Op-Ed: A dead Iran nuclear deal will prompt a nuclear Saudi Arabia

by Meera Alfalasi

In the wake of the failed Iran nuclear deal and ongoing conflict in the Middle East, tensions with Saudi Arabia are high. The Kingdom has said it would not acquire nuclear weapons unless Iran did so first. How would a nuclear Iran affect the balance of power in the region? (Photo credit: Kyle Glenn on Unsplash)

The threat that a nuclear Iran would pose to its neighbors has been extensively discussed in print. Many academics and professionals argue that it would be dangerous to let an aggressive, expansionist dictatorship obtain the most terrible weapon ever created. With the latest development of a “dead proposal,” Iran has made it clear that it is not willing to take the deal proposed in late August of 2022 (Wagenheim, 2023). With the recent escalations in the region, including an Israeli drone strike on an Iranian military factory (Hafezi et al., 2023), discussions about how to coexist with a nuclear Iran have been on the table by several politicians and commentators. 

Reviewing all the probable effects of such a tectonic event is essential before adopting a fatalistic stance. Since the proposed agreement of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ), proliferation in the region has been at the forefront of nuclear talks. Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew, in their paper titled “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East?” discussed a “cascade of proliferation” if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action fails, and it seems like we are heading in that direction. The Russia-Ukraine war and domestic turmoil in Iran following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini have taken attention as Western governments accuse Iran of making excessive demands, causing the nuclear talks to stall (Reuters, 2022). It is clear that Saudi Arabia will take all necessary measures to ensure that it is not left behind if Iran passes the nuclear threshold.

Two factors, capability and intent, are frequently used in the intelligence community to evaluate a threat. Both are included in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia started construction on a 30-kilowatt research reactor in 2018 — odd, given that using nuclear reactors is tenfold more expensive than burning fossil fuels, which are abundant there. More striking is the Saudis’ refusal to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors nuclear safety and proliferation worldwide. If allegations that China assisted in building a plant to process the raw uranium are true, Saudi Arabia is estimated to possess around 90,000 tons of unmined uranium, which is likely enough fuel for that reactor as well as a weapons program (Graham-Harrison et al., 2020).

There is evidence that Saudi Arabia has an arrangement with Pakistan to deliver nuclear weapons in the case of a crisis, like Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, even if Saudi Arabia decides against acquiring the equipment required for a weapons program, such as centrifuges or plutonium reprocessing facilities. Additionally, it has long been thought that Saudi Arabia provided funding for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (Urban, 2013). A tiny portion of those weapons is reserved for such a scenario, according to many U.S. and NATO officials (Henderson, 2019).

If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, the Kingdom also intends to join the so-called “smallest club on earth,” which is made up of countries that have nuclear weapons. To see how well its leaders have conveyed their goals, one can look at their public pronouncements. Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, stated in 2018 that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible” (Reuters, 2018).

Such overt Saudi intentions about nuclear weapons are not new. Prince Turki Al-Faisal, former intelligence chief and Saudi Ambassador to Washington, stated in 2011, “We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons, and we don’t. It’s as simple as that… If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us, and we will have to follow suit…we must, as a duty to our country and people, look into all options we are given, including obtaining these weapons ourselves” (Burke, 2011). Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud stated in an on-stage interview at the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi in December 2022 that “if Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off…we are in a very dangerous space in the region…you can expect that regional states will certainly look towards how they can ensure their own security” (Reuters, 2022). What leads us to this conclusion of Saudi Arabia’s position is that it has refused to join nonproliferation agreements and has not consented to restrictions on uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, the two ways to produce nuclear weapons.

Part of the reason the Kingdom wants nuclear weapons is the Saudi-Iran tension since Iran’s revolution in 1979. The Sunni-Shia split gives rise to a sectarian element of the conflict, although the main reason for hostilities in the Middle East is to establish supremacy and power. Proxy wars between the Saudi-backed groups in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria and the Iranian-backed groups, alongside the expansion of Iran’s “Shia crescent” agenda, have intensified the fight (Silinsky, 2019). 

The likelihood of proliferation has increased because of recent changes in the Kingdom’s geostrategic situation. Saudi Arabia formerly benefited from a cordial relationship with the U.S. America’s position as a strong ally assured that other regional powers could not develop into existential threats. But this changed after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the OPEC+ decision to cut production by almost 2 million barrels a day. In a public statement, President Joe Biden warned that Saudi Arabia will have to “pay the consequences” and that the Kingdom’s administration has “little social redeeming value” (Sanger, 2021). With the prospect of its adversary getting nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia has no option but to follow suit. The sad lesson of Ukraine and Libya, both of which handed over their nuclear weapons, is that the survival of states that do not have nuclear weapons is at the whim of states that do.

Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would dramatically change the balance of power in the Middle East. Any consideration for how the world may cope with it should look at the likely effects of further proliferation in an unstable region home to several forms of governance that are susceptible to dramatic overnight change. While we must discuss how to handle Iran’s nuclear ambitions right away, we must keep such potential nightmares in mind.

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