The Disengagement of Violent Extremists in the Rural United States

by Alexandra Woodward

“Militia overwatch in Appalachia.” photo by Rick Shaw, 2022. on Unsplash. camera: NIKON D750

This thesis aims to address the knowledge gap on rural American disengagement practices. It finds two major barriers to disengagement in rural areas of the United States: 1) the existence of radical milieus, and 2) a deficit of programming or intervention resources.

Introduction         

Research on the disengagement process of violent extremists in the United States has a blind spot. Despite the established presence of domestic extremism in rural parts of the country, most research efforts and funding are focused on urban sectors or perceived transnational threats. While it is undoubtedly important to understand how violent extremists act and disengage in urban settings or abroad, there is a lack of attention paid to their rural counterparts and the disengagement resources available to them.

This thesis aims to address the knowledge gap on rural American disengagement practices. The findings and proposed solutions are based on an examination of relevant case studies, existing U.S.-focused literature, and interviews with one practitioner and one academic. The interviews conducted for this thesis are not representative of the opinions of the aggregated research community; they serve to provide a first-person perspective on the needs of practitioners in this space. Interviews were conducted with practitioners and relevant experts due to the difficulty of contacting those who have left violent extremism (also referred to as “formers”) directly.

The study finds two major barriers to disengagement in rural areas of the United States: 1) the existence of radical milieus, and 2) a deficit of programming or intervention resources. A further goal of this thesis is to highlight the need for additional research in these spaces. Rural areas of the United States have a shortage of social services, mental health practitioners, and other resources previously identified as integral to successfully disengaging from violent extremism (Mattsson et al, 2020).

An individual might be highly motivated to leave a violent extremist group due to fear of incarceration or general disillusionment, but without addressing the underlying reasons for engaging in violent extremism and providing proper support for one’s reintegration, the likelihood of becoming a recidivist (or returning to violent extremism) will increase. Furthermore, many extremists may be reintegrating into radical milieus, communities that overtly or implicitly support extremist ideology. 

Based on the research findings, this paper proposes five solutions that should be explored for domestic rural disengagement programming and further researched to determine their practicality and effectiveness:  1) Address the scarcity of in-person healthcare and disengagement resources through the utilization of online platforms to bridge the gap between professionals and those seeking treatment. 2) Manage barriers to treatment and intervention programs by increasing funding for existing disengagement organizations. 3) Relocation may be an option for individuals struggling to disengage due to their geographic area or familial ties. 4) Leverage teachers and 5) local leaders to help stigmatize extremist rhetoric to prevent the perpetuation of rural communities supporting extremist ideologies. 

Context and History

On Jan. 6, 2021, rioters and violent extremists broke into the United States Capitol. This attack on Congress reminded people that violent extremism was alive and active in the country. While not all at the Capitol were directly affiliated with violent extremism, through examining online posts, pictures, and videos, researchers identified that multiple domestic extremist groups, militias, or fringe associates were present and contributed to the escalation of the insurrection. These extremist groups include the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and QAnon (Farviar, 2021). 

Although the attack on the Capitol may have surprised some observers, violent extremism has been a domestic threat throughout much of American history. As early as the 20th century, researchers acknowledged the differences in both the cultural and political structures between rural and urban areas in the United States. Previously, the United States Census Bureau defined an area that contains fewer than 2,500 residents as “rural.” That definition has since been expanded to include populations outside of an urbanized cluster with low population densities (US Census Bureau). 

In 1977, researchers David Knoke and Constance Henry asserted that there had been a longstanding awareness of the tendency for rural political values to lean toward a more extreme conservative stance that was not reflective of urban counterparts:

“Historical rural American political behavior has revolved around three themes of radicalism, conservatism, and apathy. Post-World War II research on urban-rural differences reveals little support either for contemporary rural radicalism or greater political apathy in rural areas. However, rural citizens, particularly farmers, exhibit more conservative political orientations than metropolitan populations (Knoke et al, 1977).”

It was argued that through exposure to mass media, the opinions of rural and urban populations may eventually converge and that without an “unforeseen crisis” the political opinions and needs of rural America will not be acknowledged by national politics  The politics of rural America in conjunction with the advent of the Internet have made it extremely easy for politicians, conspiracy theorists, and violent extremist groups to pander to more radical individuals in the country. This issue is not new as the United States has played host to varying types of extremism since its inception. From the late 1800s into the mid-20th century, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was the main threat to domestic security for people of color in the United States (McAndrew 2017). 

Yet, for a substantial part of the 21st century, attention was mainly given to external threats despite the existence of domestic groups, which largely operated in or appealed to rural portions of the country (Gruberg 2009). Appealing to rural populations of the country supports the possibility that violent extremism is changing from the traditional group-oriented structure to more lone actors, and the rise of stochastic terrorism will cause violent attacks due to the “othering” of a specific person or group.

In 2016, The Knights Party, an Arkansas branch of the KKK, published an endorsement for then-presidential candidate Donald Trump in its publication The Crusader (Robb, 2016). The KKK praised Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” and his appeal to the “white Christian Republican” voter base that felt underrepresented by mainstream politicians. Donald Trump’s candidacy and subsequent presidency helped bring white supremacist dialogue to mainstream media (Fox, 2016). By encouraging extremist rhetoric and discussing how white Christian Republican populations are oppressed, Trump legitimized the KKK and other extremists’ grievances, claims of oppression, and marginalization of the target populations. 

Since Trump’s political campaign, the presence of extremist ideology and attacks both in politics and public life have increased in the United States. The political opinions the KKK expressed in the 2016 edition of The Crusader echoed the Great Replacement Theory, that white Americans are methodically being replaced in American politics and society. This also echoes findings in 2020 that the increased population of immigrants in a county is positively related to a rise in violence from extremists (Lerma, 2020).

It is likely that demographic shifts and normalized public support of far-right sentiments from politicians and public figures, such as supporting the Great Replacement Theory, will cause an increase in stochastic terrorism as was seen on Jan. 6, 2021. Stochastic terrorism does not come from an overt call to action but arises from the implication that someone in the ingroup should mitigate an outgroup threat. Many participants in the Jan. 6 insurrection had no known involvement with extremist groups and were part of an older demographic than typical arrests involving right-wing extremists. One participant in the insurrection claimed that he was “proud to be a patriot” and cited his support on social media for President Trump and the allegations that the election had been stolen (Pape et al, 2021). 

As more extreme-conservative politicians and online content speak to people sympathetic to far-right or white supremacist ideologies, the United States may begin to see more individual acts of violence from fringe actors. These seemingly individual acts of violence, as opposed to an organized terrorist attack, were exemplified in the case of Payton Gendron’s attack on a supermarket in Buffalo, NY.

Case Study: Payton Gendron

On May 14, 2022, Payton Gendron began a live stream on the website Twitch as he entered a supermarket in Buffalo, NY, and opened fire on shoppers (Myers et al, 2022). Gendron had traveled from his home in Broome County, NY, to the more urban area of Buffalo, allegedly due to the historically Black demographic in the neighborhood with the supermarket (Bowman et al, 2022). 

Before the attack, Gendron consumed extremist content from a variety of news and social media sources including BitChute, YouTube, 4chan, and Reddit (Myers et al, 2022). Gendron claimed to have radicalized during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic when he spent an inordinate amount of time online, but the basis for his radicalization might have come in part, from the area surrounding Conklin, NY, where he lived. This area has a history of extremism. 

In the 1920s, the city of Binghamton was the New York capital for the KKK (Gager, 2017). While the Klan no longer has a chapter in the area, incidents of racism are still prevalent in the county. A 2021 lawsuit filed by a police officer highlights cultural attitudes and levels of tolerance for racial “others” in the area. Lieutenant Quinones claimed that he faced repeated incidents of systemic racism and discrimination against his Hispanic origins at the hands of the police department. Quinones alleged multiple incidents, including being mocked for speaking Spanish and being referred to as “Ricky Ricardo” from the show “I Love Lucy” during his tenure with the force (Borrelli, 2021). 

Furthermore, the lawsuit claims that another officer faced similar incidents of discrimination and racism from the department (Borrelli, 2021).

In addition to the racial tensions, half of the voters in Broome County lean toward right-wing politics. The county was split almost evenly, with approximately 44,000 people voting for Trump, who also carried almost all nearby counties (Briz et al 2020), despite news that Trump tried to pressure Ukraine to obtain disparaging information on Democratic candidate Joe Biden and his family (Miller et al 2019). The Southern Tier’s voting habits echo Knoke and Henry’s assertion that rural farming communities will lean toward conservative politics and gives some insight into the cultural and political opinions of less metropolitan areas of the state (Knoke et al, 1977). While Gendron obtained the racist propaganda and instructional materials for his attack online, the area’s political beliefs and its history of being empathetic to extremism possibly influenced Gendron’s path to find the materials., although it would be impossible to answer definitively without speaking directly to him. 

As the world moves forward from the COVID-19 pandemic, there may be an increase in online-radicalized extremists from isolated areas that travel to commit violence like Gendron. Due to this possibility, it is important to find effective ways to identify those at risk and help radicalized individuals in rural America disengage from their groups or ability to commit attacks.

While practitioners and scholars have studied disengagement and deradicalization from violent extremism for several decades, more work is needed to understand the field as it relates to rural areas.

Disengagement and Deradicalization in the United States

Though the terms “deradicalization” and “disengagement” are often used interchangeably, previous literature established that the deradicalization process is a cognitive change when someone departs from the extremist ideology that they previously subscribed to (Fink, 2008). In contrast, disengagement is a physical process where an individual reduces their participation in or leaves a violent extremist group (Fiebig et al, 2019).

To properly assist those who are ready to disengage from violent extremism, academic literature, which sometimes informs funding and the operations of disengagement programs, needs to be updated to accurately reflect the current environment in the United States. Since the mid-2000s when researchers initially wrote about the lack of literature, several institutions and government-sponsored organizations published reports on radicalization and deradicalization in the United States. Existing research has not dedicated enough resources to learn more about the barriers people leaving an extremist group may face, with few exceptions. One publication from Michael Jensen, Patrick James, and Elizabeth Yates details how different barriers can affect the way people leave far-right violent extremist groups in the country. 

The paper examines the “push and pull factors” that cause a person to leave and discovers  that many of the same factors exist for those who do or do not disengage.  However, by only examining cases where people fully exited their groups and ignoring the recidivists, existing research has largely failed to prove that the “exit mechanisms” actually cause extremists to exit (Jensen et al, 2020). Despite this assertion that true motives for disengagement are not known, a recent analysis of data from over 80 individuals suggests that push factors were a significant motivator for disengagement (Altier et al, 2017).

The findings that some push factors are particularly significant, such as dissatisfaction with involvement in an extremist organization, suggest that pull factors may not always be enough to encourage disengagement, especially for the most ideologically committed. For individuals who became involved in violent extremism through family members, motivational factors for disengagement stemmed from their ability to form a sense of self, independent from the extremist group, or after gaining conventionally accepted markers of “social prestige” (Jensen et al, 2020).

Recommendations for Rural Disengagement

Explore options for online interventions

The needs of people leaving violent extremist groups are complex and require a multidisciplinary approach. For many, a combination of support from other former extremists and a connection with mental health professionals is needed for successful disengagement. Rural areas are sometimes prone to high rates of drug addiction, and in these cases, substance abuse treatment may also be necessary. Access to necessary medical or other supportive care can be limited in rural communities where there is a deficit of mental healthcare workers, leading to extensive travel times. Extended drive times might discourage individuals from seeking in-person support. Roughly 40 percent of people living in rural areas had to travel at least 30 minutes to access medical care (Osborne, 2008). 

Online medical intervention, including therapy, may help to bridge that gap for rural communities. Though the benefits of online mental health intervention have been contested, other practitioners claim that any level of access to therapy or other online disengagement resources may be beneficial to people trying to leave extremist groups, especially those in areas without sufficient access to in-person mental health services (Budge, 2022).

Fund programs that help individuals exiting violent extremist groups create prosocial ties

Funding should be allocated towards organizations that aid former extremists on their disengagement journey. Building up these programs would be particularly helpful because they diversify the social group away from those friendships held while in an extremist group. It is possible that without prosocial ties or support systems, people who have disengaged can turn to other forms of criminality or become recidivists (Jensen, 2022). Other potential avenues where funding could be directed are programs that help place former extremists in jobs that interact with the public, or programs that help assist the family members of disengaging violent extremists. Since jobs are often scarce in rural areas, a third party may help to identify semi-local career opportunities that would help in the disengagement process. Developing resources for families could also help those trying to disengage.

Identified barriers to increased government funding include difficulty in quantifying or evaluating the long-term effectiveness of these programs and inexperience in managing the business side programs.

A possible solution would be to provide funding with stipulations, such as requiring certain metrics to track program effectiveness or working with external evaluators. Once a system is established by the government, future disengagement programs would have  clear guidelines to follow to obtain funding, evaluate the effectiveness of their programs, and increase their treatment capacity. 

Relocation may be necessary for some former extremists

Relocation, or creating a physical separation from a violent extremist group or radical milieu, may be a viable method for extremists from rural areas to build a new identity. Relocation can be voluntary, such as moving to another state, or involuntary, such as incarceration. In both cases, the individual is placed in a new environment, creating a distance between them and the environment where they engaged in violent extremism.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) highlighted a study that indicated physical separation from an extremist cohort was successful among incarcerated extremists because it created a “critical space for individuals to reconsider their beliefs…and find new non-extremist/non-criminal contacts” (Jensen et al, 2020). 

One former teenage neo-Nazi had reached out to a local welfare department and was placed into foster care to separate her from the extremist group (Mattsson et al. p. 103). While she was not immediately deradicalized, relocating provided time to gradually change her ideological beliefs and prevented continued engagement in the neo-Nazi movement (Mattson et al, 2020). By moving to a new area, those trying to disengage will be exposed to a wider variety of people, often have better job opportunities, and be able to create a new identity without the malign influence of past relationships.

Legal implications for removing minors involved in violent extremists from their homes without proof of abuse or neglect may prevent this from being a feasible option for many. Future research is needed to explore its effectiveness to prevent recidivism. Relocating could be an avenue worth exploring for adults experiencing disillusionment but that are unable to separate themselves. 

Leverage teachers to help mitigate the effects of radical milieus

In some cases, far-right extremism is so deeply ingrained in a community that parents may push their children to join the white supremacist movement or other violent groups (Eyerman et al, 2019). Training teachers in rural areas could help mitigate the effects of radical milieus and equip them with the necessary knowledge for how to act if a student expresses a desire to leave a violent extremist organization. In preparation for this potential scenario, teachers should be able to direct the student to the resources that can best assist.

Conceivably, a problem with having teachers counsel or direct students to other authority figures is that those disengaging may not want additional authorities involved. If they feel that they might be reported, it may reduce the number of young people reaching out for assistance.

Additional preventative programming in schools could be implemented to help lay a foundation of tolerance that, over time, may lower the chances of students joining extremist groups. A problem with providing school modules to mitigate culturally instilled rhetoric is that a “whole of society” approach would be required to consistently reinforce the message. This would be difficult in areas of the country where the environment at home is not consistent with the teachings at school. However, educating students could help to lay a foundation of racial and religious tolerance that may discourage violent action on behalf of a group. If a student is told that participation in violent extremism could lead to punishment and arrest, it may deter them from joining a violent extremist group even if they still sympathize with the ideology.

Work with rural community leaders to speak out against violent extremism

Rural community leaders should know what violent extremist associations look like and speak out against them (Eyerman et al). While some leaders may not be willing to speak out due to fear of job retention or other forms of retribution, allowing the normalization of violent extremist ideologies in rural communities will only contribute to the growing problem echoed in American politics and media. In 2017, the Southern Poverty Law Center published a guide that outlined how communities and their local leaders can tackle the rise of violent extremism in their areas. Namely, creating community resources such as a senior center or community center can help mitigate radical milieus and aid in the disengagement process (SPLC, 2017). 

Community resources help rural communities fill in the gap to help people disengage from violent extremists. While building a library, for example, would not inherently fix the issue of violent extremism, it could give those trying to disengage opportunities to build prosocial ties and expose themselves to a variety of people not engaged in the same ideology.

Conclusion

More research is needed to fill the gaps in understanding violent extremism’s interaction with the rural-urban divide and other underserved parts of the United States. To best address the longstanding issue of violent extremism in the United States, we must treat the issue of violent extremism differently depending on the type and location of extremism. Violent extremists in non-urban regions of the United States likely require a different approach to disengagement programming than those in urban areas. Nuanced cultural dynamics of rural municipalities add a layer of complexity for individuals attempting to disengage from their extremist groups. Before we can properly adapt or leverage existing disengagement programs for the more rural parts of the country, practitioners must first acknowledge that these communities have a deficit of in-person resources to aid in disengagement.

Additionally, individuals living in less populated parts of the country may have different motivations for joining or leaving violent extremist movements. Subsequently, a new approach is needed to further assist their permanent exit from violence. The potential solutions listed in this thesis are subject to future research. Nevertheless, by funding existing exit programs and online organizations, exploring anti-hate education in schools, and equipping teachers and local leaders with tools to mitigate radical milieus, rural residents of the United States may have a chance to truly disengage from violent extremism and develop prosocial ties.

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Alexandra Woodward is pursuing her MS in Global Affairs with a concentration in Transnational Security, and specializations in Data Analytics and Global Risk from New york University. Previously, Alexandra worked as a Policy Fellow for the Syrian Emergency Task Force to co-author reports detailing the conditions of civilians in Idlib Province and the Rukban refugee camp.

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