, Mao Zedong Thought brilliantly illuminates the entire world.” Others made a commitment to continue to study Mao Zedong Thought after they returned home so that “day-by-day, Japan could become more like China.” But perhaps the most gushing reaction came from a delegate who actually was able to meet Mao in Beijing. After shaking the Chairman’s hand, the delegate declared that he “felt a great deal of responsibility from that day forward. This was not only a hand, it was the steady hand that guided the revolution, the hand that he American imperialists dreaded.” In these statements that Japanese delegation was able to transform Mao into a stateless leader and into the natural successor of a revolutionary tradition that the Soviet Union had supposedly abandoned.

The Japanese delegation’s visit to China in 1965 is but one example of the many revolutionaries, activists, and leftists who traveled to the PRC in the 1960s and 1970s. China became one of the most important destinations of the decade; a must-see for revolutionary tourists. This situated China within the interlocking spheres of international activism that characterized the 1960s. The case of the Japanese delegation’s visit to the PRC is particularly fascinating because it captures not just how China understood the Sixties, but also speaks to how
the state and the Party contended with the fallout of the Sino-Soviet Split. The Party had real concerns about opening China up to a tour of this kind, fearing the Japanese delegates’ political reliability and the reaction of the Chinese people to the visit. The Party, however, assuaged this anxiety by tightly controlling the movements of the delegation. They also provided a context and a lens through which the Chinese people could understand the visit by grounding the tour in familiar historical tropes and equating it to support for the Vietnamese people. What is perhaps most fascinating, however, is the way that the Party turned the Japanese delegation into a tool to legitimize itself and its global relevance. The “Collected Stories” captures the many examples of the way that the CCP recorded every statement, testimonial, or story that reinforced the importance of the Chinese Communist Party. The “Collected Stories” were also affixed with familiar codes and tropes so that people could make only one conclusion: the CCP was admired all over the world.

**The Rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution**

In less than a year after the Japanese delegation’s visit, China was plunged into a state of political chaos. The beginning of the Cultural Revolution only amplified the importance of the Sixties in China. Indeed, many of the methods and techniques used to incorporate the Japanese delegation’s visit into Chinese politics were employed during the Cultural Revolution. This is especially true of the language of the Cultural Revolution, and the way that language was used to imagine the outside world. The Cultural Revolution was a campaign that was conducted through violence and through language. The Chinese Communist Party and the Red Guards deployed a vast range of phrases, insults, critiques, and words to castigate the Party’s enemies and humiliate anyone who had supposedly deviated from Maoism. Language became a weapon that was all too effective in condemning people to years of misery. This language was also bombastic,
confrontational, and sometimes coarse. Phrases like “bastard” and “son-of-a-bitch” found their way into the everyday rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. As Paul Clark notes, “the inflation of rhetoric and language reached unprecedented heights in the Cultural Revolution. Everything… could be presented as part of some vast, all-encompassing, and life-or-death struggle between good and evil.” Language, however, was not solely deployed as a weapon. It also became a means by which the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Guards legitimized themselves. The Sixties were critical in this endeavor. The Red Guards and the Chinese Communist Party consistently incorporated global developments into their language, using the civil rights movement, the war in Vietnam, or the student protests in Paris to explain the importance of the Cultural Revolution and the significance of the Red Guard movement.

The way that language was deployed reveals a great deal about the course of the 1960s in China. Engagement with the outside world was a central aspect of the Cultural Revolution but it was also influenced by Chinese politics at home. Language reflected the periodization of the Chinese Sixties, and captured the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. This is perhaps best exemplified by tracking the use of the term “global revolution” in the Chinese press (世界革命). The following chart suggests that two of China’s major newspapers – People’s Daily and People’s Liberation Army Daily – began to use the term “global revolution” with much greater frequency in 1966, when the Cultural Revolution began.
‘Global Revolution (世界革命)’ in headlines of *People’s Daily (人民日报)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Global Revolution’ in headlines of *People’s Liberation Army Daily (解放军报)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The vicissitudes of this term’s use in the press reflects the general trajectory of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution began in 1966 when students at Beijing University hung the country’s first big-character poster. As the table reflects, the term “global revolution” appeared with much greater frequency during that year. The use of the term peaked in 1967, during the most radical year of the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1968, however, the term’s use declined precipitously. In 1968, Mao Zedong, growing weary of student factionalism and, in some cases, the defiance of the Red Guards, began to send many of China’s young people to the countryside. He also clamped down on radicalism in the CCP, purging and dismissing a number of officials that he believed were “ultra-leftists.” Most interestingly, the term virtually disappears from the Chinese press in 1971. This was likely caused by the death of Lin Biao and the coming of Sino-American rapprochement. Lin Biao’s death was an especially critical time for the Party, when officials favored stability and order over ideas like “global revolution.” This also reflects important changes in China’s foreign policy. President Nixon visited Beijing in January, 1972. In order to promote Sino-American rapprochement, the Party once again muted ideas of “global revolution” and instead slowly embraced the new international system. The term only briefly reappeared in late 1976 and early 1977, in a series of memorials and retrospectives commemorating Mao Zedong’s death. Nonetheless, the use of the term and its appearance in the Chinese press parallels the contours of the Cultural Revolution and reflects how Chinese officials positioned the movement within a larger global framework. During the years when the Red Guards were most influential, and when the global Sixties played an important part in the Cultural Revolution’s rhetoric, “global revolution” appeared frequently in the Chinese press. That trend, however, diminished with the banishment of China’s students, the death of Lin Biao, and the coming of Richard Nixon.
The use of the term “global revolution” generally reflects the imagined connections between the Cultural Revolution and international politics. But the CCP and the Red Guards used specific domestic events to further promote China’s importance in the world. The case of Cai Yongxiang provides an interesting example of the intersections between the Cultural Revolution and imagined international solidarity. Cai Yongxiang was a soldier in the People’s Liberation Army. On October 10, 1966, while guarding a bridge of the Qiantang River, Cai noticed a log laying on the train tracks by his post. At that exact moment a train full of Red Guards happened to be approaching, and Cai had to make a quick decision. He managed to remove the log from the tracks – saving all on board – but was struck by the train and killed. Following his death, Cai was laid to rest in Zhejiang and designated a national hero. Cai embodied many of the basic values of the Cultural Revolution, and the CCP used Cai’s death as a means to demonstrate the revolutionary sacrifice that was prized by the Party. But the Party also presented Cai’s death as a great loss for the entire world. In February 1967, People’s Daily published an article titled, “Foreign Friends Warmly Praise Cai Yongxiang as a Great Example of a Global Revolutionary.” According to the article, all foreigners agreed that Cai’s “heart was full of revolution, his heart was for the people, he was fearless in the face of danger, and he courageously sacrificed his body.” The article then quotes “foreign friends” from Africa, Latin America, Albania, Romania, and Mali, essentially covering parts of the world that the Chinese hoped to influence in the wake of the Sino-Soviet Split. Each of the speakers echoed the sentiments laid out in the article, and assured readers that Cai’s death was being mourned around the world. The Party’s treatment of Cai’s case demonstrates the process through which the CCP synchronized the Sixties, emphasizing the overlap between domestic politics and international
discourse. Revolutionaries around the world mourned Cai’s death in the same manner and for the same reasons that he was being memorialized in China.

The CCP presented Cai Yongxiang as an international revolutionary hero. But the Party and the Red Guards also incorporated specific global events of the 1960s into their political discourse. Like Cai, however, these events were often used as political tools to reinforce the legitimacy of the Party, the Red Guards, or the Cultural Revolution itself. For example, the French student movement – one of the iconic moments of the 1960s – was co-opted and used to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the Cultural Revolution. The events of May '68 also revived images of the Paris Commune in China, which served as an important discursive tool. The Paris Commune was used as a means of demonstrating the historical significance of the French movement, but also, by a convoluted route, of inserting the Cultural Revolution into French politics. New Beida, a Red Guard group formed at Beijing University, specifically laid claim to the legacy of the Paris Commune. The group was one of China’s most infamous Red Guard collections. It had sprung up from the early days of the Cultural Revolution and was headed by Nie Yuanzi, who was also credited with authoring China’s first big-character poster in 1966. In May, 1968, New Beida published an article in their newspaper in which they claimed that, “China’s Cultural Revolution has had a tremendous impact, and has spread all over the world. The lofty flame of the Cultural Revolution has illuminated all of the blood spilled by the heroes and heroines of the Paris Commune.”

At the same time that New Beida was claiming ownership over the legacy of the Paris Commune, the CCP and some Red Guard groups were connecting the Cultural Revolution with the Paris uprising. The CCP called the Paris student movement a “continuation of the traditional revolutionary spirit of the Paris Communes.” As event in Paris reached a climax in late May,
the Chinese press once again invoked the Paris Commune to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. According to an article published on May 25, “the French youth used the precedent of the Paris Commune to once again construct heavy barricades along the Boulevard Saint-Michel and the Boulevard Saint-Germain, and then engaged in a heroic struggle with the heavily armored police and soldiers.”

The Red Guards were also attuned to events unfolding in Paris, especially after Mao Zedong issued a statement of support for the French students. In late May, 1968, millions of people, including many Red Guards, rallied in Tiananmen Square and around the country to show their support for the French student movement. The Red Guards also discussed the French student movement in their newspapers, although the tone they took and the perspective they adopted required a good deal of imagination. For the Red Guards, events in Paris were easy to understand: they were proof of the Cultural Revolution’s global influence. At Qinghua University, the Red Guard group Jinggangshan, equally as famous as New Beida, declared in their newspaper that “the rising storm of the Western European and North American student movements especially stems from the influence of the Red Guard movement. This is also the result of the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought in the world.” Their counterparts at the Beijing Mining Institute – the Red Guard group called Dongfang Hong – simply declared that “the student and worker strike in France and the deep influence of China’s Cultural Revolution cannot be separated.”

New Beida, at Beijing University, took a different approach, actually dispatching a letter of support to the French students (the group did not say specifically to whom the letter was addressed). The letter, which is filled with familiar Maoist tropes, sees the French protests as an outgrowth of the Cultural Revolution and as one component part of Third World Liberation.
According to New Beida, “African, Asians, Latin Americans, and all suppressed people and minorities of the world fighting for liberation, along with European and American workers and students, are like a noose, firmly wrapped around the necks of American imperialism and its accomplices. The day of American imperialism’s final collapse is not far away.” Like in the article above, New Beida also referenced the Paris Commune: “You (French students) have a luminous revolutionary history. Early in 1871, you overthrew the reactionary government, and establish the Proletarian Paris Commune. Today, your struggle has once again struck a devastating blow against the reactionary government of Paris.” The underlining implications of this are fascinating. Although ostensibly praising the French students for their revolutionary commitment, the letter also established a clear hierarchy of the 1960s. For New Beida, French students were one part of the Third World liberation movement, at the head of which stood the PRC. The movement in France was also a means of spreading the ideas of the Paris Commune, whose spirit, according to the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, was being kept alive by the Red Guards.

Race, and especially the civil rights movement in America, was another means by which the Red Guards and the CCP contextualized and globalized the Cultural Revolution. This manifested itself in different ways. One Red Guard group, the Center to Liberate Foreign Affairs, used civil rights as a means to prosecute cases against supposed enemies of Mao Zedong, like Liu Shaoqi. The Center to Liberate Foreign Affairs was established in 1967 when the Cultural Revolution entered a new phase of radicalism. One aspect of this new phase was an increased obsession with foreign affairs, and a feeling that China’s Foreign Ministry was rife with capitalists, revisionists, and traitors. The Center to Liberate Foreign Affairs, spurred on by Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, especially targeted Chen Yi, the Foreign
Scarlett Minister, and Liu Shaoqi, who had previously been the Vice-chairman of the Communist Party. The Red Guards charged both men with impeding international revolution and committing various crimes that had hurt activists and radicals abroad. In order to provide proof of these supposed crimes, the Cultural Revolution Small Group demanded that the Foreign Ministry hand over all of their archives.\(^5^0\)

The Center to Liberate Foreign Affairs was specifically formed to act as the spearhead of this attack, and to purge the Foreign Ministry of all backward and traitorous elements. The Red Guard group began by attacking Chen Yi, but eventually moved on to also criticize Liu Shaoqi. The Red Guards quickly labeled both men as “flunkies of imperialism” and charged them with severely hampering international revolution.\(^5^1\) The African American struggle soon became a part of this campaign to criticize Liu Shaoqi. In May, 1967, an international conference was convened in Beijing to assess the damage that Liu Shaoqi had done to the worldwide communist movement, and to discuss all of the mistakes contained in one of Liu’s most well known works, *How to be a Good Communist*. Until the Cultural Revolution, the book was widely read in China and around the world, and was considered to be Liu’s greatest theoretical contribution to the movement. But during the Cultural Revolution Liu’s work was labeled a poisonous weed and said to reveal his underlying revisionist attitude. The conference, which was held at the Beijing Foreign Language Institute, was composed of a number of different attendees, including communist party members from Brazil, Japan, England, and the United States.\(^5^2\)

The American speech garnered particular attention. It was delivered by an individual who was identified only by a Chinese name, Fulan De. In the speech, Fulan De recalled that he joined the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 16 years ago. However, he very quickly grew frustrated with the Party’s complacency and their failure to maintain revolutionary
momentum. According to Fulan De, this was largely because of the malevolent influence of Nikita Khrushchev, who had sown revisionism among the CPUSA ranks. But the real breaking point for Fulan De came when Party members began to read and discuss Liu Shaoqi’s *How to be a Good Communist*. In his speech, Fulan De asked rhetorically what impact the book had on him, specifically. He answered that after reading it he concluded that the book shrewdly captured the ideology of revisionism that existed in the world at the time. He believed that Liu’s book slyly called on all communist parties to abandon the masses and to become professional revolutionaries.⁵³ Frustrated, Fulan De told the conference that he himself went to the CPUSA leadership and demanded that they begin to take action on several issues. In response, he was told to be patient and to let the situation develop slowly and peacefully. He then asked, incredulously, “what about the problems of black people in America?” The Party responded, “you must wait, first the white workers have to get organized.”⁵⁴ The issue of African American rights was the breaking point for Fulan De, and when he confronted his comrades he was accused of being anti-Party. After relating this anecdote, Fulan De then asked the crowd at the conference in Beijing, “comrades, have we not heard this type of talk before here in China? This is the road of Liu Shaoqi, this is the road that strangled the American Communist Party.”⁵⁵ Fulan De’s invocation of racial inequality sent a clear message to the crowd about the revolutionary potential of African Americans, the perfidy of white Americans for abandoning their cause, and the true damage of Liu Shaoqi’s ideas around the world. Either you supported the African American struggle, or you were a revisionist traitor like Liu Shaoqi.

The civil rights movement received the most attention from the Red Guards in the immediate aftermath of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. In the wake of King’s death, Mao issued a second statement of support for civil rights in America, this time condemning the violent
capitalist state that contributed to King’s death. Like in the Chinese press, many Red Guard groups commented on King’s death and on Mao’s public denunciation of American racism. However, this did not mean that all Red Guard groups engaged with civil rights equally or proportionally. Some groups barely covered the subject, mentioning only King’s death and Mao’s statement very briefly. Other groups, however, dedicated entire editions of their newspapers to the subject, detailing King’s assassination, Mao’s statement, the connections between the Cultural Revolution and civil rights, and the direction of the African American struggle. The differences in the amount of discussion of the civil rights movement can be attributed to a host of factors. For example, Jinggangshan, the Red Guard group at Qinghua University only briefly noted King’s assassination. The Red Guard group dedicated one article to Mao’s support of the African American struggle, but the article itself was more about Mao than civil rights. The article described the spectacle that arose when Mao’s statement of support for civil rights was read out on campus, and noted how welcome Mao’s words were among the Jinggangshan Red Guards. Mao’s statement was characterized as a fierce strike against imperialism, revisionism, and Liu Shaoqi. Jinggangshan also declared that the statement was not only a shining beacon for African Americans, but also for the armies fighting in Vietnam and for all revolutionary people around the world. The article itself is filled with platitudes and other rhetorical devices used throughout the Cultural Revolution to demonstrate Mao’s international importance. In this case, civil rights was just a placeholder, and the article could have been about any range of topics. Short in length, the rest of the Jinggangshan newspaper is dedicated to other items unrelated to civil rights. One likely explanation for this brevity is the situation at Qinghua University, which, in 1968, had been torn apart by a fierce factional struggle. It appears, at least
from their newspaper, that Jinggangshan was much too focused on their Red Guard rivals at Qinghua to dedicate a large amount of their attention to civil rights.

On the other hand, the Red Guard group at Beijing Normal University devoted an entire issue of their newspaper to civil rights in the wake of Martin Luther King’s death. Like their Qinghua counterparts, the Beijing Normal Red Guard group, which was also called Jinggangshan, was among China’s most infamous, and the group’s leader, Tan Houlan, was a national figure. While Beijing Normal University was certainly not immune to the factionalism of the Red Guard movement in 1967 and 1968, the nature of this factionalism differed from that at Qinghua University. At Qinghua, Red Guard factionalism was more localized and more personal. At Beijing Normal, however, factionalism was propelled by larger issues within the city of Beijing itself. In 1967, the Red Guards split for the second time into “heaven” and “earth” factions. The Beijing Normal Red Guards allied themselves with the “earth” faction, and became one of the group’s most important defenders. Throughout 1967, the Beijing Normal Red Guards remained largely unchallenged on their own campus, meaning that they were free to engage in larger factional debates. It also meant that, unlike at Qinghua, the Beijing Normal Red Guards did not need to defend themselves against rivals on their own turf. Even in 1968, when a rebel faction did emerge at Beijing Normal, the issue was quickly dealt with and the challenge was thwarted.

Reading the Beijing Normal Jinggangshan newspaper, one quickly notices the difference in tone. Rather than criticizing their rivals, Jinggangshan was free to engage with the civil rights movement, and they dedicated an entire edition of the paper to the issue following King’s death. In fact, they reprinted Mao’s statement of support for civil rights in its entirety. In follow-up articles, the Beijing Normal Red Guards praised Mao profusely, but also went into more depth
about the African American struggle. They referred to Mao’s statement as exhibiting the greatest concern for “our brothers in America.” The Red Guards also treated Mao’s statement as a bludgeoning weapon. Mao’s support for civil rights was described as striking a blow against “the embattled U.S. imperialists and all reactionaries at home and abroad,” as well as a blow against “the American running dog revisionist Brezhnev and Kosygin.” Rather than focus on the death of Martin Luther King or the evils of American racism, the group instead trotted out familiar villains like Brezhnev. This was likely meant to help Chinese readers understand that supporting civil rights was a means of rejecting Soviet revisionism.

That is not to say that the Beijing Normal Red Guards completely ignored the African American struggle itself. The group also published a separate article in which they reviewed the history of African American activism in the United States during the 1960s. Although the article again relied on familiar Maoist political codes and language – it was titled “Mao Zedong Thought Illuminates the Road Toward African American Liberation” – it did describe in more detail the course of civil rights in America. The article began by discussing the origins of the civil rights movement in 1963. Among the crucial events were the “heroic struggle” of the campaign in Birmingham, the March on Washington, and Mao Zedong’s overwhelming support for African Americans. This synopsis of 1963 perhaps perfectly captures the Red Guards’ engagement with civil rights: an amalgamation of actual events, global solidarity, and the insertion of Mao Zedong into the center of the movement. The article continues in a similar vein. The Red Guards describe the 1964 murder of James Powell in Harlem (although he is not mentioned by name) and the subsequent protests that erupted there. Once again, the protests were attributed to “the penetration of Mao Zedong Thought among the black people of America.” The article also discussed the violent confrontation between police and activists during the Selma
March, and the rise of “black power” at the end of 1966. The article detailed the civil rights movement’s supposed turn to armed struggle, and mentioned various instances in which African Americans used arms to defend themselves or to resist the police. It concluded with a description of Martin Luther King’s death and Mao’s statement in support of African Americans, which would “surely push the African American struggle into a new stage.”67 The overall teleology of the article is clear: year by year, African Americans were bringing the United States closer to Maoist revolution. In a sense, the underlying implication was also that African American activists were becoming more like the Red Guards. As the vanguard of American revolution they would usher in a new stage of struggle while relying on Mao Zedong to guide them along the way.

Taken together, this rhetoric exemplifies a protracted campaign to co-opt and incorporate the 1960s into the discourse of the Cultural Revolution. By using Chinese political tropes – the revolutionary spirit of the Paris Commune, familiar Maoist imagery, and the prospect of a revolution led by African Americans – Chinese students and officials created a legible map of the international revolutionary situation that was easily internalized. This rhetoric also demonstrates the tendency to synthesize complex world events and rearrange them with an attendant vocabulary that was familiar to Chinese readers. By making it appear that the sinews of the Cultural Revolution extended around the world, the Red Guards bolstered their own claims that they were the global vanguard and the inheritors of a reinvigorated Communist Party.

**Conclusion**

In August 1967, the Chinese Communist Party faced a serious crisis. During the summer, a number of Red Guard groups had gathered to protest outside of the British Charge-de-affairs in Beijing, demanding that Hong Kong be returned to China. Throughout the summer, the Red
Guards grew increasingly obstreperous and truculent, and they appeared determined to siege the compound. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party warned them not to take any direct action against the British. But, despite this, the Red Guards did indeed storm the building and burnt a portion of the Charges-de-affairs to the ground. Zhou Enlai, in charge of foreign affairs, was outraged, and held a personal meeting in which he excoriated the Red Guards responsible for the attack.\textsuperscript{68} As a direct result of the Red Guards’ actions, Mao began to move against those he believed had pushed the Red Guards to such dangerous extremes. A number of radical officials were purged from the Party. While Mao attacked, Zhou was more brooding and resigned. Amidst this chaos, the state coincidentally received Shirley Graham-DuBois, the widow of W.E.B. Dubois, for another of her many visits. Zhou Enlai met with Graham-DuBois, but clearly had the excesses of the Red Guards on his mind. In a moment of genuine frankness, he told Shirley Graham-DuBois,

\begin{quote}
“The whole Chinese Revolution may go down to defeat for a while. We may lose everything. But never mind. If we are defeated here, you in Africa will learn from our mistakes and you will develop your own Mao Zedong, and you will learn to do it better. In the end, we shall succeed.”\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Shirley Graham-DuBois, coming at a moment of extreme frustration, captures the dynamics and contours of the Chinese Sixties. We see in this interaction the revolutionary contact that characterized the decade. The Chinese state received countless activists who came to China to see Maoist society firsthand. But we also sense the imagined revolutionary narratives that pervaded Chinese politics. Zhou Enlai expressed the historicism that typified the CCP’s understanding of the outside world during the 1960s. He implied a singular trajectory along which all revolutionary states evolved, a trajectory that naturally led toward China. Even if China succumb to the extremes of the Cultural Revolution, others revolutionaries – in Africa – would pick up where the Chinese left off not by developing new revolutionary
techniques but simply by repeating Chinese history. China represented the apex of revolutionary thought and action, especially during the Cultural Revolution. The Global Sixties were crucial in sustaining this idea. The decade acted as a discursive prop that allowed the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Guards to reaffirm their legitimacy.

That is not to say that genuine support for leftist social movements did not exist among many Chinese people. The most difficult aspect of studying the 1960s in China is balancing between seeing the Sixties as a discursive tool used to promote the Party and Mao Zedong, and recognizing that many Chinese people did indeed genuinely engage with the revolutionary struggles that characterized the decade. Issues of race, American imperialism, capitalism, and the perfidies of the Soviet Union undoubtedly shaped the politics and attitudes of an entire generation of young people in China. Many of these young people even engaged with the now iconic culture of the long Sixties. During the Cultural Revolution, a group of students in Beijing petitioned the central government to issue a collection of translated Western literature. Included in the collection was *On the Road* and *Catcher in the Rye*, which became two of the most popular foreign books in China.70 The internationalism of the Chinese people, especially young people, was also fundamentally shaped by the war in Vietnam, which deeply affected the generation of the Cultural Revolution. As Chen Jian has written about his personal memory,

“Like many of my fellow students of that age, I felt much concern for the fate of Vietnam. How could we feel otherwise? Every day, broadcast and newspaper reports would transport us to the seemingly so remote southern jungles, and stories about how the heroic Vietnamese people were struggling against the American ‘paper tiger’ would move us to tears.”71

And yet, genuine support for anti-imperial struggles and international leftism does not negate the fact that the Sixties were also used as a political tool for the CCP and the Red Guards. The imagination of the Sixties was largely precipitated by the Sino-Soviet Split. The Sino-Soviet Split was a crisis that affected the PRC on a variety of levels. Within the inner-circle of the
Communist Party it created a crisis that necessitated the rewriting of Chinese foreign policy. This crisis, however, also provoked a more profound, and in some ways, deeper dilemma. It disrupted the fabric of the nation and challenged the notions of modernity that had been the pillars of the Chinese state since its founding in 1949. Throughout the 1950s, the CCP presented the Soviet Union as China’s future, and created a very tangible trajectory that could be used to measure the nation’s progress. The Sino-Soviet Split obviated that future – it was no longer possible. Instead, the Maoist mentality turned itself inside out, adopting a teleological framework that suggested that the rest of the world would evolve toward China, rather than China mimicking the Soviet Union.

This was a new reality that was to be inculcated at home. Although the CCP did make small efforts to spread Mao Zedong Thought around the world in the 1960s, many of the examples discussed above were intended to be consumed by the Chinese people. This meant creating a new set of mentalities, discourses, and narratives that the Chinese people could deploy to engage with radical activism abroad. This was accomplished through a complex process of knowledge production: creating new paradigms through which to view the world, generating the evidence needed to support the PRC’s claims through active contact, and imbuing old symbols – like that of the Paris Commune – with new meaning that conformed to the global importance of the Cultural Revolution. The CCP were the cartographers of this world; the Red Guards the midwives that oversaw the birth of a new revolutionary order. The chaos and violence of the Cultural Revolution, therefore, must be understood in this context, as an event that drew from the global narratives of the Sixties to justify itself and sustain its momentum. Failure would have arrested the international revolution and stranded leftist around the world, leaving them rudderless and without an ideological compass.

Many scholars have adopted the term “Long Sixties” as a means of periodizing the 1960s. This periodization often refers to the years between 1957 and 1973. The Chinese Sixties, however, were different, and lasted from approximately 1962 to 1972. They began and ended in an elliptical fashion, with the Sino-Soviet Split in 1962 and Sino-American Rapprochement in 1972.

Many scholars of the Sixties have produced studies that focus on the phenomenon of international travel, or, alternatively, the process by which imagined revolutionary communities were constructed and sustained. For a brief selection of those who focus on movement and contact, see: Judy Tzu-Chun Wu *Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism during the Vietnam War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Martin Klimke *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Cynthia Young *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Front* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). For some scholars who focus on imagination, see: Robeson Taj Frazier *The East is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che*. (New York: Verso, 2002); Peter Braunstein and Michael Doyle *Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 60s and 70s* (New York: Routledge, 2002).


“Zhongguo geile wo di erci shengming” in 102-001-00401 北京市档案馆 (Beijing Municipal Archives). Herein, (BJCA).

“Guanyu jixu jiedai canjia zhong-ri qingnian youhao dalianhua de qingnian daibiao de tongzhi” in 102-001-00401 (BJCA).

“Riben shehui zhuyi qingnian tongmeng” 102-001-00401 in Beijing Municipal Archives

“Zai zhongri qingnian youhao dalianhua zhongzuo waibin zhenghi sixiang gongzuo de jidian tihui” in 102-001-00401 in Beijing Municipal Archives

Guanyu zhongri qingnian youhao lianhuaxiang quzhong xuanzhuan de yaodian” in 102-001-401 Beijing Municipal Archives.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Revolution: A History

recognize the revolutionary potential of the French people. This made it easier for students to read French philosophy during the 1960s. Sartre, for example, was particularly popular in China during the 1960s. Sartre was also highly popular in the West, and his writings influence many students in Europe and the United States. This made it easier for students to recognize the revolutionary potential of the French people. For more, see Paul Clark. The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2008), 228.
At the time, Paris was paralyzed by a large worker and student strike, and it appeared that the DeGaulle government was on the verge of collapse.

48 “Quan yuan wuchang jieji geming pai he geming shisheng yuangong jianjue zhichi faguo gongren xuesheng zhengyi douzheng” Dong Fang Hong, May 28, 1968 in Zhou (1999), 1363.


50 Ma (2004), 212.


54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.


57 Ibid.

58 The two sides took their names from the Beijing Aeronautics Institute, which led the “heaven” faction and the Geological Institute, which led the “earth” faction.

59 Walder (2009), 225.

60 Ibid., 241.


63 Ibid. Following Khrushchev’s downfall, Brezhnev and Kosygin had assumed key leadership positions in the Soviet Union. The two essentially shared power until 1971.


65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.


70 For a discussion of this literature and the 白皮书 (white covered books) that contained these stories, see: Paul Clark. The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2008), 228.