by Yazan Ammus
International political events since the turn of the century have severely undermined the cause of nuclear disarmament. A deal between Washington and Pyongyang may now offer the best hope to resuscitate global non-proliferation. (Photo credit: Micha Brändli on Unsplash)
When it comes to crafting policy for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Washington policymakers must internalize Pyongyang’s understanding of modern political history, particularly given all that has transpired since the turn of the century. The international community, particularly the United States, has undermined the cause of nuclear non-proliferation through a series of actions, all of which now fuel the intransigence of the Hermit Kingdom.
The most seminal of these events: the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Given all available evidence, it now seems more plausible that Baghdad was invaded not because it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), but as a consequence of their absence (“CIA Final Report: No WMD Found”). Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s dismantlement of his country’s nuclear program in return for normalized political and economic relations with Europe and the U.S. was, for a time, heralded as a shining example of nuclear diplomacy (Cirincione). Like much of Libya, the positive disarmament case study would be destroyed following NATO’s military intervention in the North African State at the outset of the Arab Spring in 2011 (Bowen and Moran). The Iran nuclear deal? As a result of former U.S. president Donald Trump’s petty vindictiveness and desire to deprive his predecessor of a foreign policy legacy achievement, the agreement was scrapped, in contravention of international law, the wishes of all other parties to maintain the accord, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) verification of Tehran’s compliance with its obligations (Smith; O’Connor).
The Russian invasion of Ukraine offers additional disastrous precedent. Not only was the Russian attack made possible as a consequence of Kyiv’s lack of WMD’s, which it gave up to its larger neighbor following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in the face of an impressive Ukrainian counterattack, the Russians began leveraging their nuclear arsenal in a predatory way (Cameron). Through the threat of WMDs, the Russians hoped to secure on the battlefield what they could not with conventional armaments. Tragically, the war has demonstrated not only the utility of WMDs as a defensive deterrent, but as a complementary offensive tool as well.
When examined in the context of this history, North Korean distrust of the international community is understandable. Additional geopolitical realities augment their suspicion. The isolated regime is told its nuclear program is to blame for the sanctions suffocating its economy, but in U.S.-sanctioned Venezuela, no such WMD program threatens international peace and security (Weisbrot and Sachs). If Caracas, a human rights paradise when compared to Pyongyang, can be sanctioned for its democratic deficiencies, would not the totalitarian nature of the DPRK’s government alone justify their continued economic embargo, even after disarmament? Or rather, through such policy contradictions, is the United States incentivizing the Venezuelan government to acquire WMDs, which it could then relinquish in return for economic relief?
President Joe Biden has the opportunity to rectify past errors and create an international political system conducive to nuclear non-proliferation. Reentry into the Iran nuclear deal and reducing the severity of the sanctions imposed on non-nuclear states would be critical first steps, which should be complemented by a new diplomatic effort with North Korea.
During his tenure in office, Trump behaved recklessly, both domestically and internationally. The 45th president got very little right, but his willingness to engage in diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jung Un was positive. One can mock the “love letters” exchanged between the two gentlemen, but is it not better for leaders of any two nuclear states to have personal affinity rather than animus?
Moreover, the fixation on such marginal dynamics obscures the more significant: the reflexive hawkishness that defined the foreign policy dogma of the Republican Party was, to some degree, neutered by the real estate mogul. Notwithstanding his escalation of tensions with Iran, through his negotiations with the Taliban, attempts to establish better relations with Russia, and summit with Kim, Trump brought the possibility of diplomacy with adversaries into the GOP mainstream.
Thus, without the fear of being analogized to former British prime minister Neville Chamberlain or criticized as weak by his congressional opposition, Biden should seek to build on Trump’s experience and engage in his own face-to-face summit with Kim. At the technical level, extensive discussions will be necessary but the basic contours of any agreement are well known: North Korea’s return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the dismantling of all its nuclear weapons; removing sanctions and providing economic assistance, particularly fuel, to North Korea; normalizing political and economic relations; and formal security assurances by each side, with explicit guarantees against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. is serious about advancing such an effort, it would need to accept a sequential, reversible process in which some economic relief is granted prior to the complete denuclearization of the peninsula. North Korean leadership made the centrality of this demand clear at the failed Hanoi Summit (Panda and Narang).
As paranoid as the North Korean regime is, it has consistently showcased a desire to reach a comprehensive accord with the U.S. that it feels satisfies its security needs and delivers economic development. In 1994, North Korea struck the Agreed Framework agreement with the Clinton administration, in which it froze its nuclear program, agreed to stay in the NPT, and respect their commitments as an NPT signatory. American congressional opposition to the agreement impeded its implementation (Ryan). On Aug. 7, 2005, at the fourth round of the six-party talks, participants issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear program, return to the NPT, and allow inspections of its sites by the IAEA in return for security guarantees, energy provisions, and normalizing relations. Disputes over the construction of a light water reactor and the imposition of fresh sanctions on North Korean banks in Macau ultimately scuttled the agreement (“North Korea: A Chronology of Events”).
If past is prologue, a deal that ends the potential for nuclear war on the divided peninsula can still be reached. The global non-proliferation regime is on life support. Only through bold action can President Biden resuscitate it.
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Yazan Ammus is a candidate for a Master of Science in Global Affairs at New York University, with a concentration in Transnational Security. He previously worked with the Middle East Zone Unit of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to advance a nuclear weapons free zone treaty in the Middle East.
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