Now, We Become the Barbarians!

Notable Essays, 2021-2022

My Dear Fellow Countrymen,

        First, I must assure you that I wrote this with complete honesty and sincerity. I am a patriot, as you are. I am “born under the red flag and raised in New China.” My grandparents are poor but proud farmers; my parents are diligent civilians and party members, and myself a passionate member of the Youth League. With an ardent love for our country, I’m writing this with a deep concern for our shared future – not because of an imminent danger like a foreign invasion but as a cautionary note in our seemingly best times. 

        I will begin with the recent controversy over Chinese director Chloe Zhao, the first Chinese and woman of color to win an Oscar with her film Nomadland. At the height of her fame, Zhao was praised as high as the “pride of China” by state news outlets. In the acceptance speech, she gratefully recited the ancient proverb she memorized as a child growing up in China: “People at birth are inherently good.” However, intense public backlash soon followed when she was found criticizing China as a place where “lies are everywhere” in a 2013 interview. The issue became politicized as netizens questioned: “what is her nationality?” “Has she forgotten her roots?” “If she is American, why should we celebrate her success?” Denounced as a “Han Jian [race-traitor],” Zhao’s name is censored, the hashtag “#Nomadland” blocked, and her film canceled. 

        In a New York Times article, it is said that Zhao’s fall from grace is part of the growing nationalist sentiment in China. It also shows that despite the central government ultimately controlling foreign films’ entry to China, “more and more, China’s online patriots can also influence the fate of a film or a company” (Qin and Chien, “Backlash”). Still, I would argue that it’s not simply the result of the global surge of nationalism and conservatism. We too often understand things in the metaphor of disease today, as if nationalism is a disease, spreading across borders, but can be contained and cured without tackling the cultural and political implications behind it. We also too often dismiss others as being “too extreme;” for those who took part in the cancellation of Nomadland, H&M, or Nike, we conveniently invented the term “Xiaofenhong [little pink]” to distance ourselves from those “ultranationalists,” as if we are not part of the problem. Yes, brothers and sisters, I’m writing this to argue that all of us Chinese are part of the problem. There is no clear boundary between “good patriotism” and “bad nationalism” since they are profoundly intertwined and rooted in our historical understanding of our nation. Ultimately, it’s about different visions of our nation. What should China be? Who are Chinese? These are not big questions devoid of meaning but practical questions we would encounter in real life. We canceled Zhao because of her seeming “betrayal” of her nation and race, calling her a “Han Jian,” which literally means “a traitor to the Han race.” But what is “Han” in the first place? 

        Conventionally, we have two names for our nation – “Hua” and “Han.” Though both are translated to “Chinese” in English, there are nuanced differences. In What is China, Professor Ge Zhaoguang proposes that “Hua,” etymologically meaning beauty, represents an ancient ideal – Chinese are the most civilized people under heaven, marked by the grandness of their ceremonial etiquette, beauty in their clothing, and the harmony of their existence with the world (60). On the other hand, “Han” is a much more politically charged term. As Mark Elliott points out in “Hushuo,” Han is a shifting ethnic label that emerged within ancient identity politics of distinguishing Self against Other, “us” against “them.” In the North Wei dynasty, Sarbi conquerors call all the Central Plain dwellers they conquered “Han” (Elliot 16). However, in the Yuan dynasty, “Han” is attributed to the third-class citizen, northerners on the side of Mongol conquers, while their rebellious southern counterpart is derogatorily named “Nanren” (Elliot 24). Finally, in the Ming dynasty, with the Mongols repelled, “Han” was again adopted as an ideological tool to reintegrate northerners and southerners alike into one group to serve Ming’s unification project (Elliot 26). Hence, Han was – and still is – a deeply politicized and racialized term, especially when it comes to dominate the way we construe China in modern times, facilitated by the “national humiliation discourse.”

        According to William Callahan in China: The Pessoptimist Nation, the national humiliation discourse is a strategy developed against a contemporary identity crisis. The racial label “Han” and the civilizational signifier “Hua” were once unified when ancient Chinese defined themselves as the civilized “Han” while all others were “Yi [foreigners]” or “Hu [barbarians].” However, the racialized understanding of civilization was challenged when the British Royal Navy made its appearance on the Qing empire’s shore in 1839 (Callahan 48). Forced to yield before westerners’ cannons and ships in the Opium War, the Daoguang Emperor came to realize he was no longer the one and only “Son of Heaven” and our “Central Plain” is no more than the “Far East” for the British. Once proud elites and intellectuals were forced to open up borders, accepting modernization as the only way out. They discovered, embarrassingly, “now, we became the barbarians” (Callahan 45). The nation felt frustrated and humiliated – what were we now? Can we no longer cling to the Hua ideal, becoming merely a mundane Han ethnicity? It was only more shocking when the Japanese, our neighbor who had been submitting to us for hundreds of years, invaded China proper in 1937. In response to a series of political and identity crises, Callahan argues that a “national humiliation discourse” emerged. Functionally, the discourse is a promise that brings together the divided vision of Hua and Han. The “national story of blood and tears” is derived its strength from a racialized and politicized distinction of “us” and “enemy” (Callahan 40). “We” are backward because “they” have obstructed our rise, so if all enemies are cast out of China and traitors purged, China would be rejuvenated as glorious as it was in the Hua ideal. Appealing to our glorious past and disgraced present, promising a rejuvenated, civilized future, the discourse acts as a powerful patriotic mobilization uniting all ethnic groups and political parties in China alike during the Sino-Japanese war (Callahan 165). In 1989, the national humiliation discoursed was again revived in response to the ideological, regime, and cultural crisis posed by the Tiananmen Square protests and later entrenched in top-down patriotic education campaigns to foster political loyalty and unity for the new republic (Callahan 35). 

        Still, the national humiliation is not cleansed once and for all after China achieved prosperity. When China started an extraordinary economic growth and rose to the second-largest economy after Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 reform, the national humiliation discourse did not fade away but is reproduced over and over again in textbooks, films, museums, festivals, and maps (Callahan 39). Historically effective in turbulent times, the discourse continues to foster a crisis mentality in a racialized understanding of civilization, though China is no longer in such a crisis that needs so much hatred for “our common enemies.” Living in modern prosperity, probably comparable to our glorious past, we constantly fear “covetous westerners” vying to sabotage and obstruct our rise. It almost becomes a national aesthetic to portray a “virtuous and civilized Chinese” against “barbarous, jealous, and evil foreigners” because it seems the most effective way to make us Chinese unite. 

        However, is casting out barbaric foreigners and domestic traitors the only way to rejuvenate the Great Chinese Nation? The Han-dominated view of Chinese civilization seems especially problematic in our pluralistic postmodern world today. If China is exclusively Han, what about the left-outs? What about ethnic minorities, immigrants, overseas Chinese, and mixed-race? Must they all be sinicized into Han to avoid being vilified as “bloody foreigners?” Is being Han the only way to claim for Hua and the civilizational ideal behind it?

        As if answering the questions raised above, the government is tightening its control over the linguistic autonomy of ethnic minority regions like Tibet, aiming to further replace the default language of teaching from local languages to Putonghua (the national language based on Beijing dialect). Facing pushbacks like the 2010 Tibetan language protest, netizens were not compassionate as protesters were later stigmatized as “terrorists.” Further, apathetic netizens displayed a condescending, patriarchal attitude as if saying, “those singing and dancing minorities do need our help. Economically, politically, and culturally backward, they ought to be educated, modernized, and finally sinicized.” Moreover, in the 2009 controversy around Shandong University’s study buddies program, the long-held resentment against foreigners’ “super-national treatment” reemerged. African exchange students were under massive cyber violence because they were seen as the modern successors of western colonizers. Their relative well-treatment was depicted as a waste of public resources or an outright “encroachment of Han resources.” Racially stigmatized as “black devils,” Africans in China are also suffering a racialized sexualization where they were depicted as “ravaging our educational resources, having sex with our Chinese girls.”

        Apart from casting out “foreigners,” we are also obsessed with purging “domestic traitors,” as in the case of Chloe Zhao. In mass media, we love the game of blaming others for “hurting Chinese people’s feelings,” disregarding right/wrong for honor/humiliation. We are keen to defend China from any form of disgrace, resulting in an atmosphere of populist censorship of any form of criticism, even though they are constructive and beneficial. We criticize analytical works on Chinese society as “giving westerners knives to stab China.” We see any form of criticism as an attempt to subvert the country or sell the motherland for profit. We attack any form of violation that differs from a “Chinese way of doing things.” But what’s the point? We are trapped in an echo chamber of false praises, blind to what’s happening outside.

        The question of “what is China” is constantly under the tension between a civilizational ideal encapsulated in “Hua” and a racial understanding in “Han,” though now, with the help of national humiliation discourse, the Han-centric, conservative impulse toward uniformity seem to prevail. However, is not the obsession with an evil foreign Other against a virtuous Han Self a self-racialization and internalized orientalism that repeat what the British did to us in the Opium War? In times of crisis, the national humiliation discourse was legitimately created and disseminated to evoke Han nationalism for the sake of national salvation, but now the circumstances have changed. Brothers and sisters, we have pursued the vision of Han too far that we forgot “civilization” itself means inclusiveness and harmony, as encapsulated in the ancient Hua ideal. Too obsessed with identity politics, we forgot the ancient Confucian proverb, “the virtuous are friendly to each other though they hold different opinions; the mean is hostile to each other when they blindly follow the others.”

        This letter is inspired by my professor teaching the course “The Concept of China.” It turned out that Professor Sen, born in India, speaking fluent Chinese, knows China better than I do. Thus, when he explained the national humiliation discourse in class, mimicking the Daoguang Emperor discovering “we are the barbarians!” – these words stroked my heart. So now, my dear fellow countrymen, I would like to present this question to you. What kind of Chinese are we? What kind of China should we build? These are urgent questions, brothers and sisters, because now, with rampant racism, nationalism, and nativism online, a horrifying fact occurred to me:

        We have become the barbarians, again.

Yours for our nation’s prosperity and rejuvenation,

A patriot

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Works Cited

Callahan, William. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford University Press, 2012. 

Elliott, Mark. “Hushuo 胡說: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese.” Critical Han Studies: the History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, by Thomas S. Mullaney et al., University of California Press, 2013. 

Ge, Zhaoguang, and Michael Hill. What Is China?: Territory, Ethnicity, Culture, and History. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018. 

Qin, Amy, and Amy Chang Chien. “In China, a Backlash Against the Chinese-Born Director of ‘Nomadland’.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Mar. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/world/asia/chloe-zhao-nomadland-china.html. 

Make Something: A Practical Advice to Live in Modern Times

It was a snowy winter night. A policeman on patrol stopped by a newly built park. There he saw an old man on the swing, nearly buried in snow. Deeming him as another random drunk, the policemen took no care, but still, something seemed rather bizarre about him – from the old man’s trembling lips comes a haunting lyric: “Life is brief. Fall in love, maidens, before the crimson bloom fades from your lips. Before the tides of passion cool within you – for those of you who know no tomorrow” (Kurosawa).

This is a scene from one of Akira Kurosawa’s most pronounced film works, To Live. Later on, the policeman learned he actually witnessed the very last moment of the old man called Kanji Watanabe, who passed away from severe stomach cancer. In his funeral, his family and friends deplored his departure and talked about his sudden personality shift: the unparalleled passion he instilled on dealing with a cesspool complaint, and his endeavor to push for a new children’s park in the bureaucratic municipal administration. In his funeral, the audience is implied with how he suffered before death: the helplessness upon knowing his ‘death sentence’, his unfilial son caring nothing but his inheritance, his boss taking credit for the park he toiled over for… but this is not the end of his misery, or his long, ‘unpleasurable’ life. Rather, this last scene on the swing is the destination of his journey, a late blossom of life, the conclusion of a long way towards the genuine understanding of ‘joy.’ What Watanabe had gone through is not a path rarely tread upon; it’s a confluence of philosophers, social theorists, and individual thinkers. Still, it’s a rather lonesome journey, because we all start uniquely from where we are, and embark on our own odyssey in answering ‘the concerning question.’

The question takes forms or variations like searching for meaning, pursuing a good life, exploring spirituality, living by faith, etc. Zadie Smith, in her essay, “Joy”, frames the question as untangling the intricacies of pleasure and joy. According to Smith, “a lot of people seem to feel that joy is only the most intense version of pleasure,” meaning pleasure naturally leads to joy as the scale of emotion increases. Dealing with a public for whom pleasure and joy are merely two junctions on the same continuity, Smith approaches this issue from multiple angles and tries to establish her ‘theory of joy’ that is clearly differentiated from the fundamentals of pleasure. She first defines pleasure from her personal experiences, giving examples like food, people’s faces, and (occasionally) her child, suggesting that pleasure is a more immediate, physiological thing originated from “the flavor of something good in [one’s] mouth” or making fun of strangers by gawking and gossiping (Smith 1, 2). However, though Smith tries to define joy as something complicated and different as “a strange admixture of terror, pain, and delight,” she nonetheless builds her ‘theory of joy’ upon biological or physiological foundations: to elucidate the pleasure-joy distinction for readers, she relies on examples like “amphetamine ecstasy” that helped her get close to the feeling of joy when clubbing. This bottom-up approach to joy-pleasure distinction in a biologically-based perspective persists until the very end of the essay: when informed the quote, “It hurts just as much as it is worth” that reminds her of the hurtful nature of joy, she intuitively rejects this idea and is baffled why anyone would choose joy over pleasure, because “the end of a pleasure brings no great harm… and can always be replaced with another of more or less equal worth.” This a biological understanding of pleasure and joy from the angle of sensory experiences, based on the economic assumption that rational man will always maximize utility by avoiding harm and choosing pleasure, which I deem as problematic and essentially counter-humanism. Though Smith is clearly critical of this embrace of a biology-dominated view of humanity, as she mocked it’s only what animals would sensibly do (Smith 6), this bottom-up methodology probably obstructs her from drawing a solid, confident conclusion that joy and pleasure are fundamentally different. In this way, Smith’s ‘theory of joy’ leads to a position where joy’s legitimacy cannot be upheld, and eventually, the pessimistic ending where she mocks on choosing the pleasure, massively produced and incessantly consumed, is just animal.

Still, despite this overall confusion about joy’s value caused by the author’s failure to take a non-biological and thus non-animal path towards a ‘theory of joy’, Smith does offer us some insight into what joy could be like. She insightfully points out “some small piece of joy” could be felt in particular experiences, though they only “mimicked joy’s conditions pretty well” (Smith 4). On dance floors, from the “communal experience” where “All was dance floor. Everybody danced”, from the smileys’ unconditioned generosity that allowed them to “pass beyond their own egos”, the needs for belongingness and love are evanescently satisfied, and thus a sense of joy briefly touched upon, enlightening on the audience how the true joy feels like (Smith 4). Though the author doesn’t explicitly point it out herself, she seems to unconsciously realize that joy is not a conditioned response to some random stimuli but a deep sense of satisfaction felt when fundamental psychological needs are satisfied (Smith 5). That’s why she emphasized the experience of clubbing only “mimicked joy’s condition” because it’s only an inferior, ephemeral satisfaction of the needs from which joy is derived, and it “had no substance whatsoever now, here, in the harsh light of the morning.” In fact, one of the reasons why we are more than Pavlov’s dogs is precisely our ability to feel joy, and our yearning for it. On the other hand, the true satisfaction of those needs where joy arises originates from things like long-term intimate relationships that actually yield very little pleasure (Smith 6). Hence, it’s possible to conclude pleasure and joy are different things: the former is the sensory gratification of physiological desires, while the latter is the satisfaction of human psychology’s deep, inner needs for love, belonging, self-esteem, etc.

As far as I am concerned, the author’s impotence in arguing for the clear distinction arises from our social reality. The capitalistic value or ideology blurs the semantic difference between the two words and tries to replace joy with pleasure because the latter can be commodified, easily reproduced, and thus used for profiting. Therefore, the essentially humanistic focus of joy is shifted to the technicality of pleasure – it’s not the problem of pursuing joy, but how to manufacture pleasure. This structural societal change manifests itself as the underlying semantic change that eventually results in the equivalency of pleasure and joy, as pointed out by Smith among her audience. The discussion of pleasure and joy’s difference and their relative significance, then, is posited in a broader structural value change in modern society, in which form is deemed to be greater than content, technology greater than human thoughts, and technicality greater than meaning. In this way, Smith’s essay could be usefully seen as a product of the socio-political reality of our times. Her attempt to dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tool, or to negate the pleasure-joy equivalency theory as a superstructure of modern society from the angle of modern biology, is a destined failure. With this in mind, it’s ironic to look back to see how Smith starts with the ambition to entangle the pleasure-joy mess in modern society but only shows how hedonism entrenches the pleasure-joy continuity, which Smith fails to destroy (1, 6).

This disconnection to meaning as a symptom of modernity results in the inability to distinguish between pleasure and her joy Smith points out in her audience, and her own failure in putting forth a concrete argument in favor of joy. On the other hand, this general social trend of losing contact with meaning is also intimately related to the death of expertise, a concept suggested by Tom Nichols. In his article “How America Lost Faith in Expertise,” Nichols centers around the issue of the expert’s position in a democratic society. He points out the danger of the common skepticism over professionals. The essay’s theoretical construction consists of two main social roles within the US society, “professionals” and “laypeople”. While the former is defined as “people who have mastered the specialization of skills,” the later refers to everyone else in the modern society as a result of the division of labor, with little “competence to judge most of [the vital and intricate issues and acknowledges]” because the modern world is becoming too complex to be fully grabbed by any individual (Nichols 63, 64). The author then contends, “this overwhelming complexity produced feelings of helplessness and anger,” engendered by their frustration that the intellectual “is needed too much,” leads to a “natural skepticism regarding expert,” resulting in a “collapse of communication” (Nichols 61). The advent of the digital age only exacerbates the situation, where the “stupidest people… [are] one click away”, the boundary of fact and opinion is blurred, and the “echo chamber “effect leads to the retribalization of politics, “miring millions of Americans in their own political and intellectual biases” (Nichols 68, 69). On the other hand, due to this “collapse of functional citizenship,” “experts disengage, choosing to speak mostly to one another,” rendering conversation between social groups even more unlikely. This distrust of expertise, along with their knowledge, forces individuals to back to themselves and embrace individualism, which, in its extremist and worst form, could be detrimental (Nichols 72). Since no subject can be formed without the influence of ideology, the reckless break with intellectuals impairs an individual’s critical thinking and may lead to a complete penetration of mainstream social values like scientism or hedonism. In this broadly delineated social picture, the problem of pleasure and joy can thus be connected to the demise of expertise. Meaning, embodied by experts, is no longer a part of today’s mass society and mass culture that champions hedonism – no wonder why the distinction between pleasure and joy becomes blurry under this dominant ideology.

Here it brings us back to Watanabe’s personal struggle. Upon knowing his imminent death after just a few months, Watanabe finally retreats from the swamp of populist ideology which Nichols points out as a widespread phenomenon in modern society. Watanabe once lives in the way all others in the bureaucracy do – to “pretend” to work hard so that others won’t find out they are just redundant. His failure to find meaning in piles and piles of paperwork in his job makes him cherish his son and parenting the only meaningful thing in his life. The populist ideology grabs him so tight that when he is disappointed by his disloyal son and himself upon death, there is nothing meaningful in his life that can make him feel joy. The angst develops in a craving for meaning and joy, that can’t be possibly satisfied by some of his failed attempts: gambling, clubbing, and spending money like water. In his journey, Watanabe is then attracted to the enthusiasm and joyous love of life in his young subordinate Toyo. Inspired by her words, “why don’t you try making something too,” Watanabe realizes it’s never too late to ‘live’ and instills unparalleled passion in solving a cesspool complaint kicked around in the bureaucratic system, where he pushed around for a child playground. Though his endeavor is not recognized and the honor stolen by his boss, the policeman, who happens to witness his last moments, reports seeing him “on the swing… so perfectly happy.”

To Live is a modern tale of an individual struggle for meaning in a cold, apathetic mass society. Here, the convenience brought by advancing science and technology makes possible many things that were once unthinkable, but they don’t take care of ‘the big, concerning questions’ in life, which we usually eschew by escaping to passive consuming and entertaining. The scene where Watanabe tries to lose himself in gambling and clubbing is such a realistic representation of how meaning crises are handled in modern times – a never-ending cycle of consumption that makes you feel pleasurable each of the time but never satisfied, insatiable hunger for meaning only treated with endless entertainment like air. This is the same impasse that leaves Smith in bewilderment; if we hover around the concept of pleasure, linger in the mere biological aspect of humans, and refuse to see inside, this is as far as we can get. Nevertheless, to make the leap of faith and begin the search for “all that makes life intolerable, feeling the only thing that makes it worthwhile” requires real courage and determination (Smith 5).

Personally, I believe we can straighten our backs facing the problem of meanings even without something serious as stomach cancer. Even for Watanabe, who wasted most of his life doing nothing in the bureaucratic system, it’s still not too late to start searching for meaning. The best part of the film for me is that it elucidates how self-realization can be attained in a daily form, in a practical manner, and it debunks the mundane belief that self-realization is a privilege of a few, and the commons can only turn to affordable hedonism. Though Smith’s struggle makes it look like such a mounting and painful task, it’s ultimately something as simple as to just “make something.”

Works Cited

Kurosawa, Akira, director. Ikiru (To Live). Toho, 9 Oct. 1952.

Nichols, Tom. “How America Lost Faith In Expertise”. Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 60 – 73.

Smith, Zadie. “Joy.” The New York Review, 10 Jan. 2013, www-nybooks-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/articles/2013/01/10/joy/.