Commentary

Stateless in Kuwait: Women Denied Existence

September 9, 2025 by emd9507 Leave a Comment

By: Mozah Alkuwari

Kuwait’s Bidun women are forced into invisibility — denied citizenship, rights, and even dignity. In this op-ed, Mozah Alkuwari exposes the human cost of statelessness and calls for bold reforms to end generations of silence and exclusion.

I understood the full brutality of statelessness the day my friend disappeared from the records of Kuwait. Her family’s nationality was stripped by a government decree, rendering them stateless. The term Bidun (meaning “without” in Arabic) is a bitter reflection of these women’s lives: without citizenship, without elementary rights, and without hope. The recent heartbreaking case of a Bidun female from Kuwait who gained asylum in the UK again brought attention to one of the Gulf’s largest human rights issues: the stateless Bidun females of
Kuwait. According to the Human Rights Watch, approximately 100,000 Bidun females are experiencing oppression. They have no state. They are female in a highly patriarchal regime and have no simple legal protection; meanwhile, the majority of men enjoy such protections as their birthright.

A 2023 Amnesty International investigation showed how statelessness creates cycles of disadvantage spanning generations. Stateless women lack the ability to pass down their citizenship to their children. Youth are denied the opportunity to pursue an education, which is frequently their only way out of the poverty cycle.

The dilemma began with Kuwait’s independence in 1961, when many of the country’s nomadic tribes refused to register as citizens. This initial failure evolved into systemic discrimination. Despite its promising name, the Central System for the Remedy of the Situation of Illegal Residents has often perpetuated the problem. It does not present Bidun with a road toward citizenship; rather, it drives them toward classification as nationals of other states. The process takes away even their identity as stateless persons seeking recognition—over 100,000 Bidun remain classified as ‘illegal residents’.

For Bidun women, statelessness combines with the gender-discriminatory legal system of Kuwait. Although all Bidun experience difficulties, Bidun women have their own distinct set of burdens. Bidun women cannot pass their citizenship onto their children even when they marry Kuwaiti nationals. They face virtually impossible impediments in accessing healthcare and education, as well as work. Immigration law expert Danielle Cohen’s report describes how the male guardianship system in Kuwait makes these difficulties are even more complex. Bidun women, for instance, are forced to obtain male guardian consent before getting married and have limited access to jobs and education, all of which are made worse by their stateless status.

The human cost is overwhelming. What does it mean for a country to force its women into invisibility, stripping them of their basic dignity? Joumana, a university graduate, worked for the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. Despite her qualifications, she earned less than 200 dinars per month, which is less than one-third of what Kuwaiti nationals are paid for identical employment. Kuwaiti natives earn on average KD1,571 per month, whereas non-Kuwaitis, including Bidun, earn KD343. Joumana was denied paid leave, even while ill, and no end-of service gratuities—rights that are technically protected by labour law but are frequently denied to Bidun because of their statelessness. Her story illustrates how Bidun women face job insecurity, lack of legal protection, and social exclusion. This is about more than money; it is about dignity and the right to build a stable future.

Education, often regarded as the road to progression, is frustratingly beyond Bidun grasp. The Amnesty International report outlines how Bidun girls have specific difficulties accessing education. Why is the education of girls consistently de-prioritized in crises like these? Private schooling is financially out of reach for most families. Those who can afford it tend to prioritize the education of their male children. This forms a cycle in which limited education constrains job opportunities, reinforcing poverty and dependence.

Domestic violence is a particularly serious issue for Bidun women in Kuwait. Human rights organizations and expert testimonies frequently highlight Bidun women’s vulnerability to assault, as their statelessness prevents them from receiving legal protection or access to refuge. Despite the 2020 domestic violence law, such protections remain mainly out of reach for stateless women, locking them in cycles of abuse and forcing them to choose between life in a shelter or a life with no existence under the law.

Healthcare access is no different. Bidun women struggle with even the simplest forms of healthcare, with maternal health being particularly affected. Most people avoid hospitals because they can be detained or deported if they cannot provide the necessary documentation. Human Rights Watch reports that Bidun face restrictions accessing essential services and risk arrest without valid IDs. Research confirms stateless women in Kuwait face major barriers to reproductive care due to their lack of legal status. This leads to dangerous home births and untreated health conditions.

What makes this crisis particularly unconscionable is the recent escalation of citizenship revocations. Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah authorized the withdrawal of citizenship from 1,145 women under vague national security claims. These arbitrary revocations have created a new class of stateless people overnight, many of whom are women who must now navigate this terrain of invisibility and devastating countless lives.

The international community cannot continue to ignore the crisis. As a state party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Kuwait is obligated to act upon these concerns. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly urged Kuwait to end laws that prevent Kuwaiti women from passing their nationality to their children, a practice that perpetuates statelessness and violates international standards. Reform must also be initiated with urgent changes in the country’s nationality law, enabling mothers to confer citizenship to their children. Reform must begin with the Emir himself, who holds the constitutional power to grant citizenship and reverse these damaging policies with a single decree.

Some progress exists. Human Rights Watch notes that on September 17, 2023, the Kuwaiti parliament approved implementation measures for the domestic violence law, but the shelters continue to be closed. But more is required. The international community needs to put pressure on Kuwait to live up to its human rights obligations, and the Kuwaiti civil society must continue to fight for these women. The era of incremental change is over. Kuwait’s Bidun women require far-reaching legal reform that affirms their humanity and safeguards their basic rights.

As someone who has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with these women and felt their pain, I am certain that their power will triumph in the long run. When the Emir finally recognizes that Kuwait’s greatness lies in embracing all its daughters, the invisible women of Kuwait will step into the light and help build the nation they’ve always loved—even when it refused to love them back.

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Mozah Alkuwari is an International Cooperation Specialist at Qatar’s National Planning Council (NPC). She holds a Master’s degree in Global Affairs from NYU and is dedicated to advancing women’s rights, promoting gender equity, and amplifying marginalized voices through her independent work with UN initiatives.

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Works Cited

AlAwsat, Asharq. “Kuwait Revokes Citizenship of 1,145 Women, 13 Men.” Aawsat.com, Nov. 2024, english.aawsat.com/gulf/5084786-
kuwait-revokes-citizenship-1145-women-13-men.

Amnesty International. “Kuwait: ‘I Don’t Have a Future’: Stateless Kuwaitis and the Right to Education.” Amnesty International, 17 Aug.
2023, www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde17/6990/2023/en/.

Blanchard, Christopher M. “Kuwait: Issues for the 118th Congress.” Congress.gov, Mar. 2025, www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47390.
“CEDAW Reviews Kuwait’s Gender Equality Progress: Commendation and Calls for Reform – ECDHR.” Www.ecdhr.org, 10 June 2024,
www.ecdhr.org/cedaw-reviews-kuwaits-gender-equality-progress-commendation-and-calls-for-reform/.

Cohen, Danielle. “Bidoon Women in Kuwait.” Danielle Cohen Immigration Lawyer, 9 Jan. 2024,
www.daniellecohenimmigration.com/bidoon-women-in-kuwait/.

“Country Policy and Information Note, Kuwait: Bidoons, August 2024 (Accessible).” GOV.UK, 2024,
www.gov.uk/government/publications/kuwait-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-kuwait-
bidoons-august-2024-accessible.

Human Rights Watch. “Kuwait: Events of 2023.” Human Rights Watch, 7 Dec. 2023, www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-
chapters/kuwait.

“Kuwait – United States Department of State.” United States Department of State, 20 Mar. 2023, www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-
reports-on-human-rights-practices/kuwait/.

“KUWAIT: Children’s Rights in UN Treaty Body Reports | CRIN.” Crin.org, 4 Dec. 2013, archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/kuwait-
childrens-rights-un-treaty-body-reports.html.

Nadim Kawach. “Kuwaitis Earn Nearly Five Times as Much as Expats.” AGBI, 19 Mar. 2025, www.agbi.com/employment/2025/03/kuwaitis-
earn-nearly-five-times-as-much-as-expats/.

O, Talal. “Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness.” Human Rights Watch, 13 June 2011,
www.hrw.org/report/2011/06/13/prisoners-past/kuwaiti-bidun-and-burden-statelessness.

“Our Joint Submission Information on Kuwait for Consideration by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) at Its 88th Session (13 May 2024 – 31 May 2024.” SALAM DHR, 20 Apr. 2024, salam-dhr.org/our-joint-submission-
information-on-kuwait-for-consideration-by-the-committee-on-the-elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-cedaw-at-its-88th-
session-13-may-2024-31-may-2024/.

Philipp, Jennifer. “Learning Poverty among the Bidoon in Kuwait – the Borgen Project.” The Borgen Project, 6 Feb. 2025,
borgenproject.org/bidoon-in-kuwait/.

“The State of Kuwait: Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review.” UPR Info, Refugees International, May 2010, upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/documents/2013-09/riuprkuws082010refugeesinternational.pdf.

Yuki. “Policy Reform Needed for Bidoon Children in Kuwait – the Borgen Project.” The Borgen Project, 16 Oct. 2023,
borgenproject.org/bidoon-children/.

Cyber Security and Global Power: Adapting to a New World of Digital Risks

April 25, 2025 by mg7601 Leave a Comment

By Jayda Bonnick

As cyberspace reshapes global security, traditional notions of power and dominance are being redefined. This piece explores how digital vulnerabilities, private tech influence, and innovation challenge state authority in the cyber realm. Drawing on Fred Kaplan’s Dark Territory, it highlights the complex balance between connectivity and control in an increasingly digital world.

One of the defining features of cyberspace is its ever-evolving nature. Both consumers and governments alike find themselves grappling to adopt and adapt to the latest innovations while simultaneously learning what vulnerabilities lie in its wake. Fred Kaplan’s Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War examines the U.S government’s decades-long journey to understand and adopt cyber operations in the scope of its national security and military operations. Throughout the chapters, Kaplan discusses the underlying notion state officials found themselves going back to when adopting and implementing new cyber practices systemically: “whatever we can do to our enemies, our enemies could soon do to us” (Kaplan 125). This concept of reciprocity is key in highlighting the inherent insecurity that states experience in the cyber realm of global security. Cyber capabilities do not equate to power in the same way that tactical military capabilities once did in the 20th century. When both civilians and state officials rely on the Internet and digital connectivity both personally and professionally, a delicate dance has to be done by governments when asserting their position in global security.

During the Cold War’s nuclear arms race, power was determined by which nations possessed tangible nuclear capabilities, while those without such weapons gained relative power by aligning with nuclear states (Kaplan 43). This led to a bipolar dynamic between the United States and Russia, creating a generally straightforward system of deterrence. With cyber activities as the latest technology that actors are implementing into their security programs, the road to power and dominance in this space is not as linear as it is when discussing tangible capabilities. Information warfare and espionage operations are long-standing practices in security, but cyberspace brought those practices to a new level as technology became more accessible and more sensitive information became digitized.

Cyber operations can be executed against specific personnel or entire state-owned agencies, making vulnerabilities in cyberspace broader and more complex than in traditional security contexts.. The Obama administration represented the shift in people’s relationship with the Internet as it pertained to security on a personal and public level. Former President Barack Obama had to have a new Blackberry with high-end encryption manufactured specifically for him after refusing to give up his phone upon the Secret Service’s request (Kaplan 145). While the president could not part with his personal smartphone, each device becomes a potential entry point for malicious actors seeking to compromise national security. President Obama was the first president to represent the give-and-take of cybersecurity. He, like most Americans, has a personal device integrated into everyday life, one that parting ways with is seemingly impossible, while each device serves as a host and a new pathway for violating privacy. The pervasiveness of the Internet in the lives of citizens and officials alike can undermine a country’s cyber capabilities if hackers target an individual or a private server outside of the state’s control, making it hard to establish cyberpower through quantitative means, like how tactical security capabilities could be measured in past decades through number of troops or amount of artillery.

In Dark Territory, Kaplan mentions how most of the world’s Internet bandwidth flowed through US-owned infrastructure: “pieces of every email and cell phone conversation in the world flowed, at some point, through a line of American-based fiber optics” (178). Through innovation and globally relied-upon infrastructure, the United States is able to achieve a level of cyberpower that indicates its influence in the sphere, similar to Michael Mann’s definition of power in The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. Mann describes power as the ability to attain goals through mastering one’s environment (Mann 6). While American-based fiber optics does not equal security for the United States, it shows how innovation in cyber can be just as important as knowing how to convert those innovations into cyber operations for a nation’s military plan.

This notion of innovation to assert cyber dominance is seen in states’ strategies to either align with or discredit private technology companies. Private tech firms and social media platforms have the funding and attention of millions of consumers, asserting their own power in cyberspace. States have to acknowledge the legitimacy of these private actors when their platforms have non-political figures with more followers than congressmen and presidents. Social media platforms like TikTok (owned by a private Chinese company, ByteDance) have faced scrutiny by American politicians in the last five years as the app has about 150 million active users in the United States alone (Kerr, Lee). With the amount of active users on these platforms, private companies have access to mass amounts of personal data that can be a tool for or a threat to state agencies and their operations. Whether it’s through allowing private firms to be in discussions around cybersecurity or, on the other end, considering legislation to bar certain actors from operating within a state’s territory, innovators in cyberspace carry weight when it comes to today’s conversations around global security and state interests.

From coding knowledge being as accessible as a free video on YouTube to less financial barriers to connect to the Internet, billions of people are active participants in cyberspace, making it both a critical resource and source of vulnerability for all of its users. Fred Kaplan’s Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War outlines the struggles lawmakers, tech experts, and military officials faced when confronted with inherent insecurity at every stage of incorporating cyber operations into the government’s infrastructure and national security plans. From adding security software to military computers to the first major cyber attack carried out by the United States, Stuxnet, there was an inability to be “ahead of the curve” offensively or defensively, making cyberpower harder to establish in the same way states have historically demonstrated security and power. The value of cyberspace lies in a state’s ability to contribute to innovations in the digital era, whether through social media platforms or investing in global cyber infrastructure. Being able to keep up with the nuances of cyberspace has not and will not guarantee foolproof protection against cyber attacks, but rather it allows actors to be perceived as leaders in a space that boasts and encourages interconnectivity and convenience despite the list of vulnerabilities that come with it.

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Jayda Bonnick is a graduate student at NYU studying Global Security, Conflict, and Cybercrime. With a background in international relations and cybersecurity strategy analysis, she explores the evolving intersections of technology, security, and power. Her work focuses on how digital infrastructure and innovation shape global governance and national security.

Works Cited

Kaplan, Fred. “Buckshot Yankee.” In Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, 125-137. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Kaplan, Fred. “A Cyber Pearl Harbor.” In Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, 33-45. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Kaplan, Fred. “The Whole Haystack.” In Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, 138-145. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Kaplan, Fred. “The Five Guys Report.” In Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, 170-189. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Kerr, Dara.. “Lawmakers grilled TikTok CEO Chew for 5 hours in a high-stakes hearing about the app.” NPR, March 23, 2023. https://www.npr.org/2023/03/23/1165579717/tiktok-congress-hearing-shou-zi-chew-project-texas#:~:text=Front%20and%20center%20were%20concerns,users%20with%20the%20Chinese%20government.

Lee, Carol. “TikTok now has 150 million active users in the U.S., CEO to tell Congress.” NBC News, March 23, 2023. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/tiktok-now-150-million-active-users-us-ceo-tell-congress-rcna75607.

Mann, Michael. “Societies as organized power networks.” In The Sources of Social Power, Volume: 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, 1-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

A Feminist Approach to 21st Century Human Security: Assessing Israel-Hamas Conflict Through a Gendered Lens

April 16, 2025 by mg7601 Leave a Comment

By Quentin Kundert

This policy brief analyzes the 2023 Israel-Hamas war through a feminist lens, highlighting how gender inequality and the exclusion of women from peace processes contribute to insecurity. It argues that traditional IR theories fall short in explaining such conflicts, while feminist theory offers vital insights into achieving lasting peace.

On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, most commonly referred to as Hamas, launched an unprecedented attack on Israeli territory. The raid, which took the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli government by surprise, led to the death of approximately 1,200 people and the kidnapping of 250 others (Human Rights Watch). In response, Israel declared a state of war against Hamas, launching extensive bombings on the Gaza Strip and invading it (Al Jazeera). Israel also imposed a total siege on the territory, cutting off food, water, electricity, and gas supplies (UN Women). This resulted in the deaths of over 40,000 Palestinians (Al Jazeera). Both sides of the conflict have been accused by international organizations of committing war crimes (Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch). It should be noted that the conflict is not limited to Israel and Hamas, as numerous other states and non-state actors in the Middle East have been directly or indirectly involved. The continuous rocket clashes between the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia and Israel are a case in point, eventually leading to an IDF incursion on Lebanese territory at the end of September 2024 (Reuters). Without concealing the pressing humanitarian challenges that this conflict entails and the need for an immediate cease-fire, IR theories can help facilitate understanding of the broader implications of this war.

The proliferation of belligerent groups in the Middle East has disrupted conventional norms of sovereignty and statehood, posing significant challenges for traditional IR theories such as realism or liberalism (Lecocq 1070). Despite being neglected by most IR scholars, the feminist theory provides a compelling approach to these questions (Hudson et al. 41; Whitworth 112). While not limited to these claims, this approach firmly argues that gender equality, and particularly women’s participation in peace processes, is among the most effective means for achieving international and human security, if not the foremost (Hudson et al. 41). More importantly, this vision extends beyond academia, with broad and tangible implications in the political and institutional spheres. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, is a landmark example of this vision being implemented in practice. It recognized the fundamental role of women in peace processes and urged states to take enforcement measures to increase women’s participation in these processes (Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (Security Council Resolution 1325).

Indeed, research has shown that gender equality serves as a significant deterrent to war, as countries with greater gender equality are less likely to resolve conflicts through violence. Additionally, gender equality also plays a fundamental role in successful post-conflict peace processes, as women’s participation increases the likelihood of long-lasting peace agreements (Council on Foreign Relations, “Women’s Participation in Peace Processes”). Considering the 2023 dramatic escalation in the Israeli-Hamas conflict, it can be argued that not only is this relevant, but it is necessary to assess the war by engaging with a feminist approach. Therefore, gender equality prior to October 7th will be assessed in both territories, as well as the extent to which women have been involved by both parties in peace processes.

In recent gender equality reports, Israel has been portrayed as “OECD’s black swan”, as it ranks lowest amongst all members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Staff), with one of the highest gender pay gaps in the organization (OECD). This worrying trend has been decried by some of the country’s leading security think tanks (INSS), accusing the current government of systematically undermining the status of women (Baruch and Caner 1). Indeed, the decline of women’s participation in crucial decision-making is characteristic of the broader deterioration of their political representation in Israel (Baruch and Caner 1). To put it bluntly, “gender equality is not only not on [Israel’s] agenda, but in fact is perceived as undesirable” (Baruch and Caner 2).

Since the Gaza Strip is not recognized as a state, it is much harder to find accurate data on gender inequality confined to this specific territory. For instance, both the UN Development Program and the OECD’s gender inequality indices do not provide any data for the Gaza Strip or the State of Palestine altogether. Therefore, to assess gender inequality in the Gaza Strip, one would need to gather and consider numerous other gender related indices, which are mostly only available for the whole state of Palestine. That is not the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the status of Palestinian women is undeniably preoccupying, as they face significant disparities in the distribution of power and resources, along with heightened personal insecurity compared to Palestinian men (ECSWA). As a result, numerous UN bodies have repeatedly called for improvement of their status (UN Women; United Nations in Palestine).

Respectively, both entities exhibit high levels of gender inequality, but what are the implications regarding the peace-negotiation process? The Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations process is highly representative of the broader issues regarding women’s implications in peace processes. Palestinian and Israeli women have played leading roles in grassroots peace campaigns, both in their communities and through joint efforts, notably earning an Israeli and Palestinian organization a nomination for the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize (Working Group on WPS). However, they have been systematically excluded from formal governmental peace negotiations (GPPAC). Indeed, during the 2023 intra-Palestinian reconciliation efforts in Cairo, only one woman was present, out of 54 negotiators (GPPAC). Women who were involved, as in the 1992 Oslo Accords, were restricted to “backstage” roles such as spokeswomen or secretaries (Finkel 2). Two notable exceptions stand out: Tzipi Livni, who served as Israel’s chief negotiator during several rounds of negotiations from 2007 to 2014 and Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, who acted as a negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1990s (Council on Foreign Relations, “Israel and the Palestinian Territories Case Study”). Both were former ministers in their respective states. Despite the significant roles they played, Livni and Dr. Ashrawi remain, as underlined above, the only two exceptions in the long history of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation negotiations.

Consequently, what are the key takeaways to consider? It cannot be definitely claimed that greater gender equality and women’s participation in peace negotiations would have prevented the current conflict between Israel and Hamas. However, existing academic research on both topics suggests that if gender gaps were reduced, the likelihood of going to war might have been reduced as well. An optimistic, yet perhaps hypocritical, embodiment of this perspective is Bill Clinton’s words after the Oslo Accords at Camp David: “If we’d had women at Camp David, we’d have an agreement” (Finkel 21).

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Quentin Kundert is a first-year graduate student at the Center for Global Affairs with a focus on geopolitics and security, and a growing interest in statistical analysis. Outside of academics, he spends his time at the lake, in the mountains, or at the skatepark.

Works Cited

Al Jazeera. (2024, September 30). Israel-Gaza war in maps and charts: Live tracker. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker.

Amnesty International. (2024, August 27). Israel/OPT: Israeli attacks targeting Hamas and other armed group fighters that killed scores of displaced civilians in Rafah should be investigated as war crimes. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/israel-opt-israeli-attacks-targeting-hamas-and-other-armed-group-fighters-that-killed-scores-of-displaced-civilians-in-rafah-should-be-investigated-as-war-crimes/.

Baruch, P. S., & Caner, T. (2023). The Undermined Status of Women as a National Security Challenge (No. 1752). Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep52777.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2024a). Israel and the Palestinian Territories Case Study. Council on Foreign Relations. https://microsites-live-backend.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/israel-and-palestinian-territories.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2024b). Women’s Participation in Peace Processes. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes.

ESCWA. (2023). Social and economic situation of Palestinian women and girls. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. https://www.unescwa.org/publications/social-economic-situation-palestinian-women-girls.

Finkel, L. (2012). The role of women in Israeli—Palestinian Peace Negociations. ICSR.

GPPAC. (2024). Empowering young Palestinian women in peace negotiations | GPPAC. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts. https://gppac.net/empowering-young-palestinian-women-peace-negotiations.

Hudson, V. M., Caprioli, M., Ballif-Spanvill, B., McDermott, R., & Emmett, C. F. (2009). The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States. International Security, 33(3), 7–45. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.7.

Human Rights Watch. (2024, July 17). October 7 Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes by Hamas-led Groups. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/17/october-7-crimes-against-humanity-war-crimes-hamas-led-groups.

Lecocq, S. (2020). Hamas and Hezbollah: Hybrid actors between resistance and governance. International Affairs, 96(4), 1069–1079. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa104.

Millender, M. (2024, April 9). IntelBrief: Non-State Actors in the Middle East Demonstrate Increasing Power and Influence. The Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-april-9/

NGO working group on WPS. (2024). Israel & Palestine. NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/region/asia/western-asia/israel-palestine/.

OECD (2023), OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/901365a6-en.

Reuters. (2024, October 30). Israel begins Lebanon ground invasion with “limited” raids on Hezbollah. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-has-begun-limited-raids-against-hezbollah-targets-border-area-2024-09-30/.

Samuel, M. t. (2023). The Israel-Hamas War: Historical Context and International Law. Middle East Policy, 30(4), 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12723.

Sjoberg, L. (2009). Introduction to Security Studies: Feminist Contributions. Security Studies, 18(2), 183–213. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410902900129.

Staff, Toi. “Israel Ranked Lowest of All OECD Countries in Gender Equality Index.” Times of Israel, 29 May 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-ranked-lowest-of-all-oecd-countries-in-gender-equality-index/.

UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender. (2024). Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security (Security Council resolution 1325). https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/.

UN Women. (2024, September 9). Facts and estimates: Women and girls during the conflict in Palestine. UN Women – Palestine Country Office. https://palestine.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-security-humanitarian-response/facts-and-figures/conflict-in-palestine.

United Nations in Palestine. (2023, March 8). Fact sheet on Gender Equality and women’s empowerment. https://palestine.un.org/en/222284-fact-sheet-gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment, https://palestine.un.org/en/222284-fact-sheet-gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment.

Whitworth, S. (2012). Feminisms. In Security Studies (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Tribalism’s wave: U.S. Politics rippling beyond its borders

February 4, 2025 by mg7601 1 Comment

By Evan Dixon

Photo by David Everett Strickler in Washington D.C.

This article evaluates the growth of tribalism in U.S. politics and its potential ramifications to the international system, including examples of where tribalism is present. In particular, it emphasizes the need to combat tribalism and offers a suggestion to the reader on how they can influence tribalistic thinking.

In the Summer 2018 edition of Foreign Affairs, Amy Chua, a Jr. Professor of Law at Yale University, defines tribalism as, “the human instinct to identify with a group”, and proceeds to cite several examples which show that tribalism is psychologically interwoven with human nature (25-33). Chua contends that “tribalism remains a powerful force everywhere; indeed, in recent years, it has begun to tear at the fabric of liberal democracies in the developed world, and even at the postwar liberal international order” (25). I believe this to be absolutely true in the United States, as we look back at our most recent election and at the promises made by our incoming leadership.

Undoubtedly, tribalism in the U.S. is a potent force which has had noticeable effects domestically and globally. In his book, ‘Liberal Leviathan,’ American political scientist and IR theorist, John Ikenberry, wrote about the importance of the U.S. to the international order, and that to maintain and grow the current establishment, the U.S. must “work to re-create the basic governance institutions of the system—investing in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities” (Ikenberry, 32). The United States is central to NATO, the UN, and international trade, and because of its deep involvement with major international institutions, its domestic instability can have a rippling effect around the world. With the exception of the U.S. Civil War, the United States is in an unprecedented period of increased polarization and ideological hostility. Due to the influential power of the U.S., these rising tensions could destabilize the current international order. Much of this destabilization can be attributed to ideologies and rhetoric which proliferate from tribalistic thinking, and are amplified by the actions and talking points of President-elect Donald Trump.

The Bleed from Domestic to International

With the 2024 U.S. presidential election having just concluded, there is a lot at stake institutionally and politically. Presidential campaigns did everything in their power to court undecided voters in key demographics. This has led to both sides mudslinging the other, and general distrust mounting. Trump has touted the idea that the current presidential administration is corrupt and needs to be prosecuted, in addition, he has supported the notion that political rivals, including the current presidential administration, are corrupt and need to be prosecuted (Dreisbach). At the same time, Harris’s campaign has pushed back at these comments, echoing previous descriptions of Trump, labeling him as a ‘fascist’ (Gangitano and Stanage). Regardless of the validity of either candidate’s statements, it is clear that the American political scene has become more thorny as a result of growing candidate hostility, expanding differences in political vision, and by extent, tribalism.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, in their 2024 Preventive Priorities Survey, events in the United States surrounding the election could increase domestic instability, concerning security policy experts (www.cfr.org). This growing instability has existed in U.S. politics for some time, and has only grown with Trump’s more tribalistic approach to politics. This has bled into U.S. international dealings previously, some examples include when:

In 2019, President Trump attempted to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into finding compromising information on Trump’s political rival, then incumbent Joe Biden (Oprysko).
In 2016, Trump publicly encouraged Russian officials to leak emails from his political rival, Hillary Clinton, undermining election integrity in the U.S. (it should be noted that his prompting does not necessarily prove collusion in this matter) (Hendry).
On the 2020 campaign trail, President Trump criticized Joe Biden several times for having a focus on alliances, which Trump touted as anti-American and harmful to America (Kim and Ibssa).

The first two cases show clear conflicts of interest which fall outside of normal government responsibilities and the third case involves the erosion of strategic U.S. based alliances. Through all of these, Trump prioritized damaging his political rivals over protecting the U.S. backed international order, irrespective of the potential ramifications to world peace and security. Despite his own claims, he placed his tribalistic interests above that of the interests of the U.S. and the democratic world.

Beyond the election, Trump has favored a ‘tough on allies’ approach to international relations, emphasizing their need to rely less on the United States. Most notably, Trump pushed countries to contribute more to NATO while remaining skeptical of the institution, going as far as to say that the US would not defend NATO allies who do not contribute more (Kim and Ibssa). Domestically, this stance benefited Trump, as the majority of Republicans and about one third of Democrats believe the U.S. contributes too much to maintaining the global order (www.pewresearch.org). This narrative rejects the idea of ideological order, and advances the idea that the United States should focus more upon itself. This could serve as another form of destabilization for the international order, reflecting tribalism as it asserts that the U.S. should only prioritize itself at the expense of world stability.

Looking Forward

Tribalism has always existed in the U.S. political structure, but the last decade has seen a rise in its thinking and weaponization. The credibility of the U.S. on the international stage could be questioned, especially if U.S. domestic issues continue to bleed out onto the international order. In his last administration, Trump took a ‘tough on allies’ stance, resulting in German Chancellor Angela Merkle distancing herself from the U.S. – this can certainly happen again with any European leader (Britton, et al.) This sort of distancing could have long-term detrimental effects on U.S. influence on the world stage, and push countries to look for alternative institutions and leaders. If tribalism continues to flourish in the United States, there is a strong possibility that America erodes its own influence as it grapples with its growing internal divisions, only serving to destabilize the world.

Tribalism is a complicated social issue and we must seek solutions to combat it in politics. It is important to find the room to respectfully disagree with those who we identify with, and escape the political labels we so often rely on to categorize our beliefs. We also need to accept that not all positions have a full perspective, and it’s important to push back on (or add on to) them in a constructive manner when we have something to offer to various social and political discussions.

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Evan Dixon is a Masters Student at New York University studying International Relations and Global Affairs, having also received two bachelor’s degrees from Bowling Green State University. He has spent considerable time studying the political and economic systems of several countries, both in the field and through academic writings. At the time of writing, Evan is an Associate Editor at the Global Affairs Review.

Works Cited

Britton, Bianca, et al. “Angela Merkel Stands in ‘Solidarity’ with Congresswomen Attacked by Trump.” CNN, Cable News Network, 19 July 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/07/19/europe/angela-merkel-annual-conference-intl-grm/index.html.

Chua, Amy. “Tribal World: Group Identity Is All.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 4, July/August 2018, pp. 25–33.

Dreisbach, Tom. “Trump Has Made More than 100 Threats to Prosecute or Punish Perceived Enemies.” NPR, NPR, 22 Oct. 2024, www.npr.org/2024/10/21/nx-s1-5134924/trump-election-2024-kamala-harris-elizabeth-cheney-threat-civil-liberties.

Gangitano, Alex, and Niall Stanage. “Harris Faces Questions about Campaign Strategy in Final Stretch.” The Hill, The Hill, 23 Oct. 2024, thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4950136-vice-president-harris-campaign-concerns/.

Hendry, Erica. “Trump Asked Russia to Find Clinton’s Emails. on or around the Same Day, Russians Targeted Her Accounts.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, 13 July 2018, www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-asked-russia-to-find-clintons-emails-on-or-around-the-same-day-russians-targeted-her-accounts.

Ikenberry, G. John. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton University Press, 2012.

Oprysko, Caitlin. Trump Pressed Ukraine’s President to Work with Barr for Dirt on Biden – Politico, Politico, 25 Sept. 2019, www.politico.com/story/2019/09/25/white-house-releases-transcript-of-trumps-call-with-ukraines-president-1510767.

Poushter, Jacob. “What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?” Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center, 23 Apr. 2024, www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/04/23/what-are-americans-top-foreign-policy-priorities/.

“Preventive Priorities Survey 2024: Center for Preventive Action.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2024.

Rin Kim, Soo, and Lalee Ibssa. “A Closer Look at Trump’s Years of Criticizing NATO, Particularly on Defense Spending.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 20 Feb. 2024, abcnews.go.com/Politics/closer-trumps-years-criticizing-nato-defense-spending/story?id=107201586.

Book Review: Click Here to Kill Everybody

February 4, 2025 by mg7601 Leave a Comment

By Donna Victoria Bell-Tchega

Bruce Schneier’s Click Here to Kill Everybody highlights the growing vulnerabilities of interconnected systems and the urgency of addressing cyber threats in a rapidly digitizing world. This review explores Schneier’s analysis of the Internet of Things, cyber power, and the evolving complexity of cyberattacks, emphasizing his call for global policy reforms, public-private collaboration, and proactive international cooperation to safeguard critical infrastructures.

Click Here to Kill Everybody by Bruce Schneier provides valuable insight into how cyber power must first acknowledge vulnerabilities within interconnected systems to achieve global security. The rapid growth of connected devices, from “8.4 billion things attached to the Internet, to an estimated 20 to 75 billion by 2020” (Schneier 5), has reshaped global security, widening the attack surface for cyber threats. With diverse digital-age actors—from state to non-state players—the cyber battlefield has grown increasingly complex. Schneier argues that interconnected networks not only increase these vulnerabilities but also necessitate immediate global policy reform. Cyber power is “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in other operational environments and across the instruments of power” (Nye 3).

Through this book, Schneier illustrates how the interconnectedness of critical infrastructures has made cyber power central to national security. He provides strategic insights for protecting these infrastructures in a digital society while emphasizing the difficulties in countering cyberattacks. Schneier discusses “how everything is considered smart, even objects are becoming smart” (Schneier 4), underscoring our growing reliance on interconnected systems like the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT’s explosive growth has made both people and critical infrastructures more vulnerable to cyberattacks. While IoT technology offers ease and efficiency, it has also expanded the attack surface, with everyday objects like cars, refrigerators, and fitness trackers collecting personal identifiable information (PII). One minor vulnerability can give an attacker access to larger networks.

Computer scientist and mathematician Robert Wiener coined the term Cybernetics,”the science of communications and automatic control systems in machines and living things.” In Chapter 1 of Schneiner’s book, cybernetics discuss covering devices like thermostats, baby monitors, and smart speakers that now make up the cyber ecosystem. This increased device integration brings complexity and raises security costs, making ongoing vigilance essential. As Schneier states, “The attacker has to find one vulnerability and the defender has to secure the entire attack surface” (Schneier 27), a challenge that puts defenders at a fundamental disadvantage.

Defining cyber warfare presents a significant challenge, varying between state actors and organizations. “Some say cyberwar is coming. Some say cyberwar is here. Some say cyberwar is a term that everyone uses, that no one agrees on, and that has no agreed-upon definition” (Schneier 68). Schneier emphasizes that cyber warfare remains ambiguously defined in international security, which complicates responses to cyberattacks. Cyber law principles such as distinction, precaution, and proportionality could provide a framework for state and non-state actors to address cyberattacks. Schneier’s analysis of cases like the United States’ “limited response” to North Korea’s Sony breach and the 2016 Russian interference in U.S. elections highlights the lack of established international norms and legal frameworks in cyber conflict, restraining national responses (Schneier 71). This ambiguity complicates defense strategies and leaves room for exploitation by bad actors. A major theme in Schneier’s work is the need for policy reform in cybersecurity, especially regarding legacy systems that cannot adequately defend against modern attacks. “The National Institute of Standards and Technologies framework for improving critical infrastructure is a great example of this type of standard. Unfortunately, the NIST cybersecurity framework is only voluntary at this stage, but it’s gaining traction. In 2017 it became mandatory for federal agencies” (Schneier 123).

Schneier calls for extending this framework to private industries, proposing incentives for compliance or penalties for non-adoption. He advocates for a security-by-design approach, embedding cybersecurity at the design phase to minimize vulnerabilities. As we’ve observed, policy follows precedent (Jarmon), and only mandatory frameworks can create a consistent security standard. While governments play a key role, the private sector, which owns much of the critical infrastructure, often prioritizes short-term profitability over security investments. According to tech analyst firm Gartner, 2018 internet security spending was projected at $93 billion, but cost considerations limit consumer and producer willingness to invest in robust security (Schneier 101). Schneier highlights the need for a public-private partnership to address these gaps and establish effective security frameworks.

Schneier’s book proceeds to stress collaboration between consumers and manufacturers in securing IoT products. Schneier argues that consumers, often lacking the necessary knowledge to secure devices, rely on manufacturers to build security into their products. He proposes that cybersecurity experts should educate less-informed users, creating a collective digital security framework. He also emphasizes that cybersecurity must be treated as a public good, requiring investment from both private and public sectors.

Cybercriminal tactics continue evolving, and Schneier’s suggestions underscore the need for consistent security funding and development. Schneier’s discussion of cyber systems’ global interconnectedness, which he refers to as “Internet+,” highlights the urgency of international cooperation. Digital borders cannot protect against malicious threats, as vulnerabilities in one country’s infrastructure can easily impact others. Schneier emphasizes that the growing asymmetry between attackers and defenders makes it difficult to execute proportionate responses. Without international cybersecurity standards, countries lack coordinated responses to prevent and manage cyber threats. He suggests that proactive international collaboration could help prevent escalation into physical conflicts. Ultimately, cyberattacks carry risks to economic stability and diplomatic relations, underscoring Schneier’s call for a globally unified approach to cybersecurity.

Although Schneier supports increased regulation and international collaboration, critics worry that these efforts could hinder innovation or infringe on privacy rights. Schneier addresses these concerns by arguing that the risks of insufficient regulation far outweigh potential drawbacks. He encourages educating the public on cybersecurity practices to help consumers make informed security decisions, ultimately strengthening individual and collective resilience against cyber threats. His analysis suggests that cyber threats pose risks not only to national security but to global stability. As cyberattacks increasingly threaten the global economy and international relations, Schneier’s advocacy for comprehensive policies and international standards offers a reminder that proactive measures, rather than reactive responses, will shape our secure, interconnected future.

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Donna Victoria Bell-Tchega is a graduate student at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, pursuing an M.S. in Global Security, Conflict, and Cybercrime. Her research centers on analyzing and addressing threats posed by violent extremism and terrorism in the United States, with a particular focus on public and religious institutions, and exploring equitable and effective prosecution strategies. She also serves as a Community Outreach Liaison at a nonprofit in New York City, working to combat homelessness and housing insecurity.

Work Cited

Jarmon, Jack A., and Pano Yannakogeorgos. The Cyber Threat and Globalization: The Impact on U.S. National and International Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018.
Nye, Joseph. “Cyber Power.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2010.

Schneier, Bruce. Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-connected World. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2018.

UCSD Robotics Research. “Chapter 1: Introduction to Robotics.” Accessed October 27, 2024. http://robotics.ucsd.edu/rr_chap01.pdf.

Tribalism in Germany– Us versus Them(?)

January 30, 2025 by mg7601 Leave a Comment

By Jennifer Hofmann

Tribalism in Germany – Us versus Them (?) explores the complex dynamics of tribalism and its impact on Germany’s national and global role. Highlighting the rise of the far-right AfD party, the piece examines how tribalism fuels anti-immigrant rhetoric, pressures liberal policies, and threatens Germany’s commitment to the international liberal order. Yet, it also considers the potential for positive tribalism to foster belonging and cultural exchange, offering hope for a more inclusive and cooperative future.

Tribalism – “the state of existing as a tribe, or a very strong feeling of loyalty to your tribe” (Cambridge Dictionary) – is an important part of human nature that can shape human interactions, leading groups to adopt certain ideological thinking and values that may distort the cognitive processing of information, affirming the views of the ingroup (Clark and Winegard 1). Thus, tribalism affects the tribe’s relations to the “outside world”, shaping its approach to international relations. As Chua states, tribalism has even started to pose a threat towards the postwar liberal international order (Chua 1-2). My home country Germany illustrates the truth behind that statement.

Ever since the end of World War II, democratic Germany has been an integral part of the liberal world order, being crucial in the establishment and the success of the European Union (EU), supporting NATO’s collective security framework, and actively engaging in the United Nations’ initiatives for peace, stability, and human rights. Despite this, tribalism can be found throughout Germany, from the sovereignty aspirations in Bavaria to the closed-off communities of Turkish migrants in German cities. Yet the most compelling example demonstrating the impact of tribalism on Germany’s role on the global stage is the rise of the right-wing party, “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD).

Since its foundation in 2013, the party has increasingly developed a far-right, populist profile (Decker). Nowadays, its leaders have established a clear “us-versus-them” narrative, where “us” encompasses the “German population” and “them” the growing population with a migrant background. Examples of this narrative can be found in statements of party officials as well as campaign slogans, like the 2017 poster, “New Germans? Let’s make them ourselves!” depicting a pregnant, blonde woman (Koenigs). Furthermore, Alice Weidel, co-chairwomen and chancellor-candidate, declared that “burqas, headscarf girls, publicly-supported knife men, and other good-for-nothings” would not serve German prosperity (Breitenback and Hallam). This anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany culminated in November 2023, when far-right extremists, politicians and supporters with connections to the AfD met in Potsdam to discuss a “master plan” for the mass deportation of foreigners and “non-assimilated” Germans (Shelton). The AfD has increasingly embraced this radicalized rhetoric, frequently employing terms like “remigration” in public discourse..

This anti-immigrant rhetoric has proven successful, resonating with voters and leading to strong results in the European and Eastern State elections in Germany. Francis Fukuyama, in “The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”, might provide an answer as to why the AfD has found such support amongst the German voters. Examining Trump’s U.S. popularity, he finds that many of his supporters, who identify as white working class, feel victimized and disregarded by the elites. Fukuyama accurately describes how the freedom and the degree of choice within modern liberal societies can leave people feeling unsatisfied and disconnected (Fukuyama 102-105). Thus, they might find themselves nostalgic for the ordered life and community they think they have lost and that their ancestors possessed.

This sentiment can be found amongst many Germans that feel their security, jobs, and culture are threatened by the influx of immigrants. For example, in my hometown many people vocalize their fear of German culture being undermined by the arrival of immigrants with different religions, cultures, and morals. They also view their safety as compromised by traumatized and “dangerous” refugees. In order to preserve the Germany their ancestors built, some view it as their only option to vote for the AfD and restrict the arrival of “those others”.

This rise of the AfD, riding on tribalism that unites Germans feeling threatened by the negative perception of immigrants, has several implications for Germany’s role on the global stage. Firstly, the AfD’s success has pressured the German government to reintroduce border controls and abandon the “Willkommenskultur” Merkel introduced in 2015 (Shukla et al.). Thus, Germany also contradicted the principles of the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees free movement across member states without internal border controls, undermining the foundation of European unity and threatening the liberal international order. Secondly, the shift of German voters to the right has led to immense insecurity and instability in the former center-left coalition led by Chancellor Scholz. Given the populations’ evident discontent as well as internal coalition disputes, the German government has indeed collapsed, with Scholz losing a vote of confidence on December 16, 2024, and new elections scheduled for February 2025. From an outside perspective, Germany seems paralyzed by its failed government, causing concern among fellow European States who might have to take the lead in EU matters, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine (Marsh). Beyond that, the rise of the AfD gives reason for further doubts about Germany’s future in the liberal world order, as the party has previously toyed with propositions of Germany leaving NATO as well as the EU (Hockenos). Thirdly and more broadly, German tribalism, expressed by but not limited to the rise of the AfD, fosters mistrust and pressure to further isolate “the Germans” from outside influences.

Summarily, the tribalism portrayed and supported by the AfD has caused Germany to slowly abandon its former liberal policies and to adopt a more realist stance, potentially restricting its future role in the world order. Germany – adamant defender of a liberal world order, promoter of change through trade, largest net contributor to the EU, and safe haven for millions of refugees – disengaging from the global stage would have dramatic consequences. Especially in times of multiple crises and increasing global tensions, a lack in Germany’s commitment could put the entire postwar liberal international system into jeopardy.

However, as stated by Clark and Winegard, tribalism is not inherently bad (Clark and Winegard 2). Tribalism can also enable a feeling of belonging and togetherness, as demonstrated by my hometown’s folklore group, for example. It brings together people of all ages, uniting them in the goal to uphold and celebrate the culture of the region through traditional clothing and dancing. This folklore group has strong global ties to other groups. For example, last year a group from Latvia paid a visit and shared their own traditions and culture with the locals. Thus, both groups fostered a mutual understanding for each other’s tribes and established enduring friendships. This simple connection makes me believe in the existence of positive tribalism, when it is not weaponized by “us-versus-them”-populism, such as the AfD’s. Tribalism in this perspective does not foster isolationism, but rather the motivation to share one’s own culture, the curiosity to learn more about others, and the desire to celebrate the diversity of the international world order.

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Jennifer Hofmann is a first-year graduate student pursuing a degree in Global Affairs, Global Economy. With extensive experience in political environments, she has worked at various levels, from being an elected member of the local district parliament, assisting Members of Parliament in the Hessian State Parliament to contributing to international organizations like the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation at the United Nations. Her work spans research, advocacy, and policy development, giving her a unique perspective on both local and global political dynamics.

Works Cited

Breitenbach, D. & Hallam, M. (n.d.): AfD leaders and their most offensive remarks, in Deutsche Welle, in https://www.dw.com/en/afd-leaders-and-their-most-offensive-remarks/g-37651099. Accessed 25 October 2024

Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.): tribalism, in https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tribalism. Accessed 25 October 2024

Chua, A. (2018): Tribal World. Group Identity Is All, in Foreign Affairs

Clark, C.J. & Winegard, B.M. (2020): Tribalism in War and Peace: The Nature and Evolution of Ideological Epistemology and Its Significance for Modern Social Science, in Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1-22

Decker, F. (2022): Etappen der Parteigeschichte der AfD, in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, in https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273130/etappen-der-parteigeschichte-der-afd/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Fukuyama, F. (2018): Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy. In Foreign Affairs, September/October 2018, pp. 90-114

Hockenos, P. (2024): Germany’s Far-Right Party Is Worse Than the Rest of Europe’s, in Foreign Policy, in https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/26/afd-germany-far-right-populism-radical-europe-remigration-immigrants/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Koenigs, V. (2024): AfD: Kirche muss nicht – Kinder und Küche aber schon, in Norddeutscher Rundfunk, in https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/niedersachsen/Die-AfD-und-ihre-Positionen-zu-Frauen-und-Familie,afd3132.html. Accessed 25 October 2024

Marsh, S. (2024): Far-right state win shakes Germany’s fragile coalition, in Reuters, in https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-state-win-shakes-germanys-fragile-coalition-2024-09-01/. Accessed 25 October 2024

Shelton, J. (2024): Germany: Report shows deeper AfD ties to Potsdam meeting, in Deutsche Welle, in https://www.dw.com/en/germany-report-shows-deeper-afd-ties-to-potsdam-meeting/a-68127057. Accessed 25 October 2024

Shukla, S., Schmidt, N., Otto, M. (2024): Goodbye, ‘welcome culture.’ Germany bows to far-right pressure and tightens its borders, in CNN World, in https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/21/europe/germany-borders-poland-scholz-intl/index.html. Accessed 25 October 2024

America’s Climate [Policy] Hypocrisy: The Disconnect between the Climate Change Aims and Action

May 10, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Yashwani Kularia

The op-ed “America’s Climate ~~Policy~~ Hypocrisy: The Disconnect between the Climate Change Aims and Actions” highlights that amidst escalating environmental concerns, the United States appears to grapple with a disconcerting paradox between its climate change aspirations and its policies. Despite voicing commitments to address climate issues, the nation’s ongoing dependence on fossil fuels and inadequate efforts in environmental justice initiatives highlight its climate hypocrisy. The disconnect between rhetoric and action raises critical questions about America’s commitment to combating climate change and the urgency of implementing meaningful reforms. (Photo Source: Melissa Bradley on Unsplash).

On January 26th, 2024, the White House announced a temporary pause on pending approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports to the Non-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) countries. It aims to address the increasing concerns about climate change and the mounting domestic prices (“FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Temporary Pause on Pending Approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports”). This decision happens to have been made at the beginning of the year, coinciding with the upcoming Presidential elections in November 2024. As of 2023, the United States emerged as the world’s leading oil producer, effectively surpassing Qatar. Indeed, the United States achieved a historic peak in oil production, reaching approximately 13.2 million barrels a day (“United States produces more crude oil than any country, ever”). The state of Texas alone contributes around 5.6 million barrels a day (“Texas oil and gas group says industry is surging”). Moreover, the US has become the largest exporter of LNG just last year.

As the world grapples with the need to address climate change, the United States has found itself mired in hypocrisy. Notwithstanding its rhetoric of climate responsibility and commitment to reducing carbon emissions, the reality paints a starkly different picture. A glaring example of America’s climate hypocrisy lies in its continued reliance on fossil fuels, particularly shale gas and oil. Throughout the 2020 election campaigns, the Biden administration pledged to steer the nation away from reliance on fossil fuels (Ronayne and Knickmeyer). However, after the elections, the administration has overseen the largest expansion of oil and gas production to date. The Biden administration has approved extensive fossil fuel projects like Alaska’s willow oil project, the Mountain Valley fracked gas pipeline, and several other oil-LNG export terminals (Gardner). This highlights a disparity between their promises and their subsequent actions.

America’s failure to adequately address environmental justice issues highlights another dimension of its climate hypocrisy. In spite of environmental justice (EJ) being touted as a top priority by the Biden administration, the implementation of initiatives, like the “Justice40 Initiative,” has fallen short. The “Justice40 Initiative” aimed to ensure that 40% of the benefits from climate and environmental programs would flow to Environmental Justice (EJ) communities (“Justice40 Initiative | Environmental Justice”). An EJ community is considered to be more affected by environmental hazards than others. These communities often include minority, low-income, indigenous, and tribal populations (“Environmental Justice | US EPA”). However, specifics as to what constitutes benefits, and how to satisfy the 40% rule remain undefined.

The Inflation Reduction Act (2022) is the U.S. Congressional legislation aimed at curbing inflation, which includes measures such as changes in tax policies and investments in clean energy and infrastructure (“INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022”). However, the act fails to protect EJ communities and reduce fossil fuel production. Current trends suggest that oil and gas production, as well as exports, will nearly double by 2035. This will exacerbate the sufferings of communities impacted by gas and oil, namely black, brown, and indigenous communities in the Appalachia, Gulf of Mexico, and Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico (Rees). Furthermore, the Biden administration’s actions, such as auctioning off over 73 acres of Gulf of Mexico public waters to oil and gas industries in Lease Sale 259 at the beginning of 2023 (“Lease Sale 259”), pose significant environmental risks. This auction marked the largest offshore lease sale in U.S. history, with the potential for severe impacts on EJ, such as the extinction of endangered species like the Rice’s whales, an increased risk of oil spill, and substantial greenhouse gas emissions (Meigs).

Climate reparations represent a critical aspect of climate justice. These reparations offer a means to take responsibility and support low-income countries grappling with the devastating effects of climate change. At the CoP27 in Egypt (November 2022), a landmark agreement was reached. This agreement established a loss and damage fund aimed at compensating poor and vulnerable nations for their climate-related losses funded by developed countries. Despite being one of the world’s largest historical emitters of greenhouse gasses, the United States has staunchly opposed efforts to contribute. In fact, the US Climate envoy, John Kerry, stated in July last year that the country would not pay reparations “under any circumstances” to developing countries hit by climate change-induced disasters (Slow). Regardless of stated commitments to environmental justice, such actions underscore the need for greater accountability and coherence in U.S. climate and environmental policies. Moreover, the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration dealt a severe blow to global efforts to address climate change. While President Biden re-joined the agreement, the damage to America’s reputation as a reliable partner in climate action had already been done. This back and forth on climate positions of the U.S. erodes trust and hinders progress.

The US appears to be caught in a frustrating deadlock between two polarized political factions. Wherein one side is reluctant to recognize the urgency of addressing climate change altogether, the other side seemingly acknowledges its urgency but reflects inconsistency and duplicity in its actions. This has led the U.S. to a standstill in its climate policies. Amidst the recent conflict in the Middle East, President Biden chose not to attend the 2023 UN climate summit, CoP 28, held in the UAE (Joselow). This move implies a diminishing prioritization and a waning emphasis on climate change action and policies.

Ultimately, addressing America’s climate hypocrisy requires more than just rhetoric – it demands bold and decisive actions. This requires a fundamental shift in priorities, policies, and practices to align with the urgent need to mitigate the climate crisis. This will have the effect of transitioning into a sustainable, low-carbon, and clean energy future. Global warming has recently exceeded the 1.5°C threshold target as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Surpassing this threshold amplifies the likelihood and risk of severe impacts on ecosystems and regions beyond the global tolerance levels (Di Liberto). The stakes are too high to continue down the path of half-measures and empty promises.

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Yashwani Kularia is a first-year Graduate Student at NYU’s Center of Global Affairs (CGA) pursuing an MS in Global Affairs with a concentration in Transnational Security with a twin specialization in Data Analytics and the United Nations. Her academic and research interests include exploring cross-border terrorism, multiple forms of extremism, counterterrorism, and geopolitics. She has worked with the Ramboll as a Junior Consultant and at the US Army War College as an intern. In addition to her studies, she serves as President of the Student Association of Global Affairs (SAGA) for the academic year 2024-2025.

Works Cited

Di Liberto, Tom. “What’s in a number? The meaning of the 1.5-C climate threshold.” Climate.gov, 9 January 2024, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/features/whats-number-meaning-15-c-climate-threshold. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“Environmental Justice | US EPA.” Environmental Protection Agency, 6 February 2024, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Temporary Pause on Pending Approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports.” The White House, 26 January 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/26/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-temporary-pause-on-pending-approvals-of-liquefied-natural-gas-exports/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Gardner, Timothy. “Biden admin greenlights LNG exports from Alaska project.” Reuters, 14 April 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/biden-admin-greenlights-lng-exports-alaska-project-document-2023-04-14/. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022.” Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/inflation-reduction-act-2022. Accessed 26 April 2024.

Joselow, Maxine. “Biden to skip world leaders’ summit at COP28 climate talks in Dubai.” Washington Post, 26 November 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/11/26/biden-cop28-climate-summit-dubai/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Justice40 Initiative | Environmental Justice.” The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Lease Sale 259.” Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 29 March 2023, https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/lease-sale-259. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Meigs, James B. “The Big Squeeze: How Biden’s Environmental Justice Agenda Hurts the Economy and the Environment.” Manhattan Institute, 7 September 2023, https://manhattan.institute/article/how-bidens-environmental-justice-agenda-hurts-economy-and-environment. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Rees, Collin. “Biden’s Fossil Fuel Fail: How U.S. Oil & Gas Supply Rises under the Inflation Reduction Act.” Oil Change International, 20 November 2023, https://priceofoil.org/2023/11/20/fossil-fuel-fail/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Ronayne, Kathleen, and Ellen Knickmeyer. “Biden calls for ‘transition’ from oil, GOP sees opening.” AP News, 23 October 2020, https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-technology-climate-26908b855045d5ce7342fd01be8bcc10. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Slow, Oliver. “US refuses climate reparations for developing nations.” BBC, 13 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66197366. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Texas oil and gas group says industry is surging.” The Texas Tribune, 30 January 2024, https://www.texastribune.org/2024/01/30/texas-oil-gas-association-annual-report/. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“United States produces more crude oil than any country, ever.” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 11 March 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545. Accessed 26 April 2024.

Comparative Security of the Maritime Flow of Petroleum-Based Energy

March 28, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Raghvendra Kumar, PhD.

The security of the maritime flow of petroleum-based energy will be a critical determinant for both New Delhi and Beijing, while India’s geographical proximity to the source of oil and gas exporting countries will always provide India and its Navy with an upper hand to exploit Beijing’s security-of-energy vulnerability. (Photo Source: Venti Views on Unsplash).

India and China are net importers of oil and gas and are heavily dependent on overseas energy supplies for their sustained economic expansion and development. They import oil and gas from various geographical regions, including countries from West Asia, Africa, and South America. The critical commodities sourced from the hydrocarbon resource-rich regions of West Asia and Africa are of significant value to India and China, “as these two regions alone accounted for 64.5% and 63% of oil imports, respectively, in 2022” (Economic Times & U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022). However, the increased flow of cheap oil from Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict has become a lucrative alternative to West Asia, Africa, and South America in China’s energy security matrix.

However, replacing West Asia, Africa, and South America as the primary suppliers of oil to China requires three factors, according to scholarly analysis. First, the share of renewable energy sources should overtake conventional sources in China’s energy mix. The share of renewable sources of energy in India’s and China’s energy mix is bound to rise at a decent pace. Both India and China have set ambitious renewable energy targets, with India aiming to achieve 450 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity by 2030, including 280 GW of solar energy and 140 GW of wind energy, while China targets to increase its non-fossil fuel energy consumption to 25% and reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 (Economic Times, & U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022). Despite significant progress in the cost of production and feasibility, the limitations on renewable energy’s widespread utility, availability, adoption and efficiency remind us how dependent the world is on fossil fuel —especially oil and gas. Second, a significant increase in the share of natural gas in China’s energy mix could end its dependence on oil, allowing huge volumes of gas to be imported through pipelines from gas-rich areas of Central Asia and Russia. China “currently consumes around 13.4 million barrels per day (b/d)” (Reuters, 2022) and “imports 11.8 million b/d” (Reale, Bingham, and Greenberg, 2), of which only a fraction is transported through pipelines. Further, the adaptation of China’s national industry to a gas-based economy is possible but will not be swift as it faces several hurdles. Firstly, significant investment in infrastructure like pipelines and storage facilities is needed, demanding time for planning and implementation. Secondly, technological challenges in altering industrial processes from oil and coal to natural gas are prominent. Thirdly, resistance from existing industries and stakeholders poses a barrier to change. Lastly, economic factors, including costs and potential disruptions, need careful management. Overall, the transition is expected to be gradual due to these complexities. Consequently, reliance on oil will be critical for China for a foreseeable period.

The third factor addresses the practicality and affordability of alternative maritime routes, such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is questionable considering China’s security-of-energy strategy. The NSR constitutes a vital maritime corridor connecting Europe and Asia via the northern regions of Russia. The “NSR is the shortest route linking Europe to East and South East Asia,” and, “until the 20th century, due to its harsh icebound environment, oceanographic ships conducting surveys were the primary users, but the ice-free period in summer has become longer every year, making it the better condition for sailing” (Hataya and Huang, 4). This renewed attention is primarily driven by the potential for extended navigational periods and the resultant cost and time reductions associated with utilizing these emerging shipping lanes. The all-weather accessibility of NSR due to adverse impacts of climate change could provide an indisputable advantage over the conventional route passing through the Indian Ocean via the choke points of the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca strait to Beijing as an alternative sea route. However, in comparison to other sea routes, the NSR is still underdeveloped (The Japan Association of Marine Safety, 2016). It poses several limitations, including a lack of specialised tanker fleets, equipment, and supporting infrastructure, hindering its wider suitability because the Northern Sea is comparatively more vulnerable to environmental factors than the Indian Ocean, “especially during winters” (United States Coast Guard, 6). Therefore, since the relevance of crude oil and natural gas is not going to diminish in the strategic calculations of India and China, the centrality of the Persian Gulf remains crucial.

The pivotal role of West Asia and Africa in India (the world’s third-largest consumer and importer of oil) and China (the world’s largest consumer and importer of oil) is sure to intensify as their future demand for overseas oil and gas is expected to rise at a significant pace due to their “rapid rate of growth and development and increased per capita demand” (The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) 8). By 2050, the share of oil and gas will be around 32% (International Energy Agency 2019) in China’s and 39% (BP 2023) in India’s total energy mix, a projection that challenges the conventional assumption that renewable sources of energy will undermine the importance of oil and gas. This continued centrality of West Asia, Africa and South America in Beijing’s and New Delhi’s security-of-energy is primarily determined by geography. Oil coming from Venezuela on Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) that draw too much water cannot maneuver the shallow depths of the Panama Canal and, therefore, must sail almost halfway around the world to reach India and China. Similarly, oil from Nigeria, Libya, Angola, and rest of Africa must either pass from the Suez Canal or through the Cape of Good Hope, whereas the oil from the Persian Gulf has to pass through the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, situating India and China on the same plane of geographical vulnerability. However, New Delhi gains a comparative advantage due to its central location in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), close to the primary sources (West Asia and Africa) from where it imports the majority of its oil and gas. However, this becomes a critical vulnerability for China, which has no direct access to the IOR. China imports “nearly 75% of its oil from abroad,” most of which is imported from a single geographical region, the Persian Gulf (Government of China, 2022). The Persian Gulf is separated from the east coast of China by two major natural choke points, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca.

China’s vulnerability is demonstrated by the close proximity of the Indian island territories of Andaman and Nicobar to the Strait of Malacca, while the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, and the East African Coast are near India’s western seaboard. This gives New Delhi substantial influence over vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that carry the bulk of China’s oil and other merchandise trade. Therefore, by virtue of geographical positioning, New Delhi and its Navy is in a commanding position to control the China-bound maritime movement of oil and gas. The Indian Navy’s sustained presence through its mission-based deployments around the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, the Mozambique Channel, and its strategic approaches to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar, Central and South Indian Ocean provides it with strategic depth to counter several contingencies that may arise. These deployments enable New Delhi to easily interdict China-bound oil, causing anxiety in Beijing and further amplifying its vulnerability.

China, in order to circumvent the vulnerability of its energy systems, is investing heavily in its Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and expanding the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s role and presence in the IOR. In the past decade, “China, through its BRI project in Pakistan, aims to invest approximately US$ 62 billion” (Brookings Institution, 2020) in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Chinese strategic community views the CPEC as a means to promote the idea that Gwadar port will serve as a bypass to the Strait of Malacca. However, in order for this to be possible, two factors should be taken into account. First, to transport the bulk of West Asian oil to China through a series of pipelines, one must account for the elevation from Gwadar, a port city in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan, to Kashgar in the Xinjiang province of China, which sits at an elevation of approximately 1500 meters. However, this route passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, “which is part of the Kashmir region under illegal occupation by Pakistan” (MEA 2020), and “includes the highest point, Khunjerab Pass, at roughly 4500 meters elevation” (South China Morning Post n.d.). This disputed territory, coupled with the high elevation, would pose significant challenges. Therefore, transporting oil through pipelines as a solution to China’s problem is neither feasible nor cost-effective. A second option for China to bypass the Malacca Strait would be through a network of highways and rail links – which also happens to be one of the major thrust areas of CPEC. Despite Gwadar’s “strategic positioning” at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which can facilitate the movement of the bulk of China’s oil, the depth of the Gwadar port becomes the most significant limitation. Due to siltation, the port requires dredging of the approach channels at regular intervals to “increase the depth to 14 metres from the current 11.5 metres” (The Nation, 2022). In order to enable the docking of ships with a deadweight tonnage (DWT) of up to 70,000 DWT, while the “current capacity permits a maximum of 20,000 DWT” (Kardon, Kennedy, and Dutton, 13). This makes the process expensive and limits its practical usage by bulk oil carriers. Further, the lack of capacity and requisite infrastructure to offload the VLCC is another aspect that limits the use of Gwadar Port as an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca.

In comparison, India’s strategic position at the intersection of international shipping lanes entitles New Delhi and its Navy to effectively and efficiently use hard power tools to interdict China’s oil supply, crippling its economy. China is aware of its comparative disadvantage manifested by the ‘harness of geography.’ This geographical reality is at the cusp of its strategic and operational planning as it sees the Indian Navy as a threat in its security dilemma. Thus, the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas at an affordable price is critical to India’s and China’s national security as their societal and economic well-being is entwined with unhindered access to these critical commodities.

In conclusion, despite the desire and efforts undertaken to transition away from fossil fuels — oil and gas will remain dominant in India’s and China’s energy mix. They will continue to consume significant amounts of oil and gas to meet their growing economic and per capita demand. In this context, the security of the maritime flow of petroleum-based energy will be a critical determinant for both New Delhi and Beijing while India’s geographical proximity to the source of oil and gas exporting countries will always provide it and its Navy an upper hand to exploit Beijing’s security-of-energy vulnerability.

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Dr. Raghvendra Kumar holds a PhD in African Studies from the University of Delhi, specializing in Indian Ocean geopolitics and India’s and China’s involvement in East African Island States. Previously, he served as an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) in New Delhi. Before his tenure at NMF, he taught undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Maharaja Agrasen College, University of Delhi, India. He can be reached at raghvendrakumar2007@gmail.com.

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, DG, NMF, for his invaluable feedback and insights provided to the author during his tenure as an Associate Fellow at the NMF. His expertise and guidance significantly contributed to the refinement of this research paper.

Works Cited

BP. “India Insights.” BP Energy Outlook, 2023. www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook/country-and-regional-insights/india-insights.html. Accessed 23 September 2023.

Brookings Institution. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” The Brookings Institution, 15 June 2020. www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_pakistan_afzal_v2.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2023.

Economic Times. “India’s Russian Oil Binge Drags Down Opec’s Share to Lowest in 2022.” The Economic Times, 23 Aug. 2022. economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/commodities/news/indias-russian-oil-binge-drags-down-opecs-share-to-lowest-in-2022/articleshow/97065032.cms. Accessed 19 September 2023.

Government of China. “A Report on the Work of the Government (2022).” English.www.gov.cn, 24 Feb. 2022. english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202202/24/content_WS6216e221c6d09c94e48a569e.html. Accessed 23 September 2023.

Hataya, Sakiko, and Huang, Michael C. “The Opportunity and Challenges of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) after the Suez Obstruction of 2021.” OPRI Perspectives No.22 [2021], SPF (Sasakawa Peace Foundation) Ocean Policy Research Institute, p. 4, https://www.spf.org/opri-intl/global-data/report/perspectives/20210804165958118.pdfAccessed 24 September 2023.

Kardon, Isaac B., Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton. “China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China’s Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan.” 2020. CMSI China Maritime Reports, no. 7. Digital Commons, US Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7. Accessed 8 March 2024.

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) “QUESTION NO.606: BRI AND CPEC.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 05, 2020. www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/32353/QUESTION+NO606+BRI+AND+CPEC. Accessed 8 March 2024.

The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). “China Energy Outlook 2050.” CNPC ETRI, 2018, eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/8192.pdf. pp 1-58. Accessed 24 September 2023.

International Energy Agency. “2050 World and China Energy Outlook 2019.” ResearchGate, 2019,www.researchgate.net/publication/345151631_2050_World_and_China_Energy_Outlook_2019. Accessed 20 September 2023.

Reale, Hannah, Emma Bingham, and Kara Greenberg. “Where Does China Get Its Oil?” The Wire China, 12 July 2020. www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Where%20Does%20China%20Get%20Its%20Oil_%20-%20The%20Wire%20China.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2023.

Reuters. “China’s Re-Opening J-Curve: Oil Consumption.” Reuters, 13 Dec. 2022, www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-re-opening-j-curve-oil-consumption-2022-12-13/. Accessed 19 September 2023.

South China Morning Post. “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Is the Jewel in the Crown of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative.” South China Morning Post, multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/pakistan.html.

The Japan Association of Marine Safety. “Northern Sea Route Handbook”. https://www.nikkaibo.or.jp/pdf/NorthernSeaRouteHandbook_E.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2023.

The Nation. “Depth of Gwadar Deep Sea Port Reduces to 11 Meters Due to Siltation.” The Nation, 13 May 2022, www.nation.com.pk/13-May-2022/depth-of-gwadar-deep-sea-port-reduces-to-11-meters-due-to-siltation. Accessed 25 September 2023.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. “China.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Jan. 2022. ww.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/china.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2023.

United States Coast Guard. “Arctic Search and Rescue.” Department of Homeland Security, 2020 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USCG%20-%20Arctic%20Search%20and%20Rescue_1.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2023.

Book Review: Travels of a T-shirt in the Global Economy by Pietra Rivoli

March 20, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Rachel Teng

How far would you travel to investigate the making of a t-shirt? Sparked by an anti-globalisation protest in 1999 at Georgetown University where she taught, the book’s author spent six years digging into how a t-shirt is produced right down to its raw cotton origins. Beyond economics, this book is an easy read about the interconnectedness of capital – both financial and human – through the perspective of politics, culture, and the social impact of globalisation. (Photo credit: Keagan Henman on Unsplash)

It is widely recognized that peaceful protests are organised as a means of raising awareness about a certain issue. To find out that an anti-globalisation protest in 1999 at Georgetown University witnessed by the author sparked her six-year journey to investigate the full production trajectory of a cotton t-shirt was astonishing. Even if one were unfamiliar with economic concepts and purely interested in just reading about functioning of globalisation, Rivoli’s book is an entry-level work of non-fiction that traces the path of a simple cotton T-shirt across its journey from a raw piece of cotton in the fields of Texas, to its manufacturing at a factory in China, to its final stage of being sold in the United States (US) and, eventually, the extension of its life as a used clothing product or as a recycled mattress filler in Africa. This book brings the reader along the ups and downs of globalisation, accentuating the level of interconnectedness amongst states with an increased flow of trade, investment, and capital, including human capital as labour – through a nexus of perspectives ranging from politics, trade and economics, as well as culture and ethics.

The journey begins with an old Walgreens cotton t-shirt from Florida that the author found stashed in her cupboard. As she starts digging into the origins of the t-shirt, she starts off the book with a history of the cotton industry in the 1950s, which was initially dominated by the US as a result of e national farm subsidies. While in violation of the World Trade Organisation’s trade rules, these circumstances effectively allowed the US cotton industry to be buoyant and remain competitive with a comparative advantage over its Asian or African competitors. At the same time, with industrialisation and technological advancements increasing productivity and lowering prices, there arose a need for a massive supply of cotton at cheap labour costs. With the boom in demand, the US turned to its South American neighbours where its cheap labour force and availability of land provided the resources necessary for the mass production of cotton required to meet global demand. This is reminiscent of the extractive economic institutions in Acemoglu & Robinson’s Why Nations Fail where a bulk of available resources meant for the masses are utilised by a handful of cotton farmers who had growing political influence. The lack of market modernisation in India and China also contributed to the US becoming the world leader in cotton production.

These themes of exploitation and dominance continue into the second part of the book, where the author explains that China sought to emulate the US’s approach by operating as an extractive economic institution for its cheap sweatshop labour in the textile manufacturing industry. Rivoli goes on to discuss the history of the textile industry. With China securing many trade agreements and support as a state-owned enterprise, the cheaper textile products made by China grew in popularity. A gradual decline in British textiles made from the local mills in India led to China eventually becoming the global leader in textile manufacturing. The British Industrial Revolution spurred high demand for textiles, and interestingly, while there were poor working conditions in China’s factories, the need for large supplies of labour provided the opportunity for women to be introduced into the manufacturing labour market. This led to the economic and social liberation of women towards the industrial sector with upgraded skills. Of the several downsides of globalisation, Rivoli also incorporated the issue of culture and female empowerment and how, albeit not in the best working conditions, women favoured globalisation seeing as it provided them with the opportunity to upskill and move away from the labour-intensive agricultural industry.

Part I of the book discussed the resistance to creative destruction with the display of the lack of incentive to innovate under an extractive institution. This was elaborated in how the cotton farmers were unable to adapt to the genetically engineered cotton seeds to save their crops against pests. Moving to Part III of the book, Rivoli brings the reader through examples of how globalisation can be weaponized, with the US’s heavy-handed protectionist measures such as import restrictions, tariffs, and the quota system imposed in the textile and apparel industries. This demonstrates how political influence can have perverse impacts on trade and the economy, even when motivated by good intentions to protect domestic jobs and employment. This lavish protectionism was also how the US lost its competitive edge against China in the textile market.

The last part of the book discusses the resale trading of t-shirts where the wealthy US suburbs provide most of the supply of second-hand t-shirts to fulfil the demand of poor countries. Though it shows the consumerism and capitalism of wealthy countries, it is heartening to see that there is an afterlife for these commodities, even as simple as a t-shirt in the global used-clothing industry or as innovative uses as rugs or fillers for automobile doors, mattresses or to provide insulation in homes. Even more delightful is how resale trading is boosting the African society and industry with “mitumba” – referring to used clothing fashion from the West, and even providing a positive environmental effect. Rivoli concludes the book on the moral case for trade, discussing the need for broader perspectives, that while the anti-globalisation activists argue against poor working conditions or environmental sustainability in their protests, there can be upsides from globalisation as well. Through her journey to discover how her cotton t-shirt was made, the author shared her insight that activists should take a step back sometimes to see the broader picture. In the case of a t-shirt, the author suggests that there could perhaps be a more balanced view taken, and that there could be more good than harm if one takes into consideration the effects from the entire supply chain process.

Overall, the book was an enlightening read on how a t-shirt as a commodity can have an impact on the political, economic, and social aspects of so many states along its various stages of harvesting to production and manufacturing, to retail sale and resale trading. My takeaway from reading the book is to appreciate the complexity of the production process required to obtain the products we consume and the downstream impacts they have after they have served their time for us. If we look at the broader picture, globalisation can have a tremendous social impact across the world beyond just politics and economics.

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Rachel Teng is a first-year M.S. student at NYU concentrating in International Relations and Global Futures. Her academic areas of interest include the hard and soft power relationship, impact of great power shifts on the defence diplomacy of city-states, and emerging technologies in the information realm. Rachel believes in a polymath mentality towards acquiring knowledge and is always happy to chat about a wide-ranging spectrum of issues to broaden her weltanschauung.

Works Cited

Rivoli, Pietra. Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade. 2nd ed., Wiley, 2015.

Op-Ed: North Korea and the Resuscitation of the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

May 14, 2023 by lc4998 Leave a Comment

by Yazan Ammus

International political events since the turn of the century have severely undermined the cause of nuclear disarmament. A deal between Washington and Pyongyang may now offer the best hope to resuscitate global non-proliferation. (Photo credit: Micha Brändli on Unsplash)

When it comes to crafting policy for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Washington policymakers must internalize Pyongyang’s understanding of modern political history, particularly given all that has transpired since the turn of the century. The international community, particularly the United States, has undermined the cause of nuclear non-proliferation through a series of actions, all of which now fuel the intransigence of the Hermit Kingdom.

The most seminal of these events: the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Given all available evidence, it now seems more plausible that Baghdad was invaded not because it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), but as a consequence of their absence (“CIA Final Report: No WMD Found”). Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s dismantlement of his country’s nuclear program in return for normalized political and economic relations with Europe and the U.S. was, for a time, heralded as a shining example of nuclear diplomacy (Cirincione). Like much of Libya, the positive disarmament case study would be destroyed following NATO’s military intervention in the North African State at the outset of the Arab Spring in 2011 (Bowen and Moran). The Iran nuclear deal? As a result of former U.S. president Donald Trump’s petty vindictiveness and desire to deprive his predecessor of a foreign policy legacy achievement, the agreement was scrapped, in contravention of international law, the wishes of all other parties to maintain the accord, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) verification of Tehran’s compliance with its obligations (Smith; O’Connor).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine offers additional disastrous precedent. Not only was the Russian attack made possible as a consequence of Kyiv’s lack of WMD’s, which it gave up to its larger neighbor following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in the face of an impressive Ukrainian counterattack, the Russians began leveraging their nuclear arsenal in a predatory way (Cameron). Through the threat of WMDs, the Russians hoped to secure on the battlefield what they could not with conventional armaments. Tragically, the war has demonstrated not only the utility of WMDs as a defensive deterrent, but as a complementary offensive tool as well.

When examined in the context of this history, North Korean distrust of the international community is understandable. Additional geopolitical realities augment their suspicion. The isolated regime is told its nuclear program is to blame for the sanctions suffocating its economy, but in U.S.-sanctioned Venezuela, no such WMD program threatens international peace and security (Weisbrot and Sachs). If Caracas, a human rights paradise when compared to Pyongyang, can be sanctioned for its democratic deficiencies, would not the totalitarian nature of the DPRK’s government alone justify their continued economic embargo, even after disarmament? Or rather, through such policy contradictions, is the United States incentivizing the Venezuelan government to acquire WMDs, which it could then relinquish in return for economic relief?

President Joe Biden has the opportunity to rectify past errors and create an international political system conducive to nuclear non-proliferation. Reentry into the Iran nuclear deal and reducing the severity of the sanctions imposed on non-nuclear states would be critical first steps, which should be complemented by a new diplomatic effort with North Korea.

During his tenure in office, Trump behaved recklessly, both domestically and internationally. The 45th president got very little right, but his willingness to engage in diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jung Un was positive. One can mock the “love letters” exchanged between the two gentlemen, but is it not better for leaders of any two nuclear states to have personal affinity rather than animus?

Moreover, the fixation on such marginal dynamics obscures the more significant: the reflexive hawkishness that defined the foreign policy dogma of the Republican Party was, to some degree, neutered by the real estate mogul. Notwithstanding his escalation of tensions with Iran, through his negotiations with the Taliban, attempts to establish better relations with Russia, and summit with Kim, Trump brought the possibility of diplomacy with adversaries into the GOP mainstream.

Thus, without the fear of being analogized to former British prime minister Neville Chamberlain or criticized as weak by his congressional opposition, Biden should seek to build on Trump’s experience and engage in his own face-to-face summit with Kim. At the technical level, extensive discussions will be necessary but the basic contours of any agreement are well known: North Korea’s return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the dismantling of all its nuclear weapons; removing sanctions and providing economic assistance, particularly fuel, to North Korea; normalizing political and economic relations; and formal security assurances by each side, with explicit guarantees against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. is serious about advancing such an effort, it would need to accept a sequential, reversible process in which some economic relief is granted prior to the complete denuclearization of the peninsula. North Korean leadership made the centrality of this demand clear at the failed Hanoi Summit (Panda and Narang).

As paranoid as the North Korean regime is, it has consistently showcased a desire to reach a comprehensive accord with the U.S. that it feels satisfies its security needs and delivers economic development. In 1994, North Korea struck the Agreed Framework agreement with the Clinton administration, in which it froze its nuclear program, agreed to stay in the NPT, and respect their commitments as an NPT signatory. American congressional opposition to the agreement impeded its implementation (Ryan). On Aug. 7, 2005, at the fourth round of the six-party talks, participants issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear program, return to the NPT, and allow inspections of its sites by the IAEA in return for security guarantees, energy provisions, and normalizing relations. Disputes over the construction of a light water reactor and the imposition of fresh sanctions on North Korean banks in Macau ultimately scuttled the agreement (“North Korea: A Chronology of Events”).

If past is prologue, a deal that ends the potential for nuclear war on the divided peninsula can still be reached. The global non-proliferation regime is on life support. Only through bold action can President Biden resuscitate it.

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Yazan Ammus is a candidate for a Master of Science in Global Affairs at New York University, with a concentration in Transnational Security. He previously worked with the Middle East Zone Unit of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to advance a nuclear weapons free zone treaty in the Middle East.

Bibliography

Bowen, Wyn and Matthew Moran. “What North Korea Learned From Libya’s Decision to Give Up Nuclear Weapons.” The Conversation,11 May 2018, https://theconversation.com/what-north-korea-learned-from-libyas-decision-to-give-up-nuclear-weapons-95674.

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