Month: March 2019

As I stared at the closing credits after watching Crazy Rich Asians, I immediately thought that I must own property. Many people gawked at what I took away from the movie. From the groundbreaking Asian representation to the romance to the beautiful way Singapore is depicted, people were confused as to why property ownership stood out to me the most. I mention this because after reading this week’s texts, I realize that one of the best ways to build wealth and to secure safe assets is to invest in property. This response paper will illustrate the interesting ways people viewed land ownership, particularly in New York.

In Manhattan for Rent, Elizabeth Blackmar discusses the ways in which Manhattan real estate changed. She states, “For Manhattans’ large proprietors, land served initially as a different kind of asset, as a means of storing, transferring, and displaying wealth rather than generating it” (24). Initially, people did not view owning property in Manhattan as a way to make more money. The moment free Blacks were forced to forfeit their properties demonstrates the shift in people’s views towards property ownership in Manhattan.  I credit this shift to the British crown since they passed legislation that made it illegal for Blacks to own land (20). I posit that this law affected people’s views and induced behaviors that perpetuated anti-Blackness and, as Cheryl Harris states, “witness as property.” The passing of this law reveals that property owners and soon to be property owners, who were in most cases White, saw the value in owning land and thus they created a system that made it easier for them to generate wealth and cement/raise their class status. Blackmar mentions that by examining the colonial system of land tenure, one can understand how city real estate became a profitable commodity. I believe that the growing trend towards renting is bad for communities and society at large. Owning land forces you to have a stake in the neighborhood you are in. When one simply rents, people do not invest in the neighborhood they live in or even interact with their neighbors. People observed the growing concentration of land ownership after the American Revolution and it is still seen today (35). When I interned at Macy’s, I could not help but realize how much property Vornado Realty Trust owned. Was NYC becoming a place only for the rich and a place to make money? Do the NYC landowners even live in the city or on the properties they own? Is it safe to assume that they all live in fancy homes in upstate New York, the Hamptons, or on the Upper East Side, areas that have strict zoning laws and residents who display their wealth with Birkin bags and expensive, personalized cuff links? “In New York City,” Blackmar asserts, “control over land and housing had assumed new social meanings and represented a new kind of social power” (Online). I concur with Blackmar. Landlords have a disturbing amount of power over the lives of those who live or work on their properties. In the mid-nineteenth century, New Yorkers saw how bad landlords affected their own “health, safety, and domestic tranquility, and a threat to the social equilibrium of a free-market society” (Online). This reading made me wonder if I should reject owning land in protest of a system that creates immense inequality and makes the rich richer. Revell’s text deepened this idea. The 1916 Zoning Ordinance, which at face value seems wonderful, was heavily affected by private property owners. Reading “Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values, City Planning, and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance” basically told me suspicions I had about NYC real estate, which I believe, among other things, are racist and classist (i.e. 5th avenue). Although the ordinance did not change the existing arrangement of space in the city, it did help the city from address overcrowding and the city’s aesthetic. People arguing against tall buildings/skyscrapers is not new. But is the war against useless? When the first “tall” building was erected in the city, it created a precedent. Overall, these readings highlight how New York City was shaped by the wealthy and it continues to make them richer.  

In Think Like a Commoner: A Short Introduction to the Life of the Commons, David Bollier challenges prominent negative views of the commons, which are considered to be chaotic and a failure. He asserts that such ideas have arisen because many, specifically economists, think of it as a free-for-all. Instead, he states that the commons “has boundaries, rules, social norms, and sanctions against free riders” (24). He recognizes that the tragedy of the commons myth must be addressed because it mischaracterizes a social system that formerly existed inaccurately. I noticed that he does not say whether capitalism must be dismantled but he does describe those who work on Wall Street, which is the epitome of capitalism, like wizards. By doing so, he indicates that they have powers and through their supernatural abilities they “maximize private gains without the regard for the systemic risks or local impacts” (26). I aver that money provides the Wall Street “wizards” their abilities. Bollier modifies the popular phrase tragedy of the commons to tragedy of the market to illustrate that the faults people pinpoint to the commons, in fact, derive from the flaws of a laissez-faire market economy. To support his argument, Bollier analyzes political scientist Elinor Ostrom’s work.

Bollier clearly defines the commons as a system that is about the practice and ethic of sufficiency. Given Earth’s finite resources, one may believe that such a system of governance will permit everyone to enjoy the fruits of the land. If everyone works together, then everyone would have enough to survive, right? If boundaries are drawn and people are allowed to capture/claim any and all resources, what would occur? From the readings, many of the authors argue that is natural resources deplete at such a rate where they cannot replenish themselves fast enough and it creates the haves and have nots. Currently, in NYC, Elizabeth Street Garden has been marked as a potential site to build low-cost apartment complexes for senior citizens. Although low-income affordable housing is desperately needed, so is green space. In an economy that pushes people to maximize profits and may seem to be filled with vultures, how can society for all even exist? People who would want to do good may be reluctant to do anything because they fear they will be taken advantage of. Bollier does an excellent job describing why people are reluctant to contribute to the commons. He does so by stating that because people fear that their idea may be used and privatized to be sold for money, people don’t contribute. This reminded me of a specific moment I taught at a high school. When discussing a project that all students had to complete, I asked if anyone would want to share with the class what they were thinking of doing. When no one raised their hand, I simply called on a student and they quickly snapped back stating that they did not want to say because they didn’t want anyone to take their idea. This encounter affirms Bollier’s assumption. In order to have people contribute to the commons, there must be substantial reform to how society and the economy operates.

In Manhattan for Rent, 1785-1850, Elizabeth Blackmar explains how New York City property was established, became profitable, and the political conflicts in the city’s property system. The concept of property was produced by the British and Dutch colonizers of the land. What is now Manhattan became the site for trade, but not a strong internal economy. European residents on the “new” land were able to establish and own their own households and artisans could buy small pieces of land (Blackmar 15). While this continued for some time, both the Dutch and English used to the land to form connections with businessmen, endowing land to the mercantile elite. In the 1640s, the West Indies Company established gave half-free slaves “negro lots” just outside the fort to protect the company’s trade interests (Blackmar 16). This shows the role land played, as a tool for the elites to utilize. 

The land was a crucial mean for profits, but because the city was based on trade and not the use of land itself, it did not hold the same “intrinsic” value it does today. Yet as the internal economy expanded, the land became used more (Blakmar 21). While this process was already underway, the economy turned a corner, shortly after the industrial revolution. From 1785 to 1800, the population increased from 23,000 to over 60,000 people. Because the economy was increasing, as well as the sheer number of people, the land became a means for profit itself. Between 1795 and 1815, the real land costs in New York City became eight times the price (Blakmar 38). The land was no longer a place for the economic outputs to occur, as the artisans used their land or how the West Indies Company used the fort for trade. Rather, the land itself was the cite for economic transaction and growth. The financial value was in the land itself.  

This can be seen in the regulations of land emerging at the time. Henry Rutgers, a large landowner in Lower East Side, set strict terms on his lease’s, such as not building backhouses, to maintain the value of the property, even though they were against the practical use of the occupants (Blakmar 41-42). Similarly, in the early twentieth-century real estate largely backed limitations to housing because it could be used to protect their own land values, which could fall if skyscrapers, like the Singer Tower, were built (Revell 29-30). The property-based economy because the lens for decision making, as profits became a goal within itself.

As the land became profitable, the issue of land ownership became not only a question of unequal distribution but also unequal power. As independent proprietorship fell, working-class people became trapped in wage labor and rent. According to Blakmar, by 1850, the working class had lost their claims to the city’s resources and their own labor and life value. Here Blakmar compares Marxist understandings of the worker-capitalist relationship to the tenant-landowner relationship, as landowners exploit their tenants for rent. They are able to do so because they own the land, the means of production This is particularly true for the increasing tenement population in the city. Dumb-bell apartments were first constructed in 1879 and became ubiquitous. They used almost the entire lot with a small gap in the back along each side. For residents, they were largely inhospitable, with little light and access to air. But, for the landowner, they were the most efficient means for exploitation (Revel 7-9). The use of land underwent a striking transformation into modern-day property. By looking at this history, we can learn that the current state of property has been produced and is not a natural state.  

Throughout this week’s readings, we get insight into the origins of how New York became the real estate hub it is today, taking us all the way back the collection of private property by wealthy white British settlers in the 18th century, setting in place the system we have for collecting rent that we have today in Blackmar’s “Manhattan For Rent,” the consequential public policy of the early 20th century in Revell’s “Regulating the Landscape,” and the realities of how the city has failed its working class and immigrant communities in De Forest and Weeks’ “The Tenement Problem.”

While it was certainly interesting to see the influence of labor relations (from facilitating a redistribution of property to the middle class to the shift in dependency on slavery in the city, as well as the Haitian Revolution providing a disruption to the Anglo-American understanding of property rights), what I find more compelling is the story told by “Regulating the Landscape” and “The Tenement Problem.” It is truly heartbreaking to see how attempts were made throughout the years to better regulate the tenements in which New York’s labor class lived in that were continually abandoned, leaving many to suffer, while real estate magnates were able to essentially seize control over dictating the formation of the 1916 Zoning Ordinance to their benefit. 

I recently started reading Samuel Stein’s new book “Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State,” and so much of this is introduced in the introductory chapter. Starting off with the memory of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, the anniversary of which was this Monday, marking the death of immigrant women for the sake of capitalist greed, to the Grenfell Tower fire a few years ago. With 106 years between them, the one thing that remains true is the failure to prioritize building a city equitably for the working class, immigrants, and people of color. Although they are municipal  employees, Stein raises the question of how much they are truly able to help given the push to increase city revenue: “If the city is an investment strategy, are they just wealth managers?”

Capitalism, averse to limits being placed on their ability to exploit land and production, will prevent planning that affects this aforementioned exercise, as we examined in Revell’s piece, but we must work towards a place where we fight not for the Amazons, but for those who are continually being displaced, and are running out of places to go. It goes without saying that this will not be provided by the state, but I’m certainly interested in continuing to read Stein’s piece and seeing where he sees city planners fitting into this future, and the potential to right the wrongs of the planners who made way for the crisis of the tenements and the forming of the city to the desires of its elite. 

In the first chapter of Elizabeth Blackmar’s “Manhattan for Rent, 1785-1850”, she writes that land was initially viewed by the Dutch and British Colonists of New York as an extractive resource. Arguably, the effort to extract the maximum value from New York land can be seen throughout history, down to the present day, albeit, in a very different way. In the early colonial times, land values on Manhattan were very low, as the city was only seen as valuable for its port. The valuable land was that which surrounded the Island, where the main export commodities, fur and timber were found in great quantity. Therefore, the area of lower Manhattan which comprised the port was granted and sold to those who had direct roles servicing and allowing the port to function. Outside of this, the ever present threat from the Native Americans to the north, made the city fairly unattractive and unstable. This instability characterized the New York City real estate market for hundreds of years, and played a role in depressing the city’s value. In fact, while contemporary developers often view regulation of property with contempt, historically, government regulation of real estate in Manhattan has been the catalyst for its explosive growth. It was not until the Commissioners Plan of 1811, which established the grid system and the created the 25’x100’ lots, that New York City began to move northward with any speed or regularity. With the introduction of the Commissioners Plan, speculative investment and development such as that described in Lawrence Veiller and Robert DeForest’s “The Tenement House Problem” could be undertaken. Prior to this, the uncertainty made most of the island unusable, as anything but farmland, in the absence of infrastructure or plans for infrastructure. Just over 100 years later, the 1916 Zoning Ordinance took this further. This revolutionary piece of legislature created, perhaps the strongest and most comprehensive set of planning and land use regulations in history. As described in Keith Revell’s “Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values, City Planning, and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance.”, this legislation resulted from the efforts of, primarily private entities, such as the Fifth Avenue Association. Formed of high end retailers, the rapid neighborhood change which Manhattan experienced throughout the latter half of the 19th century, largely resulting from the industrial revolution caused the private retailers to solicit public regulation to protect their considerable investments. Similarly, the disaster that was the 1915 Equitable Life Insurance Building, caused the city planners to realize the negative effects of private land use on both public and private space. Therefore, the regulation of both the use of land, and the physical form of buildings became a widely accepted practice. Throughout New York City’s history, the proactive approach to regulation of land has created a hospitable environment for the creation of one of the world’s most important property markets. This shows that while the imposition by the government on the rights of private property owners is often viewed as a nuisance by developers today, the stability, predictability, and regularity they create is invaluable and necessary for the creation of a functional modern city.

In The Tenement House Problem, attorney Robert W. DeForest and social reformer Lawrence Veiller call the public’s attention to the corrupt speculative system of building tenement houses. DeForest and Veiller observe that while the landlord is commonly recognized as responsible for the evils of the tenement building, the deceitful behavior of the building loan operator and the speculative builder goes unnoticed by the general public. For DeForest and Veiller, corruption begins with the building loan operator, who buys up plots of land which he then sells to a speculative builder, lending a certain of cash for the erection of a building on that plot of land in addition to the loan for the land itself. This speculative builder then seeks a secure permanent loan from fiduciary institutions like trust and insurance companies wishing to invest their capital, as well as a purchaser for his building at the earliest possible convenience. However, because New York State has laws in place mandating that such institutions not loan their capital on real estate exceeding 50% of the value of the property, a practice evolves in which the builder has the property over-appraised at a false valuation which then allows him to obtain larger loans from these fiduciary institutions and side-step the restrictions of the law. This false valuation also affects the prospective purchaser of the building, who is left under the impression that the property is worth significantly more than it actually is. In yet another instance of deception, the speculative builder often fills up his building with tenants immediately upon its completion, signing bogus leases so that prospective purchasers believe large rentals can be earned from the building. When the prospective purchaser does purchase the building, he often learns the property is worth significantly less than its estimated value, and that it was built shoddily and sometimes even illegally using what is known as the “lumping system.”
          The authors wisely recommend instrumentalizing public knowledge against the building loan operator and speculative builder, suggesting that building law violations be made public to ward off prospective purchasers likely to be victimized by this process. “Publicity,” as Veiller and DeForest put it, “is the one thing the builder cannot stand.” In addition to dissuading prospective purchasers from buying such a building, exposing the public to the corrupt practices of these two figures also exposes their relative needlessness. After all, as the authors remind the reader several times over the course of the essay, “The building loan operator adds nothing to the value of the property.” He and the speculative builder are merely middlemen, and could be eliminated from the process entirely if investors built tenement houses directly with their own invested capital.
           By deflecting attention away from the landlord and toward higher echelons of real estate corruption, Veiller and Deforest attempt to inform the public of larger systemic injustices. While they assert that “the investor,” at whose expense the building loan operator and speculative builder both profit, “must be awakened to a knowledge of the existing facts,” I believe that the essay also functions to educate the general public toward larger wrongdoings. The landlord is such a familiar figure to the average New Yorker. This narrative of the “evil slum-lord” is a convenient one, partly because it provides tenants with a visible focal point for their frustrations and partly because the landlord is the major authoritative figure of a property with which a layman interacts from day to day. In actuality, processes of corruption begin with the speculative work of the building loan-operator and the builder, two figures with which the public is rarely acquainted. Their relative obscurity to the public is exactly what allows loan operators and speculative builders to continue to profit from harmful practices. Whereas the landlord is certainly not faultless in many of these situations, the public should realize that attributing all corruption to a rather marginal figure in the overall process only detracts attention away from the public harm done by speculative builders and loan-operators.