Tribalism – “the state of existing as a tribe, or a very strong feeling of loyalty to your tribe” (Cambridge Dictionary) – is an important part of human nature that can shape human interactions, leading groups to adopt certain ideological thinking and values that may distort the cognitive processing of information, affirming the views of the ingroup (Clark and Winegard 1). Thus, tribalism affects the tribe’s relations to the “outside world”, shaping its approach to international relations. As Chua states, tribalism has even started to pose a threat towards the postwar liberal international order (Chua 1-2). My home country Germany illustrates the truth behind that statement.

Ever since the end of World War II, democratic Germany has been an integral part of the liberal world order, being crucial in the establishment and the success of the European Union (EU), supporting NATO’s collective security framework, and actively engaging in the United Nations’ initiatives for peace, stability, and human rights. Despite this, tribalism can be found throughout Germany, from the sovereignty aspirations in Bavaria to the closed-off communities of Turkish migrants in German cities. Yet the most compelling example demonstrating the impact of tribalism on Germany’s role on the global stage is the rise of the right-wing party, “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD). 

Since its foundation in 2013, the party has increasingly developed a far-right, populist profile (Decker). Nowadays, its leaders have established a clear “us-versus-them” narrative, where “us” encompasses the “German population” and “them” the growing population with a migrant background. Examples of this narrative can be found in statements of party officials as well as campaign slogans, like the 2017 poster, “New Germans? Let’s make them ourselves!” depicting a pregnant, blonde woman (Koenigs). Furthermore, Alice Weidel, co-chairwomen and chancellor-candidate, declared that “burqas, headscarf girls, publicly-supported knife men, and other good-for-nothings” would not serve German prosperity (Breitenback and Hallam). This anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany culminated in November 2023, when far-right extremists, politicians and supporters with connections to the AfD met in Potsdam to discuss a “master plan” for the mass deportation of foreigners and “non-assimilated” Germans (Shelton). The AfD has increasingly embraced this radicalized rhetoric, frequently employing terms like “remigration” in public discourse.. 

This anti-immigrant rhetoric has proven successful, resonating with voters and leading to strong results in the European and Eastern State elections in Germany. Francis Fukuyama, in “The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”, might provide an answer as to why the AfD has found such support amongst the German voters. Examining Trump’s U.S. popularity, he finds that many of his supporters, who identify as white working class, feel victimized and disregarded by the elites. Fukuyama accurately describes how the freedom and the degree of choice within modern liberal societies can leave people feeling unsatisfied and disconnected (Fukuyama 102-105). Thus, they might find themselves nostalgic for the ordered life and community they think they have lost and that their ancestors possessed.

This sentiment can be found amongst many Germans that feel their security, jobs, and culture are threatened by the influx of immigrants. For example, in my hometown many people vocalize their fear of German culture being undermined by the arrival of immigrants with different religions, cultures, and morals. They also view their safety as compromised by traumatized and “dangerous” refugees. In order to preserve the Germany their ancestors built, some view it as their only option to vote for the AfD and restrict the arrival of “those others”. 

This rise of the AfD, riding on tribalism that unites Germans feeling threatened by the negative perception of immigrants, has several implications for Germany’s role on the global stage. Firstly, the AfD’s success has pressured the German government to reintroduce border controls and abandon the “Willkommenskultur” Merkel introduced in 2015 (Shukla et al.). Thus, Germany also contradicted the principles of the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees free movement across member states without internal border controls, undermining the foundation of European unity and threatening the liberal international order. Secondly, the shift of German voters to the right has led to immense insecurity and instability in the former center-left coalition led by Chancellor Scholz. Given the populations’ evident discontent as well as internal coalition disputes, the German government has indeed collapsed, with Scholz losing a vote of confidence on December 16, 2024, and new elections scheduled for February 2025. From an outside perspective, Germany seems paralyzed by its failed government, causing concern among fellow European States who might have to take the lead in EU matters, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine (Marsh). Beyond that, the rise of the AfD gives reason for further doubts about Germany’s future in the liberal world order, as the party has previously toyed with propositions of Germany leaving NATO as well as the EU (Hockenos). Thirdly and more broadly, German tribalism, expressed by but not limited to the rise of the AfD, fosters mistrust and pressure to further isolate “the Germans” from outside influences. 

Summarily, the tribalism portrayed and supported by the AfD has caused Germany to slowly abandon its former liberal policies and to adopt a more realist stance, potentially restricting its future role in the world order. Germany – adamant defender of a liberal world order, promoter of change through trade, largest net contributor to the EU, and safe haven for millions of refugees – disengaging from the global stage would have dramatic consequences. Especially in times of multiple crises and increasing global tensions, a lack in Germany’s commitment could put the entire postwar liberal international system into jeopardy. 

 However, as stated by Clark and Winegard, tribalism is not inherently bad (Clark and Winegard 2). Tribalism can also enable a feeling of belonging and togetherness, as demonstrated by my hometown’s folklore group, for example. It brings together people of all ages, uniting them in the goal to uphold and celebrate the culture of the region through traditional clothing and dancing. This folklore group has strong global ties to other groups. For example, last year a group from Latvia paid a visit and shared their own traditions and culture with the locals. Thus, both groups fostered a mutual understanding for each other’s tribes and established enduring friendships. This simple connection makes me believe in the existence of positive tribalism, when it is not weaponized by “us-versus-them”-populism, such as the AfD’s. Tribalism in this perspective does not foster isolationism, but rather the motivation to share one’s own culture, the curiosity to learn more about others, and the desire to celebrate the diversity of the international world order.

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Works Cited

Breitenbach, D. & Hallam, M. (n.d.): AfD leaders and their most offensive remarks, in Deutsche Welle, in https://www.dw.com/en/afd-leaders-and-their-most-offensive-remarks/g-37651099. Accessed 25 October 2024

Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.): tribalism, in https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tribalism. Accessed 25 October 2024

Chua, A. (2018): Tribal World. Group Identity Is All, in Foreign Affairs 

Clark, C.J. & Winegard, B.M. (2020): Tribalism in War and Peace: The Nature and Evolution of Ideological Epistemology and Its Significance for Modern Social Science, in Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1-22 

Decker, F. (2022): Etappen der Parteigeschichte der AfD, in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, in https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273130/etappen-der-parteigeschichte-der-afd/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Fukuyama, F. (2018): Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy. In Foreign Affairs, September/October 2018, pp. 90-114 

Hockenos, P. (2024): Germany’s Far-Right Party Is Worse Than the Rest of Europe’s, in Foreign Policy, in https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/26/afd-germany-far-right-populism-radical-europe-remigration-immigrants/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Koenigs, V. (2024): AfD: Kirche muss nicht – Kinder und Küche aber schon, in Norddeutscher Rundfunk, in https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/niedersachsen/Die-AfD-und-ihre-Positionen-zu-Frauen-und-Familie,afd3132.html. Accessed 25 October 2024 

Marsh, S. (2024): Far-right state win shakes Germany’s fragile coalition, in Reuters, in https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-state-win-shakes-germanys-fragile-coalition-2024-09-01/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Shelton, J. (2024): Germany: Report shows deeper AfD ties to Potsdam meeting, in Deutsche Welle, in https://www.dw.com/en/germany-report-shows-deeper-afd-ties-to-potsdam-meeting/a-68127057. Accessed 25 October 2024

Shukla, S., Schmidt, N., Otto, M. (2024): Goodbye, ‘welcome culture.’ Germany bows to far-right pressure and tightens its borders, in CNN World, in https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/21/europe/germany-borders-poland-scholz-intl/index.html. Accessed 25 October 2024