“Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards […] I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan” said former President Barack Obama when he addressed the American population from West Point Military Academy on December 1, 2009. After eight years of American presence in Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military approach to the conflict required change not only in its strategy, but also in its understanding of the Afghan conflict. Moreover, NATO’s International Security Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF), as well as the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) lacked the support of the Afghan population and failed to appear as an Afghan ally –appearing instead as a foreign invader. In August 2009, General McChrystal, Commander of the ISAF, along with General Patreus and Admiral Mullen, crafted the COIN Surge (2009-2012), a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy inspired by counterinsurgency techniques used by the former British Empire, and David Galula’s expertise in counterinsurgency. McChrystal’s COIN doctrine rested on four main pillars: (1) improving ISAF’s effectiveness through a greater partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); (2) prioritizing responsive and accountable governance; (3) reversing the insurgency’s momentum; and (4) focusing resources on areas where the population was vulnerable. According to former American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, “the stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing methods of “clear, hold, and build” (2013), meaning that the goal of the COIN was not to only crush the Taliban insurgency (clear), but also to establish political legitimacy and concrete governance in Afghanistan (build) to prevent the return to a Taliban regime (hold). The efficiency of the COIN stood on three critical assumptions: (1) the goal of protecting the Afghan population was both clear and attainable, (2) “higher levels of foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan government’s capacity and legitimacy” (Eikenberry), and (3)President Karzai’s preferred political-military approach would match America’s COIN tactic.
While McChrystal fervently defended and pushed for the adoption of the COIN approach, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry vehemently opposed the technique, claiming that McChrystal had clearly underestimated the risks linked to a military surge and an expansion of the American mandate (Eikenberry). While a counterinsurgency approach focused on the welfare of the local population, the Afghan social, political, historical and geographical terrain did not allow for the correct implementation of such strategy. Indeed, although the COIN approach allowed for the removal of important Taliban cells in Southern Afghanistan, the lack of Pakistani support hindered the complete destruction of the Taliban. In addition, a lack of collaboration and coherence between the USFOR-A / ISAF and the Afghan government stood in the way of nation-building. What is more, while the counterinsurgency approach aimed at fostering a steady Afghan governance, America pushed for a hyper-centralized type of governance, failing to take into account the importance of Pashtunwali in the Afghan culture, and its aversion to centralization.
This policy memorandum bases its analysis on three main areas impacted by the COIN Surge: 1. Afghan state formation; 2. strong and steady Afghan governance; and 3. concrete political legitimacy of the Karzai government.
Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to the Afghan state formation
Political scientists Badie, Barg-Schlosser and Morlino define state formation as “the process of leading to the centralisation of political power within a well-defined territory” (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, Morlino). However, as demonstrated under the regime of Amin or Najibullah, a centralisation of political power is not suited for Afghanistan. Hence, this policy memorandum approaches the question of state formation using Max Weber’s definition of the state as an authority exercising the monopoly of violence over a given territory (Weber et al.), thereby defining state formation as the process to approach a monopoly on violence held by the state. For a state entity to achieve a monopoly on violence, it needs to ensure the provision of fundamental services to its population, such as education, security, healthcare and economic welfare. As a result, based on a population-centered approach, COIN established goals relating to the strengthening of state services in order to increase Afghan support for Karzai, simultaneously decreasing the amount of insurgency supporters. Indeed, COIN put forth the idea that “a more secure and content people would rally behind the local elected and appointed officials, and peace and stability would follow” (Eikenberry).
Researcher Hager Ali argues that although the U.S. believed the COIN Surge would help with state formation, nation-building, on the other hand, is not attainable through military involvement (Ali). Indeed, Ali believes that a sustainable “transition from foreign militaries to local political agents is hardly possible” (2021). However, this was precisely the plan adopted by the COIN Surge: the American army was tasked by the Obama administration to securise Afghanistan by eliminating the Taliban threat before transferring security responsibilities to the ANFS. Thus, because the primary role of the state is to provide services through solid infrastructures, adopting Galula’s vision of counterinsurgency strategy, many American troops were instructed to take on social worker roles. Not only was it profligate, it was also highly unrealistic to expect American soldiers with a clear lack of basic understanding of the Afghan culture to deliver what the COIN Surge doctrine asked of them.
In addition, the COIN surge only increased the dependence of Afghanistan on the U.S. While the U.S. military, was expected to carry out social workers’ tasks for a definite period of time, COIN failed to create the necessary Afghan workforce that should have taken over U.S. troops by prioritizing military funding over development funding, thus reinforcing a dependency on U.S. troops. In addition, COIN could only work if Karzai’s goals were aligned with Obama’s. However, according to Ekeinberry, Karzai only agreed to the COIN Surge because it meant a longer American presence in Afghanistan. Karzai’s government never planned on taking over the U.S. troops’ social commitments. To a certain extent, it is understandable that a surge in troops, especially numbering 30,000, would cause the Afghans to believe that the Americans were here to stay. Arguably, such a formidable surge in numbers is incompatible with a near-future withdrawal goal, especially when the military is responsible for military,social and development duties
Finally, although the COIN Surge implied that some American troops would partake in the training of ANSF, which was a partial success, the sudden increase of American forces rendered the ANSF even more reliant on U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, due to Afghanistan’s wide ethnic diversity, the ANSF was fundamentally divided between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks troops. Such differences hindered internal cohesion and made it almost impossible for American troops to properly train them. Indeed, because of their lack of understanding of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic background and of existing grievances amongst said ethnic groups, the U.S. Military failed to unite Afghan troops under the hegemon of Kabul.
All in all, with regards to state-building, COIN fell into the classic trap of aid dependency: by taking on the role of strengthening state structures in a country which had been at war for more than three decades which government had no will for the international community to leave their country, COIN fostered a culture of dependency on U.S. presence. In other words, instead of putting an emphasis on local involvement in state-building, COIN fostered a top-down approach to institutions-building, accentuating an Afghan dependence on U.S. military presence in the country.
Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to Afghan governance
Bevir defines governance as “patterns of rule or practices of governing, [stating that] the study of governance generally approaches power as distinct from or exceeding the centralized authority of the modern state.” (2021) While COIN assumed that an increased foreign military presence would lead to a strengthened Afghan governance, COIN once again failed to do so. While oftentimes, strong and legitimate governance facilitates peace by providing a secure environment for its population, Afghanistan and its longstanding history of internal conflict had never truly experienced strong governance.
Afghanistan is a highly decentralized state: with an incredible variety of ethnicities. Afghan governments always had to reconcile traditional with national and central forms of governance. However, many modern and Western forms of governance tend to clash with traditional forms of governance such as the ones put forth by Pashtuwali. While Afghanistan is objectively in dire need of uniformed security policies amongst its provinces to fight off the Taliban more effectively, the reality and Afghan history makes the installation of centralized governance impossible. The United States’ attempt at improving Afghan governance, both through formal and traditional mechanisms, was bound to fail because of their lack of insights and consideration into Afghan history. As Eikenberry states: “The typical 21-year-old marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?” (p.64). Although COIN claimed to be a population-centered strategy, ISAF and American troops monumentally failed at understanding Afghan culture and traditions, hindering their goal to establish good governance.
In addition, America’s strained relationship with the Afghan government, especially illustrated through its tense relationship with President Hamid Karzai, strongly hindered the implementation of solid Afghan governance. While Karzai was reluctant to listen to America’s views on governance, the U.S. was reluctant to compromise with Karzai’s traditional Afghan government. Karzai, a descendant of the Khans, the traditional chefs of the Popalzai Pasthun tribe, was deeply attached to traditional governance which clashed with the COIN doctrine of centralizing Afghan governance. All in all, tense relations between the U.S. and Karzai, heavily hindered the progression of COIN with regards to governance reforms.
Finally, the U.S. held an opposite opinion from Karzai’s regarding the provenance of the Taliban insurgency. While America believed the Taliban insurgency’s roots to be native to Afghanistan and bolstered by Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), Karzai believed the insurgency to be a form of militant extremism exported from Islamabad into Afghanistan. Such differences led to strategy clashes between Karzai and the U.S., especially regarding the American military’s crackdown on the Southern provinces of Afghanistan, such as Kandahar where Karzai was born. Further,the failure of both the U.S. and the Afghan government to enter into substantial talks with Islamabad regarding ISI’s financial and tactical support for the Taliban insurgency demonstrates the failure of both governments to conduct sustainable foreign relations with Pakistan. The ability to conduct foreign relations is an integral part of governance. COIN’s failure to help Karzai’s government enter into meaningful talks with their most important neighbor with regards to the Taliban insurgency proves COIN’s ineptitude in establishing sustainable governance in Afghanistan.
All in all, relating to governance, COIN did not fulfill its central basis of a population-centered operation by failing to strike compromises with Karzai’s government and by overlooking ancestral traditional forms of governance.
Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to the Karzai government’s political legitimacy
Political legitimacy is defined as “justifying power and obedience simultaneously in order to gain the right to govern” (Coicaud). Legitimacy usually stems from effective governance: when the state provides its citizens with appropriately needed services such as security, healthcare, and education, the government is more likely to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people compared to a government failing to qualify under state obligations. Unfortunately, it has been established that Karzai’s government lacked strong governance meaning that Karzai’s political legitimacy could not stem from his good governance. Although Karzai’s legitimacy had been contested upstream of COIN’s implementation, COIN failed to increase Karzai’s legitimacy. What is more, one of the partial reasons for COIN’s failure is the lack of political legitimacy enjoyed by Karzai’s government. While the COIN doctrine stood on Karzai’s government legitimacy and hence the impact Karzai’s acceptance of COIN would have on the Afghan population, Karzai’s lack of legitimacy hindered Afghans’ trust in COIN.
Factually, Karzai had been considered a puppet of the American government by the Afghan population. Having attained the presidency through the Bonn Agreement, unofficially meaning that Karzai was directly chosen by the Americans to preside over Afghanistan in order for the U.S. to easily advance its agenda through Kabul. Afghanistan has always been reluctant to foreign interventions in their political sphere, because of the impact of the Mongol Empire’s invasion from 1219 to 1221 and of the countless invasion attempts carried out by the British Empire. Considering its history as one of the only Central Asian countries to have resisted British colonialism, Afghanistan refuses the mingling of foreign powers into its national governance. Hence, Karzai’s ascension to power goes against some of the most important Afghan values. The Afghan people always viewed Karzai’s Decisions as being influenced by an American agenda. As a result, Karzai’s political legitimacy was not nationally recognised, part of the Afghan population held intense grievances against him.
Over the course of Enduring Freedom, America’s mission in Afghanistan, more than 70,000 civilians (Brown University) had been killed. Although the number of civilian casualties was lower between 2009 and 2012, the killing of non-hostile individuals by American and ISAF forces strongly impacted America’s standing in Afghanistanand Karzai’s popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population. COIN only decreased Karzai’s legitimacy: the U.S.’ decision to surge was seen by the Afghans as an increase in the possible threat to their security posed by American troops. While COIN aimed at having a population-centered approach,, COIN failed to do so and undoubtedly increased Afghans’ distrust in U.S. troops. However, the trust of the population is one of the fundamental aspects of an adequate counter-insurgency strategy. The more trust Afghans have for American troops and Karzai’s government, the less likely they are to join the insurgency. However, since Karzai failed to provide basic services and protection from both the Taliban and criminal opium narco-traffickers, the Afghan population failed to see him as a legitimate leader. Not only by failing to improve Karzai’s legitimacy, but also by assuming that Karzai was already considered as a legitimate leader in the eyes of the Afghan population, the COIN doctrine was unable to secure the support of the majority of the Afghan population, a fundamentally primordial aspect of the U.S. military strategy.
All in all, while Karzai’s lack of political legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population impeded on the COIN doctrine, the COIN doctrine also failed to strengthen Karzai’s political legitimacy, one of the main pillars of the U.S. military strategy. Because the U.S. failed to take into account Afghanistan’s history and tradition, COIN was incredibly flawed with regards to Afghan leaders’ political legitimacy.
It can be said without a doubt that the COIN Surge doctrine failed. By failing to take into account Afghanistan’s history, traditional process and relation to a centralized power, the U.S. adopted a military strategy unfit for Afghanistan’s political, cultural and geographical terrain. Although COIN might have, to a certain extent, worked in Iraq in 2007, the U.S. adopting COIN in Afghanistan demonstrates how inadequate McChrystal’s understanding of Afghanistan was. Instead of having opted for the COIN Surge doctrine, as argued by Kael Weston, the U.S. should have opted for a “smaller but enduring force” to fight off the insurgency (Chandrasekaran). As the adage “Rome was not built in a day” implies, nation-building, strong governance, and political legitimacy cannot be expected to easily be created in a country, which in 2009, had been at war for the past 30 years. While invading Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is not an option for the United States, neither is forgetting about the consequences of a 20-year American presence in Afghanistan. While it is imperative that international and intergovernmental relief agencies such as the United Nations continue their crucial work inside Afghanistan, it is of the utmost importance that the international community, led by the United States, refuses to consider the Taliban authority as the de jure Afghan government. Former U.S. Chargé D’affaires for Afghanistan, Karen Decker, refusal to directly and openly name the Taliban as a terrorist organization on television (Amu TV), only gives rise to Taliban’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Hence, it is crucial for the international community not to engage in any further negotiations with the Taliban in order to diminish their de facto legitimacy as the current Afghan authority.
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Emma Chevalier Trager-Lewis is a French/British Graduate Student at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. In addition to her background in Law and Peacebuilding, Emma’s research focuses on violent extremism, salafi jihadism and mass displacement caused by war and political instability. With a regional focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Greater Middle East, Emma aims to become a war correspondent and document the stories of those the general public too often decides to ignore.
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International political events since the turn of the century have severely undermined the cause of nuclear disarmament. A deal between Washington and Pyongyang may now offer the best hope to resuscitate global non-proliferation. (Photo credit: Micha Brändli on Unsplash)