Five Voted ‘No’: Where Are They Now?

by Geoff Sloan

If the UN General Assembly is the highest forum for international diplomacy, then the five member states that voted not to condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine took the staunchest position available. These five countries’ post-Soviet alignment with Russia shed light on their strategic policy motives. (Photo credit: the blowup on Unsplash)

Russia’s allies at the United Nations have dug in their heels on the diplomatic stage. Again and again, they abet Russia’s aggression with varying levels of vocal and tangible support.

In the first in-person UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting since the COVID-19 pandemic, the states that supported Russia since its reinvasion of Ukraine varied in their shows of support for Russian policymaking, from the pen to the gun barrel.

In a General Assembly referendum-of-sorts on March 2 (UNGA 2022), resolution signatories deplored “in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.” Of the 181 member states that voted on that resolution, five voted “no” including Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Russia and the Syrian Arab Republic (Al Jazeera 2022). Here are their stances at the 77th General Assembly and in the half-year since the reinvasion began.

Belarus

“It is the collective West that should fully bear the responsibility for the ongoing bloodshed in Ukraine,” said the late Vladimir Makei, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, to the General Assembly on Sept. 24 (Makei 2022). Much of the speech blamed “the West” while also calling for a ceasefire and open negotiations to end the fighting. Should Ukraine, her allies and the West be blamed to blame for Russia firing the first shots? Invariably, Belarus believes so.

Longtime Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has showcased a history of doubting the West, aligning with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and showing a lack of care for democracy advocates. Lukashenko’s October announcement to deploy Belarusian forces near Ukraine is the most tangible support of Russia’s war yet (Reuters 2022). The international community must not be surprised when Lukashenko’s mobilization of forces alongside the Russian military causes greater destruction in Ukraine.

Early fears of conflict spillover into Belarus, Moldova, or even Poland could now materialize thanks to Belarusian escalation. If Belarus begins to directly engage with the war in Ukraine, however, this escalation will likely not bring on a domino effect that many European powers have worked so adamantly to avoid since World War II. Therefore, far greater escalation ought to be a reality even if Belarus is drawn deep into this quagmire. But that future reality cannot be removed from the realm of possibility. More so, the possibility of greater escalation must be taken extremely seriously while nuclear-powered Russia continues behaving irrationally.

“We have been preparing for this for decades,” Lukashenko said during a security meeting made public on Oct. 10 (Reuters 2022).

More tacitly, Belarusian action at the UN has remained consistent. Before Makei’s Sept. 24 General Assembly speech, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was permitted to deliver his address virtually, a highly rare but necessary step for the UN, given Zelenskyy has not left Ukraine since the reinvasion. Belarus voted against allowing Zelenskyy’s virtual address, as did Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, and the Syrian Arab Republic (Macias 2022).

Eritrea

In an act of effectively choosing sides of the former Iron Curtain, Eritrean officials have continued their support of Russia in a fashion defiant of American policy. Yet oftentimes the words not uttered are far louder than those delivered from the podium.

“Cyclical conflicts – which have [seen] an exceptional, dangerous and almost apocalyptic dimensions with the war in Ukraine – have ratcheted up the impending crisis to unprecedented levels,” said Eritrean Minister for Foreign Affairs Osman Saleh Mohammed during the General Assembly on Sept. 26 (Mohammed 2022).

He made no other mention or allusion to the war in Ukraine during his 10-minute speech. To refer to the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine as one of a multitude of “cyclical conflicts” diminishes a truly historic moment. The Eritrean delegation’s prepared word choice is also an act of public messaging to indicate Eritrea’s policy – one in line with Russian minimization and deflection of the war in Ukraine.

To the credit of Eritrean foreign policymakers, the East African country changed its position, if only somewhat, in an Oct. 12 resolution regarding Russian actions, and was the only nation to change its vote between the resolutions on March 2 and Oct. 12 from “no” to abstaining.

Specific draft resolution language can often be a make-or-break factor in voting. But given how drawn out the war in Ukraine has been, it is likely that Eritrean support for Russia is experiencing woes.

North Korea

Never speaking softly, and only seldom carrying a big stick, North Korea has taken action past the pen and the podium.

North Korea is using this tumultuous time in eastern Europe to test the waters with its own nuclear weapons program. — literally. The isolated, nuclear-armed state has launched dozens of missiles, “including one that landed near South Korean territorial waters for the first time since the 1953 division of the peninsula,” at the same time that Russian nuclear threats are making headlines (Johnson 2022).

The heightened possibility of a Russian nuclear attack has opened a door for North Korea to test how far it can take its nuclear prodding of Western allies, like South Korea and Japan. As Russia normalizes nuclear threats, North Korea has a window to do the same. Unsurprisingly, when one state brings about violence and destabilization, it creates opportunities for other nations to do the same.

Further adding to the escalation, U.S. intelligence reported North Korean arms sales to Russia in early September (Barnes 2022), which North Korean officials have denied (Sang-Hun 2022). Yet the likely weapons deal between the two states comes as sanctions have hampered Russian options in the arms market. Iran, which abstained from the March 2 resolution, has also sold arms to Russia since the outbreak of the war. Again, Russia’s allies at the UN are providing support on the podium and battlefield, leading to more violence and a less stable world.

Additionally, North Korean officials said the UN Security Council sanctions against Russia are “unlawful” (Tong-Hyung 2022). North Korea is one of three states, alongside Russia and the Syrian Arab Republic, to recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Tong-Hyung 2022).

At the General Assembly, North Korean Permanent Representative to the UN Kim Song made no explicit mention of Ukraine or Russia during the plenary sessions on Sept. 26 (Song 2022). Similar to Mohammed of Eritrea, choosing not to directly acknowledge the war in Ukraine is public messaging. By not so much as hinting at one of the most disruptive interstate conflicts in decades, North Korea has signaled that its priorities lie far from Kyiv. Omitting any reference to Ukraine is an interesting tactic for North Korea because of its actions outside the UN, such as arming Russia, has been so concretely supportive.

Song only came close to acknowledging the reinvasion, saying “[North Korea] will broadly cooperate with all countries and nations which oppose and reject aggression and interference, domination and subordination, and aspire [for] independence and justice.”

Maybe Song’s Sept. 26 quote refers back to much of his focus that day on U.S. aggression in North Korea, or maybe it served no referential purpose. Nonetheless, the North Korean position on Russia and Ukraine has seen nearly no sympathy for Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people, and nothing indicates a change of heart on the horizon.

Syrian Arab Republic

The Syrian Arab Republic was the first state to recognize independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (The AP 2022). Subsequently, Ukraine broke diplomatic ties with the Syrian Arab Republic – the Assad regime – this summer. The Syrians then broke ties with Ukraine (The AP 2022).

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of the Syrian Arab Republic Faisal Mekdad stuck to the policy line in Moscow that the “special military operation” has been an act of defense against the encroaching West. Mekdad further evidenced Syria’s support as he took jabs at the U.S. and the West for their involvement in places such as Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela. 

How, then, Mekdad asked, may states “confront these challenges collectively and jointly, in a way that contributes to meeting the aspirations of all our peoples?” (Mekdad 2022).

Suffice to say the Russian support of the Syrian Arab Republic has given rise to the Assad regime’s support of Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe. Despite this, some Russian troops have moved from the Syrian front to aid other forces in Ukraine (Stanton 2022).

Mekdad condoning the use of aggressive tactics should not come as a surprise. Russian support of the Assad regime since the Arab Spring and Damascus’ support of aggressive tactics are in line with these comments. Yet ostracizing the small Arab state further from not only the West, but the entire world, is a risky stance.

Over the last decade, the government in Damascus has forced its country to become a pariah state. Putin has been President Bashar al-Assad’s leading supporter in Syria’s historically destructive civil war. As a relatively small – and shrinking – economy, the impact of Damascus’ support of Moscow is negligible. Further, it is not particularly impressive or impactful that Putin garnered support from an ostracized state such as the Syrian Arab Republic. Even as Belarus strongly signals its militant support of Russia, the international alliance-building has been both minimal and absent any titans of economic capital, political capital, or military aid.

Rather, it speaks volumes that Russia feels the need to accept Syrian paratrooper regiment fighters in its war with Ukraine.

Delegates of the Syrian Arab Republic allocated significant airtime to discussing the war. Syrian involvement in both interstate and intrastate war in the past decade lends this to be an amenable topic. But despite the reinvasion of Ukraine marking one of the greatest conflicts in recent memory, the Syrian Arab Republic mentioned the aggression in Eastern Europe with little sympathy at the 77th General Assembly.

Mekdad framed the aggression in Ukraine much like Moscow, that conflict is purported to be necessary in a balancing act to stabilize Russian defense against the West.

“My country, Syria, reaffirms its position on the Russian special military operation in Ukraine and its support for the right of the Russian Federation to defend itself and protect its national security in response to aggressive Western policies,” Mekdad said at the Sept. 26 General Assembly. “We are confident that the Russian Federation today is not only defending itself, but also the world, the principles of justice and humanity, and the right of all of us in a world that rejects the logic of hegemony and monopolarity.”

It is hard to imagine a set of public comments during the General Assembly that could have expressed more explicit support for Russian aggression than Mekdad’s.

Russia

Russian diplomacy has been stonewalled, and so have its military forces.

In a Sept. 24 speech given by Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov to the General Assembly, the longtime Russian representative highlighted the stance consistently held by his government — one which contextualizes the reinvasion of Ukraine in the balance of power with NATO, a decades-long struggle for hegemony, and a fight against neo-Nazism Russia claims is rampant in Eastern Europe.

“Washington is trying to turn the whole globe into its backyard,” Lavrov said in his speech (Lavrov 2022).

He has been present for few of the other speeches. After the Russian delegation’s cold diplomatic welcome to New York — including American approval of only half the diplomatic visas requested and a 25-mile radius of movement for Russian diplomats — Lavrov’s trip is likely the final Russian flight to land in New York for the foreseeable future (Mauldin 2022).

Russia’s isolation comes as its military might dwindles. When the bear is backed into a corner, the threat of it lashing out becomes real. Worries of nuclear weapons use have made headlines throughout the war, but as Russia achieves fewer and fewer victories, the threats must be taken more seriously.

Russia has conducted nuclear weapons exercises and recently held meetings among military officials on how tactical nuclear weapons might be used (Cooper, Barnes, Schmitt 2022). Tactical nuclear weapons are far smaller than those that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but their range of destruction can vary greatly, leaving thousands dead and large swaths of land uninhabitable. Putin has denied the likelihood that tactical nuclear weapons are necessary, yet public statements from a world leader like Putin must be taken with a grain of salt. Additionally, Belarusian escalation of the war could show that Russia is in need of options that come at a high cost.

Take Two: UN channels produce similar results months later

Overall,  support for Ukraine at the UN has outlasted the Russian forces – a success, no doubt, that is occurring as the Russian military is beat back and resorting to feverish attacks like its unconfirmed, yet likely, attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea. Since the March 2 vote, UN channels have been somewhat active on Ukrainian topics, to largely no avail (Nielsen, Eddy 2022).

More recently, one Sept. 30 resolution failed in its intentions “to condemn the Russian Federation referenda that preceded Moscow’s proclamation of its annexation” toward the end of the 77th General Assembly’s 11th Emergency Special Session (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases 2022). Not long after, an Oct. 12 resolution made received an overwhelming majority of support from member states (UN General Assembly 2022). Once again, strong public language proved that a vast majority of the international community still disapproves of Putin’s actions.

The Oct. 12 resolution “condemns the organization by the Russian Federation of illegal so-called referenda in regions within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine and the attempted illegal annexation of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine,” and declares such actions illegal.

In the Oct. 12 special session vote, the resolution harkened back to a 2014 Ukrainian letter addressed to the Security Council that condemned Russia’s initial 2014 invasion of Crimea – hence the intentional use of “reinvasion” when referring to Russian acts of aggression toward Ukraine in 2022 (UN Security Council 2014).

Language matters. In both UN resolutions and in popular discourse, the specific word choice is often just as meaningful as the words that are not uttered. Ensuring we link the current acts of Russian aggression to those less violent ones in Crimea almost a decade ago is paramount. Additionally, many states have attempted to decouple the sovereign rights of a clearly recognized independent and contiguous Ukrainian state from the supposed independence of its substate units. Such logic is flimsy, as groups cannot simply declare independence under international law. The logic is also an example of a problematic precedent for the future sovereignty of other legitimate UN member states.

Nicaragua, as one of few states that changed their vote from abstaining on the Ukrainian issue, is an odd outlier. Of the original five states to vote “no” for the March 2 resolution, Eritrea opted to abstain in the Oct. 12 resolution and was replaced by Nicaragua’s no-vote. Additionally, there were a total of 35 abstentions, including China, India, and El Salvador and Honduras (Cuffe 2022).

“Our solidarity and commitment embrace … (Venezuela, Cuba, the Palestinian People, Iran), and Great Battle of the Russian Federation against fascism and for security, integrity and peace,” Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs Denis Moncada Colindres said to the UNGA on Sept. 26 (Moncada Colindres 2022). 

Nicaragua and other ardent supporters of Russian aggression remain outliers at the United Nations. Their political and economic capital can only support relatively minimal backing to Putin’s rampage. Yet as Russia’s allies persist in their support at the UN and on the ground, the world will watch with distress. Not only do these voices stand out among the crowd, but the world must also be wary that they do not lead us all to global war.

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Works Cited

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