I am an associate professor of philosophy at New York University. I received my PhD in Philosophy (Columbia 2008) and BS in Biological Sciences (Stanford 2000). I am interested in problems in the philosophy of biology, the general philosophy of science, metaphysics, and the epistemology of philosophy.

My work has focused on three families of questions:

1) why we ‘carve up’ or classify the world into the kinds and individuals that we do, and whether it is possible to maintain that some carvings are objectively correct, and others not; if so, on what basis?       [For more, see Kinds and Categories]

2) the nature of scientific explanation and understanding, and particularly how explanations in biology are similar to or different from those in circulation in other sciences; where our explanatory norms come from; and why explanations functions in the ways that they do   [For more, see Scientific Explanation]

3) how it is that, given that our universe is ultimately a physical one, we are able to get 3) how it is that, given that our universe is ultimately a physical one, we are able to get such an effective grip on its workings–for instance, formulating predictively successful theories about it–even when we are describing and conceptualizing it in non-physical terms, in doing so omitting many details that may appear crucial from a physical point-of-view.   [For more, see High-Level Sciences in a Physical World]

I’ve most recently been working on:

• a paper on the nature of the biological sexes.
• a project on whether the difference between correct and incorrect explanations is mind-independent or real
• a paper on why scientists sometimes deploy historical, and other times synchronic, categories

My CV is here.

Philosophy Papers

The Casual Economy Approach to Scientific Explanation (forthcoming) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, eds. Waters and Woodward   pdf

The Animal Sexes as Historical Explanatory Kinds (2020) in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science, eds. Dasgupta, Dotan and Weslake, p 177-197, pdf & Book Link

New Mechanistic Explanation the Need for Explanatory Constraints (2016) Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, eds. Aizawa and Gillett, p. 41-74, pdf & Book Link

High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’ (2016) BJPS, 67: 553-577,  pdf & Journal Link

Explaining Causal Selection with Explanatory Causal Economy: Biology and Beyond (2015) Explanation in Biology, eds. Malaterre and Braillard, p. 413-438,  pdf & Book Link

Natural Kinds as Categorical Bottlenecks (2015) Philosophical Studies, 172: 925-948,  pdf & Journal Link

Trashing Life’s Tree (2010) Biology & Philosophy 25: 689-709,  pdf & Journal Link

Bacteria Sex and Systematics (2007) Philosophy of Science 74: 69-95, pdf & JSTOR Link

Exploratory Experiments (2005) Philosophy of Science 72: 888-899,  pdf & JSTOR Link

Contact:

NYU Department of Philosophy

5 Washington Place 

NY NY 10003