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krc8929

America’s Climate [Policy] Hypocrisy: The Disconnect between the Climate Change Aims and Action

May 10, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Yashwani Kularia

The op-ed “America’s Climate Policy Hypocrisy: The Disconnect between the Climate Change Aims and Actions” highlights that amidst escalating environmental concerns, the United States appears to grapple with a disconcerting paradox between its climate change aspirations and its policies. Despite voicing commitments to address climate issues, the nation’s ongoing dependence on fossil fuels and inadequate efforts in environmental justice initiatives highlight its climate hypocrisy. The disconnect between rhetoric and action raises critical questions about America’s commitment to combating climate change and the urgency of implementing meaningful reforms. (Photo Source: Melissa Bradley on Unsplash). 

On January 26th, 2024, the White House announced a temporary pause on pending approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports to the Non-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) countries. It aims to address the increasing concerns about climate change and the mounting domestic prices (“FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Temporary Pause on Pending Approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports”). This decision happens to have been made at the beginning of the year, coinciding with the upcoming Presidential elections in November 2024. As of 2023, the United States emerged as the world’s leading oil producer, effectively surpassing Qatar. Indeed, the United States achieved a historic peak in oil production, reaching approximately 13.2 million barrels a day (“United States produces more crude oil than any country, ever”). The state of Texas alone contributes around 5.6 million barrels a day (“Texas oil and gas group says industry is surging”). Moreover, the US has become the largest exporter of LNG just last year.  

As the world grapples with the need to address climate change, the United States has found itself mired in hypocrisy. Notwithstanding its rhetoric of climate responsibility and commitment to reducing carbon emissions, the reality paints a starkly different picture. A glaring example of America’s climate hypocrisy lies in its continued reliance on fossil fuels, particularly shale gas and oil. Throughout the 2020 election campaigns, the Biden administration pledged to steer the nation away from reliance on fossil fuels (Ronayne and Knickmeyer). However, after the elections, the administration has overseen the largest expansion of oil and gas production to date. The Biden administration has approved extensive fossil fuel projects like Alaska’s willow oil project, the Mountain Valley fracked gas pipeline, and several other oil-LNG export terminals (Gardner). This highlights a disparity between their promises and their subsequent actions. 

America’s failure to adequately address environmental justice issues highlights another dimension of its climate hypocrisy. In spite of environmental justice (EJ) being touted as a top priority by the Biden administration, the implementation of initiatives, like the  “Justice40 Initiative,” has fallen short. The “Justice40 Initiative”  aimed to ensure that 40% of the benefits from climate and environmental programs would flow to Environmental Justice (EJ) communities (“Justice40 Initiative | Environmental Justice”). An EJ community is considered to be more affected by environmental hazards than others. These communities often include minority, low-income, indigenous, and tribal populations (“Environmental Justice | US EPA”). However, specifics as to what constitutes benefits, and how to satisfy the 40% rule remain undefined. 

The Inflation Reduction Act (2022) is the U.S. Congressional legislation aimed at curbing inflation, which includes measures such as changes in tax policies and investments in clean energy and infrastructure (“INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022”). However, the act fails to protect EJ communities and reduce fossil fuel production. Current trends suggest that oil and gas production, as well as exports, will nearly double by 2035. This will exacerbate the sufferings of communities impacted by gas and oil, namely black, brown, and indigenous communities in the Appalachia, Gulf of Mexico, and Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico (Rees). Furthermore, the Biden administration’s actions, such as auctioning off over 73 acres of Gulf of  Mexico public waters to oil and gas industries in Lease Sale 259 at the beginning of 2023 (“Lease Sale 259”), pose significant environmental risks. This auction marked the largest offshore lease sale in U.S. history,  with the potential for severe impacts on EJ, such as the extinction of endangered species like the Rice’s whales, an increased risk of oil spill, and substantial greenhouse gas emissions (Meigs).

Climate reparations represent a critical aspect of climate justice. These reparations offer a means to take responsibility and support low-income countries grappling with the devastating effects of climate change. At the CoP27 in Egypt (November 2022), a landmark agreement was reached. This agreement established a loss and damage fund aimed at compensating poor and vulnerable nations for their climate-related losses funded by developed countries. Despite being one of the world’s largest historical emitters of greenhouse gasses,  the United States has staunchly opposed efforts to contribute. In fact, the US Climate envoy, John Kerry, stated in July last year that the country would not pay reparations “under any circumstances” to developing countries hit by climate change-induced disasters (Slow). Regardless of stated commitments to environmental justice, such actions underscore the need for greater accountability and coherence in U.S. climate and environmental policies. Moreover, the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration dealt a severe blow to global efforts to address climate change. While President Biden re-joined the agreement, the damage to America’s reputation as a reliable partner in climate action had already been done. This back and forth on climate positions of the U.S. erodes trust and hinders progress. 

The US appears to be caught in a frustrating deadlock between two polarized political factions. Wherein one side is reluctant to recognize the urgency of addressing climate change altogether, the other side seemingly acknowledges its urgency but reflects inconsistency and duplicity in its actions. This has led the U.S. to a standstill in its climate policies. Amidst the recent conflict in the Middle East, President Biden chose not to attend the 2023 UN climate summit, CoP 28, held in the UAE (Joselow). This move implies a diminishing prioritization and a waning emphasis on climate change action and policies.  

Ultimately, addressing America’s climate hypocrisy requires more than just rhetoric – it demands bold and decisive actions. This requires a fundamental shift in priorities, policies, and practices to align with the urgent need to mitigate the climate crisis. This will have the effect of transitioning into a sustainable, low-carbon, and clean energy future. Global warming has recently exceeded the 1.5°C threshold target as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Surpassing this threshold amplifies the likelihood and risk of severe impacts on ecosystems and regions beyond the global tolerance levels (Di Liberto). The stakes are too high to continue down the path of half-measures and empty promises.

*******

Yashwani Kularia is a first-year Graduate Student at NYU’s Center of Global Affairs (CGA) pursuing an MS in Global Affairs with a concentration in Transnational Security with a twin specialization in Data Analytics and the United Nations. Her academic and research interests include exploring cross-border terrorism, multiple forms of extremism, counterterrorism, and geopolitics. She has worked with the Ramboll as a Junior Consultant and at the US Army War College as an intern. In addition to her studies, she serves as President of the Student Association of Global Affairs (SAGA) for the academic year 2024-2025.


Works Cited

Di Liberto, Tom. “What’s in a number? The meaning of the 1.5-C climate threshold.” Climate.gov, 9 January 2024, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/features/whats-number-meaning-15-c-climate-threshold. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“Environmental Justice | US EPA.” Environmental Protection Agency, 6 February 2024, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Temporary Pause on Pending Approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports.” The White House, 26 January 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/26/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-temporary-pause-on-pending-approvals-of-liquefied-natural-gas-exports/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Gardner, Timothy. “Biden admin greenlights LNG exports from Alaska project.” Reuters, 14 April 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/biden-admin-greenlights-lng-exports-alaska-project-document-2023-04-14/. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022.” Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/inflation-reduction-act-2022. Accessed 26 April 2024.

Joselow, Maxine. “Biden to skip world leaders’ summit at COP28 climate talks in Dubai.” Washington Post, 26 November 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/11/26/biden-cop28-climate-summit-dubai/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Justice40 Initiative | Environmental Justice.” The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Lease Sale 259.” Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 29 March 2023, https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/lease-sale-259. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Meigs, James B. “The Big Squeeze: How Biden’s Environmental Justice Agenda Hurts the Economy and the Environment.” Manhattan Institute, 7 September 2023, https://manhattan.institute/article/how-bidens-environmental-justice-agenda-hurts-economy-and-environment. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Rees, Collin. “Biden’s Fossil Fuel Fail: How U.S. Oil & Gas Supply Rises under the Inflation Reduction Act.” Oil Change International, 20 November 2023, https://priceofoil.org/2023/11/20/fossil-fuel-fail/. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Ronayne, Kathleen, and Ellen Knickmeyer. “Biden calls for ‘transition’ from oil, GOP sees opening.” AP News, 23 October 2020, https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-technology-climate-26908b855045d5ce7342fd01be8bcc10. Accessed 4 April 2024.

Slow, Oliver. “US refuses climate reparations for developing nations.” BBC, 13 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66197366. Accessed 4 April 2024.

“Texas oil and gas group says industry is surging.” The Texas Tribune, 30 January 2024, https://www.texastribune.org/2024/01/30/texas-oil-gas-association-annual-report/. Accessed 26 April 2024.

“United States produces more crude oil than any country, ever.” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 11 March 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545. Accessed 26 April 2024.

Filed Under: Environment & Energy Policy, Opinion

Comparative Security of the Maritime Flow of Petroleum-Based Energy

March 28, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Raghvendra Kumar, PhD. 

The security of the maritime flow of petroleum-based energy will be a critical determinant for both New Delhi and Beijing, while India’s geographical proximity to the source of oil and gas exporting countries will always provide India and its Navy with an upper hand to exploit Beijing’s security-of-energy vulnerability. (Photo Source: Venti Views on Unsplash). 

India and China are net importers of oil and gas and are heavily dependent on overseas energy supplies for their sustained economic expansion and development. They import oil and gas from various geographical regions, including countries from West Asia, Africa, and South America. The critical commodities sourced from the hydrocarbon resource-rich regions of West Asia and Africa are of significant value to India and China, “as these two regions alone accounted for 64.5% and 63% of oil imports, respectively, in 2022” (Economic Times & U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022). However, the increased flow of cheap oil from Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict has become a lucrative alternative to West Asia, Africa, and South America in China’s energy security matrix. 

However, replacing West Asia, Africa, and South America as the primary suppliers of oil to China requires three factors, according to scholarly analysis. First, the share of renewable energy sources should overtake conventional sources in China’s energy mix. The share of renewable sources of energy in India’s and China’s energy mix is bound to rise at a decent pace. Both India and China have set ambitious renewable energy targets, with India aiming to achieve 450 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity by 2030, including 280 GW of solar energy and 140 GW of wind energy, while China targets to increase its non-fossil fuel energy consumption to 25% and reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 (Economic Times, & U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022). Despite significant progress in the cost of production and feasibility, the limitations on renewable energy’s widespread utility, availability, adoption and efficiency remind us how dependent the world is on fossil fuel —especially oil and gas.  Second, a significant increase in the share of natural gas in China’s energy mix could end its dependence on oil, allowing huge volumes of gas to be imported through pipelines from gas-rich areas of Central Asia and Russia. China “currently consumes around 13.4 million barrels per day (b/d)” (Reuters, 2022) and “imports 11.8 million b/d” (Reale, Bingham, and Greenberg, 2), of which only a fraction is transported through pipelines. Further, the adaptation of China’s national industry to a gas-based economy is possible but will not be swift as it faces several hurdles. Firstly, significant investment in infrastructure like pipelines and storage facilities is needed, demanding time for planning and implementation. Secondly, technological challenges in altering industrial processes from oil and coal to natural gas are prominent. Thirdly, resistance from existing industries and stakeholders poses a barrier to change. Lastly, economic factors, including costs and potential disruptions, need careful management. Overall, the transition is expected to be gradual due to these complexities. Consequently, reliance on oil will be critical for China for a foreseeable period. 

The third factor addresses the practicality and affordability of alternative maritime routes, such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is questionable considering  China’s security-of-energy strategy. The NSR constitutes a vital maritime corridor connecting Europe and Asia via the northern regions of Russia. The “NSR is the shortest route linking Europe to East and South East Asia,” and, “until the 20th century, due to its harsh icebound environment, oceanographic ships conducting surveys were the primary users, but the ice-free period in summer has become longer every year, making it the better condition for sailing” (Hataya and Huang, 4). This renewed attention is primarily driven by the potential for extended navigational periods and the resultant cost and time reductions associated with utilizing these emerging shipping lanes. The all-weather accessibility of NSR due to adverse impacts of climate change could provide an indisputable advantage over the conventional route passing through the Indian Ocean via the choke points of the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca strait to Beijing as an alternative sea route. However,  in comparison to other sea routes, the NSR is still underdeveloped (The Japan Association of Marine Safety, 2016). It poses several limitations, including a lack of specialised tanker fleets, equipment, and supporting infrastructure, hindering its wider suitability because the Northern Sea is comparatively more vulnerable to environmental factors than the Indian Ocean, “especially during winters” (United States Coast Guard, 6). Therefore, since the relevance of crude oil and natural gas is not going to diminish in the strategic calculations of India and China, the centrality of the Persian Gulf remains crucial. 

The pivotal role of West Asia and Africa in India (the world’s third-largest consumer and importer of oil) and China (the world’s largest consumer and importer of oil) is sure to intensify as their future demand for overseas oil and gas is expected to rise at a significant pace due to their “rapid rate of growth and development and increased per capita demand” (The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) 8). By 2050, the share of oil and gas will be around 32%  (International Energy Agency 2019) in China’s and 39% (BP 2023) in India’s total energy mix, a projection that challenges the conventional assumption that renewable sources of energy will undermine the importance of oil and gas. This continued centrality of West Asia, Africa and South America in Beijing’s and New Delhi’s security-of-energy is primarily determined by geography. Oil coming from Venezuela on Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) that draw too much water cannot maneuver the shallow depths of the Panama Canal and, therefore, must sail almost halfway around the world to reach India and China.  Similarly, oil from Nigeria, Libya, Angola, and rest of Africa must either pass from the Suez Canal or through the Cape of Good Hope, whereas the oil from the Persian Gulf has to pass through the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, situating India and China on the same plane of geographical vulnerability. However, New Delhi gains a comparative advantage due to its central location in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), close to the primary sources (West Asia and Africa) from where it imports the majority of its oil and gas. However, this becomes a critical vulnerability for China, which has no direct access to the IOR. China imports “nearly 75% of its oil from abroad,” most of which is imported from a single geographical region, the Persian Gulf (Government of China, 2022). The Persian Gulf is separated from the east coast of China by two major natural choke points, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca.  

China’s vulnerability is demonstrated by the close proximity of the  Indian island territories of Andaman and Nicobar to the Strait of Malacca, while the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, and the East African Coast are near India’s western seaboard. This gives New Delhi substantial influence over vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that carry the bulk of China’s oil and other merchandise trade.  Therefore, by virtue of geographical positioning, New Delhi and its Navy is in a commanding position to control the China-bound maritime movement of oil and gas. The Indian Navy’s sustained presence through its mission-based deployments around the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, the Mozambique Channel, and its strategic approaches to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar, Central and South Indian Ocean provides it with strategic depth to counter several contingencies that may arise. These deployments enable New Delhi to easily interdict China-bound oil, causing anxiety in Beijing and further amplifying its vulnerability.

China, in order to circumvent the vulnerability of its energy systems, is investing heavily in its Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and expanding the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s role and presence in the IOR.  In the past decade, “China, through its BRI project in Pakistan, aims to invest approximately US$ 62 billion”  (Brookings Institution, 2020) in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Chinese strategic community views the CPEC as a means to promote the idea that Gwadar port will serve as a bypass to the Strait of Malacca. However, in order for this to be possible, two factors should be taken into account. First, to transport the bulk of West Asian oil to China through a series of pipelines, one must account for the elevation from Gwadar, a port city in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan, to Kashgar in the Xinjiang province of China, which sits at an elevation of approximately 1500 meters. However, this route passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, “which is part of the Kashmir region under illegal occupation by Pakistan” (MEA 2020), and “includes the highest point, Khunjerab Pass, at roughly 4500 meters elevation” (South China Morning Post n.d.). This disputed territory, coupled with the high elevation, would pose significant challenges. Therefore, transporting oil through pipelines as a solution to China’s problem is neither feasible nor cost-effective. A second option for China to bypass the Malacca Strait would be through a network of highways and rail links – which also happens to be one of the major thrust areas of CPEC. Despite Gwadar’s “strategic positioning” at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which can facilitate the movement of the bulk of China’s oil, the depth of the Gwadar port becomes the most significant limitation. Due to siltation, the port requires dredging of the approach channels at regular intervals to “increase the depth to 14 metres from the current 11.5 metres” (The Nation, 2022). In order to enable the docking of ships with a deadweight tonnage (DWT) of up to 70,000 DWT, while the “current capacity permits a maximum of 20,000 DWT” (Kardon, Kennedy, and Dutton, 13). This makes the process expensive and limits its practical usage by bulk oil carriers. Further, the lack of capacity and requisite infrastructure to offload the VLCC is another aspect that limits the use of Gwadar Port as an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca. 

In comparison, India’s strategic position at the intersection of international shipping lanes entitles New Delhi and its Navy to effectively and efficiently use hard power tools to interdict China’s oil supply, crippling its economy. China is aware of its comparative disadvantage manifested by the ‘harness of geography.’ This geographical reality is at the cusp of its strategic and operational planning as it sees the Indian Navy as a threat in its security dilemma. Thus, the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas at an affordable price is critical to India’s and China’s national security as their societal and economic well-being is entwined with unhindered access to these critical commodities. 

In conclusion, despite the desire and efforts undertaken to transition away from fossil fuels — oil and gas will remain dominant in India’s and China’s energy mix. They will continue to consume significant amounts of oil and gas to meet their growing economic and per capita demand. In this context, the security of the maritime flow of petroleum-based energy will be a critical determinant for both New Delhi and Beijing while India’s geographical proximity to the source of oil and gas exporting countries will always provide it and its Navy an upper hand to exploit Beijing’s security-of-energy vulnerability.

*******

Dr. Raghvendra Kumar holds a PhD in African Studies from the University of Delhi, specializing in Indian Ocean geopolitics and India’s and China’s involvement in East African Island States. Previously, he served as an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) in New Delhi. Before his tenure at NMF, he taught undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Maharaja Agrasen College, University of Delhi, India. He can be reached at raghvendrakumar2007@gmail.com.

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, DG, NMF, for his invaluable feedback and insights provided to the author during his tenure as an Associate Fellow at the NMF. His expertise and guidance significantly contributed to the refinement of this research paper.


Works Cited

BP. “India Insights.” BP Energy Outlook, 2023. www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook/country-and-regional-insights/india-insights.html. Accessed 23 September 2023.

Brookings Institution. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” The Brookings Institution, 15 June 2020. www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_pakistan_afzal_v2.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2023.

Economic Times. “India’s Russian Oil Binge Drags Down Opec’s Share to Lowest in 2022.” The Economic Times, 23 Aug. 2022. economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/commodities/news/indias-russian-oil-binge-drags-down-opecs-share-to-lowest-in-2022/articleshow/97065032.cms. Accessed 19 September 2023.

Government of China. “A Report on the Work of the Government (2022).” English.www.gov.cn, 24 Feb. 2022. english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202202/24/content_WS6216e221c6d09c94e48a569e.html. Accessed 23 September 2023.

Hataya, Sakiko, and Huang, Michael C. “The Opportunity and Challenges of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) after the Suez Obstruction of 2021.” OPRI Perspectives No.22 [2021], SPF (Sasakawa Peace Foundation) Ocean Policy Research Institute, p. 4, https://www.spf.org/opri-intl/global-data/report/perspectives/20210804165958118.pdfAccessed 24 September 2023.

Kardon, Isaac B., Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton. “China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China’s Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan.” 2020. CMSI China Maritime Reports, no. 7. Digital Commons, US Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7. Accessed 8 March 2024.

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) “QUESTION NO.606: BRI AND CPEC.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 05, 2020.  www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/32353/QUESTION+NO606+BRI+AND+CPEC. Accessed 8 March 2024.

The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). “China Energy Outlook 2050.” CNPC ETRI, 2018, eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/8192.pdf. pp 1-58. Accessed 24 September 2023.

International Energy Agency. “2050 World and China Energy Outlook 2019.” ResearchGate, 2019,www.researchgate.net/publication/345151631_2050_World_and_China_Energy_Outlook_2019. Accessed 20 September 2023.

Reale, Hannah, Emma Bingham, and Kara Greenberg. “Where Does China Get Its Oil?” The Wire China, 12 July 2020. www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Where%20Does%20China%20Get%20Its%20Oil_%20-%20The%20Wire%20China.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2023.

Reuters. “China’s Re-Opening J-Curve: Oil Consumption.” Reuters, 13 Dec. 2022, www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-re-opening-j-curve-oil-consumption-2022-12-13/. Accessed 19 September 2023.

South China Morning Post. “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Is the Jewel in the Crown of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative.” South China Morning Post, multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/pakistan.html.

The Japan Association of Marine Safety. “Northern Sea Route Handbook”. https://www.nikkaibo.or.jp/pdf/NorthernSeaRouteHandbook_E.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2023.

The Nation. “Depth of Gwadar Deep Sea Port Reduces to 11 Meters Due to Siltation.” The Nation, 13 May 2022, www.nation.com.pk/13-May-2022/depth-of-gwadar-deep-sea-port-reduces-to-11-meters-due-to-siltation. Accessed 25 September 2023.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. “China.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Jan. 2022. ww.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/china.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2023.

United States Coast Guard. “Arctic Search and Rescue.” Department of Homeland Security, 2020 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USCG%20-%20Arctic%20Search%20and%20Rescue_1.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2023.

Filed Under: Environment & Energy Policy, Global Economy, International Relations/Global Futures, Opinion

Humanitarian Drones: Uses and Ethics 

March 25, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Jolie Pont
As the possibilities that drones offer the globe increases, it is inevitable that the ethical issues surrounding their implementation will rise. The humanitarian field is no exception to this. This paper outlines not only the several uses that drones play in the humanitarian field, but the ethical consequences that can, and do, arise. (Photo credit: Alessio Soggetti on Unsplash)
 

In 1889, the first ever portable camera was unveiled, revolutionizing the world of photography (Fischer et al., 1). 30 years later, the first unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) was constructed in 1918 to attack enemies over short distances during WWI (Estrada and Ndoma, 375). Later, in 2006, UAVs were first utilized for humanitarian aid as surveillance technology in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and then in 2010, to provide satellite imagery after the Haiti Earthquake (Wynsberghe & Comes, 2019). Drones proved to be very helpful in humanitarian aid but were still not widely used in the humanitarian field. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, worldwide use of military and civil drones has increased dramatically since (West & Bowman, 2). This rapid increase in drone usage begs the question of how drones can help in humanitarian aid and what the potential concerns are that come alongside this new technology. 

Drones were initially implemented as merely surveillance tools for a handful of actors in humanitarian operations (Wynsberghe & Comes, 2019). While the military increased UAV technology, the humanitarian field quickly latched on and applied it to their missions (Haidari et al. 2016). As technology improved, drones were used to inspect damage after natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons and deliver aid during the Ebola outbreak (Want et al., 4). Because of these improvements, drones became more popular as they served genuine needs, such as surveillance info and communication. Drones became attractive to the media, the UN, and several humanitarian NGOs, irrespective of their potential negative outcomes (Wynsberghe & Comes, 2019). 

Surveillance 

Drones have many different application possibilities, and many of them will be outlined in this paper. The first usage is the most practical: surveillance capabilities. Capable of getting a bird’s eye view of a physical location, drones have a natural advantage in surveillance applications. Surveillance is the most widespread use of military drones today and has been used in humanitarian operations since the mid-1990s in Bosnia (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). Ostensibly, surveillance drones (military or humanitarian) are not inherently malicious. Drones are used to fulfill legitimate goals like stopping crime and finding missing persons (Fischer et al., 1). Drones are a low-cost option for acquiring high-resolution images and guaranteeing the safety of operational crews that do not have to go into dangerous areas.

Compared to older techniques of acquiring imagery, drones can be superior (Tatsidou et al., 2). For example, after an earthquake in Nepal, experts and Kathmandu University students utilized drones to help the most affected communities. Drones were used to create large-scale aerial maps to provide information on the location of safe drinking water, dangerous debris, displaced people, and ruined buildings. This information was used to inform navigation crews transporting aid (Tatsidou et al., 2). Without the use of these humanitarian drones,  these relief efforts would have incurred greater costs, required more time, and posed greater risks.

Humanitarian drones provide benefits. For example, UAVs provide numerous benefits in surveillance opportunities, including the ability to fly at low levels, reach remote locations, host multiple sensors, capture images at various angles, and carry out any scale of operation (Brighenti et al., 2). The next best option in these situations is helicopters, but if helicopters are being used to obtain imagery, they are unavailable to simultaneously deliver heavy cargo. Drones are also more cost-effective compared to helicopters. UAVs cost about $50,000 to purchase and $75 an hour to operate. In contrast, military helicopters can cost up to $40,000,000 and over $300 an hour to operate (West & Bowman, 4). Drones are also safer in many cases. Sending in operational crews to disaster areas poses serious dangers in active sites, whereas the worst-case scenario with the deployment of a drone is that it gets destroyed or damaged — a preferable alternative to losing human lives.

Natural Disaster Response 

Alongside surveillance, humanitarian drones can respond immediately to natural disaster emergencies. First responders have found drone abilities to be imperative in disaster response (Tatsidou et al., 4). In disaster management, the first step is assessing specific requirements. Considering that  UAVs do not rely on buildings or roads that are frequently destroyed in natural disasters, they can provide the initial response in delivering aid and information (Bravo et al., 6). 

For example, after the 2009 Sichuan earthquake in China, 69,000 people were killed, and 18,000 were missing (Estrade & Ndoma, 7). Quadcopter drones were sent in to evaluate the damage and were able to detect and evaluate highways, buildings, schools, hospitals, electric plants, bridges, tunnels, and population-dense locations (Estrada & Ndoma, 7). This information was extremely valuable in finding missing persons and identifying the most affected areas. Aid operational crews that rely on roads and require more time would not have been as impactful in this situation. After the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, quadcopters were specifically used to evaluate the damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Estrada & Ndoma, 7). This type of aid might not be possible without drones, as sending crews close to a damaged nuclear power plant is unsafe. 

There are numerous other examples of drones in environmental disasters, but Nepal, in particular, has some interesting applications. In 2015, Nepal suffered a major earthquake, and similar to China, they used quadcopters to evaluate the damage and rebuild the area based on the photos and videos taken at different locations (Estrada & Ndoma, 7). In addition, UAVs with thermal cameras were also utilized. These cameras could sense body heat under rubble and aided rescue groups in prioritizing which areas to prioritize (Bravo et al., 2). As technology is always progressing, drones currently on the market have sensors equipped with sensors that can detect breathing and heartbeats (Tatsidou et al., 2). These capabilities are not only an incredible technological advancement but the benefits they could provide are life-changing. After natural disasters like earthquakes, it is impossible to pinpoint which parts of rubble bodies may be under. Even if the person under the debris is alive, it is unlikely that they will be able to verbally cry out for help. Aid groups only have so much time to get under the rubble and save people, and when an entire area is rubble after an earthquake, it can be difficult to choose a location to prioritize. Drones that can tell where someone might be under rubble provide monumental benefits of humanitarian aid in these situations. 

Aid Delivery

Surveillance might be the most ‘obvious’ application of drones, but drones are also being utilized in delivering small amounts of aid. This alternative application changes the dynamic because instead of humanitarians interacting with the drones, the beneficiaries of the aid are interacting with the drones. This leaves space for some ethical issues, which will be expanded upon later in the paper. 

This application of drones as delivery systems of aid was introduced in part as a solution to issues with the current system. Current aid delivery of materials such as food, water, clothing, and medical supplies takes far too much time in urgent situations (Haidari et al., 2016). For example, in low and middle-income countries, immunization programs face various issues in getting vaccines to those who need them (Haidari et al., 2016). After entering a country, vaccine vials travel by road and are stored in multiple storage locations before arriving at clinics (Haidari et al. 2016). Vaccines are commonly spoiled and wasted throughout this lengthy process before they can be administered. This has led experts to believe that an innovative and cheaper distribution system needs to be implemented (Haidari et al., 2016).  

Drone delivery services that can send anything from vaccines, HIV tests, bandages, and blood have the ability to revolutionize medical aid in humanitarian interventions. For example, drones have the ability to deliver vaccines much more efficiently and ensure that no vaccine is spoiled. Furthermore, drones can be useful in curbing the transmission of infectious diseases like COVID-19. A robot can’t catch a human virus.

In Papua New Guinea, drones have been very successful in the delivery of medical supplies. Papua New Guinea is struggling with some of the world’s highest rates of tuberculosis and is in desperate need of medical aid to treat and prevent illness (Tatsidou et al., 3). Drones have been implemented to carry microbiological samples, vaccines, and medications to rural and remote areas that would not otherwise have access (Tatsidou et al., 3). 

The proliferation of drones could also help to eliminate the frequency of corruption and theft in aid delivery (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). Aid is commonly stolen or sold to rebel groups in humanitarian operations, preventing those who need the aid from receiving it. These logistical problems could be alleviated by implementing drones in aid delivery.

Search And Rescue Operations 

Lastly, another way drones can be used in humanitarian settings is for search and rescue operations. The critical factor in the success of a search and rescue (SAR) operation is a fast visual survey of the situation from a bird’s eye view. In SAR operations, a victim could be surrounded by extremely dangerous conditions that are hard to navigate, making it unsafe for a rescue team to go in blind (Tatsidou et al., 1). Drones are perfectly suited for this need. The ability to have a bird’s eye view and not rely on roads or dangerous pathways is essential for quickly rescuing someone in danger. This is yet another marvelous humanitarian application of drones. 

There are lots of great examples of drones being used in SAR operations. The Air Force currently uses drones for SAR after natural disasters, such as Global Hawk in the 2007 California wildfires, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan, and the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). These relief operations would be very dangerous if rescue teams were to proceed without information about the terrain.

In Dry Creek, a canyon in the Columbia Gorge National Scenic area in Oregon, a man ascended the rock and continued 15 meters above a waterfall. His group members then saw him slip and fall the 15 meters he had just ascended and disappear into a slot canyon at the top of the waterfall (Tilburg 2017).  It was unsafe for group members to go in and find him without risking a similar fall, so they called the fire department. The fire department showed up an hour later, alongside the mountain with rescue responders. The firefighters could not ascend the route the victim took as it was unsafe. Additionally, they could not safely ascend the cliff without rock-climbing protection – which they did not have (Tilburg, 2017).  With the fire department and rescue team unable to help, a local resident brought in their personal drone (a quadcopter) to help the situation. The resident flew the UAV into the slot canyon, about 30 meters away and 30 meters high. Tragically, the images acquired confirmed that the man did not survive the fall, and the rescue team came by the following day with the proper equipment to recover the body (Tilburg, 2017).  As unfortunate as this tragedy was, it is incredible what a resident’s drone was able to do. Had this drone not been used, the rescue team would have eventually rappelled down the slot canyon, a very risky task, to locate the remains of the body. Subsequently, they would have had to ascend and descend multiple times to retrieve the remains. Implementing a drone meant they did not have to make multiple risky trips.

Humanitarian workers have spoken about drone efficiency while in SAR operations. They claim that UAVs help by monitoring difficult areas such as flooding and landslides and monitoring conditions of rivers, forests, and water. They are also helpful for estimating the number of people injured and delivering medical supplies and small devices. Lastly, they can serve as points of communication, with the ability to reach interest points quickly so teams don’t have to go into dangerous areas (Bravo et al., 16). It is good to speculate from the outside what good drones can provide. However, hearing this from humanitarians themselves and seeing how drones are already being implemented underscores the crucial role drones play in SAR operations. 

Ethical Considerations

Even though drones in humanitarian emergencies have proven to be abundantly helpful, they do not come without various consequences and ethical concerns. Skepticism is constantly increasing, with reports of drones being invasive, unauthorized, and threatening, leading to a lack of trust and feelings of insecurity (Tatsidou et al., 4). New technology frequently has many ethical implications, especially when regulations are still being implemented. This section will explore the various emerging ethical issues regarding the utilization of drones.

Privacy

Privacy concern is a universal fear when it comes to humanitarian, military, and even personal recreational drones. Regulations and safeguards around drone usage are currently insufficient. As aforementioned, drone usage for surveillance is crucial in many humanitarian operations, but ensuring that they are used only to gather necessary information and not to spy on citizens is a genuine concern (Bravo et al., 17). Even in the humanitarian sphere, this fear that privacy could be compromised through the unlawful use of drones through data collection has started to make waves (Tatsidou et al., 3). Drones performing surveillance can be seen as either justifiable deployment with the intent to save lives or oppressive technology catering to the interests of people with power, at the expense of those who are vulnerable (West & Bowman, 3). With the realization that proper regulations are not in place to ensure proper drone usage, this lack of transparency and accountability threatens the rule of law in international security (Takemura).

Hypothetically, let us say that there was a drone taking videos of an area after an earthquake with the purpose of finding a route for aid operations. However, someone operating the drone snaps an image of a child and likes the picture. Through whatever means, the photo ends up being sold to a newspaper, and then the photo is used as advertisement material. Although this may seem far-fetched, it has occurred. There are frequently photos of injured or malnourished children being used as advertisements for a range of NGOs. In this situation, the child clearly suffered an injustice. Without their consent, they are now part of an advertisement. The issue here is assigning responsibility to someone. Is it the drone technician, the person who ordered the use of the drone, or whoever sold the photo? Responsibility is entirely unregulated. When a robot is technically the perpetrator of the situation, who takes the blame? 

Impact on Local Communities 

With drones becoming increasingly commonplace, their impact on local communities needs to be considered. In interviews with humanitarian workers currently in the field, it was explicitly mentioned that in SAR operations, local populations demonstrated negative feelings and reactions toward the usage of drones. Many of the beneficiaries of drone aid are refugees with severe trauma and do not know if a drone has malicious intent. Understandably, this can lead to fear, anxiety, and even rejection of the aid provided by the drone (Bravo et al., 17). This is precisely because it is impossible to distinguish the purpose of a drone, especially from several meters high. As previously mentioned, drones were first invented for military purposes, with humanitarian usage being implemented later on. Many still see drones as solely military devices. 

Due to the understanding by many that drones are tools of war and control, some humanitarians believe that, regardless of the potential positive impact, drones should not be used in humanitarian settings. At this point in time, there is no way for someone receiving aid via drone to know if it is carrying weapons to an army, blood to a local hospital, or aid intended for them. The inability to know the intent of the drone is also exacerbated during wartime (Tatsidou et a., 9). For the time being, drones will be assumed to have malicious intentions until their use in humanitarian aid is more universally understood. 

The PlayStation Phenomenon 

The last ethical implication to discuss is the PlayStation phenomenon. When people are behind a screen, they tend to act differently.  It is easier to dehumanize someone when behind a screen, which leads to making different choices than when looking at someone in real life. The PlayStation phenomenon is precisely this. The PlayStation phenomenon makes it less likely that the person controlling a remote drone will hesitate to use lethal force because physical distance can break physiological barriers that stop one person from killing another (Takemura). Physical and psychological distance plays a role in dehumanization, which is required for killing in wartime and is an aspect of military practice that could pose real consequences for humanitarian intervention (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). It is clear that drones are helpful, but only in the right hands. 

This phenomenon might seem like it only applies to military drones, where the soldier or officer operating the drone cannot be trusted to use it properly due to being behind a screen. However,  this is also slowly seeping into the humanitarian field. Firstly, there are instances of humanitarian intervention that involve the use of force. There are humanitarian wars, where the purpose of the war is not necessarily political or about power but about the pursuit of human rights and the protection of those who were wronged. Drones could also be deployed to fire humanitarian missiles, missiles being used in the interest of humanitarian aid as opposed to war.’Depending on the operator’s perception of who deserves it from wherever in the world they are, this could cause consequences (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). Here, the line between military drones and humanitarian drones is more blurred. However, the PlayStation phenomenon remains an ethical implication even in non-force settings. Loyalty to those on the ground can shape where operators direct drones, what types of footage are captured, and how footage is interpreted (Sandvik & Lohne, 12). This psychological distance can sway an operator’s perception of what is happening on the field and shift their decision-making. As drones become more common, this effect will likely increase, which is something to keep in mind. 

Should Drones be Used?

Considering these ethical implications, it, of course, begs the question of whether or not drones should even be used for humanitarian interventions. Drones can gather data and provide small bits of short-term physical aid. Nevertheless, is it worth the possibility of corruption and violating privacy? It is not surprising that with new technology, new ethical issues arise. However, there does seem to be a pattern to the ethicality. The root of ethicality seems to be whether the drone is interacting with the humanitarian in the field themselves or the beneficiary of the humanitarian aid.

When the humanitarian interacts with the UAV, there is less concern for the ethical implications. If the drone is nowhere near the beneficiary, their privacy and autonomy are not at risk, and fear of malicious intentions is not of concern. The PlayStation phenomenon is lessened because the humanitarian on the field can deliver and utilize whatever service the drone provides, such as aid and missiles, and distribute it appropriately. On the other hand, when the drone interacts with the beneficiary of the aid, issues of privacy of the beneficiary, whether or not the drone is malicious, and the PlayStation phenomenon become increasingly apparent. 

It seems that in this situation, the way to use drones ethically is to keep the usage of drones solely to the humanitarian workers themselves. This application would mean that drones in humanitarian operations such as SAR with a team at the site, drones delivering medical supplies to a hospital, and drones locating bodies under rubble operated by someone on the scene pose less ethical threats to the beneficiaries of humanitarian intervention. However, at this time, drones that deliver aid to people when an operational crew cannot get to them can not be performed ethically. As drone technology becomes more common, and its various uses become more well-known, it might become ethical to have drones interacting with beneficiaries of humanitarian aid. Alternatively, if regulations become stricter and more reliable, it is also possible that humanitarian aid of this form could become objectively ethical. However,  for the time being, this does not seem possible. 

Suggestions for Regulations 

Regulations about drones in general, specifically humanitarian drones, could involve numerous different suggestions. First, it makes sense to have some kind of distance regulation for aid beneficiaries. If someone uses a drone in SAR operations, regulations on how close a drone can be from stranded individuals seem justifiable. This distance is far enough so the person does not feel in harm’s way but also close enough for modern-day cameras to get all the necessary information. With regards to surveillance drones, some type of conventions should also be created concerning surveillance drones to lay out regulations for drones that collect data. Negotiations should be held on topics such as what pictures can be taken, how they are regulated, what official governmental body is reviewing data that is stored, and what kind of drones should be used. 

Even though drones are not commonplace right now, they will become increasingly prevalent as the technology advances and replaces more expensive options like helicopters. There are humanitarian organizations that are currently choosing to take a principled stance against the usage of drones, but these organizations have been criticized. This stance is seen as a rejection of “live-saving technology” (Bravo et al., 17). that could help people. Humanitarian workers have argued that,

Soon, human rights groups will actually be demanding that drones be included as a staple ingredient in peacekeeping operations. Opting not to use drones could indeed someday be a breach of international humanitarian law as a failure to take all measures to protect civilians and document violations (Bravo et al., 17).  

This argument is, of course, just a prediction and speculation, but it does seem to be reasonable. Drones have shown impressive capabilities to benefit those who are struggling while still protecting the humanitarian workers themselves. It seems impractical to reject new technology because there are some ethical implications to get around and to let the ethical implications prevent someone from doing the right thing. Especially when options to find ethical ways to do it are available. 

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Jolie Pont is a first-year Graduate Student at the Center for Global Affairs, with a concentration in Human Rights and International Law at NYU. With a background in International Relations and Global Affairs, her research includes gender and migration, drones in immigration practices, global economics, and human rights law. In addition to her studies, she works part-time at the Brooklyn-based nonprofit Neighbors Together as a housing advocate. Jolie hopes to work in humanitarian aid and assistance upon graduation. 
 

Works Cited

Bravo, Raissa Zurli Bittencourt, et al. “The Use of UAVs in Humanitarian Relief: An Application of POMDP‐Based Methodology for Finding Victims.” Production & Operations Management, vol. 28, no. 2, Feb. 2019, pp. 421–440. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12930. 

Brighenti, Fabio, et al. “UAV Survey Method to Monitoring and Analyzing Geological Hazards: The Case Study of Mud Volcano of Villaggio Santa Barbara, Caltanissetta (Sicily).” Natural Hazards & Earth System Sciences Discussions, Dec. 2020, pp. 1–31. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-378.

Estrada, Mario Arturo Ruiz, and Abrahim Ndoma. “The Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAV’s- (or Drones) in Social Logistic: Natural Disasters Response and Humanitarian Relief Aid.” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 149, Feb. 2019, pp. 375–383. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2019.01.151.

Fischer, Amy Sherry, et al. “Drones: A New Front in the Fight between Government Interests and Privacy Concerns.” Defense Counsel Journal, vol. 84, no. 4, Oct. 2017, pp. 1–14. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.defcon84.26&site=eds-live.

Haidari, Leila A., et al. “The Economic and Operational Value of Using Drones to Transport Vaccines.” Vaccine, vol. 34, no. 34, July 2016, pp. 4062–4067. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.06.022.

Sandvik, K. B., and K. Lohne. “The Rise of the Humanitarian Drone: Giving Content to an Emerging Concept.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, Sept. 2014, pp. 145-164. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814529470.

Takemura, H. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Humanization from International Humanitarian Law.” Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 32, no. 3, Jan. 2014, pp. 521–546. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.wisint32.24&site=eds-live.

Evanthia Tatsidou, et al. “Reflecting upon the Humanitarian Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones).” Swiss Medical Weekly, vol. 149, no. 1314, Apr. 2019. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.4414/smw.2019.20065.

Van Tilburg, C. “First Report of Using Portable Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Drones) for Search and Rescue.” Wilderness and Environmental Medicine, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2017, pp. 116-118–118. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wem.2016.12.010.

Wang, Ning, et al. “Ethical Considerations Associated with ‘Humanitarian Drones’: A Scoping Literature Review.” Science & Engineering Ethics, vol. 27, no. 4, Aug. 2021, pp. 1–21. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00327-4.

West, Jonathan P., and James S. Bowman. “The Domestic Use of Drones: An Ethical Analysis of Surveillance Issues.” Public Administration Review, vol. 76, no. 4, July 2016, pp. 649–59. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.pbcamnstn76.136&site=eds-live.

van Wynsberghe, Aimee, and Tina Comes. “Drones in Humanitarian Contexts, Robot Ethics, and the Human–robot Interaction.” Ethics & Information Technology, vol. 22, no. 1, Mar. 2020, pp. 43–53. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09514-1.

 

Filed Under: International Development & Humanitarian Assistance, International Relations/Global Futures

Book Review: Travels of a T-shirt in the Global Economy by Pietra Rivoli

March 20, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Rachel Teng

How far would you travel to investigate the making of a t-shirt? Sparked by an anti-globalisation protest in 1999 at Georgetown University where she taught, the book’s author spent six years digging into how a t-shirt is produced right down to its raw cotton origins. Beyond economics, this book is an easy read about the interconnectedness of capital – both financial and human – through the perspective of politics, culture, and the social impact of globalisation. (Photo credit: Keagan Henman on Unsplash)

It is widely recognized that peaceful protests are organised  as a means of raising awareness about a certain issue. To find out that an anti-globalisation protest in 1999 at Georgetown University witnessed by the author sparked her six-year journey to investigate the full production trajectory of a cotton t-shirt was astonishing. Even if one were  unfamiliar with economic concepts and purely interested in just reading about functioning of  globalisation, Rivoli’s book is an entry-level work of  non-fiction that traces the path of a simple cotton T-shirt across its journey from a raw piece of cotton in the fields of Texas, to its manufacturing at a factory in China, to its final stage of being sold in the United States (US) and, eventually, the extension of its life as a used clothing product or as a recycled mattress filler in Africa. This book brings the reader along the ups and downs of globalisation, accentuating the level of interconnectedness amongst states with an increased flow of trade, investment, and capital, including human capital as labour – through a nexus of perspectives ranging from politics, trade and economics, as well as culture and ethics. 

The journey begins with an old Walgreens cotton t-shirt from Florida that the author found stashed in her cupboard. As she starts digging into the origins of the t-shirt, she starts off the book with a history of the cotton industry in the 1950s, which was initially dominated by the US as a result of e national farm subsidies. While in violation of the World Trade Organisation’s trade rules, these circumstances effectively allowed the US cotton industry to be buoyant and remain competitive with a comparative advantage over its Asian or African competitors. At the same time, with industrialisation and technological advancements increasing productivity and lowering prices, there arose  a need for a massive supply of cotton at cheap labour costs. With the boom in demand, the US turned to its South American neighbours where its cheap labour force and availability of land provided the resources necessary for the mass production of cotton required to meet global demand. This is reminiscent of the extractive economic institutions in Acemoglu & Robinson’s Why Nations Fail where a bulk of available resources meant for the masses are utilised by a handful of cotton farmers who had growing political influence. The lack of market modernisation in India and China also contributed to the US becoming the world leader in cotton production. 

These themes of exploitation and dominance continue into the second part of the book, where the author explains that China sought to emulate the US’s approach by operating as an extractive economic institution for its cheap sweatshop labour in the textile manufacturing industry. Rivoli goes on to discuss the history of the textile industry. With China securing many trade agreements and support as a state-owned enterprise, the cheaper textile products made by China grew in popularity. A gradual decline in British textiles made from the local mills in India led to China eventually becoming the global leader in textile manufacturing. The British Industrial Revolution spurred high demand for textiles, and interestingly, while there were poor working conditions in China’s factories, the need for large supplies of labour provided the opportunity for women to be introduced into the manufacturing labour market. This led to the economic and social liberation of women towards the industrial sector with upgraded skills. Of the several downsides of globalisation, Rivoli also incorporated the issue of culture and female empowerment and how, albeit not in the best working conditions, women favoured globalisation seeing as it provided them with the opportunity to upskill and move away from the labour-intensive agricultural industry. 

Part I of the book discussed the resistance to creative destruction with the display of the lack of incentive to innovate under an extractive institution. This was elaborated in how the cotton farmers were unable to adapt to the genetically engineered cotton seeds to save their crops against pests. Moving to Part III of the book, Rivoli brings the reader through examples of how globalisation can be weaponized, with the US’s heavy-handed protectionist measures such as import restrictions, tariffs, and the quota system imposed in the textile and apparel industries. This demonstrates how political influence can have perverse impacts on trade and the economy, even when motivated by good intentions to protect domestic jobs and employment. This lavish protectionism was also how the US lost its competitive edge against China in the textile market. 

The last part of the book discusses the resale trading of t-shirts where the wealthy US suburbs provide most of the supply of second-hand t-shirts to fulfil the demand of poor countries. Though it shows the consumerism and capitalism of wealthy countries, it is heartening to see that there is an afterlife for these commodities, even as simple as a t-shirt in the global used-clothing industry or as innovative uses as rugs or fillers for automobile doors, mattresses or to provide insulation in homes. Even more delightful is how resale trading is boosting the African society and industry with “mitumba” – referring to used clothing fashion from the West, and even providing a positive environmental effect. Rivoli concludes the book on the moral case for trade, discussing the need for broader perspectives, that while the anti-globalisation activists argue against poor working conditions or environmental sustainability in their protests, there can be upsides from globalisation as well. Through her journey to discover how her cotton t-shirt was made, the author shared her insight that activists should take a step back sometimes to see the broader picture. In the case of a t-shirt, the author suggests that there could perhaps be a more balanced view taken, and that there could be more good than harm if one takes into consideration the effects from the entire supply chain process. 

Overall, the book was an enlightening read on how a t-shirt as a commodity can have an impact on the political, economic, and social aspects of so many states  along its various stages of harvesting to production and manufacturing, to retail sale and resale trading. My takeaway from reading the book is to appreciate the complexity of the production process required to obtain the products we consume and the downstream impacts they have after they have served their time for us. If we look at the broader picture, globalisation can have a tremendous social impact across the world beyond just politics and economics.

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Rachel Teng is a first-year M.S. student at NYU concentrating in International Relations and Global Futures. Her academic areas of interest include the hard and soft power relationship, impact of great power shifts on the defence diplomacy of city-states, and emerging technologies in the information realm. Rachel believes in a polymath mentality towards acquiring knowledge and is always happy to chat about a wide-ranging spectrum of issues to broaden her weltanschauung.


Works Cited

Rivoli, Pietra. Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade. 2nd ed., Wiley, 2015.

Filed Under: Book Reviews, Global Economy, International Relations/Global Futures

Policy Memorandum: Obama’s 2009 COIN Surge in Afghanistan

January 30, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Emma Chevalier Trager-Lewis
 
 
Nearly three years have passed since the complete withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan in what is now deemed as the biggest failure in American military intervention and foreign policy. This policy memorandum sheds light on the inadequacy of President Obama’s 2009 COIN surge in Afghanistan. (Photo credit: andre_klimke on Unsplash)

 

“Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards […] I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan” said former President Barack Obama when he addressed the American population from West Point Military Academy on December 1, 2009. After eight years of American presence in Afghanistan,  the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military approach to the conflict required change not only in its strategy, but also in its understanding of the Afghan conflict. Moreover, NATO’s International Security Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF), as well as the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) lacked the support of the Afghan population  and failed to appear as an Afghan ally –appearing instead as a foreign invader. In August 2009, General McChrystal, Commander of the ISAF, along with  General Patreus and Admiral Mullen, crafted the COIN Surge (2009-2012), a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy inspired by counterinsurgency techniques used by the former British Empire,  and David Galula’s expertise in counterinsurgency. McChrystal’s COIN doctrine rested on four main pillars: (1) improving ISAF’s effectiveness through a greater partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); (2) prioritizing responsive and accountable governance; (3) reversing the insurgency’s momentum; and (4) focusing resources on areas where the population was vulnerable.  According to former American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, “the stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing methods of “clear, hold, and build” (2013), meaning that the goal of the COIN was not to only crush the Taliban insurgency (clear), but  also to establish political legitimacy and concrete governance in Afghanistan (build) to prevent the  return to a Taliban regime (hold). The efficiency of the COIN stood on three critical assumptions:  (1) the goal of protecting the Afghan population was both clear and attainable,  (2) “higher levels of foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan government’s capacity and legitimacy” (Eikenberry), and (3)President Karzai’s preferred political-military approach would match America’s COIN tactic. 

While McChrystal fervently defended and pushed for the adoption of the COIN approach, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry vehemently opposed the technique, claiming that McChrystal had clearly underestimated the risks linked to a military surge and an expansion of the American mandate (Eikenberry). While a counterinsurgency approach focused on the welfare of the local population, the Afghan social, political, historical and geographical terrain did not allow for the correct implementation of such strategy. Indeed, although the COIN approach allowed for the removal of important Taliban cells in Southern Afghanistan, the lack of Pakistani support hindered the complete destruction of the Taliban. In addition, a lack of collaboration and coherence between the USFOR-A / ISAF and the Afghan government stood in the way of nation-building. What is more, while the counterinsurgency approach aimed at fostering a steady Afghan governance, America pushed for a hyper-centralized type of governance, failing to take into account the importance of Pashtunwali in the Afghan culture, and its aversion to centralization. 

This policy memorandum bases its analysis on three main areas impacted by the COIN Surge: 1. Afghan state formation;  2. strong and steady Afghan governance;  and 3. concrete political legitimacy of the Karzai government. 

Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to the Afghan state formation 

Political scientists Badie, Barg-Schlosser and Morlino define state formation as “the process of leading to the centralisation of political power within a well-defined territory” (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, Morlino). However, as demonstrated  under the regime of Amin or Najibullah, a centralisation of political power is not suited for Afghanistan. Hence, this policy memorandum approaches the question of state formation using Max Weber’s definition of the state as an authority exercising the monopoly of violence over a given territory (Weber et al.), thereby defining state formation as the process to approach a monopoly on violence held by the state. For a state entity to achieve a monopoly on violence, it needs to ensure the provision of fundamental services to its population, such as education, security, healthcare and economic welfare. As a result, based on a population-centered approach, COIN established goals relating to the strengthening of state services in order to increase Afghan support for Karzai, simultaneously decreasing the amount of insurgency supporters. Indeed, COIN put forth the idea that “a more secure and content people would rally behind the local elected and appointed officials, and peace and stability would follow”  (Eikenberry).

Researcher Hager Ali argues that although the U.S. believed the COIN Surge would help with state formation, nation-building, on the other hand, is not attainable through military involvement (Ali). Indeed, Ali believes that a sustainable “transition from foreign militaries to local political agents is hardly possible” (2021).  However, this was precisely the plan adopted by the COIN Surge: the American army was tasked by the Obama administration to securise Afghanistan by eliminating the Taliban threat before transferring security responsibilities to the ANFS. Thus, because the  primary  role of the state is to provide services through solid infrastructures, adopting  Galula’s vision of counterinsurgency strategy, many American troops were instructed to take on social worker roles. Not only was it profligate, it was also highly unrealistic to expect American soldiers with a clear lack of basic understanding of the Afghan culture to deliver what the COIN Surge doctrine asked of them. 

In addition, the COIN surge only increased the dependence of Afghanistan on the U.S. While the U.S. military, was expected to carry out social workers’ tasks for a definite period of time, COIN failed to create the necessary Afghan workforce that should have taken over U.S. troops by prioritizing military funding over development funding, thus reinforcing a dependency on U.S. troops. In addition, COIN could only work if Karzai’s goals were aligned with Obama’s. However, according to Ekeinberry, Karzai only agreed to the COIN Surge because it meant a longer American presence in Afghanistan. Karzai’s government never planned  on taking over the U.S. troops’ social commitments. To a certain extent, it is understandable that a surge in troops, especially numbering 30,000, would cause the  Afghans to believe  that the Americans were here to stay. Arguably, such a formidable surge in numbers is incompatible with a near-future withdrawal goal, especially when the military is responsible for  military,social and development duties

Finally, although the COIN Surge implied that some American troops would partake in the training of ANSF, which was a partial success, the sudden increase of American forces rendered the ANSF even more reliant on U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, due to Afghanistan’s wide ethnic diversity, the ANSF was fundamentally divided between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks troops. Such differences hindered internal cohesion and made it almost impossible for American troops to properly train them. Indeed, because of their lack of understanding of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic background and of existing grievances amongst said ethnic groups, the U.S. Military failed to unite Afghan troops under the hegemon of Kabul. 

All in all, with regards to state-building, COIN fell into the classic trap of aid dependency: by taking on the role of strengthening state structures in a country which had been at war for more than three decades which government had no will for the international community to leave their country, COIN fostered a culture of dependency on U.S. presence. In other words, instead of putting an emphasis on local involvement in state-building, COIN fostered a top-down approach to institutions-building, accentuating an Afghan dependence on U.S. military presence in the country. 

Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to Afghan governance

Bevir defines governance as “patterns of rule or practices of governing, [stating that] the study of governance generally approaches power as distinct from or exceeding the centralized authority of the modern state.” (2021) While COIN assumed that an increased foreign military presence would lead to a strengthened Afghan governance, COIN once again failed to do so. While oftentimes, strong and legitimate governance facilitates peace by providing a secure environment for its population, Afghanistan and its longstanding  history of internal conflict had never truly experienced  strong governance. 

Afghanistan is a highly decentralized state: with an incredible variety of ethnicities. Afghan governments always had to reconcile traditional with national and central forms of governance. However, many modern and Western forms of governance tend to clash with traditional forms of governance such as the ones put forth by Pashtuwali. While Afghanistan is objectively in dire need of uniformed security policies amongst its provinces to fight off the Taliban more effectively, the reality and Afghan history makes the installation of centralized governance impossible.  The United States’ attempt at improving  Afghan governance, both through formal and traditional mechanisms, was bound to fail because of their lack of insights and consideration into Afghan history. As Eikenberry states: “The typical 21-year-old marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?” (p.64). Although COIN claimed to be a population-centered strategy, ISAF and American troops monumentally failed at understanding Afghan culture and traditions, hindering their goal to establish good governance. 

In addition, America’s strained relationship with the Afghan government, especially illustrated through its tense relationship with President Hamid Karzai, strongly hindered the implementation of solid Afghan governance. While Karzai was reluctant to listen to America’s views  on governance, the U.S. was reluctant to compromise  with Karzai’s traditional Afghan government. Karzai, a descendant of the Khans, the traditional chefs of the Popalzai Pasthun tribe, was deeply attached to traditional governance which clashed with the COIN doctrine of centralizing Afghan governance. All in all, tense relations between the U.S. and Karzai, heavily hindered the progression of COIN with regards to governance reforms. 

Finally, the U.S. held an opposite opinion  from Karzai’s regarding  the provenance of the Taliban insurgency. While America believed the Taliban insurgency’s roots  to be native to Afghanistan and bolstered by Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), Karzai believed the insurgency to be a form of militant extremism exported from Islamabad into Afghanistan. Such differences led to strategy clashes between Karzai and the U.S., especially regarding the American military’s crackdown on the Southern provinces of Afghanistan, such as Kandahar where Karzai was born. Further,the failure of both the U.S. and the Afghan government to enter into substantial talks with Islamabad regarding ISI’s financial and tactical support for the Taliban insurgency demonstrates  the failure of both  governments to conduct sustainable foreign relations with Pakistan. The ability to conduct foreign relations is an integral part of governance. COIN’s failure to help Karzai’s government enter into meaningful talks with their most important neighbor with regards to the Taliban insurgency proves COIN’s ineptitude in establishing sustainable governance in Afghanistan. 

All in all, relating to governance, COIN did not fulfill its central basis of a population-centered operation  by failing to strike compromises with Karzai’s government and by overlooking ancestral traditional forms of governance.

Implications of the COIN Surge with regards to the Karzai government’s political legitimacy

Political legitimacy is defined as “justifying power and obedience simultaneously in order to gain the right to govern” (Coicaud). Legitimacy usually stems from effective governance: when the state provides its citizens with appropriately needed services such as security, healthcare, and education, the government is more likely to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people compared to a government failing to qualify under state obligations. Unfortunately, it has been established that Karzai’s government lacked strong governance meaning that Karzai’s political legitimacy could not stem from his good governance. Although Karzai’s legitimacy had been contested upstream of COIN’s implementation, COIN failed to increase Karzai’s legitimacy. What is more, one of the partial reasons for COIN’s failure is the lack of political legitimacy enjoyed by Karzai’s government. While the COIN doctrine stood on Karzai’s government legitimacy and hence the impact Karzai’s acceptance of COIN would have on the Afghan population, Karzai’s lack of legitimacy hindered Afghans’ trust in COIN.

Factually, Karzai had been considered a puppet of the American government by the Afghan population. Having attained  the presidency through the Bonn Agreement, unofficially meaning that Karzai was directly chosen by the Americans to preside over Afghanistan in order for the U.S. to easily advance its agenda through Kabul. Afghanistan has always been reluctant  to foreign interventions in their  political sphere, because of the impact of the Mongol Empire’s invasion from 1219 to 1221  and of the countless invasion attempts carried out by the British Empire. Considering  its history as one of the only Central Asian countries to have resisted British colonialism, Afghanistan refuses the mingling of foreign powers into its national governance. Hence, Karzai’s ascension to power goes against some of the most important Afghan values. The Afghan people always viewed Karzai’s Decisions as being  influenced by an American agenda. As a result, Karzai’s political legitimacy was not nationally recognised, part of the Afghan population held intense grievances against him. 

Over the course of Enduring Freedom, America’s mission in Afghanistan, more than 70,000 civilians (Brown University) had  been killed. Although the number of civilian casualties was lower between 2009 and 2012, the killing of non-hostile individuals by American and ISAF forces strongly impacted America’s standing in Afghanistanand Karzai’s popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population. COIN only decreased Karzai’s legitimacy: the U.S.’ decision to surge was seen by the Afghans as an increase in the possible threat to their security posed by American troops. While COIN aimed at having a population-centered approach,, COIN failed to do so and undoubtedly increased Afghans’ distrust in U.S. troops. However, the trust of the population is one of the fundamental aspects of an adequate counter-insurgency strategy.  The more trust Afghans have  for  American troops and Karzai’s government, the less likely they are to join the insurgency. However, since Karzai failed to  provide basic services and protection from both the Taliban and  criminal opium narco-traffickers, the Afghan population failed to see him as a legitimate leader. Not only by failing to improve Karzai’s legitimacy, but also by assuming that Karzai was already considered as a legitimate leader in the eyes of the Afghan population, the COIN doctrine was unable to secure the support of the majority of the Afghan population, a fundamentally primordial aspect of the U.S. military strategy. 

All in all, while Karzai’s lack of political legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population impeded on the COIN doctrine, the COIN doctrine also failed to strengthen Karzai’s political legitimacy, one of the main pillars of the U.S. military strategy. Because the U.S. failed to take into account Afghanistan’s history and tradition, COIN was incredibly flawed with regards to Afghan leaders’ political legitimacy. 

It can be said without a doubt that the COIN Surge doctrine failed. By failing to take into account Afghanistan’s history, traditional process and relation to a centralized power, the U.S. adopted a military strategy unfit for Afghanistan’s political, cultural and geographical terrain. Although COIN might have, to a certain extent, worked in Iraq in 2007, the U.S. adopting COIN in Afghanistan demonstrates how inadequate McChrystal’s understanding of Afghanistan was. Instead of having opted for the COIN Surge doctrine, as argued by Kael Weston, the U.S. should have opted for a “smaller but enduring force” to fight off the insurgency (Chandrasekaran). As the adage “Rome was not built in a day” implies, nation-building, strong governance, and political legitimacy cannot be expected to easily be created in a country, which in 2009, had been at war for the past 30 years. While invading Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is not an option for the United States, neither is forgetting about the consequences of a 20-year American presence in Afghanistan. While it is imperative that international and intergovernmental relief agencies such as the United Nations continue their crucial work inside Afghanistan, it is of the utmost importance that the international community, led by the United States, refuses to consider the Taliban authority as the de jure Afghan government. Former U.S. Chargé D’affaires for Afghanistan, Karen Decker, refusal to directly and openly name the Taliban as a terrorist organization on television (Amu TV), only gives rise to Taliban’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Hence, it is crucial for the international community not to engage in  any further negotiations with the Taliban in order to diminish  their de facto legitimacy as the current Afghan authority. 

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Emma Chevalier Trager-Lewis is a French/British Graduate Student at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. In addition to her background in Law and Peacebuilding, Emma’s research focuses on violent extremism, salafi jihadism and mass displacement caused by war and political instability. With a regional focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Greater Middle East, Emma aims to become a war correspondent and document the stories of those the general public too often decides to ignore.


Works Cited

Ali, Hager. “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Failed Long before the Taliban Took Over.” The Loop, September 30th, 2021. Web. Retrieved from https://theloop.ecpr.eu/counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan-failed-long-before-the-taliban-took-over/

Amu TV. “Interview with US Charge d’affaires Karen Decker.” Amu TV, 4 May 2023. Web. Retrieved from amu.tv/47246/

Badie, Bertrand, et al. “International Encyclopedia of Political Science.” Sage Knowledge, SAGE Publications, Inc., 4 Oct. 2011. Web. Retrieved from doi.org/10.4135/9781412994163.;

Bevir, Mark. “Governance.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 2021. Web Retrieved from www.britannica.com/topic/governance. 

Brown University. “Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022.” The Costs of War, 2022. Web. Retrieved from https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022 

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “The Afghan Surge Is Over.” Foreign Policy, 26 Sept. 2012. Web. Retrieved from foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/25/the-afghan-surge-is-over/.

Coicaud, Jean-Marc. “What Is Political Legitimacy? (Chapter 1) – Legitimacy and Politics.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 2002. Web. Retrieved from www.cambridge.org/core/books/legitimacy-and-politics/what-is-political-legitimacy/C3AD5C3FB8D24A86D84FAFECDB9ABF90.;

COMISAF, Commander’s Initial Assessment, NATO/ISAF unclassified, August 30th, 2009. Web. Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB292/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf

Eikenberry, Karl, W, “Coin Strategy”,  “U.S. Embassy Kabul Cable to Washington D.C. Office of the Secretary of State”, NSA Archives,  November 6th, 2009. Web. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/24561-u-s-embassy-kabul-cable-3572-subject-coin-strategy-civilian-concerns-november-6-2009

Eikenberry, Karl, W,  Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency,  “U.S. Embassy Kabul Cable to Washington D.C. Office of the Secretary of State”, NSA Archives,  November 6th, 2009. Web. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/24562-u-s-embassy-kabul-cable-3594-subject-looking-beyond-counterinsurgency-afghanistan

Eikenberry , Karl W. “Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan – JSTOR.” Foreign Affairs 92, No. 5 , JSTOR, 2013. Web. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/23527517.

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Filed Under: International Relations/Global Futures, Perspectives on Global Issues - Archives, Transnational Security

Wounds yet to heal: Analyzing trauma within the scope of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

January 22, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Karina Casarez

Nearly three decades have passed since the tragic events of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, with a significant portion of the population suffering from mental health disorders and trauma symptoms. This research examines the specific factors of trauma endured by survivors, perpetrators, and their children, shedding light on prevailing gaps and needs within victim services. (Photo credit: helloitsrufio on Unsplash)

The 1994 genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda left between 800,000 and one million people brutally killed after a horrific 100 days of civil war and slaughter (United Nations Outreach Program). Approximately 75% of the country’s Tutsi ethnic minority and numerous Hutu moderates were massacred by Rwandan Hutu government soldiers and Interahamwe militia forces (Rieder and Elbert). Primarily using traditional weapons such as machetes and clubs, neighbors attacked neighbors, resulting in three months of looting, sexual violence, and murder, constituting genocide (Rieder and Elbert). In the aftermath of the crimes, the newly established Rwandan government began genocide trials, and by 2000, over 100,000 genocide suspects were awaiting court proceedings (United Nations Outreach Programme). Due to the enormous number of cases, the government began implementing gacaca courts, which were community-based proceedings intended to be a traditional alternative to national and international judicial systems. Nearly 30 years later, many convicted perpetrators have been released, with around 70,000 genocide suspects released by 2007 and most remaining to be released within the next few years due to their 20 to 30-year sentences being completed (Assimwe; Interpeace). The immediate needs of survivors of the genocide after the events and the current reintegration of ex-perpetrators into Rwandan society have led to considerable efforts to implement rehabilitation and recovery programs focused on providing trauma support for victims of the genocide (Interpeace).

METHODOLOGY

Although the trauma suffered by Rwandans who experienced the 1994 genocide is extensive and endured by various groups within the population, this essay will evaluate three specific factors of trauma experienced by survivors, perpetrators, and their children to identify existing gaps and needs within victim services. The subsequent research will examine trauma (a) as a general result of experiencing the 1994 Rwandan genocide, including a particular analysis of women victims, (b) trauma transmitted to second generations, and (c) retraumatization resulting from justice and reconciliation processes. Section II will utilize primary and secondary sources to review current victim services and trauma-informed practices promoting trauma healing, reconciliation, and stigma reduction. This final section will also outline recommendations for further victim service implementation to close remaining gaps in providing trauma recovery avenues for victims of genocide and second-generation children. 

TRAUMA RESULTING FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Trauma caused by experiencing the genocide

The 100 days of the 1994 Rwandan genocide witnessed crimes of humanity, genocide, and war crimes conducted on a horrific scale (United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals). Every minute, an average of six men, women, and children were murdered throughout the three-month period (Survivors Fund, “Statistics”). Many crimes were perpetrated by people known to the victim, such as neighbors and friends (Dyregrov et al. 4). In addition to the 800,000 to one million killed, it is estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped and subjected to sexual violence (Haffajee 201). Nearly 70% of women raped during the genocide were infected with HIV by the perpetrators (African Rights). As a result of the violence, thousands of children died, and up to 400,000 children were left unaccompanied (Human Rights Watch, “Children without parents”). One-third of child survivors witnessed the deaths of their relatives, and 80% lost family members (Survivors Fund, “Statistics”). The Rwandan National Trauma Survey showed that 96% of children witnessed violence, 69% witnessed death, and 30% witnessed rape (The Government of Rwanda 9). In addition, in a survey of over 3,000 children after the genocide, 90% of the children believed they would die during the events of the genocide, one-third believed they would not live to become adults, and 15% hid under dead bodies to survive (Dyregrov et al. 9).

In a study focused on trauma symptoms as a consequence of the genocide against the Tutsis, results show that nearly 80% of survivors fulfill the criteria for trauma-related disorders (Schaal et al. 96). Other studies have found that the extent of the trauma experienced during the genocide is positively correlated with the number of persisting post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms that the victims still experience (Caspar et al.). These findings are similarly confirmed by reports of victims who witnessed family members being attacked, experiencing higher rates of PTSD and distress symptoms by 2008 than individuals who had not witnessed such events (Ng et al.). Rugema et al. also found that individuals who witnessed or experienced traumatic events during the genocide were impacted nearly 17 years later, such as not marrying, not having children, and living in impoverished circumstances (Rugema et al.). Studies have shown that after experiencing the genocide, survivors had a reduced ability to resonate with the pain of others (Caspar et al.). Additional literature has shown that survivors feel that members outside their groups are dangerous. This results in them feeling diminished and vulnerable (Staub, “Reconciliation after genocide” 871). This is particularly relevant in Rwanda since perpetrators and survivors are forced to live in close proximity to each other, which may facilitate daily interaction between the survivors and perpetrators (JHA Editors and Noamschimmel).

The Rwandan genocide affected men and women differently concerning the atrocities experienced and the severity of trauma symptoms post-genocide. Men were more likely to be imprisoned, kidnapped, or killed, while women were exposed to more physical and sexual violence (Rugema). In addition, over 250,000 women were left widowed (Sharlach 98). Loss of an individual’s social support further increases the likelihood and prevalence of PTSD symptoms. Women were more likely to witness sexual or physical violence perpetrated against relatives and close friends, which has also been shown to increase PTSD symptoms (Platt 800). Women specifically reported experiencing a loss of dignity and respect, loss of identity, social isolation, and loss of hope for the future (Petersen-Coleman and Swaroop 9). Horrifyingly, it is believed that in some areas of Rwanda, all women were rape victims, and in Kigali, it is estimated that most women between the ages of 13 and 50 were victims of rape (Sharlach 98). Victims of rape have to deal with long-term consequences of the genocide, sometimes referred to as “second rape,” which relates to the stigmatization placed on rape victims and the consequences felt by the individual and their family relating to the belief that their honor has been tarnished in the eyes of society (Sharlach 90). Symptoms of post-rape trauma may include sexual apathy or promiscuity, substance abuse, depression, anger, loss of sense of womanhood, confusion about one’s identity, and destruction of a woman’s morale (Sharlach 91). Stigmatization leads to women becoming social outcasts within their communities, often due to society perceiving women as willing participants or complicit in the rape. The consequences of rape during the genocide, in addition to social stigmatization and post-trauma symptoms, include HIV infection and unwanted pregnancies (Sharlach 99).

Intergenerational trauma

It is estimated that 20,000 children were conceived from rape during the 1994 genocide (Torkgovnik). Although some women were able to accept and love their children conceived by rape, others felt it impossible to care for the child, resulting in the neglect and torture of hundreds of newborn children (Petersen-Coleman and Swaroop 10). In a meeting with the Survivors Fund in Rwanda, experts in the field shared that women with children conceived by rape often faced marital issues or found it challenging to marry or remarry (Meeting with Survivors Fund). The Rwandan Ministry additionally recounted that women often faced rejection from their families for raising children born from rape (Meeting with Ministry). Many mothers and children experienced poor relationships, including instances where mothers would lie about the child’s identity to hide the fact that they were raped during the genocide (Meeting with Survivors Fund). The stigma of rape was also passed down to children who were thought to be “illegitimate” and biologically associated with the “enemy.” Children were often referred to as “children of bad memories” and “children of hate” and became living reminders of the trauma suffered during the genocide. These children frequently experienced indirect and direct forms of violence, such as abandonment, abuse, and discrimination. Due to the association with the rape perpetrator, children were often rejected by the mother’s family, which led to a loss of identity and social exclusion. Children born of rape faced decreased opportunities in education, economic opportunity, lack of affection, and harassment (Denov et al.). Compared to children not born from rape, children born from rape showed higher levels of PTSD, anxiety, depression, physical function, pain intensity, and sleep disturbance (Uwizeye et al. 4-5). They also experienced shame, confusion, and anguish due to stigmatization and exclusion and often feared for their safety from community members  (Denov et al.). Children born from rape are also largely excluded from victim services because government funds are only available to genocide survivors born before 1994 (Meeting with Survivors Fund).

Even children not born from genocidal rape have a substantial likelihood of experiencing intergenerational trauma transmitted through social and biological pathways such as family mental health, sociopolitical trauma, cultural narratives, silence and disclosure of genocide experiences, and regular contact with a traumatized parent (Der Sarkissian and Sharkey 1; Jensen et al. 996). Genocide survivors who experienced higher levels of trauma exposure during the genocide showed higher levels of trauma transmission to their children (Der Sarkissian and Sharkey 2-5). Parents with PTSD are more likely to use ineffective parenting behaviors that negatively impact their children. In addition, PTSD symptoms affect a parent’s communication styles, coping strategies, and ability to attach and bond with their child (Mutuyimana et al.). It has also been observed that children of survivors and children of perpetrators show intergroup empathy bias transferred from the previous generation, showing further evidence of trauma transmission between generations after the genocide (Caspar et al. 837).

Retraumatization through justice & reconciliation methods

By 1998, nearly 130,000 suspected genocide perpetrators were imprisoned in facilities meant to hold 12,000 (Haskell). Although international and national courts had begun trying genocide cases in 1996, at the rate the trials were going, it would have taken more than a century to complete every trial. In effort to speed up justice and accountability for survivors and perpetrators of the genocide, the Rwandan government introduced gacaca trials as an alternative judicial system. Gacaca placed high value on the involvement of the entire community during judicial proceedings. Proceedings were run by local community judges and encouraged community participation. Until 2010, gacaca trials tried approximately 1.2 million cases (Haskell). The gacaca system was initiated to promote healing through truth-telling and facilitate reconciliation between perpetrators and survivors. It was believed that families could learn the truth about acts of violence committed against their relatives, reconcile their trauma, establish collective memory, and forgive the perpetrators (De Ycaza 24).

However, research regarding the psychological health impact of truth-telling processes like the gacaca proceedings has shown that participants of gacaca courts suffered higher levels of depression and PTSD. The constant trauma exposure most likely caused this increased prevalence of trauma symptoms during proceedings (Brounèus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure” 425-246). More specifically, witnesses to the gacaca trials were put through a process of remembering, recounting, and hearing traumatizing information regarding the events of the genocide. The negative impacts of gacaca proceedings are further confirmed by instances of traumatic crises, suicide attempts, and uncontrollable threatening statements made during the trials (King 139). It was even reported that thirty-six witnesses during gacaca proceedings were killed because of their participation in the trials or as an attempt to prevent witnesses from testifying against perpetrators (Nikuze). The gacaca proceedings also facilitated the collective identification of a “chosen trauma,” where groups incorporate the memories and emotional meanings of the traumatic event into their identities. This reaffirms the “us” versus “them” dichotomy rather than true reconciliation and unification between survivors and perpetrators. The justice provided by gacaca also increased feelings of guilt in witnesses of the gacaca trials. This guilt stemmed from individuals who initially supported the government, those who were bystanders during the events, or even survivors who felt guilty for having survived. In many instances, these resulting feelings from gacaca trials did more harm when analyzing the actual healing ability of truth-telling processes (Buckley-Zistel 125-126).  

The retraumatization experienced during gacaca proceedings was further endured by female survivors who testified during the trials. For female witnesses, providing testimony led to severe psychological suffering and re-traumatization. The public setting of the gacaca sessions led to women feeling that their physical security could be threatened (Brounèus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure” 71). Gacaca trials led directly to increases in threats, harassment, and murders of participating witnesses since all information was publicly accessible. For those who had lost their relatives and support systems due to the violence, feelings of vulnerability were especially prominent. Women who were victims of sexual violence or rape expressed feeling guilt, shame, humiliation, and ostracization from their community (Brounèus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure” 72). Women were allowed to report rapes through public testimony, in writing, or privately in front of a video camera. Women who testified in person were required to publicly accuse their rapist in front of their community members. For those who chose to write their testimonies, privacy was still not maintained as these writings were read aloud during the gacaca proceedings. Many women were also unaware of their inability to testify privately by camera. However, even testifying privately required the victim to face the judge panel and the accused. This was done to provide the alleged rapist a chance to defend themself. If the woman could not testify in front of the suspected perpetrator, the only additional option she had was to end the proceedings, an option only provided in rape cases (Meeting with Alphonse Muleefu). Rape victims were also fearful of potential retaliation for their accusations against rape perpetrators and faced threats by community members if the suspect was imprisoned (Eftekhari).

ANALYSIS OF TRAUMA SERVICES IN RWANDA

Rwanda has been actively building victim services and programs for survivors, perpetrators, and second-generation children within the last 28 years since the 1994 genocide. Various psychosocial models have been trialed throughout the country, with many experts identifying community-based socio-therapy practices as the most efficient methods in trauma-informed and restorative justice processes (Dyregrov; Holaday and McPhearson; Ingabire et al.). Although some individuals may benefit from individualized clinical interventions for trauma symptoms, others feel that social support and education services improve their mental well-being (Ng et al. 95). Psychosocial support must extend outside clinical approaches based on traditional Western models, utilize local resources, and focus on healing collective trauma within communities (Petersen-Coleman 13-15). Collective approaches promote resilience, re-engagement, and restoration within communities and emphasize social and cultural contexts during recovery (Pearlman 112). It is also beneficial to build national capacity within trauma approaches by encouraging participation from community leaders and trainers (Dyregrov 4-5). Due to the substantial lack of mental health professionals in Rwanda, it is essential to maintain flexibility and adaptability when training mental health professionals. Instead of observing strict educational requirements placed on most mental health professionals worldwide, some organizations, such as Never Again Rwanda, have found strength in providing short-term training to community members to ensure communities across the country have individuals with basic training and trauma-healing tools (Meeting with Never Again Rwanda). 

Organizations and entities within Rwanda also utilize decentralized processes (“village to national”) to focus on building capacity and promoting sustainability of trauma approaches by identifying local community leaders as the first essential step in providing communities with trauma-informed practices. Understanding the dangers of retraumatization and clinical burnout within therapist populations, organizations such as Never Again Rwanda provide support to trained therapists to ensure these clinicians do not feel alone while providing services to their communities. Collective therapy approaches also allow citizens to participate in dialogue, allowing communities to identify issues and utilize community leaders to assist with their service needs (Meeting with Never Again Rwanda). Some programs, such as the Trauma Recovery Program, utilize cultural methods of expression such as storytelling, drama, drawing, writing, and dancing to promote child development, assist with trauma and grief, and improve children’s listening skills (Dyregrov 4).

Numerous organizations within and outside of Rwanda provide support for victims of the genocide. Programs and services extend multiple areas of need, such as psychosocial support, economic development, gender empowerment, and education assistance. Some organizations service specific vulnerable populations, such as the Association of Genocide Widows Agahozo (AVEGA), which provides support for genocide widows, assists with trauma processing, and has established programs focused on medical care, advocacy and justice, and socio-economic development. Several organizations also focus on gender equality, women’s empowerment, and gender-based violence prevention. One such organization is the Rwanda Men’s Resource Centre (RWAMREC), which addresses negative masculinity behaviors and gender inequalities to empower families and communities to change violent behaviors, promote positive family practices, and facilitate partnership and collaboration between men and women. Many women’s cooperatives nationwide, such as the Nyamirambo Women’s Center (NWC), aim to address gender inequality, gender-based violence, and discrimination. These centers provide vocational and educational training to empower women for better employment and financial stability (Nyamirambo Women’s Center). An additional organization that provides vital support to victims is the Survivors Fund (SURF), which assists in building the capacity of other survivor organizations and supports victim programs focused on areas of need such as healthcare, housing, education, and entrepreneurship (Survivors Fund, “Our Work”). One of the most critical sources of support for victims of genocide is the Genocide Survivors Support and Assistance Fund (FARG), a state-owned organization that provides education, health, shelter, social assistance, and income generation support. However, financial compensation and support are only eligible for genocide survivors born before 1994 (Nikwivuze).

Because government support is only available to individuals alive during the 1994 genocide and consequently labeled “survivors,” many community organizations recognize the need for services and programs for second-generation youth (Dyregrov 19). However, although some of these programs provide psychosocial support, many also focus on youth empowerment, the promotion of peace, and the facilitation of intergenerational reconciliation. SURF, in partnership with the National Student’s Association of Genocide Survivors (AERG) and the National Survivor’s Association of Graduate Students (GAERG), provides vulnerable youth, including second-generation youth, with mentorship on entrepreneurship, readiness, and vocational training, and access to financial and learning resources through the Youth Economic Empowerment Program (Survivors Fund, “Report”). Other organizations, such as Ajprodho-Jijukirwa, focus on engaging youth through human rights promotion, research, advocacy, and economic empowerment. Because of the increasing acknowledgment of trends and challenges caused by intergenerational trauma, with the support of USAID, they also promote peacebuilding by providing therapeutic healing, individual and group therapy, and trauma support (Meeting with Ajprodho-Jijukirwa). The Rwanda Peace Education Programme (RPEP), implemented by Aegis Trust and additional partners, promotes peace and reconciliation efforts by nurturing social cohesion, positive values, critical thinking, and empathy. Similar to the Trauma Recovery Program, RPEP utilizes storytelling and community education outreach activities. The RPEP program was recently implemented in the Rwandan school curriculum, now known as Peace and Values Education (PVE) (Basabose). In an effort to provide psychosocial support to families impacted by genocidal rape, raise awareness about the consequences of rape and sexual violence, and reduce stigmatization, Foundation Rwanda aims to support and empower victims of rape and second-generation youth born from rape (Foundation Rwanda). Lastly, although rare, some services are also provided to children of perpetrators, such as programs established by Prison Fellowship that assist with education support (Meeting with Prison Fellowship).

Psychosocial support was also offered during gacaca trials, although during a meeting with the National Public Prosecution Authority in 2023, the prosecutors acknowledged that the protection provided to witnesses who testified publicly was inadequate. Organizations such as Ibuka and Aegis Trust provided on-site counselors who could provide trauma assistance to individuals engaged in the gacaca process. In some instances where rape cases were reported, women with knowledge and understanding of the challenges of rape were placed on judge panels. However, as noted before, victims of rape were forced to testify in front of their accused, and confidentially measures were weak during the proceedings (Meeting with Alphonse Muleefu). Before gacaca courts were implemented, national leaders had expressed initial concerns about retraumatization and a potential rise of new violence. Researchers such as Staub  (“Justice, healing, and reconciliation” 27) were invited to develop programs aimed at reducing (1) the retraumatization of survivors, especially those who acted as witnesses, (2) the trauma of children exposed to vivid images and stories of violence, including testimonies of rape, and (3) renewed anger and hostility of Tutsis and Hutus who relived the horrible events through the testimonies given. It was concluded that the most efficient programs in reducing retraumatization included four components: education on the origins of the genocide, possibilities for prevention, acknowledgment of the psychosocial impact of victimization, trauma, and healing methods, and the facilitation of individual engagement with their traumatic experiences during the genocide (Staub, “Justice, healing, and reconciliation” 27-28). Programs like these provided sources of positive healing and reconciliation processes through truth-telling mechanisms such as gacaca.

Service gaps

Despite the vast number of services and programs provided by civil society and state government entities, significant gaps currently hinder the provision of adequate trauma-informed practices to victims of the 1994 genocide. Services must be extended outside the major urban areas, such as Kigali, as most of the resources provided are concentrated within these areas and largely absent from other parts of the country. Without the economic means to travel into these urban areas to receive services, many of the most affected victims of the genocide are left without trauma services (Nowotny 424).

Given that approximately 78% of Rwanda’s 13.5 million population is under the age of 35, it is also essential to ensure that support and assistance are provided for members of the society suffering from intergenerational trauma (Mbabazi and Gomera). Policy change within the Rwandan government is essential to recognize and support the experiences of second-generation survivors and children born of rape. Although not “survivors” in the sense of having experienced the genocide, these youth are still victims of the crimes perpetrated against their families and communities (Denov). By rethinking the label “survivor” and including trauma victims of subsequent generations, a greater number of individuals could be eligible to receive financial compensation through FARG (Hamel 31). It is essential that youth be included in the policy-making process so that they are able to contribute their experiences as second-generation survivors and express insight into the needs of others in similar situations (Denov). Moving away from the commonly used labels of “survivor” and “perpetrator” is also vital, as these significantly impact individual identity and national unity. For example, although no longer identified by ethnic groups such as Hutu and Tutsi, unity within the country is debatable when new labels have connotations of people being good (survivor) or bad (perpetrator). These labels are problematic because they make it easier for policies, initiatives, and grants to target specific populations that largely exclude other relevant actors. Discarding the labels of “survivor” or “perpetrator” also includes bringing awareness and acknowledgment to the trauma faced by perpetrators and their children. It is inequitable to deny the trauma and experiences faced by populations labeled as “perpetrators” and can lead to radicalization, anger, genocide denial, and potential acts of violence (Kuradusenge-McLeod). 

Regarding justice and reconciliation, it is also essential for Rwanda to commit to ensuring that all victims receive financial reparations for the crimes they have suffered. This is especially relevant for those victims of property crimes and women victims of rape and sexual violence. Although victims were promised reparations through national and gacaca courts, many have still not received what is owed to them (Nowotny 418). This has led to many Rwandans feeling disappointed in the judicial systems meant to protect and validate their experiences (Nowotny 402). Despite the government establishing funding through FARG to provide financial assistance to victims, critics argue that the financial compensation fails to go far enough (Mugiraneza). Instead, recommendations include establishing a separate reparations fund modeled after mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court’s Trust Fund for Victims and the African Union Trust Fund for Victims of Hissène Habré’s Crimes (Ngari). Sufficient financial compensation could help victims feel validated in their traumatic experiences, become more accepting and open to reconciliation processes, and assist victims and their families with financial burdens such as healthcare and psychosocial treatment costs (Eftekhari). 

Although gacaca proceedings have ended, Rwanda still utilizes a community-level mediation system called abunzi. These traditional dispute resolution systems are facilitated at cell and sector levels, which are more localized administrative entities in comparison to the centralized provinces of the country. These systems are led by community members elected as mediators and act as a prerequisite for parties to bring forth disputes and action before reaching the level of the national court system (Republic of Rwanda). It is required that criminal and civil cases (of value below three million Rwandan francs) be first presented for mediation by the abunzi system. Therefore, the lessons learned from gacaca courts must be applied and remedied in the existing abunzi proceedings. Victim protection, especially for individuals testifying as rape and sexual violence victims, should be highly prioritized during any community-based reconciliation process. This includes confidentiality measures such as ensuring that names are redacted from any documentation of the proceedings (Eftekhari). Although the government of Rwanda has implemented the Witness and Victims Assistance and Protection Program, which provides assistance to witnesses in judicial processes, these protections are only currently reserved for domestic courts and, therefore, are not guaranteed protections during abunzi proceedings (Nikuze). Participants of truth-telling processes, including community mediation systems, must be provided with the facts and challenges associated with their testimonies and be provided support before, during, and after the sessions. Psychosocial and victim support services are also crucial necessities during these processes (Brounèus, “The Trauma of Truth Telling” 430). Elected community members and leaders should be trained in psychosocial support and trauma-informed practices. These systems should also utilize collective approaches to healing, including traditional practices and rituals that consider the social and cultural context of those involved (King 146-147). Lastly, any truth-telling, justice, and reconciliation methods must implement processes with a gender lens to ensure that protections and needs for sexual violence and rape victims are addressed (Brounèus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure” 72).

CONCLUSION

The 1994 Rwandan genocide inflicted a substantial portion of the population with mental health disorders and trauma symptoms. With an estimated 26% of the population suffering from PTSD, it is imperative that Rwanda prioritize the recovery and rehabilitation of victims of the genocide, including second-generation survivors and children with perpetrator parents (Musanabaganwa). Women, in particular, suffered extensive trauma as victims of sexual violence and rape, witnessing relatives and other loved ones be killed or harmed, becoming widowed, being infected with sexually transmitted diseases, and mothering children conceived by rape. In addition to the trauma suffered by those who experienced the genocide either personally or through intergenerational transmission, justice, and reconciliation mechanisms have provoked retraumatization through truth-telling processes. Witnesses to gacaca proceedings often experienced trauma due to inefficient witness protection measures, and rape victims often suffered extreme stigmatization and ostracization by their communities. Although various organizations throughout Rwanda provide social support services such as psychosocial healing, education assistance, socio-economic empowerment, and vocational training, significant gaps remain and must be addressed to ensure all trauma victims within Rwanda feel supported as they heal from the genocide. 

Victim services need to extend to areas across the country to ensure that all victims of genocide are supported through their trauma recovery processes. Additionally, intergenerational trauma requires further support and acknowledgment through policy and funding capacities at both state and organizational levels. Reconciliation and justice methods must also ensure that victims receive full reparations to assist with the financial burdens of genocide. Furthermore, it is essential that existing mediation methods, such as abunzi, learn from the lessons of gacaca proceedings and provide victims and witnesses with safeguard measures to ensure their safety and privacy are maintained and prioritized. Overall, victim services in Rwanda should continue utilizing community-based collective approaches that acknowledge social and cultural contexts and utilize traditional rituals and practices. By prioritizing trauma services and post-genocide recovery, Rwanda will strengthen its reconciliation and community healing efforts by acknowledging the value of its most vulnerable population’s mental well-being.

*******

Karina Casarez is a second-year master’s student at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs pursuing a degree in Global Affairs with a concentration in International Law & Human Rights and a specialization in the United Nations. She is also a Coverdell Fellow and Social Sector Leadership Diversity (SSLD) Fellow. In addition to her studies, she serves as President of The International Human Rights & Law League (THRILL) and the Managing Editor of the Global Affairs Review (GAR).  Her research interests include exploring international justice for human rights atrocities, particularly genocide and crimes against humanity, particularly in Myanmar. She recently concluded an internship with Justice Rapid Response (JRR), serves as Treasurer for the New York City Peace Corps Association (NYCPCA), and is a United Nations Representative for the National Peace Corps Association (NPCA). Before attending NYU, Karina served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Myanmar. 


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Filed Under: International Law and Human Rights, Perspectives on Global Issues - Archives, Uncategorized

Violent Extremists in the Metaverse

January 4, 2024 by krc8929 Leave a Comment

by Joseph Levin

(Photo credit: XR Expo on Unsplash)

Abstract

Since the dawn of the 21st century, numerous disruptive technologies have been brought to market that have transformed the fabric of how individuals interact with one another and their surrounding environments. However, the technological advances that stand out above the rest, specifically virtual and augmented reality, have been in developmental phases for the past decade and appear to be on the cusp of mainstream distribution. These technologies are a pivotal access point into what is now known as the metaverse. The metaverse resembles an immersive, creator-friendly online environment in which the lines between social media and online gaming are blurred like never before. Although this technology has yet to be delivered and accepted within mass consumer markets, addressing the potential consequences that may accompany it when that day comes is essential. The implications of this research indicates that the metaverse is far more complex than our current systems are built to regulate and the consequences could be devastating. Therefore, it is imperative to create proactive research efforts, legislation, and mitigation strategies to counter future threats posed by violent extremists in the metaverse.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, there has been an expeditious proliferation in technological evolution as personal computers, cell phones, and other handheld devices have become commonplace in everyday life. However, as technology companies continue to innovate and broaden the horizons of their capabilities, there is a pending fourth wave of computing innovation unfolding around spatial technologies called virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR). The companies developing this technology believe it will form the next ubiquitous computing paradigm that can transform personal entertainment, business, and educational opportunities. This new paradigm is called the metaverse, which will create a post-reality universe, a perpetual and persistent multiuser environment merging physical reality with digital virtuality (Mystakidis, 2022). The metaverse will be based on technologies that enable multisensory interactions with virtual environments, digital objects, and other users. The accuracy of the AR and VR systems are enabled by displays that create or enhance imagery to convey the perception of depth (El Beheiry, 2019). In addition to sensory inputs, these systems also allow active interaction with virtual elements through motion controllers. These are handheld input devices with a grip, buttons, triggers, and thumbsticks. By simply using the controllers, users can touch, grab, manipulate, and operate objects within an ever-changing virtual world (Mystakidis, 2022).

The current landscape of VR and AR remains primarily developmental as the technology still suffers from severe limitations in mass market delivery. For example, higher-end devices require prohibitively expensive hardware, while cheaper headsets do not deliver a realistic, stimulating enough virtual experience. Additionally, there are problems with software interoperability as a considerable number of companies are trying to be first to market with this technology. Currently, there is no wide-scale adoption of standardized technical specifications for the metaverse, given that each project relies on proprietary technology. The unwillingness to share proprietary technologies, based on privacy and transparency considerations, is a hindrance to broader development. It is likely that something more significant than corporate profit will have to drive the harmonization of standards (Chohan, 2022). With this information in mind, limited analysis has been provided on the potential consequences of this technology being widely distributed. This is particularly concerning given the rampant extremist exploitation of social media, online gaming, and other emerging technologies already. Therefore, this article will seek to answer the following question, “How can the metaverse be exploited by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations?” I contend that metaverse technology will eventually be utilized by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations for various activities that include, but are not limited to: online radicalization and heightened recruitment efforts, fundraising and cybercrime activities, pre-attack planning, and simulating attacks.

Violent Extremists in the Metaverse

Online Radicalization and Recruitment

As the world has become increasingly globalized through interconnected electronic networks, violent extremist groups have sought to captivate a broader range of audiences and promote their ideologies through various mediums, arguably none more so than online media platforms. A statement from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former chief ideologue of al-Qaeda and deputy to Osama bin Laden, explained, “We [al-Qaeda] are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people.” Evidently, prominent violent extremist groups recognize the opportunities provided by emerging technologies, especially those that enable two-way interactivity through online forums, chat rooms, emails, and texts to promote online radicalization. Furthermore, violent extremists can utilize online media platforms to connect directly with various audiences, who in turn, can become active participants in subsequent unfolding conversations. Direct connection is crucial for online radicalization because it promotes a sense of virtual community, which is often not possible with traditional broadcast media like radio and television (Aly et al., 2016). This becomes problematic as metaverse technology will likely amplify many previously established consequences of social media and online gaming while dramatically accelerating the operational capabilities of message sharing and recruitment.

Although online radicalization comes in many forms and individuals respond differently, certain commonalities appear alongside most violent extremist supporters. Online radicalization to violence is the process of introducing an individual to an ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views. A result of radical interpretations of mainstream religious or political doctrines, these extreme views tend to justify, promote, incite, or support violence to achieve any number of social, religious, or political changes (US DOJ, 2014). Through the utilization of metaverse creative capabilities, users will be able to shape their interactive virtual realities in any manner they see fit. Although the current metaverse technology has historically lacked visual sophistication, companies developing their own versions of the space are exploring a plethora of virtual engineering possibilities to make the user experience more realistic. For example, precisely designed three-dimensional elements together with animated graphics are already revolutionizing user technology interactivity through top-quality audio-visual and tactile interaction (Fiorillo, 2022). Much like other online activities, for violent extremist groups, this will create the ideal incubating environment where they can broadcast their views, provoke negative sentiment toward enemies, incite people to violence, glorify martyrs, establish virtual communities with like-minded individuals, and groom recruits (US DOJ, 2014).

A supplemental concept to understand within the overarching idea of the incubating environment provided by metaverse technology is the daunting potential of user manipulation within this space. Over the last two decades, technology companies have made a science of tracking and characterizing users on their platforms, as it enables the sale of targeted advertising. Such targeting has been a boon for advertisers and media platform providers, resulting in some of the most valuable corporations in human history. Unfortunately, such targeting has exploited users, reduced personal privacy, and made social media a polarizing force by allowing third-parties to deploy customized messaging tactfully curated for specific demographic groups. In the metaverse, these problems will be exacerbated. The technological capabilities will enable server owners to track where each user clicks, where they go, what they do, what they look at, and even how long their gaze lingers (Rosenberg, 2022). That is, assessing when users slow down to browse objects, messages, imagery, services, or when they speed up to pass content they are not demonstrating interest in.

For reference, Meta has already been granted patents to track users’ eye movements and body poses for ads in their Horizon Worlds metaverse platform. Given the track record of many major technology companies, it can be expected that more invasive data collection could include tracking vital signs, facial expressions, and user communication patterns (Xiang, 2022). This means the server providers controlling the metaverse will not just know how their users physically act and interact, but how they emotionally react as they traverse real and virtual spaces, profiling their responses at far deeper levels than has been possible in traditional media platforms (Rosenberg, 2022). Under these conditions, violent extremist groups and individuals have the opportunity to monitor their servers, examine how users interact with their content and adjust accordingly to further indoctrinate and radicalize them. Their ability to manipulate individuals operating within their sphere of influence will likely be more efficient than ever before.

A second concern with the expanded freedoms allotted by the metaverse is the lack of plausible methods to regulate how much time users spend on metaverse servers. Unlike phones, computers, and other forms of handheld technology, the metaverse can be accessed from multiple entry points (Ochs, 2021). This will prevent screen time moderation efforts and likely adversely affect users subjected to extremist content with unregulated exposure. In most cases, online radicalization results from individuals being immersed in extremist content for extended periods, the amplified effects of graphic images and video, and the resulting emotional desensitization (Neumann et al., 2012). For example, constant exposure to discourses about martyrdom and death—combined with videos of suicide operations and beheadings—can produce mortality salience, an overpowering sense of one’s mortality, which increases support for suicide operations and other, often ruthless, violent tactics. Similarly, powerful and emotionally stimulating videos from conflict zones—for example, those depicting alleged incidents of torture, rape, and other atrocities by Western troops—can induce a sense of moral outrage (Neumann et al., 2012). Given that there are already first-person shooter and gruesome bespoke games within the metaverse, it is a matter of time before violent extremists capitalize on the developed software to create scenarios that spur online radicalization.

Concerning sustained user activity within the metaverse, lessons can be drawn from other multiplayer online video games and social media platforms regarding the incentives provided to those who are more active and create large swaths of content. Essentially, content that is created by users in online games such as Roblox and Sandbox is what makes them profitable. In all its forms, the metaverse will likely follow the same general business model. Since it is a multi-usage social platform seeking to draw in support and funds from advertisers, the companies running metaverse servers will benefit from creators that produce high-quality content and encourage prolonged user activity (Babich, 2022). Since many of these companies are currently in the battle for first-to-market, widespread distribution of metaverse access and supporting technology, they are less incentivized to regulate extremist content on their platforms while pursuing maximum user engagement. This trend has been evident across major platforms such as Facebook, Minecraft, Roblox, and Twitter (Patel & Hecht-Felella, 2021)(Miller & Silva, 2021).

Within the metaverse, it can be reasonably expected that companies and creators will employ three common tactics to increase persistent user engagement. First, there will likely be some fashion of play-to-earn mechanics, which make games more addictive by rewarding users who spend more time in the system with extensive benefits. Second, the reward for content contribution will also be prevalent. Companies will compensate content creators for drawing in more user engagement. Finally, companies and creators will implement rewards for completing objectives within metaverse games, allowing users to perform virtual tasks in exchange for digital coins or goods. This works exceptionally well when the tasks are tied to a gripping storyline that hooks an audience, giving creators significant benefits (Babich, 2022). If violent extremists are to capitalize on consumer psychology and companies lack of content surveillance in order to drive online radicalization, the consequences will be damning.

Another recruitment concern is the way violent extremists will use the metaverse to exploit financial and social vulnerabilities that drive individuals to join violent extremist movements in the first place. For example, individuals who have been radicalized and drawn into violent extremism through pull factors, including financial incentives, online propaganda, and in-person recruitment networks (Smith, 2018). As mentioned above, companies constructing the metaverse will seek to monetize and provide various currency transfer services within their platforms. This will enable violent extremist groups to send cryptocurrency and other decentralized financial goods to potential recruits with limited oversight (Sarang, 2022). Additionally, in order to lure in potential new members, metaverse server access links will likely be shared within alternative platforms, such as Discord, Telegram, 4chan, Parler, and WhatsApp, to drive new user engagement. During traditional online recruitment, violent extremist groups commonly follow this process: discovery of new potential members, isolate them and create micro-communities, shift them to private communication spaces, and ultimately radicalize and encourage them into violent action (Berger, 2015). With the advent of the metaverse, however, instead of violent extremists off-ramping recruits into private chat rooms or encrypted text messaging apps, they can now create idealized virtual utopias according to their ideologies and negative stereotypes. Although each private metaverse server has different levels of accessibility, the current environment commonly requires an entry link, user login, and passcode to participate, all of which can be provided by violent extremists to gatekeep which individuals gain access to their servers (Hickey, 2022). Thus, the metaverse will enable violent extremists to build more private virtual worlds they are ultimately seeking to create offline.

The final primary concern of metaverse technology pertaining to online radicalization and recruitment is the development of violent extremist echo chambers. Historically through social media and online gaming, deviant and extreme behaviors are learned, absorbed, and normalized by users’ constant interactions with people who hold similarly extreme views. As a result, through repeated stimuli and the removal of moderating influences, users can acquire a skewed sense of reality, so that violent extremist attitudes and behaviors are no longer taboos, but rather are seen as positive and desirable. Another crucial aspect of the echo chamber phenomenon relates to violent extremists abusing anonymity to hide their real identities and avoid responsibility for their actions due to the added layer of anonymity (Neumann et al., 2012). Once users no longer believe they will face real-world consequences for their polarizing views and promotion of violence online, it may increase the likelihood of aggressive behaviors occurring offline.

As mentioned previously, extremists exploit the anonymity of online platforms to create niche communities in which their ideologies can thrive with limited interruption. Under these circumstances, there is severe cause for concern about how metaverse technology will further assist them. First and foremost, one of the most frequent concepts championed by proponents of the metaverse is that it will allow users to create worlds and avatars in more idealized ways (VMG, 2022). Moreover, many metaverse servers will incorporate artificial intelligence into their platform’s interface. Although the intention is to help increase the inclusivity and accessibility of the metaverse, making it more functional and user-friendly, artificial intelligence within the metaverse will provide an unrivaled experience for bad actors such as violent extremists (Amos, 2022). Not only will violent extremists be able to use artificial intelligence to help develop idealized avatars, but it will also help them create their own virtual worlds. During one of Meta’s first promotional events for Horizon Worlds, one of their versions of the metaverse, Mark Zuckerberg released a video highlighting its potential capabilities where users will be granted “god-like powers” to create their own worlds. This will be done with the help of an artificial intelligence assistant, Builder Bot, which will help users construct their worlds to specific requirements or modify pre-made templates. In the clip, Zuckerberg gave Builder Bot a series of verbal commands, to which the artificial intelligence assistant created the world to his exact specifications in seconds. Zuckerberg also noted that should the user be unsatisfied with the results Builder Bot produces, they will be able to modify the structures and add further details (Zuckerberg, 2021). Even if the companies that are building out the metaverse blacklist certain images, individuals, and locations from being artificially created, users will still have the ability to circumvent these moderation parameters with their own creation capabilities. In sum, the emerging metaverse affords violent extremists and violent extremist groups a new ability to maintain virtual ideological and social communities with robust, difficult-to-disrupt ways of expanding their ranks and spheres of influence (Elson et al., 2022). By allowing violent extremist groups to create their servers within the metaverse, interested users that join their virtual worlds will quickly become potential recruits from which these violent extremists can identify and target.

Fundraising and Cybercrime

The nexus between fundraising, cybercrime, and violent extremists has proven to be a fruitful money-making opportunity for groups and individuals in the past. Within the last three decades, online-based fundraising and criminal activities have increased significantly (UNODC, 2019). In general, the Internet has provided violent extremists with a practical and low-risk means to generate the resources required to sustain or expand their activities. These efforts may supplement, rather than replace, traditional fundraising channels based in the physical world. Still, they are appealing because they provide global reach and afford a degree of anonymity and security to donors and recipients alike. For example, websites, social media platforms, email distribution lists, messaging apps, and other virtual tools enable groups to publicize their needs directly to potential donors, with the option of traditional and online payment options, as well as to advertise merchandise for sale, as they might have done historically using print advertisements and paper flyers. A relatively simple and standard method for a violent extremist organization to solicit funds is by posting requests for donations on their respective websites or on forums where supporters already congregate. Violent extremist groups have also harnessed crowdfunding websites and donation applications embedded in social media platforms, such as Facebook, to expand their reach and elevate their causes (Evans & Williams, 2022).

The metaverse will provide another platform for violent extremists to fundraise. Whether that occurs within their own public-facing or micro-community private servers, violent extremists and violent extremist groups will develop methods to receive donations both through mobile payment services such as Venmo, Zelle, Cash App and PayPal, or through less conventional methods such as cryptocurrencies, and in-platform digital assets, coins, vouchers, or merchandise. This will be challenging for potential tracing purposes as links to these donations can be posted on in-game content, spread within message boards, or through voice chat, all of which can occur instantaneously (Dino, 2019). Similarly to the obstacles faced with content moderation in online gaming, there will likely be data too large for these companies’ trust and safety divisions to protect users or trace all their in-game transactions.

Furthermore, the metaverse may provide new opportunities for violent extremist groups to sell insignia and physical merchandise affiliated with their group more discreetly compared to online forums and within Internet marketplaces. Previously, violent extremists have used online retail platforms and payment processing architecture to generate funds through merchandise sales conducted directly on their websites or through intermediaries like eBay, Amazon, and Etsy. Violent extremists have also profited from self-publishing services like Amazon’s CreateSpace and music-streaming services, such as Soundcloud, Spotify, or iTunes, which serve the dual purpose of fundraising and disseminating their radical ideas (Dino, 2019). However, the underlying problem with the metaverse is that bad actors will be able to make this content interactive, enabling them to bypass certain takedown practices used by technology companies to suppress their spread. For example, most mainstream websites now utilize various forms of optical-character recognition and other visual-based approaches to censor content deemed violations of community guidelines (Panich-Linsman, 2018). In addition, governments also have the ability to carry out actions such as DNS tampering, IP blocking, keyword and packet filtering, and traffic shaping to deter access to extremist websites and other illegal online-based content (Terman, 2021).

The unfortunate nature of the metaverse is that it will resemble an online gaming platform more comparable to Roblox and Minecraft, as opposed to traditional social media. The result is that technology companies and government agencies will need to develop new machine-learning detection devices that can rapidly scan interactive three-dimensional content at incredible volume. Moreover, should these moderating entities be able to create tools to detect three-dimensional extremist imagery or key terminology within their servers, another added obstacle will be preventing them from creating a new server should they have it taken down or their profile banned. The key takeaway is that choke points previously capitalized upon by moderators to prevent bad actors from sharing their content will no longer prove sufficient within the metaverse. Should the crusade continue down the current path of automated content removal, takedowns, filtering, or removing servers altogether, it can be expected that an ever-adapting challenger will emerge and a cat-and-mouse game will ensue (Liang & Cross, 2020). This also does not consider the potential pushback from mass-auto-blocking violent extremists, especially in certain democratic countries such as the United States, where arguments about free speech are debated frequently.

Another component of violent extremist fundraising and metaverse technology is the ample opportunities for these groups and individuals to create new revenue streams through cybercrime activities. From a historical perspective, transnational organized crime and cybercrime have posed a significant threat to national and international security. Not only are criminal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their activities (US National Archives, 2011). In the past, online criminal groups engaged in services that facilitated crimes and cybercrimes for financial reward, acts such as stealing data and identity documents; ransom and malware attacks; distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and botnet services; keyloggers; phishing and spear phishing tools; hacking tutorials; and distributing instructions about vulnerabilities and possible exploits on how to take utilize these tools (UNODC, 2019). This is an incredibly lucrative industry, and it is estimated that cybercrime will cost the world economy $10.5 trillion annually by 2025, up from $3 trillion in 2015 (Morgan, 2020). However, in a 2022 report issued by Interpol, officials stated that they believe the metaverse creates new kinds of cybercrime and will exacerbate existing crime to take place on a larger scale (Kartit & Howcroft, 2022).

Regarding the technical cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the metaverse, a particular concern should be potential breaches of common entry points for users such as computers, phones, tablets, and headsets. For example, the creator of the Butterfly Bot advertised malware on the Internet that was capable of taking control of Windows and Linux computers. The creator of the Butterfly Bot also sold plug-ins that modified the functions of the malware and offered to create customized versions of the malware for paying customers. Various online criminal networks deployed the Butterfly Bot; the most extensive application of this malware resulted in the Mariposa botnet, which stole personal data from millions of compromised computers. This personal data included account information, usernames, passwords, and banking details. Additional malware downloaded by Mariposa also resulted in numerous distributed denial of service attacks (UNODC, 2019). The threat posed by hackers seeking to exploit vulnerable users and breach the systems that are required entry points to the metaverse cannot be understated.

Furthermore, a phenomenon known as Camfecting, the attempt to hack into a person’s webcam and activate it without the webcam owner’s permission, is another point of concern. Through disguised malware known as Trojans, hackers will pose as some legitimate institution or individual and provide users with a link, documents, or a program to download to their computer. Once this malware has been installed, cameras can be activated and files can be monitored without user knowledge. Moreover, this practice has become increasingly more accessible, whereas at one period, hackers needed specialist computer programming knowledge in order to write the malware. Currently, Trojans and all the tools required to launch such attacks can be bought and sold on the Internet and Dark Web. These infections commonly lead to extortion attempts and the unsolicited sale of private user data (Duong, 2021). With the potential for unfettered access to individuals’ personal surroundings and private data made available by augmented reality and virtual reality technology, violent extremists could gain unparalleled levels of extortion and financial proceeds through infected gateways.

The final possibility within the metaverse that violent extremists will almost certainly exploit are the money laundering opportunities. Traditional money laundering involves three stages: placement of illicit proceeds in the financial system (placement), concealment of the origin of illicit funds (layering), and reintroduction of funds into the economy with concealed origin (integration). Through online mediums, this money can be laundered utilizing digital currency (unregulated currency only available virtually); prepaid credit and debit cards (even Bitcoin- based cards); gift cards; money mules’ bank accounts; fake name and shell company bank accounts; PayPal and Zelle accounts; online gaming sites (via virtual gaming currency); and illicit gambling sites. Cybercriminals also utilize semi-automated cryptocurrency exchanges (known as swappers) and decentralized (peer-to-peer) exchanges, which do not require the identification and verification of users to launder criminal assets (UNODC, 2019).

How will these traditional practices translate in the metaverse? The anonymity that the metaverse affords users, specifically violent extremists in this study, will allow individuals to create servers with gambling, trading, and other money transfering opportunities that would otherwise not be possible within social media or online gaming. For example, metaverse casinos generally do not accept traditional fiat currency. A metaverse casino requires a participant to convert their fiat into one of the cryptocurrencies accepted in the metaverse and deposit funds using a crypto wallet. However, users can then exchange the NFTs and cryptocurrency that they win in the metaverse for fiat currency in the real world (Baker & Hogan, 2022). With this in mind, there is a chance that violent extremists could create gambling institutions within the metaverse that do not contain any identifying information that unsuspecting users may get lured into and provide currency to fund illicit behaviors unbeknownst to them. Ultimately, this section’s key takeaway is that the metaverse will simplify fundraising and cybercrime for violent extremists and provide added layers of anonymity to prevent detection from law enforcement and financial institutions.

Pre-Attack Planning

The third aspect violent extremists may utilize the metaverse for is expanding their pre-attack planning capabilities. Under our traditional understanding of pre-attack activities, individuals planning to commit acts of violent extremism develop a variety of different behaviors to plan their attacks. In a report published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, their researchers identified a recurrent attack planning cycle. According to the report, violent extremists generally plan attacks in observable stages, although specific details, sequencing, and timing can vary greatly and change over time. In addition, they noted that certain activities are easier to spot than others. Pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsals are often observable and can offer opportunities to identify plots and prevent attacks (ODNI, 2020). However, one major concern with the metaverse is that it may remove the need for violent extremists to conduct the majority of their pre-attack intelligence gathering in person. For example, should violent extremists become able to combine metaverse technology with other modern technologies such as CCTV, personal cameras, social media posts, and other livestream capabilities, they may never have to go in public to collect the intelligence they need to carry out attacks on specific targets or locations.

Another area of concern regarding violent extremist groups’ pre-attack planning is their ability to use roleplay metaverse games and training tools already available for law enforcement and armed forces to counter potential issues during their attacks. The usage of virtual reality training tools within militaries is not a new phenomenon. After the Vietnam War, the American military apparatus developed various training environments to reduce what the military considered an unacceptable ratio of combat losses (Lange, 2020). In the decades since then, militaries and law enforcement have adapted to an ever-changing threat landscape by advancing and innovating these technologies for their own benefit.

An example of the tools that are already available and could be modified for illicit purposes is AUGGMED (Automated Serious Game Scenario Generator for Mixed Reality Training). The aim of AUGGMED was to develop a serious game platform to enable single- and team-based training of end-users with different levels of expertise from different organizations responding to terrorist and organized crime threats. The platform automatically generates non-linear scenarios tailored to suit the needs of individual trainees with learning outcomes that improve the acquisition of emotional management, analytical thinking, problem solving and decision making skills. The game scenarios include advanced simulations of operational environments, agents, telecommunications and threats, and can be delivered through VR and MR environments with multimodal interfaces. In addition, the AUGGMED platform will include tools for trainers enabling them to set learning objectives, define scenarios, monitor training sessions, modify scenarios and provide feedback in real-time, as well as evaluate trainee performance and set training curricula for individual personnel in the post-training session phase (European Commission, 2022). This technology was deployed in March 2018 when security officers with the Piraeus Port Authority in Greece used AUGGMED to train for potential terrorist-related threats and attacks. On-site trainees in Piraeus worked with other agents remotely who were experiencing and responding to the same scenario through the online platform (Saunders et al., 2018). This platform has gained popularity and has been operated by at least 14 organizations and agencies throughout Europe representing law enforcement, first responders, academia and the public sector (Saunders et al., 2019).

During the COVID-19 Pandemic, the usage of virtual and augmented reality became more attractive for law enforcement and armed forces due to the sweeping international public health precautions. For example, in March 2022, the International Security Alliance used the metaverse to stage a three-day security simulation with over 50 participants from nine countries including Israel, Senegal, France and the UAE. By operating in roleplay scenarios within the metaverse, the participants faced situations such as drone crashes, ransomware, and distributed denial of service attacks, all within the virtual city of Brinia. The organizers of the event noted that these exercises allow for online simulations of environments usually too populated for real-world training, such as airports. Organizers could also consistently monitor participants and build a stronger understanding of optimal joint-working processes. Plus, once these virtual scenarios were created and ran without any technical issues, the cost of replicating and sharing the software with other agencies is minimal. This enables reusability and iteration at low cost (Herath & Jarnecki, 2022).

Although these examples highlight how law enforcement can utilize the metaverse for increased collaboration, they also pose a rather serious problem. Similarly to current forms of cyberattacks, should violent extremists gain access to these servers during live simulations or access notes taken by observers, they will be able to monitor and plan around law enforcement emergency response. It is also worth noting that there are growing concerns over extremist network efforts to tailor recruitment toward military personnel and an increase in criminal cases involving extremism within the ranks (Doxsee & Macander, 2022). These extremists either join the service in order to gain combat and logistical training, or are recruited once their service ends by radical groups preying on the combination of trauma, loss of purpose and community that often affects veterans (Ware, 2023). In sum, access to former law enforcement, armed forces personnel, and their response protocol information would elevate the success of violent extremist pre-attack planning in the metaverse and their operational capabilities.

The final area of concern when it comes to violent extremists using the metaverse for pre-attack planning can already be demonstrated by online games such as Minecraft, Roblox, and Sandbox. Based on publicly available plans and layouts, online information and imagery, and other mapping technologies, users have been able to create a plethora of virtual recreations of real-life infrastructure within these platforms. As a result, violent extremists will likely have the ability to gather intelligence simply by creating, downloading, or interacting with these virtual recreations to record notes and identify any points of vulnerability in which they could exploit during an attack. This will be especially worrisome for government buildings, critical energy infrastructure, public venues, university campuses, sports stadiums, and any other locations that may become potential targets for violent extremism.

Attack Simulation

The final activity that is alarming and requires immediate attention is the enhanced ability for violent extremists to simulate attacks. As mentioned above, the military has harnessed the powers of virtual and augmented reality simulation for decades. Although the technological affordances of high-quality metaverse graphics are still in development, software companies are trying to create programs that are considered so realistic they will suspend one’s disbelief that it’s a simulation and trick their minds into thinking they are physically somewhere else. This will translate to software programs that will allow users to manipulate the complexities of life such as varying amounts of civilians, differing infrastructure and traffic patterns, altering terrain, and various weather conditions. An example of how this has already manifested within the American armed forces is the Synthetic Training Environment (STE), which was developed by the software company Bohemia Interactive Simulations, that creates high-fidelity simulations for soldiers to train anywhere in the world. This version of the metaverse is called One World Terrain and the software combines three-dimensional data collected from satellites, sensors or scanners and combines it with additional information to render high-fidelity terrain simulations. Furthermore, STE’s digital world can be manipulated by artificial intelligence and machine learning to achieve specific training exercises and results (Easley, 2022).

As the technology has been democratized over recent years, it has helped companies such as Improbable overcome barriers to slow processing speeds and other limitations to a more realistic experience. Moreover, they are trying to improve the computing and networking capabilities armed forces would need to connect multiple users into a single metaverse training environment to the scale of multi-domain operations, which require vast virtual elements to render and then react naturally. However, at the end of 2022, developers at Improbable successfully held a stress test of their technology that was able to produce 20,000 artificially created bots that users within a simulation could interact with (Easley, 2022). Although this technology is being primarily produced for armed forces and law enforcement agencies, it is likely that companies building out these technologies will expand production and distribution to private sector consumers as well (Mcardle & Dohrman, 2022). Should violent extremists be able to gain access to these software programs, there is an infinite amount of plausible scenarios in which they manipulate the algorithms to the exact specifications of an upcoming attack and simulate their activities under hefty layers of anonymity.

The second key component of attack simulation within the metaverse that poses a heightened threat to public safety is their ability to practice with virtual weaponry and explosives. In the past, a trend developed where violent extremists moved to the Dark Web and used it to procure weapons, explosives, and other illegal items (Weise, 2017). The Dark Web, otherwise known as the Tor Network, is a collection of hidden sites inaccessible via a regular Internet browser and not indexed by search engines such as Google. In 2019, over 65,000 unique URLs existed on the Tor Network. Further, in a 2018 study by computer security firm Hyperion Gray, they cataloged about 10 percent of these sites and found that the most prevalent functions facilitated communication via forums, chat rooms, and file and image hosts, as well as commerce via marketplaces. Some of the more prevalent illicit activities included arms trafficking, drug dealing, and the sharing of exploitative content—often involving children—such as pornography and images of violence and other types of abuse. The pairing of Dark Web services with cryptocurrencies has led to expectations of an outbreak in crime related activities (Kumar & Rosenbach, 2019). However, there is now an emerging alternative option where users would have access to similar levels of anonymity, only now it will be far more immersive than the Tor Network. Within metaverse servers, organized crime such as arms trafficking could take place with relative ease under the current lack of technological understanding, regulation, or oversight (INTERPOL, 2022). As it pertains to firearms testing and purchasing specifically, there are companies that have already built firearm-emulating controllers that pair with virtual reality headsets that are shockingly realistic. With this technology, metaverse users and violent extremists alike will be able to simulate the usage of any number of different firearms, test its efficiency in a number of simulated situations, and arrive at a decision in which one they prefer to use in real life.

On the other hand, violent extremists would have access to purchasing firearms and explosives, while also learning how to make and operate them with technology that is already available for consumer purchase. In a hypothetical scenario, violent extremists could enter a metaverse server where they could purchase the instructions for building an improvised explosive device (IED) or 3-D printed weapon, as well as learn how to deploy them in a simulated attack from the user they are purchasing from. The critical difference between the Internet, Dark Web, and the metaverse is that within both the Internet and Dark Web, individuals using these platforms are currently more susceptible to detection from various law enforcement agencies monitoring these spaces (Goodison et al., 2020)(Dilanian, 2021).

The final activity and a critically important area of concern is how the Metaverse will enable violent extremists to rehearse their attacks. Once they have completed their pre-attack planning, gathered all the materials needed, the next step in the attack planning cycle is rehearsal. Violent extremists often rehearse the attack scenario to confirm planning assumptions, enhance tactics, and practice escape routes. They may also trigger an incident at the target site to test the reaction of security personnel and first responders. While assessing the efficacy of their plans prior to the attack, violent extremists also seek to determine the conditions which favor the highest rate of success and lowest risk. Factors they commonly consider include the element of surprise, choice of time and place, use of diversionary tactics, and ways to impede response measures. Unless the violent extremist is planning a suicide attack, escape routes and contingency plans are also carefully planned (ODNI, 2020). Until recently these activities were most frequently carried out in person. However, with the addition of metaverse technology, violent extremists could have unparalleled rehearsal opportunities (Elson et al., 2022). For example, violent extremists can simulate a variety of potential disruptions or variable changes and establish methods of best practice to still achieve their key objectives. This will enable violent extremists to replicate law enforcement and civilian responses, learn viable and efficient paths, coordinate alternative routes if some become blocked, and establish multiple contingency plans should disruptions occur.

Conclusion

The democratization of technology has proven to be a cornerstone of human life and societal development. However, with it has come numerous challenges, but none so great as the impending metaverse. In this article, the author sought to answer the following question, “How can the metaverse be exploited by violent extremists and violent extremist organizations?”

After a thorough analysis, the author identified the following conclusions: First, the metaverse will provide extremists with a unique environment to recruit new members as they can create their own private servers, reach a wider audience, and simulate in-person recruitment networks. These servers will be onerous to moderate, and the current regulatory guidelines and technological mechanisms do not sufficiently prevent the production of nefarious content and behaviors. As a result, the metaverse will serve as an ideal incubator for extremist recruitment. Second, the metaverse will simplify fundraising and cybercrime for violent extremists. Through the usage of cryptocurrency, cybercrime, and money laundering, the metaverse will provide added layers of anonymity and prevent potential detection from law enforcement and financial institutions. Third, the metaverse affords extremists the ability to do the majority of their pre-attack planning and intelligence gathering virtually. By limiting the number of times they must visit a potential target and minimizing the time spent online conducting open-source intelligence, violent extremists will be able to operate discreetly while still maintaining a high level of efficiency. Additionally, should they gain access to the servers used by law enforcement to conduct their own virtual trainings, violent extremists will have the opportunity to develop more effective attack and contingency plans. Finally, as metaverse technology becomes more realistic, extremists can practice creating and handling explosives, weapons, and conducting attack simulations with a variety of potential disruptions or variable changes and establish methods of best practice to still achieve their key objectives.

The implications of this article indicate that the metaverse resembles Pandora’s box; the emerging technology is far more complex than our current systems can handle, and the consequences could be devastating. Therefore, academics, law enforcement agencies, government policymakers, technology companies, and other nongovernmental actors must collaborate to establish proactive research efforts, legislation, and mitigation strategies to assuage future threats posed by violent extremists in the metaverse.

*****

Joseph Levin is an NYU Alumni who graduated from the Center for Global Affairs with a concentration in Transnational Security. His academic research focused primarily on violent extremism and reconciliation efforts in post-conflict settings. During his time at NYU, Joseph served as an Associate Editor of the Global Affairs Review and was a Graduate Assistant for both Dr. Mary Beth Altier and Edward Goldberg.


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