Abstract
Despite the bureaucracy’s central role in shaping how competing preferences are aggregated into policy, studies of trade policy have largely neglected its role. This paper argues interest group input can empower bureaucrats with more information, but it also leads to narrowly targeted interests increasingly gaining control over policy. This effect is mitigated by bureaucratic structures endowed with more independence and internal expertise, and which are less reliant on formalized channels of industry participation. I take advantage of WTO reports to construct a dataset that identifies all bureaucracies in charge of trade policy and categorize their structure across a panel of 135 countries and 20 years. The empirical test assesses the effect of bureaucracies on non-tariff barriers – a form of administered protection. I find that bureaucracies with apolitical expertise implement policies that are less protectionist than those that engage active industry participation, controlling for macroeconomic shocks and confounders for institutional design.