(Liam Pitt)
From my initial introduction to the term “Commons,” I recognized immediately that there didn’t appear to be one unanimously agreed upon its definition. I struggled to understand exactly what was meant by a commons, whether it was a physical place, a hypothetical situation, or a philosophy or ideology. Does a commons refer to a problem, or a solution? Or does it refer to both?
A commons from my understanding is a hypothetical but arguably existant (from Caffentzis and Federicis perspective) ideology (or arguably impossible according to Hardin) surrounding the governance of shared natural resources amongst a group of individuals. It is evidently a fairly abstract idea, with endless complications that inevitably tie-in questions and assertions of human morality. A commons relies in many ways on human morality; it depends to an extent on the hope that human beings can act individually in a way that benefits a larger community. Therefore, it doesn’t come as a surprise that when economic theory comes into conversation with commons, the ideology is almost always seen as a threat, an inevitable path to “ruin.”
When I began to read Hardin’s piece, I found myself in shock at his pessimistic view of the nature of human beings. Hardin appears to be unable to accept the idea that humans can find a way to share and cooperate fairly, seeming to believe that we will always inevitably act on our own good before considering others. It became apparent that this perspective echoes his alignment with the persistent tragedy paradigm that trails the idea of Commons throughout economic theory. I found his assertions about human behavior to be bold and presumptuous, however, I was relieved to read counterarguments in the Bollier text that gave me insight into the cultural significance of Hardin’s argument, especially in relation to economics. This sentence summarize my thoughts perfectly: that “economic theory and policy often presume a rather crude, archaic model of human being.”
At the same time, I find it difficult to discuss Commons without bringing economics or capitalism into the conversation. In the Caffentzis and Federicis article, I found some aspects of the proposed anti-capitalist commons to possibly be somewhat paradoxical. In the article, part of the definition of a commons is the involvement of a “common wealth, in the form of shared natural or social resources: lands, forests, waters, urban spaces, systems of knowledge and communication, all to be used for non-commercial purposes.” The sharing of resources as a group without individuals exploiting the resources for their own benefit relies on a similar optimism towards human morality as a capitalist or “commodity-producing commons.” In both cases, human beings are required not to be selfish. This is where I do not fully understand how the idea of a commons is a viable argument, even if capitalism is discarded entirely.
I do not find Hardin’s ideas to be entirely incomprehensible. In fact, his philosophy sounds more ‘realistic’ to me—a terrible word to use, I know. But I use the term in part to exemplify the ways that this sort of economically based argument has infiltrated our minds from the beginning. Capitalism is taught to be a natural and unchangeable model, and so we often don’t make room for the possibility of good moral judgement on the part of individuals for a whole.
I hope I haven’t fundamentally misunderstood these readings, but I am completely open to this possibility. It’s a lot to wrap one’s head around.
You have done a really good job of highlighting the problems of both arguments here! At the core of your analysis seems to be: how can we create a system of being and thriving in the world that makes productive use of both the good and bad of human nature? Hardin seems to see only “badness” — selfishness, competition, hoarding, disregard for others’ sense of good. And Bollier, Caffentzis, and Federici seem to see only “goodness” — a natural desire for cooperation, capacity to work for long-term social rewards, satisfaction with having enough. Bollier does seem to see some middle-ground in which our sympathies toward cooperation can also work within a capitalist market, although Caffentzis and Federici might consider him a sell-out for even considering capitalism a legitimate bedfellow of commoning. Ultimately, I 100% agree with your statement that Hardin’s perception of human nature as one that is essentially self-serving and, therefore, can only exist within a capitalist-like economic system has “infiltrated our minds from the beginning.” How can we think or see differently? What would it take for us to change our minds, our hearts, our ways of interacting with one another?