By Saad Bounjoua
The tragic events of May 2021 and the rapid escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas –but also between Arab and Jewish Israelis– underscore the multiplicity and velocity of drivers that have shaped the conflict in the last 70 years, writes Saad Bounjoua. In this article, the author explores political, demographic, and big power variables to foresee the future of the conflict.
Photo by Cole Keister on Unsplash.
Introduction
The Israeli-Palestinian question has been at the forefront of international relations in the Middle East and beyond for at least the last 100 years, when the first waves of Jewish immigrants moved to the region. The conflict escalated with the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, leading to approximately 700,000 Palestinians losing their land and homes and becoming stateless refugees.[i]
The conflict worsened and expanded regionally with the war of 1967, representing a significant setback for Palestinians and enabling major additional annexations by Israel (e.g., Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, Golan Heights.) The Oslo I and II Accords signed in 1993 and 1995, granted some autonomy to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and had raised significant hope for greater outcomes. These expectations have so far failed to materialize.
Subsequent events and deteriorating relations between Israel and The Palestinian Authority, in part created by actions and intentions of both parties, have challenged any prospect for a short or long-term peace agreement. A Brooking survey conducted in March 2021 with over 500 experts around the world found that the majority (52%) does not believe the two parties can arrive at a peaceful two-state solution.[ii]
Negotiations had mostly stalled since 2014, as both camps were committed to their diverging positions. They resumed this summer, with the arrival of the new Israeli government. Regional and global international developments for the last 20 years, including the wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, rising terrorism, and other transnational security risks, have also relegated the Palestinian question to a lower-level priority in the region and on the world stage.
The recent rapprochement between Israel and several Arab states, while perhaps emboldening Israel to pursue its current policies, also provides a window into a potential peaceful future in the region. The Biden election and shifting political and public opinion trends within both Israel and the Palestinian Territories may also signal a new era that could impact the state of negotiations and the prospect for peace and security or an escalation of the conflict.
Polls conducted among Jews and Arabs in Israel and the West Bank show very diverging perceptions and unclear expectations for the future of the region. Any momentum towards peace cannot be based on a unanimous consensus but will rather require negotiations within each side, trade-offs between the two sides and a very careful transition strategy, overseen by international observers that include global powers, regional players and NGOs.
The tragic events of May 2021 and the rapid escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas –but also between Arab and Jewish Israelis– underscore the multiplicity and velocity of drivers and variables that have shaped the conflict in the last 70 years. The ceasefire represents an important but fragile milestone for the current conflict and does not provide any perspective yet on the long-term outlook on the future of Israel-Palestinian relations.
These variables inform the chance for peace and the risk of escalation in the region. They also provide the essential foundation for understanding the complexity of the conflict.
1. Israeli Politics
Israeli politics have experienced a slow and steady transition to the right, ever since the victory of the Likud party under Menachem Begin in 1977. Benjamin Netanyahu remained in power from 2009 to 2021 and cemented the move of Israeli politics to the right in the last decade.
Israel held its 4th election of the last two years in March 2021, creating the path for several left and right-wing parties to build a coalition against Netanyahu and remove him from office, with the support of Israeli-Arab parties. Israel welcomed a new Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett from the religious Zionist party, Yamina, in June 2021.
The emergence of a new, albeit weak, political coalition could signal a new era in Israeli politics and create a pendulum between supporting the peace and accelerating Israel’s expansion strategy if the Israeli government pursues the policies enacted by the Netanyahu government.
Mr. Naftali has yet to formulate a precise government strategy on the issue but has stated his desire to “minimize the conflict[iii]” notwithstanding, the definition of that position is still unclear. As a positive development, his government has re-engaged with the Palestinian Authority and has provided aid to the Palestinian Territories.
2. Israeli Public Opinion
Israeli politics have also benefited from a shift to the right in public opinion, supporting a tougher stance on defending the vision of a “Grand Israel.” Under the Netanyahu government, Israeli public opinion showed little opposition to the government policies, particularly, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
Israelis have enjoyed peace and stability for almost a decade, except for occasional and relatively harmless missiles shot by Hamas from Gaza. Many Israelis still support a peace plan but seem to be conflicted about the path to getting there. The extreme right and extreme left agree that the two-state solution is the only option for peace in the region, albeit for different reasons.
Israeli’s support for a two-state solution appears to be at an all-time low and has most likely further decreased in the last few weeks, with only 47% of Israeli Jews supporting the option in 2020 vs. 53% in 2016.[iv] A significant shift to the right or center (the left is currently very weak [v] in Israeli politics and among Israeli Jews) will most likely influence future political decisions.
3. Palestinian Politics
The Palestinian Authority that oversees West Gaza is perceived as non-democratic, weak and corrupt. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian President, in power for over 15 years, has lost credibility among voters and on the international scene. Two-thirds of Palestinians want him to resign.[vi] Legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for May and July 2021, the first ones since 2006, but got postponed ten days ago by President Abbas. He invoked voting restrictions imposed by Israel on Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. The postponement has been called “a coup” by Hamas. [vii]
Palestinian politics remain very divided, with Hamas controlling Gaza and Fatah, the Party of Mahmoud Abbas, controlling most of the West Bank. The two factions of the Palestinian Authority have been at odds since 2006 but started negotiations in Egypt in 2017 that could signify a will to reconcile and develop a united Palestinian front. While Hamas has signed a ceasefire with Israel in August 2020, it has maintained its commitment to Israel’s illegitimacy and to violent resistance, thus potentially undermining any concerted strategy to approach any peace negotiation.
As new elections loom (possibly in late 2021 or 2022) in the Palestinian Territories, the emergence of new players in Palestinian politics shows a general appetite for a fresh approach to leadership. Polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that Fatah would win 38% of votes, and Hamas 34%, with 19% of voters still undecided. According to the BBC, “some of the popular candidates include Mohammed Dahlan, a former Fatah security chief exiled by Mr. Abbas in 2011 for allegedly planning a coup, Marwan Barghouti, jailed in Israel in 2004 for murder and terrorism during the second Palestinian Intifada and, Nasser Al-Kidwa, a nephew of former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat.” [viii]
A scenario where Hamas also plays a greater leadership role in the Palestinian Territories could undermine any chance of negotiation with Israel. The events of May 2021 have confirmed the limited influence of the Palestinian Authority over Gaza and have most likely strengthened the role of Hamas within the Palestinian territories, including in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
The Palestinian Authority has welcomed and celebrated Netanyahu’s exit and so far, has withheld any important declaration about the new government, perhaps adopting a wait-and-see position. The two parties have resumed high level negotiations, signaling the Palestinian Authority’s openness to a renewed dialogue with the Israeli government.
4. Palestinian Public Opinion
Palestinian support for a two-state solution has been dropping steadily since 2008 and in 2020 reached its lowest point, with only 52 percent of Palestinians supporting a two-state solution, according to a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. [ix]
Palestinian public opinion numbers have underlying significant variations between Gaza and the West Bank, but the most recent events may have triggered a higher convergence of Palestinian views between residents in the two territories, as well with Arab-Israelis, fueled by a greater level of resentment toward the Jewish state.
5. Gaza and Hamas
The economic and political future of Gaza under the exclusive control of Hamas since 2007 remains a significant issue. Hamas seizing control of the territory resulted in an Israeli land, sea and air blockade for the last 14 years. Approximately 2 million Palestinians live in a 141 square miles area, representing one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Nearly all drinking water is below basic standards. There is a severe electricity shortage and unemployment rate was 45.1% in 2019 and exceeded 50% in 2020, because of Covid-19. [x] The situation in Gaza has worsened considerably in 2021 and has become a full-blown humanitarian crisis requiring urgent international aid.
The reality of Hamas as the leading political force in Gaza underscores the fragmentation of Palestinian politics and undeniably impedes the ability for the Palestinian Authority to speak on behalf of all Palestinians. While Hamas may accept to give up civilian and governing control over the territory back to the Palestinian Authority, concessions over military control may be more challenging, absent incentives and pressures from the global community (e.g., increase in international aid, decrease in military support from Iran.)
The role of Hamas in future Palestinian politics could be considered a “wild card” and may require a separate approach to Gaza while negotiating the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
6. The Palestinian Economy
Palestinians are experiencing very difficult economic conditions, particularly in Gaza, because of the blockade, which will continue to be a source of unrest and instability. The impacts of Covid-19, the decision by the Trump Administration to cut almost all US aid to the Palestinian Territories and the latest conflict have compounded the crisis. GDP growth has moved in negative territory. Unemployment rate stands at 26.6% in 2020 and GDP per capita declined for the third consecutive year.[xi] The gap in Palestinian economic development as compared to Israel remains significant. Palestinian Territories combined GDP per capita is $3,199 vs. $43,641 for Israel. [xii]
7. Birth Rate and Demographics in Israel and the Palestinian Territories
Demographics are a major political issue for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within Israel, and the fear of being outnumbered by an Arab majority is used by right-wing Israelis who fear Israel will lose its Jewish identity. There are 6.5m Israeli Jews and 6.41m Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinian Territories (including $1.9 million Palestinians holding the Israeli nationality) [xiii], thus creating a demographic existential threat (referred to as “the demographic bomb” by Netanyahu in 2003) for certain Israelis.
Israeli Jews on both sides of the political spectrum cite demographic trends as justification for a two-state solution. On the right side, the argument is that the higher birth rate among Arab Israelis and Palestinians will eventually undermine the Jewish nature of the State of Israel under a one-state solution and is not sustainable. An Orthodox Jewish Israeli was quoted in 2019 stating that “One state is a Palestinian state from a demographic perspective. We would lose the majority […] There would not be a majority in the parliament, and it would be a slippery slope toward losing the Jewish state.”[xiv]
On the left side, their argument for a two-state outcome is that Israel cannot remain both a democracy and a Jewish national state while keeping the occupied territories and applying a “separate but not equal” policy.
The birth rate variable can support the status quo of remaining both an occupying force and having a dominant Jewish identity within the State of Israel or seeking a two-state solution that would enable a complete separation between the two identities.
The violence between Arab and Jewish Israelis during the most recent crisis and the rise of far-right movements within Israel represent a new and concerning development and a new variable that may have significant political implications on Israel’s political stability. Multi-ethnic communities and towns that have historically experienced relative harmony have been torn by the latest conflict. This significant shift to the right on both sides could further impede the chances for peace and a support for a two-state solution.
8. Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem
Over the last decade, Israel has pursued an aggressive expansion agenda in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed in 1980. By the end of 2018, approximately 430,000 Israelis lived in the West Bank, with the numbers of Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem growing to 220,000. This compares to 116,300 settlers in the West Bank and roughly 140,000 in East Jerusalem when the Oslo Accord was signed 1993. [xv]
Israeli’s expansion in the Palestinian Territories remains one of the most contentious variables in the conflict and a critical catalyst or impediment to peace depending on whether Israel reverts, pauses, expands settlements or annexes Area C in the foreseeable future. Over 60 percent of the West Bank is Area C (see Map – Source: Welcome to Palestine), where Israel keeps near exclusive control. According to the Oslo II Accord of 1995, the area was committed to be transferred back to the Palestinians, but that has not happened yet. Currently, Palestinians are prohibited from construction in most of the area.
The violence that erupted earlier this year, stemming from Israel’s decision to evict several Palestinian families in East Jerusalem, is the latest illustration of that contention.
Evictions in East Jerusalem, settlement expansions in Area C, or formal annexations by Israel (on-hold as per Israel’s agreement with the UAE) would continue to fuel unrest, escalation of the conflict, and dim any prospect of negotiations.
9. Jerusalem
Jerusalem also remains a very contentious point, even if its official transition as the capital of Israel in 2018 did not generate the expected level of unrest across the Palestinian Territories. As of 2019, new data shows that Israel has continued to build new settlements in East Jerusalem, which threatens to cut parts of the city claimed by Palestinians.
The question of Jerusalem is considered a pivotal issue because both parties claim control over the city for religious and historical reasons. The focus is on East Jerusalem and the Old City. Both parties claim the city as their capital and the ability to separate the city could help the negotiations. Alternatively, a stalemate on Jerusalem could jeopardize any chance for peace.
10. Borders and Palestinian Refugees
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948, called Nakba (“catastrophe”) by Palestinians, transformed the majority of Palestinians into refugees (5.6 million today, under the UNRWA Mandate)[xvi] primarily in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Little or no comprom
ise has been achieved on the faith of these refugees and their descendants to date. The contention relates primarily to the number of refugees and the territories that would qualify for the right to return.
The definition of borders for a future Palestinian State remains a central question. Borders established at the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 are most likely irreversible. Any chance for a two-state or bi-national solution would need to keep most, if not all, Palestinian territories lost during the 1967 war (see map- Source BBC), in play.
11. The US Role
The US has historically played a very important role in orchestrating, overseeing and participating in peace negotiations for the last 30 years, including the American-led peace process which first started at the 1991 Madrid conference and led to the Oslo Accord I signed at White House in 1993, followed by the Oslo II Accord in 1995. The Accords have never been fully implemented, and subsequent attempts by various US administrations have all failed.
The Trump administration shifted its support almost completely to Israel and removed most of the American aid given to Palestinians either directly or via UN Agencies (e.g., UNRWA.) According to many observers, the decisions made by the Trump Administration have undermined the ability for the US to be perceived as an independent mediator and have affected its credibility among Palestinians and more broadly in the Arab world.
The Biden Administration has reinstated most of the aid canceled by its predecessor and has also expressed its support for a two-state solution. It has also endorsed the diplomatic progress made by Israel and several Arab countries. It has signaled that it will continue to disengage from the Middle East, as evidenced by the withdrawal of all troops from Afghanistan in the summer 2021.
The escalation of violence in the Spring 2021 pulled the US back into the region, albeit for a short-term period. The US has in fact, committed to providing significant aid for the reconstruction of Gaza. However, it is still reasonable to assume the Biden Administration will continue to prioritize its domestic agenda and will focus on more important foreign policy questions (e.g., China, Russia.)
12. Egypt
Egypt has played a very important historical role in the Israeli-Palestinian question due to its long-standing relation with Israel since 1978 and its border with Gaza, which has become the main, if not the sole crossing for food and people between the territory and the rest of the world.
The relationship between Egypt and Hamas improved after Hamas severed its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in 2017, allowing Egypt to emerge as a critical mediator for brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas earlier this year. Egypt remains committed to the two-state solution and its contribution to the ceasefire positions it well to continue to play a key role in future peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
13. Diplomatic Rapprochement between Israel and Arab States
Since 2020, Israel has established diplomatic relations with four countries, the UAE, Morocco, Sudan and Bahrein and is pursuing active efforts to expand this diplomatic portfolio, besides Egypt and Jordan, with whom Israel has had relations for over two decades.
Rather than insisting on “land for peace” and offering normalized ties only in return for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines which had been the premise for prior discussions with Israel, Arab governments have now given precedence to self-interest. For Morocco, it is the U.S. recognition of its control over Western Sahara. For Sudan, it is the removal of U.S. sanctions and the UAE gained access to U.S. arms. The Arab Gulf States and Israel also agree on the need to contain Iran’s aspirations for greater regional influence, with an underlying undertone tied to the Sunni-Shia divide among Muslim countries.
These diplomatic wins have generated concerns within Palestinian circles and, for some, made them feel abandoned by Arab States. For Israeli hardliners, the situation validates the effectiveness of current Israeli policies. However, any chance for Israel to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia may require concessions to the Palestinian question.
The events of the last few weeks may have cooled off the rapprochement between Israel and these four countries, but it is unlikely they will have any long-term impact on the diplomatic achievements of the last two years.
14. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has historically been a critical supporter and defender of the Palestinian cause. Should it decide to pursue a diplomatic relation with Israel, it would be undeniably one of convenience against one common enemy, Iran, a critical backer of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Mohamed Bin Salman (“MBS”) has expressed a more conciliatory position towards Iran in recent weeks, but these statements are too recent to predict their impact on the future of relations between the two countries. The inter-connections between these variables underscore the complexity of the Palestinian question because it might evidently, no longer be the central question in the region but become, rather, a bargaining or collateral component to broader geopolitical forces in the region.
15. Iran
Iran lived under a very difficult embargo after the Trump Administration unilaterally cancelled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) nuclear treaty in 2017. The Biden administration has initiated new talks with Iran to reinstate the Treaty. There is no assurance that the negotiations will succeed. The attack by Israel on a critical Iranian enrichment site is also signaling that Israel may pursue a unilateral offensive strategy towards reducing Iranian nuclear capabilities, irrespective of the outcome of the US-Iran negotiations.
By supporting Hamas in Gaza, Iran has also disrupted the possibility for Palestinians to engage in a negotiation process with Israel, with one voice. Without the support of Iran, Hamas would be considerably weakened in Gaza. Iran may also be a “wild card” in assessing the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
16. Turkey
Turkey has diplomatic relations with Israel and supports a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the UN Security Council’s Resolutions. Turkey is engaged in other conflicts in the region (e.g., Syria) and faces significant domestic political and economic challenges. Its position on the Palestinian question, while firm, may be influenced or informed by changing priorities.
17. Regional Conflicts
Instability remains in the region with the civil war in Syria, political and economic turmoil in Lebanon, the civil war in Yemen, the uncertain future in Iraq and the current crisis in Afghanistan. These conflicts will continue to impact the Middle East in the foreseeable future and could continue to inform the level of priority granted by global and regional players to the Israeli-Palestinian question.
18. The European Union
European governments have taken a more balanced approach towards the issue and more recently have tried to counter the perceived bias of the Trump Administration towards Israel and mitigate the ensuing shortfall in the aid provided to Palestinians. However, mostly, Europeans see American leadership as critical. Certain European countries (e.g., Scandinavian countries) could take a more important mediating or facilitating role as part of their commitment to peace.
19. China
China has signaled its desire to be more involved in the Middle East and specifically in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As an influential member of the UN Security Council, it may inject a new perspective and seek to counter the US influence in the region. However, China’s interests and involvement in the region may be primarily motivated by its desire to secure access to energy and economic development, as evidenced by its recent deal with Iran. It will move to establish alliances and expand its economic footprint (e.g., Afghanistan), including with Israel.
20. Russia
Russia has stepped up its role in the Middle East, particularly with its support to the Syrian regime. Russia’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been unclear, but any escalation may prompt Russia to play a more active role, especially if the conflict could affect the balance of power among Russian allies in the region.
Conclusion:
This piece offered an educated perspective on key variables impacting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the complexity of their interconnection. The continuous stream of important, and sometimes unforeseen events in the region will undoubtedly continue to affect the ability to make viable long-term predictions about the chance for peace or risk of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
Cynics could assert that the recent escalation in violence has erased any opportunity for negotiation between the two parties for the foreseeable future. Others, perhaps encouraged by the recent negotiations held between the new Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, could contend that the violence in Gaza and the political transition in Israel have put the conflict back on the global geopolitical map and could be the impetus for mobilizing global and regional efforts again, toward a long-term resolution of the conflict.
Endnotes:
[i] Alex Ward, “Trump’s Israel-Palestine peace plan, explained”, Vox, January 2020
[ii] Mark Lynch and Shibley Telhami, “Biden says he will listen to the experts – here is what scholars of the Middle East think”, Brookings, April 2021
[iii] Patrick Kingsley, “Shrinking the conflict”: What does Israel’s New Mantra Really?”, The New York Times, September 30, 2021
[iv] Norulain Khawaja “The politics of demography in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, Journal of International Affairs, April 2018
[v] Brent E. Sasley, “The weakening of the Israeli left”, The Washington Post, March 2015
[vi] Mohamed Daragmeh, “Poll: Two-thirds of Palestinians want Abbas to resign”, Associated Press, March 2016
[vii] “Palestinian elections: Abbas postpones rare polls”, bbc.com. April 2021
[viii] Refer to Endnote v
[ix] Refer to Endnote iii
[x] “Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Sixty-seventh session, Geneva, 2–3 July, 7–9 September and 28 September–2 October 2020
[xi] “Covid-19 devastates Palestine’s shattered economy”, UNCTAD, September 2020
[xii] Goldenberg et al. “A new U.S. strategy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, CNAS, December 2020
[xiii] Refer to Endnote iii
[xiv] Daniel et al. “Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Rand Corporation, 2019
[xv] Refer to Endnote x
[xvi] United Nations High Commission on Refugees
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