By: Emma Hansen
This paper explores how the economic and social inclusion of refugees can positively contribute to the experience of those that are facing displacement, using Venezuelan refugees in Colombia as a case study. Colombia’s response to a mass influx of refugees from Venezuela while managing millions of internally-displaced Colombians serves as a useful example of refugee integration, with lessons for governments and aid responders in effective refugee management.
With over a decade of economic and political turmoil defining the lives of those who once called Venezuela home, many Venezuelan refugees have fled to Colombia, which has offered a unique example of economic and social inclusion of refugees in a host community. While Venezuela has often served as a host to forcibly displaced people itself, the people of Venezuela are now subject to one of the most serious crises of displacement in the world and the largest in the region (“Venezuela Crisis Explained” para. 1). Amongst increasing rates of crime, food shortages, and economic and political collapse, Venezuela has become an inhospitable place in which to reside (paras. 1-2). In fleeing violence, poverty, and soaring inflation, almost eight million Venezuelans have been displaced from their country since 2014, with 84 percent of them resettling in Latin America and the Caribbean (“Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis” paras. 1-3). Many of these refugees are facing challenges in their new communities, such as inaccessibility to the creation of livelihoods and shortages in housing options. This has caused hundreds of thousands of people to return to Venezuela, even though the political and economic situations do not appear to have improved (para. 3).
Nearly three million people have chosen Colombia as their destination, joining the pre-existing millions of internally-displaced Colombians. The country offers opportunities for refugee status regularization and economic inclusion, making Colombia quite an attractive option for settlement (“Venezuela Crisis Explained” para. 3). Colombia’s “open-door policy” has offered Venezuelan refugees multiple programs that promote the economic growth and social integration of the refugees, in contrast to neighboring host countries (Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler para. 10). In other Latin American countries that have taken on refugee populations from the crisis, there are over four million Venezuelan refugees that lack access to basic necessities, including shelter, employment, and healthcare, pushing them back to Venezuela (para. 10).
This paper examines how economic and social inclusion affects the experience of Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, contributing to a broader understanding of effective responses to mass migration at both local and international levels. As forced displacement numbers continue to grow, with increased conflict, impacts of climate change, and political turmoil, it is vital to understand what factors help establish a sustainable integration of refugees in a process that is otherwise tumultuous and often traumatic. Economic and social inclusion and integration are crucial, as they ease the reliance on international aid, which is already a struggling area, so this paper seeks to understand its true impact, with Venezuelan refugees in Colombia as a case study.
This paper proposes that it has a great impact, as it offers refugees not only security in their situation, but also the opportunity to grow economically and provide for themselves, rather than having to rely fully on international assistance. The paper will begin with a review of the reasons behind the Venezuelan exodus to Colombia. Then, it will discuss the initial response to the Venezuelan crisis, the Colombian response to the numerous arrivals, and the role of international politics and aid in dealing with the situation. The paper will examine both the positive impacts and the challenges that the economic and social integration of Venezuelan refugees has brought to Colombia’s economy and society. Ultimately, the conclusion will draw lessons from this particular case and make recommendations regarding the global response to refugee crises.
To fully understand the gravity of the experiences of Venezuelan refugees, it is important to first discuss the reasons that pushed the group to leave their homes. Venezuela was, and continues to be, in a deep economic crisis, the effects of which were only amplified by the breakdown of democracy in the country (“Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis” para. 2). In 2014, mass protests broke out in Venezuela as hyperinflation and insecurity began to take a toll on its people; ironically, this was also a year of regional economic prosperity due to its prevalence in oil production (“Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis” para. 5; Castellanos-Canales para. 6). Venezuela’s economy is heavily dependent on its export of oil, which makes up 95 percent of its exports earnings. Paired with its history of corruption, Venezuela can be considered a resource-cursed state, meaning that the country’s abundance in natural resources has actually contributed to its economic failure due to its mishandling and related corruption (Castellanos-Canales para. 6). The substantial drop in oil prices from $100 a barrel in 2014 to only $30 two years later exacerbated an economic crisis in the country that ultimately upended both the economic and political circumstances of the country (“Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis” para. 6). This crisis, paired with political unrest under President Nicolás Maduro, marked the beginning of the protracted political and economic catastrophe in Venezuela. President Maduro has had a history of consolidating power through repression and manipulation, so his refusal to step down in 2018 catalyzed an international response riddled with embargoes and sanctions that ultimately collapsed Venezuela’s economy and created a desolate outlook for the people of Venezuela (Castellanos-Canales paras. 7-9). Due to the deteriorating situation in Venezuela, millions of people turned to other parts of the region and the world for help, with Colombia being one of the most popular destinations for refugees. With over 1,300 miles of shared and relatively porous borders, and a growing economy prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Colombia had great appeal to Venezuelan refugees, even before its economic and social integration plans had been formulated (“Hard Times in a Safe Haven” p. ii).
The initial international response to this crisis in Venezuela was largely influenced by the work of the United Nations (UN), with humanitarian aid managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) to ensure access to basic necessities, such as hygiene, shelter, and security in food and health, ultimately allocating over $220 million in aid (Kleszczyńska p. 40). As a response to the reelection of President Maduro in 2018, a swath of countries from Latin America and Europe came together to form the International Contact Group, which worked specifically on re-democratizing Venezuelan electoral processes while also organizing effective humanitarian assistance for those still in the country (p. 42). This response from Spain, Uruguay, Sweden, Italy, Ecuador, the United Kingdom, Germany, Costa Rica, Panama, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, and its impact showed the value of international coordination and cooperation in dealing with crises with such enormous human tolls.
Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the UN, António Guterres, brought together the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to work with receiving countries, like Colombia, to ensure the smooth reception of the millions of tired, scared, and newly displaced people coming from Venezuela (pp. 40-41). These two organizations were the leading international contributors to the displacement response in and around Venezuela, collaborating not just with other UN bodies, but also with regional organizations, local governments, the Red Cross movement, and both national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (pp. 40-41).
Colombia’s initial response to the influx of Venezuelan refugees across its borders was unique, with economic and social inclusion at the forefront of the Permiso Especial de Permanencia program (PEP), a 2017 regularization program for Venezuelans migrating to Colombia (Ibáñez et al. p. 29). PEP affected around 500,000 Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, offering two full years of work permits and access to government-provided safety nets, such as loans, for the displaced population (p. 29). A survey conducted on the true impact of the PEP program found that those with a PEP visa not only had better overall well-being than those without it, but it also determined a stark increase in per capita consumption, mental and physical health, and income for PEP visa holders (p. 30). Ultimately, this program created a more self-sufficient group of refugees, taking some of the burden off the host community and the international community to manage the welfare of a displaced population. Concerns surrounding the implementation of the PEP program drew from the theory of migrant workers replacing native Colombians in their positions in the labor market, worsening not only the lives of locals, but also the economy overall (Rojas Morales para. 11). This theory, in the case of PEP, is unfounded, as studies in 2022 on the longer-term effects of the program on host communities revealed that PEP did not have negative effects on local employment, with migrants even having increased local income and employment (para. 11). With this, the inclusion of refugees both socially and economically has had a positive impact on host communities in Colombia, with every one dollar spent on this kind of integration of migrants and refugees resulting in a return of nearly two dollars for the community (“Colombia’s Refugee Crisis” para. 11).
With Colombia serving as a journey’s end for many Venezuelan refugees, the country has shown incredible generosity towards the refugee population, which continued in 2021 with the establishment of Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for the refugees, further integrating the Venezuelan population (Guerrero Ble para. 1). This initiative, the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPV), grants 10 years of protection to eligible Venezuelans, promoting the regularization of refugee stays, as well as providing full access to a wide range of rights (Guerrero Ble para. 1; “Colombia’s Refugee Crisis” para. 9). Under this initiative, Venezuelan refugees not only have a full decade of legal residential status in Colombia, but also have access to education, formal employment, healthcare, and many other crucial elements of integration, including financial inclusion (“Colombia’s Refugee Crisis” para. 10). This program opened the social and economic doors to nearly two million Venezuelan refugees in the country, making Colombia an attractive destination for those fleeing the economic and political crises back home. With ten years of legal status in Colombia, Venezuelan refugees have also had the opportunity to work towards obtaining other visas that would allow a stay extended beyond the decade provided under the ETPV, furthering the promotion of the economic and social incorporation of these refugees in Colombian society (para. 3). The handling of the situation by Colombia’s authorities has set a new standard for effective integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers globally (Rojas Morales para. 1). Regionally, there have been varied responses from receiving countries. Although there has been general solidarity throughout the region, not all countries have been so welcoming. For example, over 70,000 Venezuelan refugees have left Chile, their initial destination following the collapse in Venezuela, after having inadequate access to the labor market while facing rising costs of living, ultimately returning home where economic opportunities are still scarce (Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler para. 11). The major responses to the crisis have been through international bodies, such as the IOM and the UNHCR’s Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP), working to attract funding and aid for the affected population (para. 9). The RMRP works to not just create a sense of stability for refugee populations in the region, but also to provide opportunities for socioeconomic integration while working against factors that could hinder this kind of integration, such as local xenophobia or discrimination (“RMRP 2025-2026” para. 2). Under this plan, the IOM and UNHCR work alongside over 230 partners to support more than two million Venezuelans through nearly 25,000 activities aimed at strengthening protection, improving access to employment and documentation, and advancing integration efforts (para. 2). These organizations have not only worked to address dire humanitarian needs, but have also focused on the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees and migrants from Venezuela to avoid the immense and individual dependence on international aid (“Venezuela Crisis Explained” para. 4). These organizations have made a significant impact in improving the lives of Venezuelan refugees in Latin America through a range of actions, including increasing their presence at border areas to provide lifesaving assistance, offering legal aid to uphold refugee law, and supporting the relocation of refugees to improve access to employment and essential services (para. 5-6).
Other international responses to the increased population of Venezuelan refugees in Colombia include the UNHCR’s support of the “Graduation Model” for refugees, working with the Colombian government to incorporate Venezuelans into the labor market and quicken their regularization (“Colombia’s Refugee Crisis” para. 13). This model works towards the economic self-sufficiency of Venezuelan refugees within 1.5 years of arrival in Colombia, offering months of financial support, education, and capacity-building, eventually decreasing refugees’ reliance and the overall pressure on the host country (para. 13). The United States has also led an initiative called Movilidad Segura, or “Safe Mobility,” for resettlement consideration for refugees, the four countries of which include Colombia, ultimately implemented by the UNHCR and the IOM (para. 14). This process helps migrants avoid the incredibly dangerous journeys that resettlement can include, such as crossing the Darién Gap. This 60-mile stretch of jungle, mountainous terrain, and extensive swamps can increase migrants’ exposure to deadly diseases and violence from criminal groups, and with over 500,000 refugees making this journey in 2023, the Movilidad Segura initiative saves thousands of Venezuelan lives (Roy and Baumgarter paras. 1-2).
Although Colombia’s response has been largely successful, the overall region urgently needs more international support, as waning attention has resulted in a severe lack of funding for the international response (Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler para. 13). Widespread cuts in funding, both at the international and national levels, resulted in the UNHCR and the IOM receiving only 16% of what was required to address the needs of the Venezuelan refugee population in 2023 (Guerrero Ble para. 4). As a result, progress in the socioeconomic inclusion of Venezuelan refugees is now at risk under Colombian President Gustavo Petro, elected in 2022, who has dismantled much of the system responsible for shaping refugee policy and response and created a “policy of silence,” ultimately ignoring the presence of refugees and the unique needs that they have (para. 2). Not only has this impacted the Colombian response, but it has also affected the effective coordination between the Colombian government, NGOs, and international organizations to promote economic integration and general societal inclusion (para. 2). For example, the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) provides low interest loans to refugee-hosting countries, increasing the capacity of middle income countries to host refugee populations without it worsening local circumstances, but this change in government has made it difficult to effectively implement this program, as well as many others (Guerrero Ble para. 4). While the regularization process still exists under President Petro, the efforts to include Venezuelan refugees in the economy have diminished, making it more challenging to find formal employment amongst rising living costs, inaccessible housing, and thoughts of the dangerous journeys that come with resettlement (para. 3). Even with this challenge, local municipalities, mainly Bogotá and Medellín, which host the largest refugee populations in the country, have been working to continue the inclusion of Venezuelan refugees through the establishment of guidance centers and increasing access to government services, including those that promote economic and social integration into Colombian society, regardless of the actions of the President (para. 5).
Though the efforts in Colombia have been heartening and have ultimately benefited Venezuelan refugees quite extensively, there have been negative impacts on Colombia and waning empathy from Colombian citizens towards Venezuelans. The arrival of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, which was the country’s first major refugee influx, ultimately aggravated the existing social tension by putting additional strain on the country’s institutions, which were already managing an internal displacement crisis (“Hard Times in a Safe Haven” p. 4). With this, Venezuelan refugees lacked protection against recruitment by armed groups, as they are unfamiliar with the unwritten rules that govern conflict areas, rules that many local Colombians understand, making them more vulnerable to forced recruitment, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation (pp. 11-19). Venezuelan migrants have also been victims of scapegoating as poverty and unemployment levels rise, as well as of disproportionate stigmatization of migrant and refugee crime, showing that the integration of this displaced population has not been without challenges (p. 22). The pendulum swings of local politics have also left an enormous impact on the effectiveness of economic and social inclusion plans for Venezuelan refugees, as has been seen with the current Colombian President Gustavo Petro, making it a challenge to guarantee success in the implementation of such programs. Though these impacts are serious and worth further research, many of these problems arose prior to the economic and social integration of Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, showing the importance of these efforts in areas with displaced populations.
This paper aimed to examine the influence of economic and social inclusion on the experience of Venezuelan refugees in Colombia. With the successes under the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP) program and the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos initiative (ETPV), as well as negative experiences in countries without similar programs, it is clear that economic and social inclusion are key factors for the successful growth in self-sufficiency and local integration of a forcibly displaced population. Though these successes did not come without challenges, including the continued impact of host country politics on the execution of these programs, the evidence in this paper shows the benefits and the enormous impact of the economic and social inclusion of refugees on the displaced population, serving as an example for other countries looking to effectively manage a swath of displaced persons. In terms of the state of Venezuela, the humanitarian and refugee crises seem to have no end under the current President, which has contributed to the lack of coordination in terms of the local and international responses in and around the country (Kleszczyńska p. 45). A change in power seems to be vital to see effective change and growth in stability in Venezuela. It remains to be seen what the future of the country will be and how it will impact Venezuelans who are currently displaced. To address the needs of Venezuelans who have fled to other countries, I recommend that the UNHCR and the IOM work with host governments to not only ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance as needed, but also to establish a mechanism for the economic and social integration of refugees in all hosting countries. If these opportunities aren’t available, the UNHCR and the IOM should coordinate with the US-led Movilidad Segura initiative to provide safe opportunities for resettlement in Latin America with economic promise on the other end. Overall, economic and social inclusion are vital for the effective hosting of refugee populations, as they lessen the burden on the local and international systems for assistance and allow refugees the opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency, as was made evident in the Venezuelan refugee experience in Colombia.
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Emma Hansen is a graduate student in at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs, focusing her studies and research on human rights and international law and specializing in data analytics and United Nations studies. As the daughter of a teacher, Emma is passionate about the role of children and youth in global affairs, with previous professional experience in youth advocacy and inclusion. She earned dual bachelors degrees at Seattle University in political science and journalism in 2022 and will be graduating with her Masters in Global Affairs in the spring of 2026.
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