Hardin, Bollier, and Caffentzis & Federici introduce three unique approaches to the value of “the commons”. Hardin is clearly anti-commons and very much concerned with the implications of a growing world population. He drastically claims, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all,” essentially arguing that freedom and equality cannot coexist due to the finite amount of resources a commons can offer. Bollier, on the other hand, critiques Hardin first by claiming Hardin does not correctly envision a commons. Unlike Hardin’s imaginary pasture, for Bollier, “a commons has boundaries, rules, social norms and sanctions against free riders. A commons requires that there be a community willing to act as a conscientious steward of a resource” (Bollier 24). Furthermore, whereas Hardin assumes that people cannot cooperate in stable and sustainable ways, Bollier lauds the work of Elinor Ostrom who was one of the first scholars to advance more sociological motivations of a commons. Bollier and Ostrom lean toward a ruling ethic of sufficiency, rather than Hardin’s ethic of efficiency instilled within “rational” actors. Lastly, Caffentzis & Federici argue for a more stringent idea of a commons, free from any capitalist characteristics or profit-based motivations. C&F believe, “Anti-capitalist commons are not the end point of a struggle to construct a non-capitalist world, but its means” (C&F i103, emphasis added by me). Altogether, we can think of the scholars’ work in a sort of venn diagram:
I want to meditate on the ability of a commons to foster long-term relationships. First of all, the relationships between people in a commons, whether they be on the internet or in a community garden, seem to be willingly chosen and seem more active than operations within a social contract arrangement. Long-term relationships can form in a commons, unlike in the marketplace, because people form bonds by mutually maintaining a resource and working over time toward a regenerative common goal. I see this as a process that generates empathy, which I would argue is largely aided by face-to-face interaction. As such, I’m skeptical of the sustainability of a commons that grows too large. The ability for commoners to form empathy for others seems crucial, and I’m uncertain how effectively empathy can be engendered without constant face-to-face interaction. The sort of “rationality” that Hardin claims as bolstering a scenario in which, “each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit– in a world that is limited,” is less likely when each man is inclined to look out for other herdsmen (Hardin 1244). In other words, empathy can bar “rationality”, and for the better, but empathy is most strongly instilled when humans are interacting in person. (Read about mirror neurons here: https://www.apa.org/monitor/oct05/mirror)
This brings me to my skepticism of the feasibility of Ostrom’s “polycentric” governance over too much space. Despite how well the concentric levels of governance are arranged and organized, I still wonder how democratic ways of life are stymied by distance. What is lost when those making decisions don’t know the people the decisions effect? Additionally on the subject of governance, Bollier suggests that ideally “the state must act as a trustee for commoners,” a sort of revitalization of bureaucracy (141). The question, for Bollier, “is not so much whether markets or governments have some role in commons but rather to what degree and under what terms” (145). C&F would disagree on the premise of the question, but I will just pose hesitation. Hannah Arendt likens bureaucracy to the rule of nobody. I’m weary that the state in any kind of trustee capacity would function bureaucratically, because “the state” as a group of removed individuals, stray from the very necessary face-to-face interaction and governing I argue a commons needs to thrive. My parting questions are these: How scalable is a commons? Does that question depend on the kind of commons? Should we even be aiming toward scalability when it comes to a commons?
Great! You have re-enacted here the debate I hoped we’d have in class! It seems to me that you favor Caffentzis and Federici here in a few different ways. First, you question whether scalability is even desirable, as they do, and wonder how much a global version of commons doesn’t leave itself susceptible to the “rational” behavior of Hardin’s herdsman. This piece made me think of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities insofar as empire/nation could be built across great distances through the kind of bureaucracy, language, educational system, and cultural values orchestrated by the colonizing country. Of course, this was done through extreme violence. So perhaps it is possible to scale in this way, but perhaps at the cost of morality, lives, diversity, culture, etc.? Second, you see the strength and sustainability of the commons as being one built on face-to-face interactions and the cultivation of empathy. (Thank you for the article link.) One thing I’d like to see from Bollier, Caffentzis, and Federici is an example of a racially/ethnically/culturally diverse commons that has worked in this way. It seems to me that empathy is easier to practice with people when they share ethnic or racial similarity, a similarity of circumstance or history, and/or a shared ideological passion. But as we live in a world of growing heterogeneity, which I personally enjoy, how do we also build the skills of empathy that go far beyond what’s familiar and valuable to us alone? Going back to my comments on your Harris post, how can we build empathy with everyday, ordinary white supremacists, if only just enough to begin the conversation about racial construction? This is not a pre-requisite to the anti-capitalist commons, but empathy does seem to be a prerequisite to any scale of beloved community, whether it’s a commons or just a city block. I’m curious to hear what you think about this after our readings on squatters and community land trusts!