by Joseph Levin

(Photo credit: XR Expo on Unsplash)

Abstract

Since the dawn of the 21st century, numerous disruptive technologies have been brought to market that have transformed the fabric of how individuals interact with one another and their surrounding environments. However, the technological advances that stand out above the rest, specifically virtual and augmented reality, have been in developmental phases for the past decade and appear to be on the cusp of mainstream distribution. These technologies are a pivotal access point into what is now known as the metaverse. The metaverse resembles an immersive, creator-friendly online environment in which the lines between social media and online gaming are blurred like never before. Although this technology has yet to be delivered and accepted within mass consumer markets, addressing the potential consequences that may accompany it when that day comes is essential. The implications of this research indicates that the metaverse is far more complex than our current systems are built to regulate and the consequences could be devastating. Therefore, it is imperative to create proactive research efforts, legislation, and mitigation strategies to counter future threats posed by violent extremists in the metaverse.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, there has been an expeditious proliferation in technological evolution as personal computers, cell phones, and other handheld devices have become commonplace in everyday life. However, as technology companies continue to innovate and broaden the horizons of their capabilities, there is a pending fourth wave of computing innovation unfolding around spatial technologies called virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR). The companies developing this technology believe it will form the next ubiquitous computing paradigm that can transform personal entertainment, business, and educational opportunities. This new paradigm is called the metaverse, which will create a post-reality universe, a perpetual and persistent multiuser environment merging physical reality with digital virtuality (Mystakidis, 2022). The metaverse will be based on technologies that enable multisensory interactions with virtual environments, digital objects, and other users. The accuracy of the AR and VR systems are enabled by displays that create or enhance imagery to convey the perception of depth (El Beheiry, 2019). In addition to sensory inputs, these systems also allow active interaction with virtual elements through motion controllers. These are handheld input devices with a grip, buttons, triggers, and thumbsticks. By simply using the controllers, users can touch, grab, manipulate, and operate objects within an ever-changing virtual world (Mystakidis, 2022).

The current landscape of VR and AR remains primarily developmental as the technology still suffers from severe limitations in mass market delivery. For example, higher-end devices require prohibitively expensive hardware, while cheaper headsets do not deliver a realistic, stimulating enough virtual experience. Additionally, there are problems with software interoperability as a considerable number of companies are trying to be first to market with this technology. Currently, there is no wide-scale adoption of standardized technical specifications for the metaverse, given that each project relies on proprietary technology. The unwillingness to share proprietary technologies, based on privacy and transparency considerations, is a hindrance to broader development. It is likely that something more significant than corporate profit will have to drive the harmonization of standards (Chohan, 2022). With this information in mind, limited analysis has been provided on the potential consequences of this technology being widely distributed. This is particularly concerning given the rampant extremist exploitation of social media, online gaming, and other emerging technologies already. Therefore, this article will seek to answer the following question, “How can the metaverse be exploited by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations?” I contend that metaverse technology will eventually be utilized by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations for various activities that include, but are not limited to: online radicalization and heightened recruitment efforts, fundraising and cybercrime activities, pre-attack planning, and simulating attacks.

Violent Extremists in the Metaverse

Online Radicalization and Recruitment

As the world has become increasingly globalized through interconnected electronic networks, violent extremist groups have sought to captivate a broader range of audiences and promote their ideologies through various mediums, arguably none more so than online media platforms. A statement from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former chief ideologue of al-Qaeda and deputy to Osama bin Laden, explained, “We [al-Qaeda] are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people.” Evidently, prominent violent extremist groups recognize the opportunities provided by emerging technologies, especially those that enable two-way interactivity through online forums, chat rooms, emails, and texts to promote online radicalization. Furthermore, violent extremists can utilize online media platforms to connect directly with various audiences, who in turn, can become active participants in subsequent unfolding conversations. Direct connection is crucial for online radicalization because it promotes a sense of virtual community, which is often not possible with traditional broadcast media like radio and television (Aly et al., 2016). This becomes problematic as metaverse technology will likely amplify many previously established consequences of social media and online gaming while dramatically accelerating the operational capabilities of message sharing and recruitment.

Although online radicalization comes in many forms and individuals respond differently, certain commonalities appear alongside most violent extremist supporters. Online radicalization to violence is the process of introducing an individual to an ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views. A result of radical interpretations of mainstream religious or political doctrines, these extreme views tend to justify, promote, incite, or support violence to achieve any number of social, religious, or political changes (US DOJ, 2014). Through the utilization of metaverse creative capabilities, users will be able to shape their interactive virtual realities in any manner they see fit. Although the current metaverse technology has historically lacked visual sophistication, companies developing their own versions of the space are exploring a plethora of virtual engineering possibilities to make the user experience more realistic. For example, precisely designed three-dimensional elements together with animated graphics are already revolutionizing user technology interactivity through top-quality audio-visual and tactile interaction (Fiorillo, 2022). Much like other online activities, for violent extremist groups, this will create the ideal incubating environment where they can broadcast their views, provoke negative sentiment toward enemies, incite people to violence, glorify martyrs, establish virtual communities with like-minded individuals, and groom recruits (US DOJ, 2014).

A supplemental concept to understand within the overarching idea of the incubating environment provided by metaverse technology is the daunting potential of user manipulation within this space. Over the last two decades, technology companies have made a science of tracking and characterizing users on their platforms, as it enables the sale of targeted advertising. Such targeting has been a boon for advertisers and media platform providers, resulting in some of the most valuable corporations in human history. Unfortunately, such targeting has exploited users, reduced personal privacy, and made social media a polarizing force by allowing third-parties to deploy customized messaging tactfully curated for specific demographic groups. In the metaverse, these problems will be exacerbated. The technological capabilities will enable server owners to track where each user clicks, where they go, what they do, what they look at, and even how long their gaze lingers (Rosenberg, 2022). That is, assessing when users slow down to browse objects, messages, imagery, services, or when they speed up to pass content they are not demonstrating interest in.

For reference, Meta has already been granted patents to track users’ eye movements and body poses for ads in their Horizon Worlds metaverse platform. Given the track record of many major technology companies, it can be expected that more invasive data collection could include tracking vital signs, facial expressions, and user communication patterns (Xiang, 2022). This means the server providers controlling the metaverse will not just know how their users physically act and interact, but how they emotionally react as they traverse real and virtual spaces, profiling their responses at far deeper levels than has been possible in traditional media platforms (Rosenberg, 2022). Under these conditions, violent extremist groups and individuals have the opportunity to monitor their servers, examine how users interact with their content and adjust accordingly to further indoctrinate and radicalize them. Their ability to manipulate individuals operating within their sphere of influence will likely be more efficient than ever before.

A second concern with the expanded freedoms allotted by the metaverse is the lack of plausible methods to regulate how much time users spend on metaverse servers. Unlike phones, computers, and other forms of handheld technology, the metaverse can be accessed from multiple entry points (Ochs, 2021). This will prevent screen time moderation efforts and likely adversely affect users subjected to extremist content with unregulated exposure. In most cases, online radicalization results from individuals being immersed in extremist content for extended periods, the amplified effects of graphic images and video, and the resulting emotional desensitization (Neumann et al., 2012). For example, constant exposure to discourses about martyrdom and death—combined with videos of suicide operations and beheadings—can produce mortality salience, an overpowering sense of one’s mortality, which increases support for suicide operations and other, often ruthless, violent tactics. Similarly, powerful and emotionally stimulating videos from conflict zones—for example, those depicting alleged incidents of torture, rape, and other atrocities by Western troops—can induce a sense of moral outrage (Neumann et al., 2012). Given that there are already first-person shooter and gruesome bespoke games within the metaverse, it is a matter of time before violent extremists capitalize on the developed software to create scenarios that spur online radicalization.

Concerning sustained user activity within the metaverse, lessons can be drawn from other multiplayer online video games and social media platforms regarding the incentives provided to those who are more active and create large swaths of content. Essentially, content that is created by users in online games such as Roblox and Sandbox is what makes them profitable. In all its forms, the metaverse will likely follow the same general business model. Since it is a multi-usage social platform seeking to draw in support and funds from advertisers, the companies running metaverse servers will benefit from creators that produce high-quality content and encourage prolonged user activity (Babich, 2022). Since many of these companies are currently in the battle for first-to-market, widespread distribution of metaverse access and supporting technology, they are less incentivized to regulate extremist content on their platforms while pursuing maximum user engagement. This trend has been evident across major platforms such as Facebook, Minecraft, Roblox, and Twitter (Patel & Hecht-Felella, 2021)(Miller & Silva, 2021).

Within the metaverse, it can be reasonably expected that companies and creators will employ three common tactics to increase persistent user engagement. First, there will likely be some fashion of play-to-earn mechanics, which make games more addictive by rewarding users who spend more time in the system with extensive benefits. Second, the reward for content contribution will also be prevalent. Companies will compensate content creators for drawing in more user engagement. Finally, companies and creators will implement rewards for completing objectives within metaverse games, allowing users to perform virtual tasks in exchange for digital coins or goods. This works exceptionally well when the tasks are tied to a gripping storyline that hooks an audience, giving creators significant benefits (Babich, 2022). If violent extremists are to capitalize on consumer psychology and companies lack of content surveillance in order to drive online radicalization, the consequences will be damning.

Another recruitment concern is the way violent extremists will use the metaverse to exploit financial and social vulnerabilities that drive individuals to join violent extremist movements in the first place. For example, individuals who have been radicalized and drawn into violent extremism through pull factors, including financial incentives, online propaganda, and in-person recruitment networks (Smith, 2018). As mentioned above, companies constructing the metaverse will seek to monetize and provide various currency transfer services within their platforms. This will enable violent extremist groups to send cryptocurrency and other decentralized financial goods to potential recruits with limited oversight (Sarang, 2022). Additionally, in order to lure in potential new members, metaverse server access links will likely be shared within alternative platforms, such as Discord, Telegram, 4chan, Parler, and WhatsApp, to drive new user engagement. During traditional online recruitment, violent extremist groups commonly follow this process: discovery of new potential members, isolate them and create micro-communities, shift them to private communication spaces, and ultimately radicalize and encourage them into violent action (Berger, 2015). With the advent of the metaverse, however, instead of violent extremists off-ramping recruits into private chat rooms or encrypted text messaging apps, they can now create idealized virtual utopias according to their ideologies and negative stereotypes. Although each private metaverse server has different levels of accessibility, the current environment commonly requires an entry link, user login, and passcode to participate, all of which can be provided by violent extremists to gatekeep which individuals gain access to their servers (Hickey, 2022). Thus, the metaverse will enable violent extremists to build more private virtual worlds they are ultimately seeking to create offline.

The final primary concern of metaverse technology pertaining to online radicalization and recruitment is the development of violent extremist echo chambers. Historically through social media and online gaming, deviant and extreme behaviors are learned, absorbed, and normalized by users’ constant interactions with people who hold similarly extreme views. As a result, through repeated stimuli and the removal of moderating influences, users can acquire a skewed sense of reality, so that violent extremist attitudes and behaviors are no longer taboos, but rather are seen as positive and desirable. Another crucial aspect of the echo chamber phenomenon relates to violent extremists abusing anonymity to hide their real identities and avoid responsibility for their actions due to the added layer of anonymity (Neumann et al., 2012). Once users no longer believe they will face real-world consequences for their polarizing views and promotion of violence online, it may increase the likelihood of aggressive behaviors occurring offline.

As mentioned previously, extremists exploit the anonymity of online platforms to create niche communities in which their ideologies can thrive with limited interruption. Under these circumstances, there is severe cause for concern about how metaverse technology will further assist them. First and foremost, one of the most frequent concepts championed by proponents of the metaverse is that it will allow users to create worlds and avatars in more idealized ways (VMG, 2022). Moreover, many metaverse servers will incorporate artificial intelligence into their platform’s interface. Although the intention is to help increase the inclusivity and accessibility of the metaverse, making it more functional and user-friendly, artificial intelligence within the metaverse will provide an unrivaled experience for bad actors such as violent extremists (Amos, 2022). Not only will violent extremists be able to use artificial intelligence to help develop idealized avatars, but it will also help them create their own virtual worlds. During one of Meta’s first promotional events for Horizon Worlds, one of their versions of the metaverse, Mark Zuckerberg released a video highlighting its potential capabilities where users will be granted “god-like powers” to create their own worlds. This will be done with the help of an artificial intelligence assistant, Builder Bot, which will help users construct their worlds to specific requirements or modify pre-made templates. In the clip, Zuckerberg gave Builder Bot a series of verbal commands, to which the artificial intelligence assistant created the world to his exact specifications in seconds. Zuckerberg also noted that should the user be unsatisfied with the results Builder Bot produces, they will be able to modify the structures and add further details (Zuckerberg, 2021). Even if the companies that are building out the metaverse blacklist certain images, individuals, and locations from being artificially created, users will still have the ability to circumvent these moderation parameters with their own creation capabilities. In sum, the emerging metaverse affords violent extremists and violent extremist groups a new ability to maintain virtual ideological and social communities with robust, difficult-to-disrupt ways of expanding their ranks and spheres of influence (Elson et al., 2022). By allowing violent extremist groups to create their servers within the metaverse, interested users that join their virtual worlds will quickly become potential recruits from which these violent extremists can identify and target.

Fundraising and Cybercrime

The nexus between fundraising, cybercrime, and violent extremists has proven to be a fruitful money-making opportunity for groups and individuals in the past. Within the last three decades, online-based fundraising and criminal activities have increased significantly (UNODC, 2019). In general, the Internet has provided violent extremists with a practical and low-risk means to generate the resources required to sustain or expand their activities. These efforts may supplement, rather than replace, traditional fundraising channels based in the physical world. Still, they are appealing because they provide global reach and afford a degree of anonymity and security to donors and recipients alike. For example, websites, social media platforms, email distribution lists, messaging apps, and other virtual tools enable groups to publicize their needs directly to potential donors, with the option of traditional and online payment options, as well as to advertise merchandise for sale, as they might have done historically using print advertisements and paper flyers. A relatively simple and standard method for a violent extremist organization to solicit funds is by posting requests for donations on their respective websites or on forums where supporters already congregate. Violent extremist groups have also harnessed crowdfunding websites and donation applications embedded in social media platforms, such as Facebook, to expand their reach and elevate their causes (Evans & Williams, 2022).

The metaverse will provide another platform for violent extremists to fundraise. Whether that occurs within their own public-facing or micro-community private servers, violent extremists and violent extremist groups will develop methods to receive donations both through mobile payment services such as Venmo, Zelle, Cash App and PayPal, or through less conventional methods such as cryptocurrencies, and in-platform digital assets, coins, vouchers, or merchandise. This will be challenging for potential tracing purposes as links to these donations can be posted on in-game content, spread within message boards, or through voice chat, all of which can occur instantaneously (Dino, 2019). Similarly to the obstacles faced with content moderation in online gaming, there will likely be data too large for these companies’ trust and safety divisions to protect users or trace all their in-game transactions.

Furthermore, the metaverse may provide new opportunities for violent extremist groups to sell insignia and physical merchandise affiliated with their group more discreetly compared to online forums and within Internet marketplaces. Previously, violent extremists have used online retail platforms and payment processing architecture to generate funds through merchandise sales conducted directly on their websites or through intermediaries like eBay, Amazon, and Etsy. Violent extremists have also profited from self-publishing services like Amazon’s CreateSpace and music-streaming services, such as Soundcloud, Spotify, or iTunes, which serve the dual purpose of fundraising and disseminating their radical ideas (Dino, 2019). However, the underlying problem with the metaverse is that bad actors will be able to make this content interactive, enabling them to bypass certain takedown practices used by technology companies to suppress their spread. For example, most mainstream websites now utilize various forms of optical-character recognition and other visual-based approaches to censor content deemed violations of community guidelines (Panich-Linsman, 2018). In addition, governments also have the ability to carry out actions such as DNS tampering, IP blocking, keyword and packet filtering, and traffic shaping to deter access to extremist websites and other illegal online-based content (Terman, 2021).

The unfortunate nature of the metaverse is that it will resemble an online gaming platform more comparable to Roblox and Minecraft, as opposed to traditional social media. The result is that technology companies and government agencies will need to develop new machine-learning detection devices that can rapidly scan interactive three-dimensional content at incredible volume. Moreover, should these moderating entities be able to create tools to detect three-dimensional extremist imagery or key terminology within their servers, another added obstacle will be preventing them from creating a new server should they have it taken down or their profile banned. The key takeaway is that choke points previously capitalized upon by moderators to prevent bad actors from sharing their content will no longer prove sufficient within the metaverse. Should the crusade continue down the current path of automated content removal, takedowns, filtering, or removing servers altogether, it can be expected that an ever-adapting challenger will emerge and a cat-and-mouse game will ensue (Liang & Cross, 2020). This also does not consider the potential pushback from mass-auto-blocking violent extremists, especially in certain democratic countries such as the United States, where arguments about free speech are debated frequently.

Another component of violent extremist fundraising and metaverse technology is the ample opportunities for these groups and individuals to create new revenue streams through cybercrime activities. From a historical perspective, transnational organized crime and cybercrime have posed a significant threat to national and international security. Not only are criminal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their activities (US National Archives, 2011). In the past, online criminal groups engaged in services that facilitated crimes and cybercrimes for financial reward, acts such as stealing data and identity documents; ransom and malware attacks; distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and botnet services; keyloggers; phishing and spear phishing tools; hacking tutorials; and distributing instructions about vulnerabilities and possible exploits on how to take utilize these tools (UNODC, 2019). This is an incredibly lucrative industry, and it is estimated that cybercrime will cost the world economy $10.5 trillion annually by 2025, up from $3 trillion in 2015 (Morgan, 2020). However, in a 2022 report issued by Interpol, officials stated that they believe the metaverse creates new kinds of cybercrime and will exacerbate existing crime to take place on a larger scale (Kartit & Howcroft, 2022).

Regarding the technical cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the metaverse, a particular concern should be potential breaches of common entry points for users such as computers, phones, tablets, and headsets. For example, the creator of the Butterfly Bot advertised malware on the Internet that was capable of taking control of Windows and Linux computers. The creator of the Butterfly Bot also sold plug-ins that modified the functions of the malware and offered to create customized versions of the malware for paying customers. Various online criminal networks deployed the Butterfly Bot; the most extensive application of this malware resulted in the Mariposa botnet, which stole personal data from millions of compromised computers. This personal data included account information, usernames, passwords, and banking details. Additional malware downloaded by Mariposa also resulted in numerous distributed denial of service attacks (UNODC, 2019). The threat posed by hackers seeking to exploit vulnerable users and breach the systems that are required entry points to the metaverse cannot be understated.

Furthermore, a phenomenon known as Camfecting, the attempt to hack into a person’s webcam and activate it without the webcam owner’s permission, is another point of concern. Through disguised malware known as Trojans, hackers will pose as some legitimate institution or individual and provide users with a link, documents, or a program to download to their computer. Once this malware has been installed, cameras can be activated and files can be monitored without user knowledge. Moreover, this practice has become increasingly more accessible, whereas at one period, hackers needed specialist computer programming knowledge in order to write the malware. Currently, Trojans and all the tools required to launch such attacks can be bought and sold on the Internet and Dark Web. These infections commonly lead to extortion attempts and the unsolicited sale of private user data (Duong, 2021). With the potential for unfettered access to individuals’ personal surroundings and private data made available by augmented reality and virtual reality technology, violent extremists could gain unparalleled levels of extortion and financial proceeds through infected gateways.

The final possibility within the metaverse that violent extremists will almost certainly exploit are the money laundering opportunities. Traditional money laundering involves three stages: placement of illicit proceeds in the financial system (placement), concealment of the origin of illicit funds (layering), and reintroduction of funds into the economy with concealed origin (integration). Through online mediums, this money can be laundered utilizing digital currency (unregulated currency only available virtually); prepaid credit and debit cards (even Bitcoin- based cards); gift cards; money mules’ bank accounts; fake name and shell company bank accounts; PayPal and Zelle accounts; online gaming sites (via virtual gaming currency); and illicit gambling sites. Cybercriminals also utilize semi-automated cryptocurrency exchanges (known as swappers) and decentralized (peer-to-peer) exchanges, which do not require the identification and verification of users to launder criminal assets (UNODC, 2019).

How will these traditional practices translate in the metaverse? The anonymity that the metaverse affords users, specifically violent extremists in this study, will allow individuals to create servers with gambling, trading, and other money transfering opportunities that would otherwise not be possible within social media or online gaming. For example, metaverse casinos generally do not accept traditional fiat currency. A metaverse casino requires a participant to convert their fiat into one of the cryptocurrencies accepted in the metaverse and deposit funds using a crypto wallet. However, users can then exchange the NFTs and cryptocurrency that they win in the metaverse for fiat currency in the real world (Baker & Hogan, 2022). With this in mind, there is a chance that violent extremists could create gambling institutions within the metaverse that do not contain any identifying information that unsuspecting users may get lured into and provide currency to fund illicit behaviors unbeknownst to them. Ultimately, this section’s key takeaway is that the metaverse will simplify fundraising and cybercrime for violent extremists and provide added layers of anonymity to prevent detection from law enforcement and financial institutions.

Pre-Attack Planning

The third aspect violent extremists may utilize the metaverse for is expanding their pre-attack planning capabilities. Under our traditional understanding of pre-attack activities, individuals planning to commit acts of violent extremism develop a variety of different behaviors to plan their attacks. In a report published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, their researchers identified a recurrent attack planning cycle. According to the report, violent extremists generally plan attacks in observable stages, although specific details, sequencing, and timing can vary greatly and change over time. In addition, they noted that certain activities are easier to spot than others. Pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsals are often observable and can offer opportunities to identify plots and prevent attacks (ODNI, 2020). However, one major concern with the metaverse is that it may remove the need for violent extremists to conduct the majority of their pre-attack intelligence gathering in person. For example, should violent extremists become able to combine metaverse technology with other modern technologies such as CCTV, personal cameras, social media posts, and other livestream capabilities, they may never have to go in public to collect the intelligence they need to carry out attacks on specific targets or locations.

Another area of concern regarding violent extremist groups’ pre-attack planning is their ability to use roleplay metaverse games and training tools already available for law enforcement and armed forces to counter potential issues during their attacks. The usage of virtual reality training tools within militaries is not a new phenomenon. After the Vietnam War, the American military apparatus developed various training environments to reduce what the military considered an unacceptable ratio of combat losses (Lange, 2020). In the decades since then, militaries and law enforcement have adapted to an ever-changing threat landscape by advancing and innovating these technologies for their own benefit.

An example of the tools that are already available and could be modified for illicit purposes is AUGGMED (Automated Serious Game Scenario Generator for Mixed Reality Training). The aim of AUGGMED was to develop a serious game platform to enable single- and team-based training of end-users with different levels of expertise from different organizations responding to terrorist and organized crime threats. The platform automatically generates non-linear scenarios tailored to suit the needs of individual trainees with learning outcomes that improve the acquisition of emotional management, analytical thinking, problem solving and decision making skills. The game scenarios include advanced simulations of operational environments, agents, telecommunications and threats, and can be delivered through VR and MR environments with multimodal interfaces. In addition, the AUGGMED platform will include tools for trainers enabling them to set learning objectives, define scenarios, monitor training sessions, modify scenarios and provide feedback in real-time, as well as evaluate trainee performance and set training curricula for individual personnel in the post-training session phase (European Commission, 2022). This technology was deployed in March 2018 when security officers with the Piraeus Port Authority in Greece used AUGGMED to train for potential terrorist-related threats and attacks. On-site trainees in Piraeus worked with other agents remotely who were experiencing and responding to the same scenario through the online platform (Saunders et al., 2018). This platform has gained popularity and has been operated by at least 14 organizations and agencies throughout Europe representing law enforcement, first responders, academia and the public sector (Saunders et al., 2019).

During the COVID-19 Pandemic, the usage of virtual and augmented reality became more attractive for law enforcement and armed forces due to the sweeping international public health precautions. For example, in March 2022, the International Security Alliance used the metaverse to stage a three-day security simulation with over 50 participants from nine countries including Israel, Senegal, France and the UAE. By operating in roleplay scenarios within the metaverse, the participants faced situations such as drone crashes, ransomware, and distributed denial of service attacks, all within the virtual city of Brinia. The organizers of the event noted that these exercises allow for online simulations of environments usually too populated for real-world training, such as airports. Organizers could also consistently monitor participants and build a stronger understanding of optimal joint-working processes. Plus, once these virtual scenarios were created and ran without any technical issues, the cost of replicating and sharing the software with other agencies is minimal. This enables reusability and iteration at low cost (Herath & Jarnecki, 2022).

Although these examples highlight how law enforcement can utilize the metaverse for increased collaboration, they also pose a rather serious problem. Similarly to current forms of cyberattacks, should violent extremists gain access to these servers during live simulations or access notes taken by observers, they will be able to monitor and plan around law enforcement emergency response. It is also worth noting that there are growing concerns over extremist network efforts to tailor recruitment toward military personnel and an increase in criminal cases involving extremism within the ranks (Doxsee & Macander, 2022). These extremists either join the service in order to gain combat and logistical training, or are recruited once their service ends by radical groups preying on the combination of trauma, loss of purpose and community that often affects veterans (Ware, 2023). In sum, access to former law enforcement, armed forces personnel, and their response protocol information would elevate the success of violent extremist pre-attack planning in the metaverse and their operational capabilities.

The final area of concern when it comes to violent extremists using the metaverse for pre-attack planning can already be demonstrated by online games such as Minecraft, Roblox, and Sandbox. Based on publicly available plans and layouts, online information and imagery, and other mapping technologies, users have been able to create a plethora of virtual recreations of real-life infrastructure within these platforms. As a result, violent extremists will likely have the ability to gather intelligence simply by creating, downloading, or interacting with these virtual recreations to record notes and identify any points of vulnerability in which they could exploit during an attack. This will be especially worrisome for government buildings, critical energy infrastructure, public venues, university campuses, sports stadiums, and any other locations that may become potential targets for violent extremism.

Attack Simulation

The final activity that is alarming and requires immediate attention is the enhanced ability for violent extremists to simulate attacks. As mentioned above, the military has harnessed the powers of virtual and augmented reality simulation for decades. Although the technological affordances of high-quality metaverse graphics are still in development, software companies are trying to create programs that are considered so realistic they will suspend one’s disbelief that it’s a simulation and trick their minds into thinking they are physically somewhere else. This will translate to software programs that will allow users to manipulate the complexities of life such as varying amounts of civilians, differing infrastructure and traffic patterns, altering terrain, and various weather conditions. An example of how this has already manifested within the American armed forces is the Synthetic Training Environment (STE), which was developed by the software company Bohemia Interactive Simulations, that creates high-fidelity simulations for soldiers to train anywhere in the world. This version of the metaverse is called One World Terrain and the software combines three-dimensional data collected from satellites, sensors or scanners and combines it with additional information to render high-fidelity terrain simulations. Furthermore, STE’s digital world can be manipulated by artificial intelligence and machine learning to achieve specific training exercises and results (Easley, 2022).

As the technology has been democratized over recent years, it has helped companies such as Improbable overcome barriers to slow processing speeds and other limitations to a more realistic experience. Moreover, they are trying to improve the computing and networking capabilities armed forces would need to connect multiple users into a single metaverse training environment to the scale of multi-domain operations, which require vast virtual elements to render and then react naturally. However, at the end of 2022, developers at Improbable successfully held a stress test of their technology that was able to produce 20,000 artificially created bots that users within a simulation could interact with (Easley, 2022). Although this technology is being primarily produced for armed forces and law enforcement agencies, it is likely that companies building out these technologies will expand production and distribution to private sector consumers as well (Mcardle & Dohrman, 2022). Should violent extremists be able to gain access to these software programs, there is an infinite amount of plausible scenarios in which they manipulate the algorithms to the exact specifications of an upcoming attack and simulate their activities under hefty layers of anonymity.

The second key component of attack simulation within the metaverse that poses a heightened threat to public safety is their ability to practice with virtual weaponry and explosives. In the past, a trend developed where violent extremists moved to the Dark Web and used it to procure weapons, explosives, and other illegal items (Weise, 2017). The Dark Web, otherwise known as the Tor Network, is a collection of hidden sites inaccessible via a regular Internet browser and not indexed by search engines such as Google. In 2019, over 65,000 unique URLs existed on the Tor Network. Further, in a 2018 study by computer security firm Hyperion Gray, they cataloged about 10 percent of these sites and found that the most prevalent functions facilitated communication via forums, chat rooms, and file and image hosts, as well as commerce via marketplaces. Some of the more prevalent illicit activities included arms trafficking, drug dealing, and the sharing of exploitative content—often involving children—such as pornography and images of violence and other types of abuse. The pairing of Dark Web services with cryptocurrencies has led to expectations of an outbreak in crime related activities (Kumar & Rosenbach, 2019). However, there is now an emerging alternative option where users would have access to similar levels of anonymity, only now it will be far more immersive than the Tor Network. Within metaverse servers, organized crime such as arms trafficking could take place with relative ease under the current lack of technological understanding, regulation, or oversight (INTERPOL, 2022). As it pertains to firearms testing and purchasing specifically, there are companies that have already built firearm-emulating controllers that pair with virtual reality headsets that are shockingly realistic. With this technology, metaverse users and violent extremists alike will be able to simulate the usage of any number of different firearms, test its efficiency in a number of simulated situations, and arrive at a decision in which one they prefer to use in real life.

On the other hand, violent extremists would have access to purchasing firearms and explosives, while also learning how to make and operate them with technology that is already available for consumer purchase. In a hypothetical scenario, violent extremists could enter a metaverse server where they could purchase the instructions for building an improvised explosive device (IED) or 3-D printed weapon, as well as learn how to deploy them in a simulated attack from the user they are purchasing from. The critical difference between the Internet, Dark Web, and the metaverse is that within both the Internet and Dark Web, individuals using these platforms are currently more susceptible to detection from various law enforcement agencies monitoring these spaces (Goodison et al., 2020)(Dilanian, 2021).

The final activity and a critically important area of concern is how the Metaverse will enable violent extremists to rehearse their attacks. Once they have completed their pre-attack planning, gathered all the materials needed, the next step in the attack planning cycle is rehearsal. Violent extremists often rehearse the attack scenario to confirm planning assumptions, enhance tactics, and practice escape routes. They may also trigger an incident at the target site to test the reaction of security personnel and first responders. While assessing the efficacy of their plans prior to the attack, violent extremists also seek to determine the conditions which favor the highest rate of success and lowest risk. Factors they commonly consider include the element of surprise, choice of time and place, use of diversionary tactics, and ways to impede response measures. Unless the violent extremist is planning a suicide attack, escape routes and contingency plans are also carefully planned (ODNI, 2020). Until recently these activities were most frequently carried out in person. However, with the addition of metaverse technology, violent extremists could have unparalleled rehearsal opportunities (Elson et al., 2022). For example, violent extremists can simulate a variety of potential disruptions or variable changes and establish methods of best practice to still achieve their key objectives. This will enable violent extremists to replicate law enforcement and civilian responses, learn viable and efficient paths, coordinate alternative routes if some become blocked, and establish multiple contingency plans should disruptions occur.

Conclusion

The democratization of technology has proven to be a cornerstone of human life and societal development. However, with it has come numerous challenges, but none so great as the impending metaverse. In this article, the author sought to answer the following question, “How can the metaverse be exploited by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations?”

After a thorough analysis, the author identified the following conclusions: First, the metaverse will provide extremists with a unique environment to recruit new members as they can create their own private servers, reach a wider audience, and simulate in-person recruitment networks. These servers will be onerous to moderate, and the current regulatory guidelines and technological mechanisms do not sufficiently prevent the production of nefarious content and behaviors. As a result, the metaverse will serve as an ideal incubator for extremist recruitment. Second, the metaverse will simplify fundraising and cybercrime for violent extremists. Through the usage of cryptocurrency, cybercrime, and money laundering, the metaverse will provide added layers of anonymity and prevent potential detection from law enforcement and financial institutions. Third, the metaverse affords extremists the ability to do the majority of their pre-attack planning and intelligence gathering virtually. By limiting the number of times they must visit a potential target and minimizing the time spent online conducting open-source intelligence, violent extremists will be able to operate discreetly while still maintaining a high level of efficiency. Additionally, should they gain access to the servers used by law enforcement to conduct their own virtual trainings, violent extremists will have the opportunity to develop more effective attack and contingency plans. Finally, as metaverse technology becomes more realistic, extremists can practice creating and handling explosives, weapons, and conducting attack simulations with a variety of potential disruptions or variable changes and establish methods of best practice to still achieve their key objectives.

The implications of this article indicate that the metaverse resembles Pandora’s box; the emerging technology is far more complex than our current systems can handle, and the consequences could be devastating. Therefore, academics, law enforcement agencies, government policymakers, technology companies, and other nongovernmental actors must collaborate to establish proactive research efforts, legislation, and mitigation strategies to assuage future threats posed by violent extremists in the metaverse.

*****

Joseph Levin is an NYU Alumni who graduated from the Center for Global Affairs with a concentration in Transnational Security. His academic research focused primarily on violent extremism and reconciliation efforts in post-conflict settings. During his time at NYU, Joseph served as an Associate Editor of the Global Affairs Review and was a Graduate Assistant for both Dr. Mary Beth Altier and Edward Goldberg.

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