South Korea to Break Out the Dilemma in US-China Rivalry

By Zhen Li

This article addresses a “crisis” faced by the Republic of Korea. Threatened by a Chinese-supported neighbor –the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea– it demands U.S. protection in the absence of its own strong military force. On the other hand, South Korea relies heavily on China for its international trade and economic stability, which left a bitter taste when it allowed the U.S. THAAD missile defense system to be deployed in its land in 2017. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s new administration needs to find a new way to break out the rivalry between these two superpowers. According to author Zhen Li, neutrality and soft power are the way ahead.

Photo by Daniel Bernard on Unsplash

Since the former U.S President Donald Trump imposed the first-round tariffs on China in 2018, the most important bilateral relationship in the world has been tense and the effects reverberate through every part of the world. This mirrors the deterioration of US-China relations in the early 1950s, which led to war in Korea. 70 years later, the Korean Peninsula has once again become the front line of the US-China rivalry, but a different outcome is possible.

Defense Dependence on the U.S.

Since the end of the Korean War, the foremost concern of South Korea’s national security has been the threats from its neighbor, North Korea (Snyder and Lee 2020). The tension in the Korean Peninsula has escalated dramatically after entering the millennium because North Korea developed its nuclear weapons with help from its closest partner, China. As a result, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been particularly important, especially since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by both sides in 1953 (Snyder and Lee 2020).

Living in one of the world’s most vigorous democracies, people in South Korea embrace the values of democracy and freedom championed by the United States, whereas according to a Carnegie survey in 2019, many South Koreans have a negative view towards Beijing, with a quarter to a third of the population harboring distrust of the Chinese Communist Party (Lee 2020). As China’s economic, political, and military power continues to increase, South Korea is deeply aware of China’s rapidly mounting influence. Besides deep concerns about North Korea, the government of ROK has begun to work in the Indo-Pacific region together with the U.S. and its allies to tackle what they see as Beijing’s potential aggression (“U.S., South Korean Defense Leaders Assess State of Alliance”, 2021).

Economy Reliance on China

Despite security concerns, South Koreans cannot live without China because the country is its biggest trade partner  (World Integrated Trade Solution). Based on data by the World Integrated Trade Solution of 2019, Mainland China itself is the biggest importer of South Korean goods, representing a far larger share than the U.S., not to mention Hong Kong, which alone is the fourth largest importer of South Korean products.

Literally speaking, Beijing controls South Korea’s commodities via trade. According to Statista, in 2020 South Korea imported “around 152.42 million U.S. dollars-worth of Kimchi from China.” In 2017 alone, as a consequence of allowing the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile system, South Korea suffered economic losses of $7.5 billion dollars from China’s economic sanctions, while China only lost $880 million for the backlash (Brookings, 2020). Consequently, former President Moon Jae-In’s administration was always careful of expressing concerns regarding Beijing’s actions (Lee 2020).

Recommendations:

Caught in the U.S.-China rivalry, it is hard for Seoul to make a choice. As a middle power with a small territory located on the front line of this superpower’s competitive impulses, South Korea seems not to lean too much on one side or the other. However, to better balance this strategic dilemma (Stokreef 2014), South Korea must exert its influence on its own initiative instead of always being bullied by others. Therefore, this policy brief gives two recommendations to the new President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration.

• To strategically remain a neutral mediator between the two superpowers

Because of the difficulties associated with cutting ties with either side, Seoul should remain neutral in most aspects. Politically, as it faces North Korea’s nuclear threats, Seoul must continue to seek U.S. cooperation. Although China is the closest partner to North Korea, Beijing is not willing to wade into the Korean Peninsula and make the situation more complicated (Aljazeera 2017; Lee 2020). Therefore, maintaining its strategy of pursuing U.S. cooperation for security will not inflame Beijing now, as it has not in the past, but only as long as Seoul does not accept requirements from the U.S. for tackling Beijing, for instance with THAAD placement.

One certainty is that during this rivalry, Washington will not leave South Korea alone because it needs South Korea as a “gangplank” to counterbalance China’s attempts to form its sphere of influence (Lee 2020), no matter what U.S.-DPRK relationship looks like. However, it would be dangerous for South Korea’s economy if Seoul decided to do anything that enables Washington to deter China. Thus, Seoul must stay neutral when issues involve those sensitive key areas to Beijing, such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and more importantly, Taiwan. In addition, Seoul should seek to be an active mediator in areas where the U.S. and China can cooperate and ease tensions, such as global public health and climate change.

• Update and strengthen its soft power

Represented by phenomena like BTS or Squid Game, and brands such as KIA, Samsung, and more, Hallyu (Korean Wave), the phenomenal growth of Korean culture, has appealed billions of people as well as produced tons of economic gains (Ban 2020). According to Korean Culture and Information Service, each year:

• The number of South Korean soft power institutions rises by 7%
• The number of members participating in soft culture institutions rises by 36%
• The total number of people globally who follow or are affiliated with South Korean cultural institutions has reached over 100 million, representing a “5-fold increase over 5 years” (Korean Culture and Information Service).

Given these developments, Hallyu seems to be a potent “weapon” for South Korea to boost its soft power and exert its own global influence while breaking out the dilemma.

However, over recent years the Korean government intervened too much by utilizing Hallyu as a propaganda tool, which damaged the credibility of South Korean soft power. “If public diplomacy degenerates into propaganda, it not only fails to convince others, but can undercut soft power”(Ban 2020). As a result, the new administration shall give up its vital role in popular culture and promote it implicitly rather than explicitly. The South Korea’s Ministry of Culture should encourage non-governmental organizations to advocate Hallyu since “in the domain of popular culture, state-led institutions work less efficiently than the private sector” (Ban 2020).

The private sector can not only work to bring Hallyu abroad effectively, but they can also help the government to innovate cultural production. The new administration shall provide the private sector, especially small-scale companies, with high-quality training for bolstering cultural production and services to the world (Ban 2020). In addition, the administration should cooperate with the private sector to do research about Hallyu. It may help find which South Korea cultural export is the most attractive in order to make targeted investments.

Lastly, the cultural production must stay away from the subject of the U.S.-China rivalry. This means the production should not get involved in anything related to politics. For example, K-pop celebrities should not comment on anything related to politics of the U.S. or China. The most famous group, BTS, got a taste of this once they commented on the Korean War, which upset the Chinese government and contributed to Chinese nationalism in 2020, “causing brands such as FILA and Samsung to remove images of the group from their Chinese sites” (Tam Arthur 2020).

References:

(KOCIS), Korean Culture and Information Service. “Hallyu (Korean Wave): Korea.Net : The Official Website of the Republic of Korea.”, https://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Culture-and-the-Arts/Hallyu.

Ban, Yuna. South Korea?s Soft Power in Middle Power Diplomacy: Enhancing Popular Culture and its Challenges. 2020, https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/12/02/south-koreas-soft-power-in-middle-power-diplomacy-enhancing-popular-culture-and-its-challenges/.

Brookings. “Trying to Loosen the Linchpin: China’s Approach to South Korea.”, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200606_china_south_korea_pak_v2.pdf.

“China to Remain ‘neutral’ if North Korea Attacks First.”, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/11/china-to-remain-neutral-if-north-korea-attacks-first.

“Inside the BTS ARMY, the Fandom with Unrivaled Organization.”, 2020, https://time.com/5912998/bts-army/.

“Korea Still Taking Chinese Economic Hits Over US Missiles.”, -12-06T10:42:52+00:00, 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/12/korea-still-taking-chinese-economic-hits-over-us-missiles/.

Lee, Chung M., and Chung M. Lee. “South Korea is Caught between China and the United States.”, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/21/south-korea-is-caught-between-china-and-united-states-pub-83019.

Snyder, Scott, and Joyce Lee. “Infusing Commitment with Credibility: The Role of Security Assurances in Cementing the US-ROK

Alliance.” Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation. Stanford University Press, 2020.

“South Korea: Kimchi Import Value from China 2020.”, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1199351/south-korea-kimchi-import-value-from-china/.

Stokreef, Mark. “A Rising Middle Power Facing a Strategic Dilemma.” Atlantisch Perspectief, vol. 38, no. 5, 2014, pp. 12-16.

Tam Arthur. “Opinion | China Went Up Against a K-Pop Giant — and Lost.” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/26/bts-china-spat-korean-war/.

“Timeline: U.S. Relations with China 1949–2021.”, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china.

“U.S., South Korean Defense Leaders Assess State of Alliance.”, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2859149/us-south-korean-defense-leaders-assess-state-of-alliance/.

World Integrated Trade Solution. “ROK Trade.”, 2019, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/KOR.