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by Joseph Levin

As the legacy of violent sectarian conflict continues to haunt public consciousness within Northern Ireland, an innovative approach is needed to preserve the truth and provide answers for the remaining unsolved crimes committed during the Troubles. This paper examines previous truth and reconciliation attempts and their pitfalls, and recommends an unofficial truth recovery project that will provide a pragmatic mechanism for uncovering authentic versions of Northern Ireland’s past.  (Photo credit: K. Mitch Hodge on Unsplash)

Within international political discourse there are certain individuals who popularized the notion that societies riddled with prior armed conflict are prisoners of the past in such an intractable way that they bind themselves in inescapable chains of violence (Hamber, 2002). Despite being a controversial claim, perhaps there is no better case study than Northern Ireland to examine how a disjointed collective memory of the past can become a hotly contested issue once weapons are laid down. Since the 12th-century Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland, evidence indicates that the population has suffered from staunchly ingrained tensions between Protestants and Roman Catholics (Todd, 2010). Although there have been various violent clashes between these two groups through the centuries, the most recent armed conflict was known as “The Troubles” (Wallenfeldt, 2019). After nearly 30 years of fighting, the Troubles ended in 1998 with the signing of the Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). In total, approximately 3,600 people were killed and more than 30,000 were wounded during the conflict (Wallenfeldt, 2019). However, despite the GFA, many of the crimes committed during the Troubles went unsolved and the ethno-nationalist and religious divisions remain firmly entrenched within society today (Hayward & Rosher, 2021).  

In coordinated attempts to combat the longstanding effects of the Troubles, numerous scholars, legal experts, non-governmental groups, and international organizations have tried to provide potential solutions. However, for a multitude of reasons almost none of these have materialized. As time continues on, victims have become increasingly cynical that the truth of their experiences will never be told and the individuals most responsible for undue violence will escape punishment (Hancock, 2012). With these conditions in mind, this paper will seek to answer the following question: “What would be an appropriate format for a truth commission or recovery mechanism within Northern Ireland to address crimes committed during the Troubles?” I contend that in order to have a successful truth commission, it must be led by a coalition of non-governmental community and victims group leaders, scholars, and other distinguished individuals from within all six Northern Irish counties. This paper concludes with the recommendation that the people should conduct an unofficial truth recovery project called the Belfast Truth Recovery Project (BTRP). This project would follow precedents set by the Ardoyne Commemoration Project, South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

Brief History of the Troubles 

Similar to other conflicts in the 20th century, Northern Ireland’s Troubles had a long history of violence that intertwined religious, ethnic, and political disputes cultivated centuries ago when British Protestants first subjugated Ireland’s native Catholic population. It wasn’t until the early 1920s, after a successful push for Irish independence, that the island fractured in two. The result of this partition was that the Republic of Ireland made up the majority of the island, while six counties in the northeast remained part of the United Kingdom and became known as Northern Ireland (CFR, 2013). In the newly formed Northern Ireland, British Protestants made up the majority of the population and held most of the region’s political power. 

Years later, during the 1960s, Northern Ireland’s Catholic minority grew frustrated over their unequal access to housing, jobs, healthcare, and education. These grievances were the direct result of Conservatives and Unionists gerrymandering to maintain control of power by manipulating electoral boundaries, determining which individuals were granted the ability to vote, and minimizing the roles individuals from the minority could hold (TCSJNI, 1964). In addition to the rampant inequality and minimal power sharing, there was also strong disagreement between unionists, who mostly Protestants and wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, and nationalists, who mostly Catholics and wished to see the reunification of the whole island of Ireland (Cairns & Darby, 1998). The discontent and bitter social divides ultimately led to a civil rights movement led by the Catholic minority. By August 1969, there had been riots in Belfast, Derry, Dungiven, and Lurgan, as well as mass civil rights marches and sit-downs in Newry, Armagh, Dungannon, and Enniskillen (Munck, 1992). In order to violently suppress the civil unrest, the Protestant-leaning Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police force and British military were deployed (CFR, 2013). Shortly thereafter, the violent confrontation escalated and the Troubles had begun.

The main participants in the Troubles included the following groups: republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA); loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA); British state security forces such as the British Military and RUC; and political activists. During the conflict, Republican paramilitary groups carried out guerrilla warfare campaigns against British forces, as well as a series of bombings against infrastructure, commercial, and political targets. Conversely, Loyalist paramilitary operatives executed attacks on republicans, nationalists, and the wider Catholic community in what they described as retaliation for the ongoing violence (Wallenfeldt, 2019).

As the 1970s proceeded, rioting became more common in the cities of Belfast and Derry, bombings of public places increased, and both sides to the conflict perpetrated deadly atrocities. However, on Jan. 30, 1972, the conflict reached a new level of intensity when approximately 15,000 people gathered in the Creggan area of Derry to take part in a civil rights march organized by Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association to protest unjust police detention and internment. The intended destination of the march was the city center; however, barricades put in place by the British Army blocked marchers. After prolonged skirmishes between groups of youths and the British Army, soldiers from the Parachute Regiment moved in to make arrests. As the soldiers neared the protesters, stones were thrown and soldiers responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannons. As chaos ensued, British soldiers moved to arrest as many marchers as possible and began to open fire. According to British Army evidence, 21 soldiers fired their weapons, discharging 108 live rounds between them. In total, 13 people were killed and at least 15 others were injured in what is now widely regarded as one of the darkest days of the Northern Ireland Troubles — Bloody Sunday. The response was swift as angry mobs formed all over the country and the British Embassy in Dublin was burned to the ground. During 1972, more than 480 people were killed by the conflict in Northern Ireland, which proved to be the deadliest year in the Troubles (McCormack, 2022).

For the remainder of the Troubles, violence ebbed and flowed as cease-fires lingered and lapsed, and tit-for-tat bombings and assassinations continued. At times, violence even spilled over into Ireland, the U.K., and other European nations (Cowell, 2018). After many failed diplomatic efforts, the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was signed in 1998. This monumental deal tentatively brought the vast majority of the armed conflict to an end. The GFA created a power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly (at Stormont), established as an institutional arrangement for cross-border cooperation between the governments of Ireland and Northern Ireland on a range of issues, and laid the groundwork for continued consultation between the British and Irish governments. On May 22, 1998, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland held a joint referendum on the agreement, which was approved by 94% of those who voted in the Republic and 71% of those voting in Northern Ireland. Although isolated attacks still occurred in the years after the referendum passed, the Troubles had come to an end. Out of a population of approximately 1.5 million, nearly 3,600 people were killed and more than 30,000 were injured over the 30-year period (Wallenfeldt, 2019). 

The Consequences of the Troubles on Modern Politics

Since the turn of the millennium, Northern Ireland has been marred by volatile political systems and societal divisions not felt since the Troubles were exacerbated within the U.K. constituent country following Brexit (Posner, 2021). The government in Northern Ireland implements power-sharing, which allows nationalist and unionist political parties to exercise power together in an executive at parliament buildings located on the Stormont Estate of Belfast. This new assembly was established in 1998, after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (McCormack, 2020). Although it has not been terribly efficient, when members are in session, Stormont has jurisdiction over policies relevant to the Northern Irish economy, education, health, policing, and agriculture (Whysall, 2018). 

Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks of this system is that it is explicitly designed to accommodate nationalists and unionists, but has marginalized those that may not identify with either party and has reinforced the same divisions that led to conflict in the past. For example, Stormont requires members to designate as “nationalist,” “unionist,” or “other,” but gives “other” members a secondary role. Additionally, the two parties have an effective veto on certain legislative votes, which “others” do not. The top offices of first minister and deputy first minister within the Assembly are technically open to others, but have considerable stipulations, which further polarizes politics and creates an impasse within Stormont (Murtagh, 2022). In addition to the ostracization, the legislative log-jams also prevent meaningful progress on other causes of societal unrest as they pertain to the long-term consequences of the Troubles. These include, but are not limited to, the information recovery process, an oral history archive, a timeline of events to be drawn up by academics, and the Implementation and Reconciliation Group (O’Kane, 2017). 

An example of ongoing contention amongst the population in Northern Ireland surrounding crimes committed during the Troubles is the prosecution of Soldier F. In September 2022, prosecutors at the Northern Ireland Public Prosecution Service reopened the case against the former British soldier charged with two counts of murder and five counts of attempted murder on Bloody Sunday (BBC, 2022). Prosecutors had previously decided to drop the case against the former paratrooper, which led to public outcry from bereaved relatives; however, the High Court in Belfast overruled that decision in March 2022 (BBC, 2022). As public tensions continue to fester around the long held animosity of Bloody Sunday, a committal hearing resumed in late January 2023 to determine if there is sufficient evidence against Soldier F for a case to proceed to Crown Court trial (Derry Daily, 2022). 

Since British and Northern Irish institutions have been reluctant to grapple with the horrors of the Troubles, sharp partisan and religious divides persist (Connolly, 2006). The result has been governmental incompetence. Following accusations of negotiating in bad faith and perceived disrespect on both sides, Stormont collapsed in 2017 when the two biggest parties, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, split over the DUP’s handling of a green energy scandal. This disagreement led to a three-year stalemate, which ended due to the COVID-19 pandemic when legislators reconvened to pass emergency legislation (McCormack & Fox, 2022). 

Strife flared up again in 2022 after the DUP blocked the formation of a new executive to protest assembly elections after Sinn Féin won the majority vote earlier this year (Carroll, 2022). After missing the deadline to form the new executive in late October 2022, the Northern Irish government extended the deadline by another six weeks (Webber, 2022). Following a tenuous period of debate, the latest deadline to restore Northern Ireland’s devolved government at Stormont passed without an agreement on Jan. 20, 2023. Under the existing rules, the latest an assembly poll can be held is April 13, 2023, meaning the government would need to call the election no later than early March. However, Northern Ireland Secretary Chris Heaton-Harris could opt to delay a poll, as he has done previously via legislation at Westminster (BBC News, 2023). As the gridlock continues to plague Northern Ireland, citizens have progressively voiced their dismay at the political ineptitude of lawmakers who have caused Stormont to collapse six times since the Good Friday Agreement (McCormack & Fox, 2022).  

To make matters worse, the House of Lords in the United Kingdom has been discussing potential legislation called The Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, which would create the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR). This bill is intended to address the legacy of the Troubles and would be responsible for reviewing all outstanding legacy cases concerning Troubles-related deaths and other harmful criminal conduct. As it stands, there are than 1,000 unsolved killings that occurred during the 30-year conflict (McKee, 2022). The ICRIR would also be responsible for granting amnesty from prosecution to individuals who meet certain conditions. In addition, all ongoing Troubles-related criminal investigations, criminal prosecutions, inquiries, civil claims, and police complaints will be subject to prohibitions or restrictions that may threaten British national security (JCHR, 2022). Unsurprisingly, leadership in the U.K. has struggled to gain support for the bill within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 

The majority of the criticisms center on the proposed conditional amnesty for individuals accused of committing crimes during the Troubles and restricting investigator capabilities. Other concerns have come from victims’ groups and political parties in Northern Ireland that are opposed to the bill altogether, arguing it will remove access to justice for victims and their families (McKee, 2022). The consensus opinion is that the British government has purposefully structured commissions that will allow them to avoid responsibility for the significant number of incidents in which British state actors perpetrated violence. For example, the U.K. established provisions within the bill that would prevent any findings that may risk prejudicing its national security interests (Neafsey, 2022). With regards to the Irish support behind the U.K. ICRIR bill, Simon Coveney, Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defense, shared his disappointment that the U.K. government should not have unilaterally introduced the legislation. Under the current circumstances, it appears that Coveney and the Irish government have serious concerns about the legitimacy of the commission and would not support it in its current form (Coveney, 2022). 

It can be concluded that the British government has forgotten pivotal pieces of effective truth commission processes: collaboration, evenhandedness, and authentic accountability. These features provide institutional legitimacy and without legitimacy in the eyes of the Northern Irish people, a truth commission cannot effectively promulgate its views about the past. Legitimate institutions are credible, and credible institutions have the potential to persuade people. To the extent that people can be persuaded to adopt a modernized view of past struggles, reconciliation itself becomes plausible within previously divided societies (Gibson, 2009). Thus, in order to address the disputed history of the Troubles and provide justice to the victims, policymakers must consider how previous efforts have failed and what can be done to rectify them.

Meaningful Intentions, Limited Actions and Results 

The Bloomfield Report 

In October 1997, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland appointed Sir Kenneth Bloomfield as the Victims’ Commissioner of Northern Ireland, and instructed him to draft a report on ways to recognize the pain and suffering felt by victims of the violence during the Troubles. Bloomfield was also told to find pragmatic options that would work towards achieving greater recognition for victims of the conflict (Bloomfield, 1998). After a mere six months of studying the consequences of nearly 30 years of conflict, Bloomfield published his report in April 1998, shortly after the Good Friday Agreement was signed. In certain regards, the Bloomfield Report represented a noble exercise to acknowledge and pay tribute to the innocent victims of the Troubles. The commission’s staff interviewed hundreds of victims and victims’ families, and the report made a hasty attempt at quantifying the scale of injuries and wider effects of violence. The Bloomfield Report also offered a number of broad recommendations, including providing financial and medical assistance services to victims, building a physical memorial, and creating a new “Memorial and Reconciliation” holiday (Connolly, 2006).

Despite the inclusive rhetoric used within the introductory and mission statements, the Bloomfield Report drew almost immediate criticism for unabashed biases displayed towards protecting the interests of the United Kingdom. For example, the report acknowledged that a large constituency of victims argued passionately for the establishment of a Northern Ireland equivalent of the South African TRC. However, Bloomfield immediately called into question the legitimacy of such an endeavor and made no explicit recommendations for a truth commission. In Bloomfield’s opinions, a truth commission would only be a preferable outcome if the British government were able to set the terms. He also warned certain nefarious individuals may seek to use truth as a weapon as well as a shield. Therefore, if any such commission were to have a place in the life of Northern Ireland, it could only be in the context of a wide-ranging political accord (Bloomfield, 1998). Without explicitly saying it, Bloomfield demonstrated notable inclination towards protecting British-aligned perpetrators and insinuated that there would likely be condemnation and calls for justice voiced from their victims should a platform be provided.

The other portion of the commission’s report that corroborated these criticisms came when Bloomfield tried to define those who qualified as victims and how this should be acknowledged in any further mechanisms. Within the 70-page report, Bloomfield reinforced notions of a hierarchy of victims that favored law enforcement officials and devoted only two paragraphs towards victims killed by state actors (Bloomfield, 1998). This was met by strong responses from both major political groups since it promoted the same ostracization that fueled the conflict in the first place. On one hand, the Bloomfield Report was dismissed by republicans for promulgating the idea that the undeserving victims were inevitably nationalists and republicans killed by the British security forces and their agents. Conversely, the issue of inclusivity was a far greater problem for unionists than it was for nationalists because of the distinction between innocent and non-innocent victims, which they described as those killed by terrorists and those who were not (Graham & Whelan, 2007).

Additionally, the commission made no recommendations as to how the chasm in accountability for state-sponsored violence should be addressed. Conversely, in keeping with the Victims’ Commissioner’s mandate to recognize those who died in the service of the community, Bloomfield explicitly affirmed the innocence of policemen, soldiers, employees of the prison service, and other state agents who died in the conflict (Connolly, 2006). Overall, the Bloomfield Report elicited mixed reviews amongst diverse audiences, but in the end very few of the observations and recommendations gained any substantial political traction. 

All Truth is Bitter Report

The second major attempt at truth and reconciliation to address the disputed history of the Troubles came from a 1999 visit to Northern Ireland by Alex Boraine, then Deputy Chair of the South African TRC (Hancock, 2012). His visit was sponsored by Victim Support of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, resulting in a report titled All Truth is Bitter, which was published in 2000 to provide lessons to Northern Ireland from South Africa’s TRC experience (Hancock, 2012). This report was followed up by the creation of the Healing Through Remembering (HTR) project in 2001, which is still operational in Belfast today. 

The HTR project was designed to work in five key areas: storytelling, truth recovery and acknowledgement, living memorial museum, day of reflection, and commemoration. In addition, five subgroups were also established within HTR to undertake work on the individual recommendations made in All Truth is Bitter with regards to their feasibility, viability and usefulness to the process of remembering the conflict (HTR, 2022). Since its inception, the HTR has been successful at providing an avenue for Northern Irish citizens to explore the history of the Troubles and share their thoughts on proper ways forwards to unify public consciousness. However, as mentioned by their Board of Directors in their submission to the Consultative Group of the Past in 2008, the reconciliation process is much larger than a single organization alone can offer. The HTR then went on to call for a unified effort from local leadership, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and British and Irish Governments, which must publicly endorse a shared narrative of the past and provide a conducive environment for this to happen (HTR Board of Directors, 2008). Unfortunately, as evidenced by the current status of politics in Northern Ireland, this has not yet become a reality. 

Eames-Bradley Report 

Another effort to address the history of the Troubles came in June 2007, when Peter Hain, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced the formation of an independent Consultative Group of the Past. The group was asked to carry out the following tasks: consult across communities on how Northern Irish society can best approach the legacy of the events during the conflict and the decade that followed; provide recommendations on steps that should be taken to support Northern Ireland’s society in building a shared future that is not overshadowed by the events of the past; and present a report that would be published by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Eames & Bradley, 2009). The group was led by Robin Eames, retired Archbishop of the Church of Ireland, and Dennis Bradley, a former Catholic priest and a prominent public servant and journalist in Northern Ireland. The two men led a team of researchers for over a year before they published the Eames-Bradley Report in January 2009. 

Although their report compiled a plethora of information and made 31 recommendations regarding potential options for the British government and Northern Irish assembly to consider, this research paper will only focus on the most relevant conclusions. First and foremost, the report advocated for the establishment of an independent Legacy Commission to deal with the legacy of the past by combining processes of reconciliation, justice and information recovery. The commission would essentially promote peace and stability in Northern Ireland by addressing sectarianism and identifying a shared history that could be accepted by the majority of those affected. This would also be supplemented by a Reconciliation Forum, which would be established through the Legacy Commission and the Commission for Victims and Survivors for Northern Ireland (CVSNI). It would be responsible for liaising and tackling societal issues relating to the conflict. Finally, Eames and Bradley suggested that the suffering of families from Northern Ireland and Great Britain should be recognized through a monetary settlement. According to the report, they believed the nearest relative of someone who died as a result of the conflict in and about Northern Ireland, from January 1966, should receive a one-off, ex-gratia recognition payment of £12,000 (Eames & Bradley, 2009).

As with the Bloomfield Report in 1998, the Eames-Bradley Report received minimal support from the population of Northern Ireland and many of their recommendations had already been formally rejected by both the British and government of Northern Ireland in previous reconciliation efforts. The group’s most controversial proposal was for the £12,000 payment to the direct relatives of the approximate 3,600 people killed during the Troubles, which would have cost approximately £40 million in total, and it would be paid even if those killed had been involved in paramilitary shootings and bombings. The British and Northern Irish governments and victims’ groups were concerned about any form of payment being awarded to the relatives of paramilitaries killed during the Troubles. There were also concerns over the legitimacy of the Legacy Commission and Reconciliation Forum from nationalists and Sinn Féin (Moriarty, 2010). The overarching theme that became apparent during the 2000s and has returned amid talks of the ICRIR is that Northern Ireland’s nationalists do not believe there is any genuine way of establishing the truth for bereaved families if that effort is led by the British government. 

Ardoyne Commemoration Project

Despite the many failures and setbacks affiliated with establishing the truth from the Troubles in Northern Ireland, one distinct community-based mechanism found success. In July 1998, an ad hoc group of victims of the Troubles, their relatives, concerned individuals, and representatives from local community groups called a public meeting in Ardoyne. The district was particularly affected by the Troubles. During the conflict a total of 99 individuals from Ardoyne were killed and the district was subjected to harsh state counterinsurgency strategies such as political internment and blanket surveillance (Lundy & McGovern, 2006). From the outset, the ACP sought to discuss ways in which the community might contest what they perceived as the public exclusion of the community’s experiences from previously established narratives. Notably, Ardoyne was particularly concerned with the way in which a biased hierarchy of victims appeared to be emerging within British publications such as the Bloomfield Report and how the town would go about dealing with their past, as well as commemorating the victims (Lundy & McGovern, 2006). 

After several public meetings and passionate debate, it was ultimately decided that the proper method for the community to memorialize their experience would be through a book that enabled community members to tell their stories in their own words. During all stages of the project, the ACP made concerted efforts to seek the views, opinions, and active participation of the wider community. The ACP committee and its staff utilized their connections to the local media to connect with the community about the progress of the project, seek information, contact individuals, gather feedback, and encourage participation. In addition, the ACP also organized several community forums and public meetings, which were open to the general public, and all relatives of victims from Ardoyne received a personal letter of invitation. Over a four-year period the ACP collected and edited over 300 interviews, testimonies, and eyewitness accounts of the 99 conflict-related deaths in the Ardoyne community. Following years of hard work within the community, in August 2002, the 543-page book was published under the title of Ardoyne: The Untold Truth, which contained the testimonies and six historical chapters contextualizing the conflict (Lundy & McGovern, 2006). 

The significance of the commemoration project in Ardoyne is difficult to overstate. As mentioned previously, one aspect of the Troubles that has been a constant point of contention is who should be defined as a victim of the conflict. While crafting their book, the ACP tried their best to incorporate as many voices as possible and gave those who participated a platform to discuss the circumstances in which they were victimized by the conflict. This was particularly important since many of the testimonies in the book came from individuals who were ignored and silenced by their perpetrators. It also allowed relatives of victims to uncover lost details about their loved ones and provided the opportunity to correct previously misreported or intentionally distorted information about them contained in other publications (ACP, 2022). Perhaps one of the most significant legacies of the ACP came from the introductory statement, where the editors included an incredibly powerful statement that has been cited frequently over the years by those examining the need for truth within Northern Ireland:

“Many of these testimonies speak of the brutality of a system that treated ordinary people with utter contempt and colluded to ensure lack of disclosure, accountability and justice. Others recall, and have since learnt, personal details that were lost in the pandemonium and confusion that followed such traumatic events. These very vivid and personal accounts tell the ‘hidden’ story of powerlessness, marginalization and resistance. Over the years they have demonised and labelled Ardoyne a ‘terrorist community’, thus implying, in some distorted way, that the community got what it deserved. To add insult to injury, a growing number of books on ‘the Troubles’ have published details about victims’, often incorrectly and without consent, causing further distress to relatives.” 

Although the ACP proved to be efficient at the local level, there was still a body of experts within Northern Ireland that argued nationalist republican and loyalist narratives of the past are irreconcilable. They believe that these differences have been methodically shaped by diametrically opposed interpretations of past experiences and events, which have manifested as pivotal pieces of their current group identities (Graham & Whelan, 2007). Despite their cynicism, I argue that truth and justice for victims still remain vitally important pieces of sincere societal reconciliation. Through collective community organizing, the town of Ardoyne proved that the unspeakable losses and painful memories they experienced during the Troubles can still be illuminated even within a deeply divided political landscape. Their achievement provides hope that despite other historical failures, there are potential pragmatic options for prospective truth commissions or other truth recovery mechanisms within Northern Ireland. 

Oversights of the Past

Since the Troubles tentatively ended in 1998, there have been many attempts by different actors to help aid the population of Northern Ireland in addressing the longstanding divisions that have plagued since its inception. However, one commonly overlooked feature of many of these efforts is that the violence that occurred during the conflict did not affect every county the same. For example, within the six counties in Northern Ireland, Antrim saw the highest levels of conflict with hundreds of fatalities and numerous acts of violence. It should be noted that the vast majority of these casualties occurred in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland. Thus, most of Northern Ireland did not directly experience fatal violence, although the indirect effects in terms of political tension, fear, and knowledge of victims were more widespread. The spatial concentration of violence meant that some neighborhoods suffered the direct impacts of the conflict disproportionately (Gregory & Cunningham, 2013).

Although a considerable number of researchers have studied this phenomenon, many recommendations and truth recovery efforts do not sufficiently take into account the segregation of neighborhoods that persists within most of Northern Ireland’s society today. Most notably, approximately half of the country’s population continues to reside in segregated neighborhoods; the majority of people do not have a friendship network outside their religious community; and most children, nearly 95%, attend religiously segregated schools (White et al., 2018). Moreover, there are still over 100 peace walls remaining across Northern Ireland today (McGarry, 2022). The walls, which were constructed from brick and iron or steel that can stand up to 20 feet high and extend for miles through residential areas, were originally built as a temporary measure in the 1960s to separate republican and nationalist Catholic neighborhoods from loyalist and unionist Protestant areas. However, due to their effectiveness at quelling sectarian violence between groups, the walls never came down. A study conducted in 2021 found that they still extend for a total of 20 miles all across Northern Ireland, with most located in Belfast, and others in cities and towns including Derry, Portadown, and Lurgan. Moreover, there are now more peace walls across Northern Ireland than there were before the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (McQuillan, 2021). Although these peace walls may continue to serve a physical purpose, they also provide a recurring symbol of the ideological differences that motivated violence during the Troubles. Therefore, it is imperative for any prospective truth recovery mechanism to acknowledge the realities of the social and physical divisions that still exist within Northern Ireland today.

Contextualizing the aftermath of the Troubles has also been made more difficult because it was not simply a two-sided dispute between republicans and loyalists since British state actors were also active participants in the carnage (Gregory & Cunningham, 2013). As a result, the British government has gone to great lengths to protect itself from being held accountable. This has largely manifested in either the U.K. leading efforts to conduct truth commissions on its own terms or attempting to quash dissenting opinions from the narrative it has been pushed for the past two decades (Anderson, 2021). These actions, combined with the ongoing societal segregation, have led to many different narratives circulating about what conditions started the conflict, who is responsible for starting it, which individuals should be held accountable for the violence, and what accountability should look like. Division on these issues led to heightened feelings of bias by the various sides involved. 

Given their nation’s history of protracted violence dating back to the Anglo-Norman invasion in the 12th century, the population has become increasingly skeptical of outsiders (Tausch et al., 2010). Since a sizable portion of the country does not trust either the U.K. or the government of the Republic of Ireland, any recommendation that involves these governments conducting a joint truth commission lacks a fundamental understanding of the population of Northern Ireland (Fitzduff, 2017). 

Recommendation for Truth Commission in Northern Ireland: Belfast Truth Recovery Project (BTRP)

Purpose and Objectives

After an extensive review of the historical and current political landscape within Northern Ireland, it is clear that an official national truth and reconciliation commission is a non-starter. However, there have been multiple surveys conducted since the Troubles ended that showed bipartisan support for the notion that people generally want to know the truth about the conflict. Unfortunately, they do not wholly agree on how to get at it. Another aspect where respondents were generally more likely to agree were alternative approaches to dealing with the past that did not include the Northern Irish Assembly, British, or Irish governments (Lundy & McGovern, 2007). Although it would be more favorable to have an international organization or federal government backing, these options are not available, as the British government has signaled no interest in allowing the U.N. to conduct any investigations into the matter and the public doesn’t trust the three federal governments in question (Salvioli & Tidball-Binz, 2021). It is becoming increasingly apparent that in order to move towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland, the truth will have to come out or the issue will be a potential seed for further conflict (Gawn, 2007). 

Under these circumstances, this paper proposes that in order to provide victims and their families with access to the truth, a community led project similar to the Ardoyne Commemoration Project (ACP) will be the only hope for success. Although it is more than 30 years overdue, this endeavor could be called the Belfast Truth Recovery Project (BTRP). The reason for this name is that it shares a similar name to the agreement that brought the Troubles to an end and implies a drive for unity to be created throughout the nation as a result of this project. Some may criticize that unofficial truth projects may not have the powers to compel the provision of information, and they are unlikely to be as well resourced as state-funded activities. However, by mobilizing victims and survivors, documenting abuse, and issuing formal findings, these inquiries have the power to generate further public support and catalyze official action, leading to stronger official inquiries and other future measures (ICTJ, 2013). 

The purpose of this project is to provide a platform for past perpetrators to help answer questions about the nearly 1,200 remaining unresolved killings that the Northern Irish Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has been investigating. A major reason that these killings have not been solved is that many of them have been attributed to paramilitaries and state security forces. The breakdown of these are as follows: 45.5% are attributed to republican paramilitaries; 23% are attributed to loyalist paramilitaries; 28.5% are attributed to the security forces; and for the remaining 3% of deaths, the background of those primarily responsible is unknown (Winters, 2018). Another challenge that other truth commission recommendations have not properly taken into account were the thousands of people who already served time for crimes committed during the Troubles. This has had major ramifications on public access to the truth, as some criminals were not charged for all their crimes, whereas others were charged with crimes they did not commit (Ferguson, 2013). 

The BTRP will draw on lessons learned from the TRC in South Africa, which was created by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to investigate, examine, and expose the violent human rights abuses under apartheid. The goal of the TRC was not criminal prosecution, but uncovering the truth from victims and perpetrators to prompt a healing conversation among all South Africans. The TRC had the following main objectives that the BTRP will follow as well: “to analyze the political, social, and cultural conditions and behaviors that contributed to the violent conflicts in both State and societal context; to contribute to the administration of justice, and clarify the crimes and violations to human rights committed by paramilitaries, terrorists, and the states involved; to determine the identification of the victims, as well corresponding responsibilities when possible; and to recommend necessary action for preventive measures to ensure no conflicts are repeated” (Georgetown Law, 2022). As with the TRC, the BTRP will focus primarily on providing a platform for victims and perpetrators alike to disclose the truth about their experiences during the Troubles without fear of retribution. The mandate for the BTRP will focus solely on crimes and abuses that occurred between 1968 and 1998.  

BTRP Leadership

The ingenuity behind this project is that it will be led by a coalition of non-governmental community and victims group leaders, scholars, and other distinguished individuals from within all six Northern Irish counties to provide each part of the nation with equal representation. Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, there have been bipartisan calls for a truth recovery mechanism similar to this, so there should be no shortage of individuals interested in applying to be a part of the leadership team (Lundy & McGovern, 2007). However, the caveat is that each county will have two representatives and they must not come from the same political constituency. This group of 12 volunteers will serve as the project’s board of commissioners and will oversee the project through its duration and any replacements must go through a similar ad hoc election process.

In order to serve on the board of commissioners, there will be an application and interview process that will require a history of the individual serving their community and having excellent moral and professional character. The project will receive outside counsel from the former leaders of the Ardoyne Commemoration Project if they are willing to assist, as well as international human rights organizations that express interest in providing unbiased support in a limited fashion. The selection of the board of commissioners will be conducted by these groups as well. Further, throughout the duration of the project all aspects must be as transparent as possible and staff of the BTRP will be encouraged to avoid any behavior that may be seen as attempts to influence participants and the disclosure of their experiences. Through these efforts, this project will maintain a high level of independence, credibility, and effectiveness.

BTRP Format 

Similar to other unofficial truth commissions and the Ardoyne Commemoration Project, the BTRP will follow guidelines set forth by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. As mentioned previously, the focus of the BTRP is to provide a platform for all those who wish to provide statements about their experiences during the Troubles. For unofficial truth projects, this is often the most important characteristic for leaving behind a lasting legacy (Bickford, 2007). The following sections highlight the BTRP’s core activities.  

First, following the development and training of the board of commissioners, they will be tasked with fundraising and staffing. This will likely be carried out over the course of a six- to 12-month period, but will ultimately enable the project to reach a wide audience in the most professional manner possible. Fundraising efforts should target donations from international non-governmental organizations and benefactors seeking to provide an unbiased platform to all those affected by the Troubles. After sufficient funds have been raised and the staff has been trained, project members will go into communities throughout Northern Ireland and begin taking statements directly from victims, perpetrators, and witnesses. In order to gather as many stories as possible, the BTRP will employ a strategy similar to the ACP that utilizes local media to connect with the community about the progress of the project, seek information or contact individuals, gather feedback, and encourage participation. Statement-taking meetings will be done through one-on-one private sessions and individuals will have the option to either speak under the condition of complete anonymity or reveal their identity. These meetings may occur in temporary offices of the project or other private settings. Statement-taking will be designed to allow individuals to recount their experiences in a supportive environment (OHCHR, 2006).

Second, a significant portion of the project’s staff will be devoted to adding and maintaining statements within an electronic database, with statements separated by county. This is undoubtedly the largest task of the project, so the project will need to employ multiple systems managers and analysts. The project would also require teams of coders and data-entry technicians to process the statements, and would require a significant amount of the commission’s overall staff time to conduct the coding, entry, and analysis of this information (OHCHR, 2006). The outcome of this activity may allow the BTRP to help victims and their families uncover the truth about their experiences.

Finally, since the history of the Troubles is a contentious issue within Northern Ireland, the BTRP will avoid any large-scale public hearings or town halls, unless it is done to explain the project and its mandate. This project is intentionally trying to reach the community at an individual level and rebuild a more accurate understanding from a bottom-up approach. Furthermore, again drawing on past practice from the ACP, the BTRP will produce a series of final reports and recommendations through both electronic and hard copies. These documents will include all individual stories broken down by victim, perpetrator, and witness experiences, as well as by the county where they occurred. The BTRP will also create short summaries of the main takeaways within each county and the specific recommendations for rebuilding trust between the divided communities. This project will last for approximately for five to seven years and will provide quarterly updates to help garner communal interest and participation. Following the conclusion of the project, all publications will be made available through a series of books and electronic libraries to help enshrine the experiences of all those affected by the Troubles. Should there be enough funding, a public indoor museum could also be opened that memorializes these experiences and provides a space for internal reflection and reconciliation in dealing with personal grievances.

Conclusion

Since its inception, Northern Ireland has been a society permeated by societal tensions, political malpractice, and sustained outbreaks of violence motivated by ideological differences. Although this nation has had a variety of struggles dating back to the 12th century, the most recent conflict known as the Troubles demonstrates that these divisions, if left unaddressed, will trap the Northern Irish in an unending loop of violence. To make matters worse, there are still over 1,000 unsolved deaths and thousands of crimes committed during the Troubles that have not been investigated. This has led to widespread anger and confusion over the past. Since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, concerted attempts to resolve the longstanding effects of the conflict have been made by numerous scholars, legal experts, non-governmental groups, and international organizations. However, nearly all these efforts have been met with limited success and public disinterest because they failed to understand the fundamental attitudes of the public and their skepticism to outsiders and government. Although there may be challenges associated with conducting an unofficial Northern Ireland truth recovery project, this appears to be the most pragmatic mechanism for uncovering authentic versions of the past. Therefore, the Northern Irish people should adopt the recommendations put forth in this paper and establish the Belfast Truth Recovery Project.

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