Month: March 2019

Elizabeth Blackmar’s Manhattan for Rent, Lawrence Veiller and Robert De Forest’s The Tenement House Problem, and Keith D. Revell’s Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values, City Planning and the 1916 Ordinance all provide a historical backdrop for how New York real estate has developed its structure and policies of today. As a real estate agent in the process of acquiring an investment property, these texts currently contextualize my actions in shaping the built environment, which, as the readings show, influences essential livelihoods. Through these excerpts, it is clear how multiparty, profit-driven control of private property can manipulate livelihoods for the worst. On the same token, public regulation of private property can either behoove the community or fall into the hands of private interests.

As the readings illustrate, private interests have always dominated Manhattan real estate. The tenements described in Forest’s The Tenement House Problem were produced by multiple parties- the Building Operator, speculative builder, and investor- who wanted to profit through high density, low cost housing. Likewise, the wealthy proprietors and rentiers described in Manhattan for Rent controlled swaths of land first to preserve wealth and secondly to create wealth. Even the tenants of the rentier’s land wanted to turn a profit and would do so by subleasing out part of their land. Additionally, in Regulating the Landscape, proprietors actively pressed for limits on the heights and size of buildings, simply to lessen supply and maintain their own property values. Oftentimes, these real estate interests sought profit regardless of the ill effects to others.

Tenement houses are a prime example of how private property interest can be detrimental to individual livelihoods. The multilevel operation added significant cost to building the house, as every party wanted to make a profit. This took away funds that could have been spent making an actually livable building. As touched on in The Tenement House Problem and Regulating the Landscape, poor building planning and not leaving enough space for air, can even lead to health problems like tuberculosis.

Additionally, as seen in Manhattan for Rent, control of land oftentimes translates to control of production and labor. With sky-high rents, laborers and artisans may be priced out of working in a market. This ties back to Lockean theory and Henry George, who influenced progressives of the time who rallied both for and against private property on the basis that gross accumulation of land is unethical, workers have a right to their labor, and rent takes away fruit of one’s labor. Private property was dubbed evil in that a scarce property market restricted another’s freedom to work. At the same time, private property was advocated as essential to the freedom to work itself and the right to claim the bearing of one’s work.

To alleviate some of these qualms, New York public policy, as described in Manhattan for Rent and Regulating the Landscape, sought to redistribute land by breaking up large tracts and to regulate current building structures while planning for the future. The former helped redistribute land to the middle class. The latter helped provide for more air circulation, sunlight, public space, and urban decongestion.

Despite these positive effects, public policy did not always protect community interest as it should. In the case of tenement houses, building regulation was weakly enforced. In the case of the 1916 Zoning Ordinance, corrupt interest swayed much of the public policy, as at least half of the CBDR board was connected to the real estate industry. This essentially gave real estate executives the power to guide public action based on their private needs, while the initial goal was the opposite: for public needs to guide private action. The 1916 Zoning Ordinance still offered public benefits of providing order to the congested city; it simply was not as impactful as it could have been as it failed to deconstruct a history of property manipulation by colonial elites and simply built upon it.

Without the pressuring hand of private industry, however, public intervention into private property may be an adequate way to manage a system of unequal capitalist real estate interests. However, just because the private real estate market is currently managed by public oversight and driven by individual interest, doesn’t mean it will always be this way. Across countries like the UK and US, some individuals attempt to shy away from capitalism through joining co-op communities, where large resources, such as land and housing, are collectively owned. Although these communities are dwarfed by the rest of capitalistic society, they represent the possibility of blending public and private interests even past the cooperation that was seen with the 1916 Zoning Ordinance and current management of property and land.

Of this week’s readings, the one document that I resonated with was The Tenement House Problem. As a tenant in a Tenement building, I feel a more significant personal connection to the issue. From this reading, I firmly believe that when it comes to land and property one concept that must not be discounted, in any discussion within this subject, is that of the mass majority’s mindset.

In today’s modern world we operate in a society that places capitalism at the root of most actions. Everything is treated as a business, and the most significant influencer towards progression is that of the bottom line. How much does it cost to move forward? From the text assigned this week majority of the topics covered had a negative connotation to it. Things were wrong in the past, was the central idea that constantly repeated through my mind.

Take for example the text, The Tenement House Problem. On page 8 it states, “This hallway is nearly always dark, receiving no light except from the street door and a faint light that comes from the small opening upon the stairs…” Here we see how conditions in the past within tenement houses were terrible. However, we must understand the reasoning for why? This concept of why is by far one of the most interesting I got from the readings, and it is also what connects the past and the present.

From the text, Manhattan For Rent, by Elizabeth Blackmar one can trace the utilization of New York land as originating in production. However, over time the produce of the area soon became less profitable in contrast to the land’s usage. The question of how to take the products of the land and make a profit ultimately was shortened to how can said land make a profit. Thus, bringing to light how money is the driving factor to anything land or property related. The “why” to things being wrong is that the conditions are a product of peoples pursuit of wealth.

In today’s mass majority the mindset of many is that of money, capital, and profit. The one uniting theme that resonates with the past such as the colonial period up to the “modern day” that holds the issues of tenements is that of money. All the negative aspects of property such as the miss treatment of people all lie in cutting moral corners and doing what would make the owner the most money. Knowing this I firmly stand to believe that the future of what our land and concept of property would look like lies in what would create satisfactory levels of wealth. Regardless of what’s morally right or what’s morally wrong, the future of our land and definition of property would never lie in concepts of righteousness. Instead, the defense against moral wrongs and its prevention can only be achieved when a balance can be found between profitability and morality. The way to making the future better is not to satisfy righteousness but rather find room for it in a money-driven world. It holds second priority and profit is the first.

The readings for this week discuss the concept of the commons, and the implications of the misuse of common resources by individuals in various contexts. The classic 1968 text, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, by Garrett Hardin, discusses his belief that the issues caused by overpopulation of the earth cannot be solved by technology. According to Hardin, however, there is no agreeable solution to this problem, because as long as the downsides of individual actions do not exceed the individual positives of that action, there is no incentive to alter behavior. Hardin relates his explanation of the tragedy of the commons to many contemporary and historical examples. From pastures to parking spaces, the absence of rules incentivizes selfishness as the negative impact is externalized and therefore only a fraction of the positive impact. In “Commons Against and Beyond Capitalism”, by George Caffentzis and Silvia Federici, the arguments of Hardin are extended and adapted to apply to modern events, such as the current economic situation in Greece. Caffentzis and Federici argue that, in the absence of a functional capitalist economy, a commons-like collective of sharing emerges. The aid of “free medical services, free distributions of produce by farmers in urban centres, and the ‘reparation’ of the electrical wires disconnected” (Caffentzis and Federici), are examples of the mutual aid which comes to be in Greece. This is later equated to the squatters movement, to complete the argument that commoning and collective movements such as these come out of necessity, due to the dire situations that arise from capitalism. The extremes of the free market, therefore, often create a desire and need for a commons. Further, the concept of the commons, Caffentzis and Federici argue, is the basis for the more recent formation of what they refer to as “soft capitalism”, which they present as a solution to the extreme, neo-liberal capitalist practices, which often work counter to the best interests of the majority of people.

While this week’s readings offer some very interesting examples, applications, and interpretations of the principle of the commons, with numerous historical and contemporary applications, they are weak in their discussion of possible solutions to the tragedy of the commons. Hardin discusses the need for internalizing the external cost of actions against the good of the commons, which could work in a similar way to taxes. As Hardin points out, the only solution to the tragedy of the commons is to remove the benefits of exploitation, but this is exceedingly complicated. It is this dilemma that makes the commons, inherently tragic.

(Liam Pitt)

From my initial introduction to the term “Commons,” I recognized immediately that there didn’t appear to be one unanimously agreed upon its definition. I struggled to understand exactly what was meant by a commons, whether it was a physical place, a hypothetical situation, or a philosophy or ideology. Does a commons refer to a problem, or a solution? Or does it refer to both?

A commons from my understanding is a hypothetical but arguably existant (from Caffentzis and Federicis perspective) ideology (or arguably impossible according to Hardin) surrounding the governance of shared natural resources amongst a group of individuals. It is evidently a fairly abstract idea, with endless complications that inevitably tie-in questions and assertions of human morality. A commons relies in many ways on human morality; it depends to an extent on the hope that human beings can act individually in a way that benefits a larger community. Therefore, it doesn’t come as a surprise that when economic theory comes into conversation with commons, the ideology is almost always seen as a threat, an inevitable path to “ruin.”

When I began to read Hardin’s piece, I found myself in shock at his pessimistic view of the nature of human beings. Hardin appears to be unable to accept the idea that humans can find a way to share and cooperate fairly, seeming to believe that we will always inevitably act on our own good before considering others. It became apparent that this perspective echoes his alignment with the persistent tragedy paradigm that trails the idea of Commons throughout economic theory. I found his assertions about human behavior to be bold and presumptuous, however, I was relieved to read counterarguments in the Bollier text that gave me insight into the cultural significance of Hardin’s argument, especially in relation to economics. This sentence summarize my thoughts perfectly: that “economic theory and policy often presume a rather crude, archaic model of human being.”

At the same time, I find it difficult to discuss Commons without bringing economics or capitalism into the conversation. In the Caffentzis and Federicis article, I found some aspects of the proposed anti-capitalist commons to possibly be somewhat paradoxical. In the article, part of the definition of a commons is the involvement of a “common wealth, in the form of shared natural or social resources: lands, forests, waters, urban spaces, systems of knowledge and communication, all to be used for non-commercial purposes.” The sharing of resources as a group without individuals exploiting the resources for their own benefit relies on a similar optimism towards human morality as a capitalist or “commodity-producing commons.” In both cases, human beings are required not to be selfish. This is where I do not fully understand how the idea of a commons is a viable argument, even if capitalism is discarded entirely.

I do not find Hardin’s ideas to be entirely incomprehensible. In fact, his philosophy sounds more ‘realistic’ to me—a terrible word to use, I know. But I use the term in part to exemplify the ways that this sort of economically based argument has infiltrated our minds from the beginning. Capitalism is taught to be a natural and unchangeable model, and so we often don’t make room for the possibility of good moral judgement on the part of individuals for a whole.

I hope I haven’t fundamentally misunderstood these readings, but I am completely open to this possibility. It’s a lot to wrap one’s head around.

 

In The Tragedy of the Commons, by Garret Hardin, Hardin writes that the solution to over population is not technological and that the only way to control over population is to relinquish the idea of a commons in order to be more free. Hardin starts his argument by pointing out our population is growing, and our resources are depleting. He hypothesizes we must acknowledge the optimum growth rate should be zero, and we must understand that “maximizing population does not maximize goods” (Hardin). This particular idea was interesting to me because of Hardin’s debate on what is considered good. While Hardin explains some value wilderness while others value ski lodges, he also points out that there is not common agreement upon what is valuable. While some want to dedicate their time to make a family or have a stable job, others might dedicate it to saving the world or traveling for experience. I think this point is very convincing as to why there is chaos among the world. We cannot agree on what to dedicate our time and resources to, and this poses a problem of individual beliefs and how they affect society as a whole.

Furthermore, Hardin touches on different types of people who have children and observes their conditions. When stating “the most rapidly growing populations on earth today are the most miserable,” Hardin makes the point that the populations with the most people are considered “commons” due to their wide range of beliefs and consciousness. Furthermore, populations that over breed experience a harder time keeping up with the demands of more people. This leads Hardin to make his biggest argument that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin). It is my understanding that Hardin’s version of a commons is a group of people who think freely and individually. The idea of freedom in a commons poses the debate again on where our resources should go. While some would rather dedicate their time to important matters that affect us a whole, others are more focused on matters that only benefit a small portion of the world. Furthermore, these improvements cost tax payers millions of dollars which they have no authority over. Tax payers can’t control where their money goes and cannot decided what matter is more important to focus on. Freedom in a commons create people who do not think of the entire population when depleting resources and are more self focuses rather than bigger picture focused. Hardin takes an obvious opposition to a commons and believes they are the reason over population and tragedy have stuck earth.

With the multiple arguments and opinions Hardin voices, I finished this reading slightly confused as to why Hardin did not propose a plan to end over breeding. While he has multiple thoughts and opinions of over breeding and believes there is no technological solutions, why did he not create a different solution? I find Hardin’s arguments convincing, but also problematic. While I agree that the world is overpopulated and that we are going through more resources than we actually have, I feel that the solution is not just to recognizes that freedom in a commons is bad, but to propose how we fix this issue. Hardin is merely pointing out the problem and why he thinks it is a problem, but he does not offer any advice on how to rid the idea of a freedom commons or how to make everyone understand we need to work to benefit society as a whole and not just ourselves.   

Hardin, Bollier, and Caffentzis & Federici introduce three unique approaches to the value of “the commons”. Hardin is clearly anti-commons and very much concerned with the implications of a growing world population. He drastically claims, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all,” essentially arguing that freedom and equality cannot coexist due to the finite amount of resources a commons can offer. Bollier, on the other hand, critiques Hardin first by claiming Hardin does not correctly envision a commons. Unlike Hardin’s imaginary pasture, for Bollier, “a commons has boundaries, rules, social norms and sanctions against free riders. A commons requires that there be a community willing to act as a conscientious steward of a resource” (Bollier 24). Furthermore, whereas Hardin assumes that people cannot cooperate in stable and sustainable ways, Bollier lauds the work of Elinor Ostrom who was one of the first scholars to advance more sociological motivations of a commons. Bollier and Ostrom lean toward a ruling ethic of sufficiency, rather than Hardin’s ethic of efficiency instilled within “rational” actors. Lastly, Caffentzis & Federici argue for a more stringent idea of a commons, free from any capitalist characteristics or profit-based motivations. C&F believe, “Anti-capitalist commons are not the end point of a struggle to construct a non-capitalist world, but its means” (C&F i103, emphasis added by me). Altogether, we can think of the scholars’ work in a sort of venn diagram:

I want to meditate on the ability of a commons to foster long-term relationships. First of all, the relationships between people in a commons, whether they be on the internet or in a community garden, seem to be willingly chosen and seem more active than operations within a social contract arrangement. Long-term relationships can form in a commons, unlike in the marketplace, because people form bonds by mutually maintaining a resource and working over time toward a regenerative common goal. I see this as a process that generates empathy, which I would argue is largely aided by face-to-face interaction. As such, I’m skeptical of the sustainability of a commons that grows too large. The ability for commoners to form empathy for others seems crucial, and I’m uncertain how effectively empathy can be engendered without constant face-to-face interaction. The sort of “rationality” that Hardin claims as bolstering a scenario in which, “each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit– in a world that is limited,” is less likely when each man is inclined to look out for other herdsmen (Hardin 1244). In other words, empathy can bar “rationality”, and for the better, but empathy is most strongly instilled when humans are interacting in person. (Read about mirror neurons here: https://www.apa.org/monitor/oct05/mirror)

This brings me to my skepticism of the feasibility of Ostrom’s “polycentric” governance over too much space. Despite how well the concentric levels of governance are arranged and organized, I still wonder how democratic ways of life are stymied by distance. What is lost when those making decisions don’t know the people the decisions effect? Additionally on the subject of governance, Bollier suggests that ideally “the state must act as a trustee for commoners,” a sort of revitalization of bureaucracy (141). The question, for Bollier, “is not so much whether markets or governments have some role in commons but rather to what degree and under what terms” (145). C&F would disagree on the premise of the question, but I will just pose hesitation. Hannah Arendt likens bureaucracy to the rule of nobody. I’m weary that the state in any kind of trustee capacity would function bureaucratically, because “the state” as a group of removed individuals, stray from the very necessary face-to-face interaction and governing I argue a commons needs to thrive. My parting questions are these: How scalable is a commons? Does that question depend on the kind of commons? Should we even be aiming toward scalability when it comes to a commons?